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This dissertation provides a study of gender processes in the maternal human rights 
movement of the Soldiers’ Mothers NGOs, which were created in the arena of the military 
draft politics in post-Soviet Russia. It also includes an analysis of the depoliticized and 
gendered civil society of the formalized NGOs, which provides a broader social context 
for the soldiers’ mothers’ movement. 
The dissertation is founded on a combination of ideas borrowed from three 
theoretical perspectives. First, the concept ‘woman’ is approached as an analytical and 
political category constructed through the social locations by gender, class, region and 
culture within the framework of a military nation-state. The conventional maternal 
femininity, ‘naturally’ linked with caring labor, is produced as a part of the modern 
nation-states’ ideologies of militarism and patriotic duty. Second, participants in social 
movements create an oppositional sub-universe of meaning and try to deintegrate from the 
dominant beliefs, social norms, and rules of feeling. Finally, gender processes affect the 
political opportunities, mobilizing structures and collective identity construction in social 
movements. The case study´s primary empirical material is 22 semi-structural qualitative 
interviews conducted in 2000-2005 with 17 members of two organizations of the Soldiers’ 
Mothers, located in two different large cities. In addition, a participant observation of 
these two organizations and a discourse analysis of 35 articles in the Russian press were 
carried out, as well as 36 interviews with members of other human rights NGOs in Russia.      
The impact of gender processes upon the Soldiers’ Mothers movement is analyzed in 
relation to three dimensions: institutional and ideological structures, mobilizing social and 
organizational resources, and collective identity framing. In the context of the ongoing 
4military operations and the depoliticizing trends in civil society, mothers of soldiers were 
supposed to work in the social service-oriented NGOs as a helpmate to the military 
officials. Through the rituals of storytelling and interactions with their allies and their 
constituency, the Soldiers’ Mothers activists have deintegrated from the mainstream 
norms of women’s civic duty. The goals of the Soldiers’ Mothers NGOs have been 
reframed by connecting the maternal frame with the counter-discursive rhetoric of human 
rights, rooted in the Soviet legacy of political dissent. The feelings of fear, shame and 
anxiety are managed, and solidarity, pride and hope are instilled among the activists and 
parts of their constituency. Challenging the post-Soviet traditionalist gender ideology, the 
activists create a more critical identity of soldier’s mothers based on an anti-draft/military 
ideology. This ideology varies among local civic groups, depending on their access to 
material, human and symbolic resources. Relying on informal social networks, the 
activists sustain the autonomous status of their groups. From the viewpoints of the local 
grassroots’, the Soldiers’ Mothers activists reframe the concept ‘gender’ in the elitist 
feminism imported by Western donors in the NGO sector. 
The key findings in this dissertation suggest different revisions and expansions of 
earlier empirical research of the Soldiers’ Mothers NGOs and development of theories of 
gendered social movements.  
Keywords: social movement, gender, civic activism, collective identity, women’s self-
organization, a Third Sector of NGOs, post-Soviet Russia, reframing, deintegration, 
emotional work.
5To my mother and in memory of my father
6
7Contents
Abbreviations 12
Acknowledgments 13
PART I INTRODUCTION, THEORIES, METHODS 15
Chapter 1 17
Introduction
NGOs and Women in Post-Soviet Russia 18
The Social Movement of the Soldiers’ Mothers NGOs 20
Gender Regime in the Arena of the Military Draft 22
Research Problem and Aim 24
Research Questions 24
Disposition 25
Chapter 2 27
Theoretical Perspectives
Introduction 27
1. The Positioning and Experiences of the ‘Woman’ 27
The Nation-State and the ‘Woman’ 28
Nation, Violence, and Gender 29
Women in the Political Sphere 31
2. Social Movements and Change of Identity 36
Reframing Social Reality 38
Injustice Frame 40
Deintegration and Breaching 40
Solidarity-Building and Self-Expansion 42
3. Gender in Women’s Movements 43
Maternal Movements and Symbol of Mother 44
The Construction of Transnational Feminism 46
Chapter 3 49
Data and Methods
Introduction 49
1. Data Collection 49
Sampling 49
Interviews 52
Participant Observation, and Field Relations 54
Documents 57
2. Analyses 58
Data, Theory, and Analytic Generalization 59
8Coding and Categorization 61
Discourse Analysis 64
3. Representation 66
4. Ethical Aspects 67
PART II CONTEXT: NGOs, GENDER ORDER, WOMEN’S NGOs IN RUSSIA
Chapter 4 71                          
The Sphere of Non-Governmental Organizations
Introduction 71
1. The Emergence of NGOs 71
The Dualistic Legacy of the Soviet Social Activism 72
Informal Groups and Independent NGOs 75
2. Size, Participants, and Conditions in the NGO-Sector 78
3. Post-Soviet Transformation and Civic Culture 82
Socio-Economic Grievances 82
Civic Culture 83
4. Human Rights NGOs and Civil Society 88
The Concept of Civil Society 90
Methods of Work and Experience of Isolation 91
Summary 94
Chapter 5 97
Interaction between NGOs and the State
Introduction
1. The Post-Soviet State and Political System 97
New Elites, Parties, and Mass Media 98
The ‘Stealth’ Authoritarianism 100
2. The Legal Status of NGOs 102
3. The Official Discourse of a Civil Society 105
4. The New Policy of the Non-Profit Sector 107
5. The NGOs’ Influence on the State 112
Summary 113
Chapter 6 115
Western Donors’ Gendered Interventions
Introduction
1. The Donors’ Neoliberal Gendered Agenda 115
Neoliberal Civil Society 116
The Feminized Third Sector 118
2. Formalization of Activism, Gaps, and Hierarchies 121
3. Learning, Empowerment, and Fragility 124
Summary 125
9Chapter 7 127
Post-Soviet Gender Order and Women’s Agency
Introduction
1. The Enforced Emancipation of Women 127
A Soviet Working Mother 129
A Chaste Mother of the Nation 130
2. The Post-Soviet “Privatized” Woman 133
‘Sexual Liberation’ Based on Traditional Roles 135
The Intersection of Gender, Class, and Nation 137
3. Women’s Daily Life Agency and Resistance 139
Summary 142
Chapter 8 143
Women’s NGOs and Feminism
Introduction
1. Types of Women’s NGOs 143
Former State Organizations Zhensovety 145
Groups of Feminist Intellectuals 146
2. Conditions for Organizing 148
Funding from Abroad 148
Women’s Attitudes toward Civic and Political Activism 149
3. Tensions and Negotiations 153
Global “Gender” and Transnational Negotiations 155
Summary 159
Part III CASE STUDY OF THE SOLDIERS’ MOTHERS NGOs 161
Chapter 9 163
A Brief History of the Soldiers’ Mothers NGOs
Introduction
Different SOMO Organizations 163
The Human Rrights SOMO NGOs during Perestroika 164
Anti-War Campaigning 166
Domestic and International Recognition 169
Chapter 10 171
The Arena of Military Draft Politics
Introduction
1. The Shift in the State Military Politics 171
The Soviet Tradition of Military Duty 172
2. Challenges to the Military Draft System 173
The Hazing System of Dedovschina 175
10
Social Discontent about the Military Duty 177
3. The Military Reforms 179
Summary 181
Chapter 11 183
Discursive Images of Soldier’s Mother in the Russian Press
Introduction
1. Ideological-Hegemonic Image of the Loyal Mother 183
Official Discursive Context 184
The Brave, Selfless, Patriotic Mother 187
2. The Counter-Discursive Image of Mother-Activist 191
Loving Mother and Party-Politics 193
3. The Legalist-Pragmatic Image of Mother-Expert 194
Summary 196
Chapter 12 197
Maternal Framing in the State Military Field
Introduction
1. Maternal Grievance and Advocacy 197
The Maternal Identity of Activist 198
Dear Little Boys - Acting on Behalf of Soldiers 201
2. Resources and Positioning in the NGO Field 208
“Own Horizontal” Organization 208
Maternal Framing and Material Resources 210
Gender and Socioeconomic Status 211
External Funding 213
Maternal Frame and Regional Differences 215
3. The “Others:” The Little Mother and the Military 217
Moving “from the Kitchen into Politics” 217
The Soviet Legacy and Compliant Femininity 218
Opposing the Military’s Maternal Frame 220
Summary 222
Chapter 13 223
Emotional Work in the Human Rights Community
Introduction
1. The Sub-Universe of the Human Rights Community 224
Confidence and Solidarity 224
Managing Fear among the Activists 229
Legal Help and Self-Expansion 233
2. Emotion Work among the Constituency 237
Recognizing Fear 238
Instilling Hope and Pride 241
Summary 242
11
Chapter 14 243
Creating a Grassroots Women’s Movement
Introduction
1. Making an Issue of Mother’s Needs 244
The Controversy over Dedovschina 245
Disidentifying from the Pro-State SOMO 249
2. “Courage” in the NGO Field 251
Resisting Formalization and Collusion 251
Resisting the “Civil Expertise” Structures 255
3. Creating Grassroots Women’s Feminism 257
Encounters with the Elitist Feminism 260
Bridging Feminist and Anti-Draft Frames
Summary 268
Chapter 15 269
Conclusions
Summary 279
References 287
12
Abbreviations
SOMO The Soldiers’ Mothers
HR  Human rights
NGO Non-governmental organization
CSM The Committee of the Soldiers’ Mothers
FOM Public Opinion Foundation (Russia)
IWF  The Independent Women’s Forum 
NIS-US The Newly Independent States and United States Women’s 
Consortium
NTV Independent Television Channel
SPS The Union of Right Forces 
TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
URW The Union of Russian Women
VGTRK All-Russia State Television and Radio Company
VTsIOM The All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion
13
Acknowledgements
Working on the research in this dissertation has been a remarkable journey filled with 
many insights, joys and hardships. This is the opportunity to express my gratitude to the 
people and institutions which made this endeavour possible. 
My deepest thanks go to my supervisors Per Månson and Nora Machado who 
encouraged and supported me in so many invaluable ways. Per Månson inspired by a 
profound knowledge and commitment to Russian studies. Nora Machado’s insightful, 
sensitive and steady guiding has been indispensable during the writing up of the 
dissertation.   
I thank all the Russian interviewees who took part in the study for being generous 
with their time, enthusiasm and trust. Many thanks go to the Russian social scientists I 
have consulted and learned from during my work: Olga Zdravomyslova, Grigory 
Zdravomyslov, Vadim Mezhuev, Natalia Kozlova, Elena Zdravomyslova, Anna Temkina, 
Oleg Kharkhordin, Vladimir Kostushev, Alexander Sungurov and many others.
I am indebted to Pr. Ulla Björnberg and Pr. Bengt Furåker from the Department of 
Sociology in University of Gothenburg who read the final manuscript and provided 
excellent criticism and advice. I am also very grateful to Pr. Tom R. Burns from the 
Department of Sociology in Uppsala University who read the manuscript and contributed 
with many perceptive words of advice. I want to thank Margareta Oudhuis, Ingrid Sahlin, 
Claire Wallace, Risto Alapuro, Sara Ashwin, Tova Höjdestrand, Sven-Åke Lindgren, 
Anna-Karin Kollind, Bengt Larsson, Håkan Thörn, Merete Hellum, Oksana Shmulyar, 
Iwona Sobis and Minoo Alinia for their support, inspiration and comments on the doctoral 
papers. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the Department of Technology and 
Society in University of Skövde, in particular Lars-Erik Berg, Anni Tysk and Nomie 
Eriksson for their support during the final phase of my work. I am grateful to my family
and my friends Arne Lange, Jadranka Andric and Richard Sobis for their understanding 
and support.              
Finally, much of this research was made possible because of the financial support 
from the Department of Sociology, University of Gothenburg, the Humanistic-Social 
Science Research Foundation (HSFR) and the Johnsson Foundation in Sweden. The 
14
sponsorship by Johnsson Foundation was made available due to the cooperation with the 
Centre for European Research at University of Gothenburg (CERGU) headed by Pr. 
Rutger Lindahl. 
15
PART I
INTRODUCTION, THEORIES, METHODS
16
17
Chapter 1
Introduction
We are like a bridge of justice between 
people and the power-holders. (Interview 
with a Soldiers’ Mothers activist)
The family is the most important focus of our 
movement. During the Soviet time we had a 
system; a woman was put in front of the 
factory machine and a man was sent to the 
war. But nobody cared about what happened 
to the family. (Interview with a Soldiers’ 
Mothers activist)
These quotes are taken from interviews with members of the human rights movement the 
Soldier’ Mothers (hereafter HR SOMO or SOMO), which I conducted in Russia during 
2000-2005. They reflect grassroots women’s concerns from the viewpoint of mothers and 
defenders of human rights. Human rights solidarity is based on the understanding of 
human beings’ frailty and the fact that citizenship is not an adequate mechanism for 
protecting individuals against a repressive or authoritarian state (Turner 1994: 182).      
Gender is a significant aspect of political activism, particularly in post-Soviet 
Russia. Women are generally more often involved in local community networks and 
groups of grassroots activism, while the official political institutions are predominately 
managed by men (Ferree and Merrill 2003). Female activists engage in creating networks, 
negotiating between different viewpoints, and challenging deep-rooted discourses. This 
involves organizing, creative thinking, and emotional investment. In the context of 
gendered1 politics, women’s grassroots activism and contribution to social change is often 
made invisible. In addition, it is not valued as highly as the institutional politics, in which 
social change may be envisioned through official speeches delivered from top down 
(ibid.). 
                                                 
1 To say that any “analytic unit is gendered means that advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, 
action and emotion, meaning and identity, are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and 
female, masculine and feminine” (Acker 1990: 146).
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In Russia, grassroots self-organizing in politics has a controversial status, due to the 
country’s history of authoritarian regimes and political repression. The Soviet voluntary 
associations were controlled and sponsored by the Communist Party and state. They 
acquired a dualist nature; the organizations were both supposed to realize the party’s goals 
and protect the members from the official administration (Evans, Jr., Henry and 
Sundstrom 2006). Through the turbulent democratic reforms in post-Soviet Russia, a 
sphere of non-governmental organizations (hereafter NGOs) was established, which 
allowed the creation of independent NGOs. By the late 1990s, a Third Sector of social 
service-oriented NGOs took form in Russia. It was a result of the formalization of the 
spontaneous socio-political activism that emerged during glasnost. Existing research 
shows that civic groups act in conditions of relative material scarcity, political uncertainty, 
and the population’s continued Soviet habits of activism and/or individualistic attitudes 
(Howard 2003; Diligensky 1998; Diligensky 2001).  
Implications of at least four factors are important for understanding the dynamics 
and contradictions in the sphere of NGOs in post-Soviet Russia. They include: 1) the 
Soviet tradition of counter-cultural resistance, such as the underground diffusion of 
forbidden print, songs, and the like, 2) the influential role of the state, 3) the interventions 
of foreign (Western) donors, and 4) the reshaping of gender order and of the historical 
relationship between the socialist state and women as a collective actor. 
NGOs and Women in Post-Soviet Russia
Civil society in post-communist societies is often discussed in social research as if it is
created from scratch. However, the complicated legacy of counter-culture, the “second 
society,” and informal social networks were activated and reshaped in the processes of 
post-Soviet change (Gal and Kligman 2000; Alapuro and Lonkila 2000; Temkina 1997). 
For example, the Soviet human rights dissidents formulated a local concept of human 
rights, which was interrelated with the idea of social justice based on the ‘rule of law.’  
Human rights NGOs draw upon and develop these ideas in their concrete work.
The role of the state in the NGO sector has evolved during the 1990s and the early 
2000s. The ‘benign negligence’ towards the NGOs by President Yeltsin’s administration 
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was transformed into a policy of intervention in the voluntary sector and ‘vigilance’ 
towards the critical NGOs during Putin’s presidency in the 2000s. These changes and their 
impact on the activities of civic groups’ have only begun to be examined in social 
research (Henderson 2008).        
Western donors’ democracy aid, which was offered to new post-communist players 
in the post-Cold War world of market economy and democracy, has played an ambiguous 
role in shaping the Russian civil society and the NGO sector. The Third Sector was 
shaped according to a neoliberal model promoted by Western foundations. According to 
this developmental model, the state has to step back from public arenas, while the ‘civil 
society’ of the non-profit organizations is crucial for developing market economy and 
democracy (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Hemment 2007). Social activism became 
increasingly formalized. The unintended effects included the importing of
“mainstreamed” feminism that was insensitive to local cultures, bureaucratization, and 
(re)production of social hierarchies and animosities among the NGOs, which gained 
unequal access to funding. At the same time, transnational activist networks brought new 
vocabulary, organizational technologies, and valuable social resources to Russia, which 
were creatively appropriated by the activists.   
Gender order started to shift in Russia during the 1980s. The traditional relationship 
between the socialist state and women was restructured in the post-Soviet society. Among 
other things, women became increasingly involved in and associated with the Third Sector 
of the social service NGOs. The concept civil society, which was politicized in the
democratic movements during President Gorbachev’s glasnost, has been reinterpreted
with the emergence of a formalized civil society. In the late 1990s, the shift from ‘civil
society versus state’ to the ‘Third Sector with the state’ was related to defining civic 
activity as feminine (Salmenniemi 2005: 747; Gal and Kligman 2000). Women were
supposed to work in the social sector of NGOs as a helpmate of the state, not as political 
activists. The civic sphere turned “into a sphere of care where women bear the social costs 
of the transformation” (Salmenniemi 2005: 748). 
However, different groups of women-activists respond and adjust to this context in
different ways. A range of independent women’s NGOs emerged. Many of them aimed at 
resolving concrete social issues, such the Soldiers’ Mothers groups, or were formed as 
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self-help groups of single mothers, professionals, and others. A network of explicitly
feminist organizations was created mainly by female intellectuals.        
Social movements are embedded in the local gendered landscapes and they have to 
be understood within the context of local histories. Existing studies of civic NGOs and 
women’s movements in Russia focus on many different aspects (see Evans, Jr. et al. 2006; 
Sperling 1999). In post-communist civil societies, subject positions which were 
traditionally available to women, are: “worker-recipient of Communist entitlements”, 
“naturalized, sexualized private being of civil society,” “the sacred and inert mother of 
nationhood” (Gal 1997: 43). The emergence of the women’s movement involves a process 
through which the traditionally limited range of subject positions available to women is 
challenged and transformed. Political identity includes a position of “an independent 
subject whose interests and issues can be publicly defined and debated” (ibid.).  
The SOMO NGOs have been studied in earlier research as a case of the maternal 
movement (Caiazza 2002). Maternal movements emerged in different places such as 
Argentina, San Salvador, Israel, Ireland, and many others. These movements express 
‘female consciousness,’ based on the idea that women’s role as mothers is primary and 
that mothers will go to any lengths to protect their children. This kind of consciousness is 
also rooted in combating oppressive living conditions. Female consciousness may be a 
crucial political resource for women’s organizations in countries with authoritarian 
regimes or/and during transitions when other kinds of resources are limited. They can 
build popular support and they mobilize other women to activism (ibid.: 115, 116). 
However, the SOMO may be understood not only as a maternal movement, but also 
as a movement linked to the Soviet legacy of dualist voluntary organizations and counter-
cultural movements, as well as to transnational women activist networks. I approach the 
NGOs of the Soldiers’ Mothers as a broader phenomenon, which includes several
interrelated dimensions; it may be viewed as maternal, human rights, and a women’s 
movement embedded in the complex context of the post-Soviet NGO sector. 
The Social Movement of the Soldiers’ Mothers NGOs
In post-Soviet Russia, military service in the conscription army became a source of 
personal grievances and political contests. Since the 1980s, hundreds of self-help and 
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protest groups were created by mothers of soldiers who were missing in Afghanistan, 
Chechnya, or who had been abused and killed in the military barracks during peace time. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, SOMO were established in different regions of Russia, some of 
which were actively engaged in the politics of the military draft. Between three and five 
thousand soldiers in the Russian army die each year in times of peace, because of 
beatings, harassment leading to suicide and dreadful living conditions. In the 1990s, 
which was a period of political instability and many violent conflicts, many young men 
tried to avoid the military service by hiding from or bribing officials in the local military 
draft commissions (Caiazza 2002; Sundstrom 2006a, 2006b; Kay 2006). The voluntary 
groups of soldiers’ mothers articulate women’s concerns and agency related to the 
masculinized arena of the Russian army.
The activists receive tens of thousands of requests for help every year. They arrange 
help for soldiers who are experiencing abuse and for those who were drafted illegally 
despite medical problems. In the courts of law, the activists defend conscientious 
objectors, whom the military believe are trying to avoid service. They also initiated a 
consideration of a draft law on alternative service in the Supreme Soviet. In 1990, they 
proposed to abolish the compulsory conscription and built public support for the idea of a 
professional army, which met a strong resistance from the military (Sundstrom 2006a,
2006b).         
The SOMO is a heterogeneous movement; it includes separate organizations as well 
as loose networks. Voluntary groups of soldiers’ mothers cover nearly every region in 
Russia. The largest association of groups is the Union of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers 
of Russia, whose headquarters are located in Moscow and which includes around three 
hundred branch organizations. Some of them are less radical; they demand that soldiers 
receive proper food and clothes during service and social entitlements after their service is 
completed. Other groups are more radical, such as the SOMO in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg which demand human rights protection and lobby for military reform. There 
are also government sponsored groups of Soldiers’ Mothers which mainly visit and 
distribute gifts among soldiers (Zdravomyslova 1999; Sundstrom 2006a, 2006b; Caiazza 
2002; Oushakine 2004).
The SOMO provide local self-help, empowerment of mothers and soldiers, and 
pressure central political decision-makers (Zdravomyslova 1999; Caiazza 2002;
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Hinterhuber 2001; Sundstrom 2006a, 2006b; Hojer 2004; Sperling 2003; Oushakine
2004). Both activists and social researchers stress that like many other grassroots 
initiatives in Russia, the SOMO have been “pushed aside of political life” (Petukhov
2002: 62). The political effects of social movements should, however, also be assessed 
from the perspective of their ‘routine’ transformative social practices which include 
challenging conventional societal norms, values, and subjectivities (see Hojer 2004;
Hinterhuber 2001).  
The women-activists´ opportunities for social movements are shaped and limited 
within the gendered social arena of the military draft politics in Russia.
Gender Regime in the Arena of the Military Draft 
Critical research examines the exercise of power and dominance by focusing on the 
complex network of structural relations, institutional arenas, and human agency (de los 
Reyes and Mulinari 2005). The construction of gender identity in social movements needs 
to be studied in relation to the gender order in a given society and the gender regime2 in a 
particular institutional sphere (Taylor 1999). Members of the SOMO forge their female 
identities in the sphere of political culture within the particular spatial and historical 
context of post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s and the early 2000s. In addition, femininities 
are produced, negated and negotiated within the sphere of the state’s military politics. The 
gender identities of men and women are crucial for the states’ ability to maintain the 
military armies. In Russia, motherhood and the symbol of the mother of a soldier have
been central in the state’s ideology and the policies encouraging certain kinds of female 
and male behaviors.3
While in modern states, the role of citizen-soldier and citizen-speaker in political 
debate are constructed as masculine, female citizens are constructed through the feminine 
role of the biological reproducer of the nation, unremunerated chidlrearer, and transmitter
of culture (Yuval-Davies 1997; Fraser 1989: 128). Mothering seems to be linked to life 
and non-violent action and be opposed to war and death. Sara Ruddick (1989: 84) stresses,
                                                 
2 Gender regime refers to the “state of play of gender relations in a given institution” (Connell 1987: 120).
3 The symbolic meaning of the mother of a soldier in the contemporary Russian socio-cultural context is 
analyzed in more detail in chapter 11.   
23
however, that the masculinity of war is a myth which sustains both women and men’s 
support for military violence. The state-military institutions are supported and sustained 
through a gendered discourse about the masculine soldier and the self-sacrificing mother. 
Sara Ruddick (ibid.) explains that through the maternal framework of a culture of war,
women participate in the nation state wars as mothers, wives, and lovers. There is no 
‘natural’ coupling between femininity and the peace movement, although it can be 
constructed through the efforts and inventiveness of women movement activists (Ruddick 
2004; Yuval-Davis 1997). 
In the Soviet gender politics of motherhood, the role of ‘a dutiful mother’ was 
projected into the public sphere as a symbolic model that represented political and social 
conformity (Novikova 2000: 122). The mass conscript army was perceived as a collective 
body through a family metaphor of Soviet power. Through the maternal symbol “the 
Soviet ideology made war the standard for connecting gender behavior, language and 
reproduction of national identity” (ibid.). The “warlike desire to build “peace” worldwide” 
was rooted in the image of a Soviet soldier-liberator, not a single warrior but a collective 
hunter-breadwinner (ibid.: 123). Soldiers were both agents and victims of the political 
system; men learned to be “eternal soldiers” who had to “bring liberty” whenever the 
Soviet system demanded it (ibid.: 124). This image of soldier-liberator collapsed with the 
dissolution of the Soviet empire and the military failures in Afghanistan and Chechnya. In 
addition, the ‘masquerade’ of female political agency created by the Soviet rhetoric of 
gender equality turned into a more open neo-patriarchal gender climate (Novikova 2000; 
Liljeström 1995). For example, after the Soviet gender quotas in the political 
representative institutions were removed, women have been under-represented in the post-
Soviet legislatures. Politics is commonly perceived as a primarily male activity (Kay 
2000). 
At the same time, active civic groups of men and women emerged, which demanded
more openness and public debate in the sphere of state military draft politics. But this 
sphere still remains relatively closed in relation to civil society and the predominately 
masculine and male-ordered sphere (Caiazza 2002; Khramchikhin 2004).
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Research Problem and Aim 
Along with the implosion of the Soviet system, groups of mothers of conscript soldiers 
joined together and established independent NGOs as places for articulating their social 
grievances. Women’s articulation of the needs of soldiers and mothers is a moment in the 
self-constitution of a new collective agent. One of the effects of the SOMO movement is 
the transformation of women’s self-identities. Mothers of soldiers are transformed from 
‘brave victims’ to ‘activists’ of the civil society. The movement thus challenges the 
prevailing cultural codes (Melucci 1996) of national, political and gender orders. The 
activists try to create an oppositional sub-universe of meaning, feeling, and identity (Flam 
2000), through which the meanings ascribed to mothers’ membership in the political 
community are reframed.
This study’s main research problem is how and why the identity of a civic activist is 
enacted, interpreted, and reframed as a result of an oppositional sub-universe of meaning, 
produced in the maternal movement of the HR SOMO NGOs within the gendered arena of
military draft politics in Russia of the early 2000s. 
The aim of the case study of the HR SOMO NGOs is to understand and explain the 
experiences of women activists in the context of the feminized Third Sector of NGOs in 
post-Soviet Russia. Through this analysis, the study aims to contribute to a gender-
theoretical perspective on maternal social movement in the context of NGOs in post-
Soviet society.   
Research Questions 
Questions explored in the thesis are: 
1. In which historical, material, symbolic, and organizational contexts in the Russian 
Third Sector of NGOs is the SOMO social movement created and sustained? In 
which ways is the Third Sector feminized? 
2. In which socio-political and discursive context in the arena of the state military 
draft politics is the SOMO social movement formed and sustained? 
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3. How and why are the SOMO’s civic identity and strategies of delivering service to 
their constituency framed through a narrative of mothering? How is the ‘injustice 
frame’ constituted? How does ‘maternal’ framing interact with the SOMO groups’ 
positioning through gender, socioeconomic status, and regional location? How is 
the military’s construction of ‘social mothering’ in the Third Sector of NGOs
opposed by the activists? How do the activists challenge cultural codes of national 
and gender order in the political sphere?
4. How and why do the SOMO activists establish social/organizational ties with the
human rights activists’ community? How do the SOMO try to reframe the 
collective identity of the mothers of soldiers through emotional work? How do the 
activists maintain solidarity with the larger community of mothers through routine 
interactions? What are the limits of this solidarity, due to differences in ideologies 
and personal lifestyles? How is the constituency encouraged to overcome 
demobilizing feelings of fear, resignation, and cynicism? How are women able to 
produce a new, more assertive and critical, collective identity?
5. How do the SOMO articulate the needs of soldiers and mothers and oppose the 
entrenched gendered discourses in the pro-government SOMO organizations in the 
NGO sector? Why and how do the activists disidentify from the styles of some 
human rights NGOs and feminist NGOs in the political arena? How and why do 
they renegotiate their perceptions of the party-political sphere? How do they 
reinterpret the concept of “gender inequality” from a perspective of grassroots 
women’s anti-military and/or anti-draft human rights movement?
Disposition
The thesis consists of three parts. Part I includes the chapters on introduction, theoretical 
perspectives and methods. The introduction presents the background of the study, the aim, 
the research problem, and research questions. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical 
framework which guides the understanding and interpretation of the empirical materials in 
the case study. Chapter 3 describes data and methods by which materials were collected, 
analyzed, and represented, as well as ethical aspects. 
Based mainly on secondary sources, Part II presents historical, material, symbolic, 
and organizational contexts within the Third Sector of NGOs in Russia. It also describes 
changes in gender order. Chapter 4 explains how the sphere of NGOs is constructed by 
activists’ groups based on the Soviet historical legacy in post-Soviet Russia. Chapter 5 
describes interaction between NGOs and the state. Chapter 6 describes the effects of 
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gendered interventions in the sphere of Russian NGOs by Western donors who offered 
democracy assistance. 
Chapter 7 includes a brief history and a contemporary scene of gender order and 
women’s positioning in Russia. It discusses changes in gender order and the role of the 
state in constructing femininities and masculinities. Chapter 8 describes the types of 
women’s NGOs and the relationships between them. It explains that women’s NGOs are 
shaped within the material and symbolic framework of the Third Sector. The gendered 
framing of civic activism as more moral and socially oriented than the male-dominated 
political institutions is partly reproduced and partly challenged in different women’s 
groups
Part III presents the case study of two HR SOMO NGOs. Chapter 9 presents a brief 
history of the emergence and main directions of the SOMO groups’ activity. Chapter 10 
presents the historical, political, and social context in the arena of the state´s military draft 
politics. Chapter 11 includes an analysis of discursive representations of Soldiers’ 
Mothers /soldier’s mother in the Russian press, based on discourse analysis of thirty five 
articles from national and regional newspapers of different orientations. 
Chapters 12, 13 and 14 present analyses of the interviews and activists’ documents. 
Chapter 12 explains how maternal identity construction is related to the framing of the 
social problem of the military draft around which the SOMO mobilize in interactions with 
the state military authorities. It also shows that the SOMO’s maternal frame interacts with 
the activists’ social positioning through gender, socio-economic status, and geographical 
center-periphery location. Chapter 13 examines the human rights framing and emotional 
work associated with it in the SOMO. Chapter 14 examines why and how the SOMO 
activists start to identify with the Russian and transnational women’s movement and 
decide to create their own political party. The chapter examines how the SOMO create
grassroots women’s movement in the context of the partly bureaucratized and 
depoliticized NGO field. 
Chapter 15 presents the main findings in the case study of the HR SOMO NGOs in 
post-Soviet Russia. It discusses how the results contribute to the existing empirical 
research of this movement and to gender-theoretical perspective on social movement with 
focus on the institutional context of NGOs in post-communist society.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Perspectives
Introduction
This chapter presents the set of ideas and notions that are guiding my analysis and a 
discussion of women’s collective action produced in the male-dominated and 
masculinized arena of military draft politics in Russia. 
My theoretical framework combines ideas and concepts borrowed mainly from three 
theoretical spheres: Firstly, theories of gender construction explain that the endurance of 
gender inequality and of women’s subordination is the result of multilevel processes of 
social embodiment within the context of a historically distinct gender order within the 
nation state and political regimes. Secondly, I combine the structuralist and cultural-
constructivist approaches to social movement. Social movements are defined as agents of 
social change concerned with transforming subaltern groups and identities. Collective 
action comprises cognitive, emotional, and normative dimensions; and movements 
emerge when forms of social oppression may be recognized and alternative versions of 
social reality and self-identity may be produced and sustained. Thirdly, gender is one of 
the important explanatory factors in the emergence, course and outcomes of social 
movements. 
I begin by presenting the concepts which explain how social positioning and an 
analytical and political category of “woman” is produced in the society, nation-state, and 
political sphere. Further, I clarify a set of notions from social movement theories which 
have been applied in my empirical analysis. Finally, some central aspects of gender 
processes in women’s social movements are discussed.  
1. The Positioning and Experiences of the ‘Woman’  
In my study, I approach the category ‘woman’ as an analytical and political category 
(Mohanty 2003: 26) designed and sanctioned within the hegemonic frameworks of 
national (state) order and political regime.  The most cultural and ideological support in 
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contemporary society is given to the pattern of femininity which is organized as an 
adaptation to men’s power and emphasizes compliance, nurturing, and empathy as 
womanly virtues (Connell 1987: 187). However, relationships of domination between men 
and women have different effects. Women cannot be viewed as a singular group based on
a shared oppression. There is no universal ahistoric patriarchal power structure. Particular 
groups of women can be constituted as more or less “powerless” through specific material 
and ideological processes in a particular context (Mohanty 2003: 26; Lorber 1994; McNay 
2000). Women are constituted as women through a complex interaction between class, 
sexuality, race, generation, culture, religion, and other ideological institutions and 
frameworks across different sites in space and time (Skeggs 1997). One of the important 
aspects in the construction of the category ‘woman’ is the role of the modern nation state.
The national/militaristic state devises and constrains gendered identities of citizens.
The Nation-State and the ‘Woman’
The nation state has historically been represented as a center of men’s action. Men 
dominate the law, military, the police, the civil service, the state machinery, parliaments 
and autocracies, which ‘award’ suffrage to women (Hearn and Parkin 2001: 39). The state 
has been continuously based on the assumption, influence, and power of the heterosexual, 
married male collective subject (ibid.: 40). States may be characterized as heterosexual 
and heterosexist. Men and women’s relationships to citizenship, state and nation are 
different. They have been differently located and positioned as citizens, politicians, 
fathers/mothers, welfare recipients and so on. Men are usually positioned as controllers of 
the state, the dominant group in reproduction of political regimes, as adult male citizens 
(ibid.). 
The sexual division of labor assigns women the primary responsibility for the care of 
children, sick/elderly relatives, as well as of all who are unable to care for themselves. 
Women are assigned the role of unpaid caregivers (Fraser 1989: 148). They are also 
usually associated with the role of biological reproducer of nation and culture transmitter. 
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Nation, Violence, and Gender
One aspect of the ideologically supported version of femininity is the responsibility to 
represent the nation. In the modern state, men and women’s relationships to the nation are 
constructed as a complex relationship between “country (space), state (political, legal, and 
administrative authority) and nation (culture and ideology)” (Hearn and Parkin 2001: 40). 
Women are viewed as reproducers of the nation and are given the social role of inter-
generational transmitters of cultural traditions (Yuval-Davis 1997). The behavior of 
women may also be seen as signifying the ethnic and cultural boundaries. The gender 
ideologies of femininity and masculinity may therefore be used for implementing 
nationalist projects and building the nation-state (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). A trope
of the nation-as-woman is widespread in many cultures and “depends for its 
representational efficacy on a particular image of woman as chaste, dutiful, daughterly or 
maternal” (Parker et al. 1992: 6). At the same time, nationalism favors a homosocial form 
of male bonding and the nation is represented as a passionate brotherhood: “It is this 
fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of 
people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Benedict 
Anderson, cited in ibid.: 6). However, the nation distinguishes its proper homosexuality 
from sexual male-male relations; women are enshrined as the Mother, a trope of ideal 
femininity, a female who secures male-male arrangements: “Motherhood is idealized by 
the virile fraternity” (ibid.).
Violence is an essential part and a condition for membership in the nation-state.  
Men’s, and in a different way women’s, relationship to the state, country and nation, has 
been mediated by the performance/control of violence. It is involved in the construction 
of, obedience to, and the breaking of, the law, the commitment to defend the country, and 
to the institution of compulsory conscription. In many ways, the modern state has become 
a major controller and producer of violence, injury, fear, torture, and death. Men dominate 
in these individual and collective actions (Hearn and Parkin 2001: 41, 42). The power of 
the military-industrial complex and the almost complete exclusion of women from the 
major policy-making centers are related. Militarist beliefs and practices are supported by 
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an ideology which connects masculinity, physical toughness, authority, and technological 
violence (see Connell 1987: 109).4
Militarism and wars are not, however, exclusively made by men. Ruddick (1989: 84) 
stresses that the masculinity of war is a myth that sustains both women and men in their 
support for violence. Most men participate in campaigns which they do not design or 
often do not comprehend. Soldiers who engage in combat are usually very young men. 
Many are conscripted; others fight to escape the intolerant conditions of civilian life. “If 
men were so eager to be fighters, we would not need drafts, training in misogyny, and 
macho heroes, nor would we have to entice the morally sensitive with myths of patriotic 
duty and just cause” (ibid.). Many women support the military engagements of their sons, 
lovers, friends, and mates. Like men, women usually justify their militarism in terms of 
loyalty, patriotism, and legal rights and duty. While some women are militarists and 
others view war as a natural catastrophe, they delegate political judgments to leaders and 
do not try to understand these judgments. Mothers often construe their military service in 
maternal terms: “We had to back our boys” (Ruddick 1989: 87). They often argue that in a 
time of crisis, they could not “foster dissension within a family or community whose 
connectedness it has been their responsibility to sustain” (ibid.; see also Forcey 1994). 
This study applies these concepts to explaining how the category ‘woman’ is 
constructed within the hegemonic frameworks of national/militaristic (state) order to 
analyze why and how the movement of the Soldiers’ Mothers in Russia reproduce or/and 
challenges the conventional pattern of femininity that is dominant in the sphere of military 
draft politics. 
Another analytical approach applied in my study concerns the way in which 
institutional politics is distinguished from the voluntary groups’ activism and perceived as 
a predominately masculine arena.
                                                 
4 A concept of human rights solidarity has been developed as an important supplement to a theory of citizenship 
and a crucial resource for the protection of individuals against state violence. Turner (1994: 183) rather than 
starting from the idea of rational and aggressive Hobbesian man, suggests perceiving the human body as frail 
and dependent because of ageing, diseases, danger, and scarcity (see also Yuval-Davis 1997). 
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Women in the Political Sphere 
Defining the Political
The boundaries between voluntary activism and that of political parties may be defined 
differently. The concept voluntary association describes a variety of formalized and loose 
networks and multiple motivations of voluntary responsibility for fulfilling tasks related to 
the organization of collective common life (see Joas 1996: 256; Dekker and Uslaner 
2001). In some studies, political institutions and social movements are viewed as part of a 
single public political field which includes political institutions, contentious politics and 
social movements, and communication media (McAdam 2001). Other theorists argue that 
a civil society including social movements, non-government organizations, and 
grassroots’ initiatives refers to efforts to influence political debate and decision-making. 
They focus on the limits and the opportunities to connect the grassroots, different arenas 
in the public sphere, and the organized actors in civil society on the one side and the 
constitutional state or the rule of law on the other (Delanty 2002). My study reworks this 
discussion from a gender-theoretical perspective.   
The line between party-politics and grassroots’ activism or social movements is 
frequently gendered. Both institutions and social movements are important for explaining 
how social change occurs. However, due to the relative separation of institutional politics 
and social movements as two entirely different fields of study, institutional politics tends
to be studied in terms of effects of social policies and social movements in terms of their 
origins and organizations (Ferree and Merrill 2003: 257). Women are more likely to be
politically active on the grassroots level. Social research shows that women in many 
countries are involved in non-institutionalized politics including self-help groups, protests, 
and women’s associations (Bystydzienski 1992; Bystydzienski and Sekhon 1999). The 
work women do involves skills with regard to networking, bridging and organizing 
people. This type of political activity tends to be overlooked by a framework in which 
politics is defined as a typically male activity (Ferree and Merrill 2003). The gendering of 
the political in terms of a male-dominated sphere makes the formal hierarchal authority 
more visible than influence exercised in lateral networks. Top-down speeches is valued 
more than organizational bridge-building. The styles and content of discourses produced 
at the grassroots level also appear different. For example, researchers found, that women 
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who were active in community groups argued that what they did was “not politics” but 
“work for their communities.” Using the language of party politics was consequently 
controversial for them (ibid.). 
The terms “political” and “politics” have been contested. Some feminists have 
reformulated the definition of politics, rejecting the idea of a distinct political sphere. 
They stressed that “personal” institutions such as childrearing and housework also have 
political dimensions (Abbott et al. 2005: 307). The very division between public and 
private is a patriarchal idea used to exclude women and women’s concerns from politics 
(ibid.: 306; Pateman 1988; Mouffe 1992). The state ‘creates’ the division between the 
public/political and private and women’s concerns are relegated to the sphere of
family/private life. In this case study, the analysis of how groups of women-activists 
started to perceive themselves as political subjects, rather than as only mothers linked to 
the family sphere, is based on the definition of “political” in democratic theory. This 
definition was developed further by Nancy Fraser (1989). 
Fraser (1989: 166) states that the term “political” includes at least two meanings:
First, a matter is considered “political” if it is handled in the institutions of official 
governmental system, including parliaments and administrative apparatuses. In this sense, 
“economy” and “family” are viewed as outside the official political system, although they 
are actually buttressed and regulated by it. Second, democratic theory defines something 
as “political” if it is contested across different discursive arenas and among different 
publics. The politicized is contrasted with what is not contested in public or is only 
contested within specialized or segmented publics. In democratic theory, though not 
always in practice, a matter does not become subject to state intervention unless it has 
been debated in a wide range of public arenas. Inspired by Fraser (1989), I approach the 
political sphere as being constituted through the coexistence, overlap and struggle 
between three kinds of discourses which interpret the needs and interests of social groups: 
oppositional, depoliticizing, and expert discourses. 
Three Kinds of Discourses on Needs and Interests
Oppositional forms of discourse arise when needs are interpreted “from below.” These 
forms contribute to the emergence of new social identities on the part of subordinated 
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groups. Needs are politicized through oppositional discourses. For example, women, 
workers, and people of color can come together and contest the subordinate identities and 
the reified and disadvantageous interpretation of needs. These groups insist on speaking 
publicly of previously depoliticized needs for which they claim legitimate political status. 
These groups achieve several things: They contest the established boundaries separating 
“politics” from “economics” and “domestics.” They offer alternative interpretations of 
their needs. They create new discourse publics from which they disseminate their 
interpretations of their needs.  Fraser (ibid.: 171) stresses that in oppositional discourses, 
talking about needs is a moment of self-constitution of new collective agents, or social 
movements. For example, feminist groups have instituted new vocabularies and become 
“women” in a different sense. 
The politicization of needs in the oppositional discourse is resisted by powerful 
organized interests who shaped the hegemonic interpretation of needs to suit their own 
purposes. They might resist the discourses of social movements by defending the 
established boundaries that separate “political,” “economic” and “domestic” spheres. For 
example, they may insist that domestic battery is not a legitimate subject of political 
discourse but a familial matter. It is a depoliticizing discourse (ibid.: 172).            
Another axis of political struggles is concerned with the battle between oppositional 
social movements and the experts in the orbit of the social state. Once the issue of contest 
is accepted as a political issue, competing interpretations of the issue emerge. The struggle 
for hegemonic interpretation of needs point towards the involvement of the state. The 
concern here is politics versus administration. Expert discourses are the ways in which
politicized needs are translated into objects of potential state intervention. They are 
connected with institutions of knowledge production, including social science discourses, 
legal discourses and administrative discourses (ibid.: 173). Expert discourses tend to be 
restricted to specialized publics. They are associated with professional class formation, 
institution building, and social “problem solving.” The politicized need is redefined as the 
correlate of a bureaucratically administrable satisfaction, a “social service.” By virtue of 
this administrative rhetoric, expert needs discourses tend to be de-politicizing as well. 
Sometimes, however, social movements manage to co-opt or create oppositional segments 
of expert discourse publics. Expert discourse publics then acquire certain porousness.
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Expert discourses become the bridge discourse that connects social movements with the 
state (ibid.: 174). 
The practical work of “social service” is low-paid and low-status jobs in the social 
care institutions and is frequently done by women. Women perform these types of 
“caring” jobs despite the low pay and status, because it is important for the formation of
the gendered identity, of femininity. However, such work frequently involves the 
exploitation of women’s nurturing as activities and emotions are tacitly assumed as 
‘natural’ propensities stemming from the realm of instincts. The burdens and strains 
associated with caregiving are not addressed in the public debate (Hopkins et al. 2005: 
124). 
Feminists argue that “malestream” research, male-dominated trade unions and 
political parties have a certain definition of what counts as a political, which excludes 
much of women’s expertise and political concerns. Feminists demonstrate that the ‘male 
as the norm’ operates in political and social analysis; distinctions between “political” and 
“social” or “moral” are based on arbitrary criteria that are connected to gender. Although 
women do participate in political parties and trade unions, many are alienated from 
politics and excluded by the domination of men in organizations (Abbott et al. 2005: 306). 
Women’s political activities and concerns are marginalized and “hidden from history”
(ibid.). Their expertise and concerns are kept out of public politics as their experiences 
differ from those of men. For example, women may be more likely to be affected by cuts 
in public expenditures in education, health, and community care. Women’s lives, as 
Dorothy Smith argued, are more closely linked with the concrete reality. Men may have 
abstract theories on education and health care, but women take the children to school and 
to the doctor (Smith 2004; Abbott et al. 2005: 305).    
In this study the concepts about women’s positioning help to analyze the activists’ 
ambiguous relationship towards the sphere of state politics and strategies, which challenge
their exclusion from the policy making arenas. Another set of concepts regarding why and 
how women’s alienation from state politics tends to be reproduced focuses on the role of 
emotions in producing subordinated positioning.  
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‘Silenced’ Positioning and Emotions
There is an ‘emotional link’ between power and self-sense (Flam 2008; Kemper 1990). 
Emotions may be understood as social, cultural and political constructs (Hochschild 
1979). Particular patterns of emotions are produced and attached to individuals as a result 
of social positioning, inclusions or/and exclusions from certain social arenas. Collins 
(1990) states that positioning relative to micro patterns of power will result in high or low 
emotional energy. Thomas Scheff (2007, 2008) approaches people as motivated by 
maintaining or enhancing their standing in the eyes of other people. People’s conforming 
to social norms may be explained as a consequence of their pursuit of social standing. 
While social inclusion results in a feeling of pride, shame and embarrasement are the 
result of social exclusion. Pride and shame are viewed as central aspects of social order.  
The dominant keep the dominated locked in a state of collective ‘humiliation.’ A 
self-defeating emotion of shame arises when the dominated perceive themselves through 
the eyes of the dominant. The dominated become silenced when they internalize the 
outsider views of themselves although their sense of self-pride or indignity at what is 
happening to them does not disappear (Flam and Beauzamy 2008). Individuals in 
subordinated position are devaluated and perceived as morally unaccountable. They lack 
resources to make their standards of self-realization recognized (Flam 2008). Individuals 
and groups may hence be kept in positions of subordination through exclusion, prevailing 
emotions of shame and embarrassment, as well as by low levels of emotional energy.
Two types of habitus develop and are cultivated in the political realm: the self-
assured speakers and the insecure, worthless-feeling listeners (ibid.). Girls and women 
may be alienated from politics, because they have been socialized into ‘silence.’ 
According to Pierre Bourdieu (1987, in Flam 2008), individuals from lower social classes 
and women often choose “I do not know” as an answer to questions concerning politics in 
national surveys.  Their silence may be rooted in a deep feeling that they have no right, 
political power or the necessary education to speak about political issues compared to men 
with higher education. Women are silenced through gender and class habitus. They are 
taught that their command of the language and their viewpoints are inferior and that they 
should listen to those who are more articulate and better informed. They are taught to feel 
insecure (ibid.). 
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   When the silenced “I” feels ambivalent, and pulled between anger and shame, 
cultures of dissent and social movements play the role of a buffer. They help the process 
of trans-valuation and overcoming the perceived emotional ambivalence. They reinforce 
the feeling of anger while suppressing the feeling of shame or fear (Flam 2008; Jasper 
1998). Research on dissidents supports the view that angry, deeply moral, self-assured “I” 
often sustained by peers, community or social movements, retain their voice and thus the 
capacity to act after a trauma. The conformist “I” – whether on the side of the victim or
the predator – becomes silenced, and its memory is fragmented (Flam 2008). Self-
confidence and a sense of moral superiority are necessary prerequisites of critical action 
(Kleres 2005).  
This study, examines how gender structures enable and circumscribe the efforts of 
NGO activists to transform the ‘silenced’ positioning of mothers of conscript soldiers
through collective action. The following section presents a set of notions deployed for the
analysis of contemporary social movements.  
2.  Social Movements and Change of Identity 
The way in which movements are formed and evolve depends on the issue of protest and 
the larger social context which shapes them. No general theory of social movements is 
applicable to any movement in a variety of contexts. Contemporary social movements 
may be seen as collective actions organized in the form of loose networks, groups or 
organizations, whose agents share a certain basic conception of the world and feel 
solidarity with one another. Participants find themselves in conflict with the established 
system within a certain social area in which they act, express their protest, and try to bring 
about social change. Broadly defined, social change refers to the transformation of 
institutions and individual beliefs among the movement’s supporters and the larger 
society. Protest actions and collective identities established by movements endure for 
some time. Social movements occur either outside the established channels for expressing 
grievances or use existing channels in innovative ways (della Porta and Diani 2006;
Melucci 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 2003). 
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A social movement may be viewed as a form of ‘action space’ which a) is related to 
a social conflict b) is a utopian context related to the intention and action towards 
transcending the existing social order c) is constituted and integrated through 
communicative praxis, in which a certain tense world view is created and expressed not 
only through written and spoken manifestations but also through all actions. A collective 
identity through which the activists construct themselves as socio-political actors is 
formed through interwoven dimensions of formulating cognitive frameworks. These 
include the movement´s goals, means and environments, the initiation of the reflexive and 
affective relationships within groups, and making emotional investments in the 
relationships within groups (Peterson 1992: 4, 78; see also Melucci 1989: 10, 45, 43).     
As summarized aptly by Helena Flam (2008: 1), individuals join in a successfully 
staged protest “when 1) they find the political structures either favourite or unbearable 2) 
generate their own or adopt external movement entrepreneurs who lead the way in 
diagnosing and mobilising others to find a way out what they define as the problematic or 
“issue” situation 3) draw upon their established social/organizational ties and identities 4) 
manage their material, emotional, and intellectual resources to create a new collective –
assertive, critical, demanding – identity 5) an identity which blossoms when it is 
developed in quasi-therapeutic or ritualised encounters and/or dramaturgically staged in 
large demonstration, amplified by the mass media and put to the test in notable encounters 
with the opponent.”
To understand why and how a social movement is produced it is important to 
analyze the interaction between the aforementioned dimensions and factors. Examples 
include the way in which institutional and ideological opportunities, mobilizing 
organizational structures, and collective identity framing are mutually interrelated, and 
their impact on the emergence and outcomes of a movement (Kamenitsa 1998).     
In my study social movements are defined as agents of social change concerned with 
transforming subordinated groups and identities. Movements emerge when forms of social 
oppression may be recognized and alternative versions of the social reality and self-
identity are produced and sustained. This study merges micro-/structuralist and cultural-
constructivist approaches to social movements. Three moments are central in my 
approach: Firstly, the way in which the movement’s constituency is positioned within the 
mainstream society; the movement interacts with the social context. Secondly, movements 
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are constituted through a set of structured face-to-face interactions or rituals, which 
generate emotions of pride, satisfaction. They are also the result of a shared group culture, 
i.e. symbols, meanings and feelings, increasing ‘emotional energy’ and encouraging 
engaging with the social surroundings (interacting with bystanders and the opponents). 
Thirdly, activists are involved in a high risk situation to make a ‘change,’ to change 
certain prevailing norms and values. They need to manage anxiety, maintain solidarity 
within the group, and transform their selves. Furthermore, the activists ‘extend their 
selves’ (self-expansion) during interactions with members of the constituency 
(community); and might also try to transform consciousness, rules for feelings, and the 
behaviors of the constituency (Summers-Effler 2005). Concepts of reframing the social 
reality, deintegration, and breaching are central for understanding how and why social 
movements are created and achieve social change. Further, concepts of solidarity-building
and self-expansion help to explain how movements are sustained and interact with 
bystanders/potential recruits. These concepts are explained in the following sections of 
this chapter.
Reframing Social Reality
Symbolic production enables activists to attribute a meaning that facilitates mobilization 
to events and behaviors of individuals and groups (della Porta and Diani 2006). Activists
in movements create an alternative set of cultural meanings and values in order to 
challenge the cultural codes of the mainstream society. Movements produce a sub-
universe of meaning or ‘oppositional symbolic reality’ (Flam 2000). Within the context of 
asymmetries of power, social movements reappropriate culture in a given sector of 
society. Ann Swidler (1986: 279) stresses that the role of reappropriating the cultural 
repertoires increases in the periods of the ‘unsettled lives.’ Contemporary social 
movements, shaped around an ideology or value system, create their own specific spaces, 
which are both real and imaginative. Their actions often rely on developing certain rituals, 
totemic symbols and narratives. New meanings, structures of feelings and types of 
identities and identifications are constructed in these spaces (ibid.). By “doing framing 
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work” grievances, moral values, collective identity and claim of legitimacy are expressed 
in the ways which spur the support of potential participants (Ferree and Merrill 2003).
Symbolic activity in social movements has been described as framing or, in other 
words, creating different kinds of interpretative schemes (Snow et al. 1986). As they are 
recruited to protest groups, organizers and potential participants must "align" their 
"frames," and achieve a common definition of a social problem and a common 
prescription for solving it (ibid.). Snow and Benford (1992: 137) define a frame as 
following:
an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively 
punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of 
actions within one's present or past environment. 
Snow and Benford (1992) distinguish three successive types of framing necessary 
for successful recruitment: diagnostic, in which a movement convinces potential converts 
that a problem needs to be addressed; prognostic, in which it convinces them of 
appropriate strategies, tactics and targets; and motivational, in which it encourages them 
to get involved in these activities. Frames are more likely to be accepted if they fit well 
the beliefs of potential recruits, involve empirically credible claims, are compatible with 
the life experiences of the audience, and fit the narratives the audiences tell about their 
lives. 
The theoretical framework of this study integrates a concept of reframing, which
was developed further by Helena Flam (2000: 69). She points out, that frame analysis
which has been developed for Western democracies is based on the assumption that 
constructing frames is a free activity. In a democratic context, participants in movements 
have to compete with numerous frames that are diffused via the mass media. Individuals,
who find a certain frame unappealing, might withdraw their support from the movement. 
The conditions for framing, however, are different in a repressive context, in which the 
regime might battle alternative interpretative frames. The most challenging task for 
activists is to create a viable frame when the ideological message and its organizational-
technological diffusion are hindered by the opponents. In this context, the main effort of 
activists is not on reaching out and mobilizing potential supporters, but rather on 
transforming the dominant frame that is supported and diffused by the regime. When 
studying these movements it is important to understand how dissidents “manage to make 
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believable their version of reality to themselves and others” (ibid.: 70). As individuals’ 
actions are associated with risks and difficulties, a movement has to instill these risks with 
symbolic value. Managing emotions thus gains particular importance in movements which 
exist within a repressive context (ibid.).
  
Injustice Frame 
One particular kind of frame which expresses a common conviction that existing 
conditions are unjust is especially important (Jasper 1998). Gamson (1985) has developed
the concept injustice frame, which is a way of viewing a situation or condition that 
expresses indignation or outrage over a perceived injustice, while finding some human 
agency to blame for the transgression. The passion for justice is hence fuelled by anger 
over injustice; negative emotions thus have a prominent role in the protest. Abstract norms 
of justice gain some power from the positive emotions associated with them such as hope, 
joy, and compassion. The contrast with an unjust situation and the negative motions, such 
as a sense of threat, outrage, anger, and fear are, however, necessary for motivating action. 
Negative emotions are powerful (Jasper 1998).
The movements´ symbolic work includes injustice frame or ‘hot cognition’ through 
which the social nature of individual grievance is recognized (Gamson 1992). Protest 
movements articulate the injustice frame and forge strategies for transforming feelings of 
social alienation, frustration or shame which are the result of a form of social oppression. 
Deintegration and Breaching 
Social movements redefine dominant ‘rules of feelings’ about their own members, their 
opponents, and other relevant aspects of reality (Flam 2005: 19). The emotional reframing 
of ‘reality’ often predates and always accompanies its cognitive-normative reframing. 
Social movements challenge the status-quo by reinterpreting some aspects of the social 
reality, and calling for new, obligatory emotions and rules of feelings which they use to 
mobilize individuals for collective action (ibid.). 
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One of the effects of the movements is the recognition by members that they 
participate in their own oppression. Activists aim to liberate themselves and each other of 
the emotional ties that bind them to the values and ideas of the dominant society (King 
2005: 151). Maintaining an oppositional stance on issues requires activists to constantly 
negate the hegemonic messages and norms that permeate society. The concept of 
deintegration describes a process through which individuals separate themselves from 
society’s dominant norms and values (ibid.). They need to do this to develop into
reflective, creative, productive actors. Activists demonstrate non-commitment to dominant 
norms and realign their commitment to oppositional ideologies. This deintegration 
requires an engagement with the emotional as well as the rational cognitive attachments to 
internalized knowledge. To achieve and sustain an activist identity, they engage in 
emotional reflexivity which is the process through which emotional work is conducted 
(Hochschild 1979). They not only manipulate (through ‘surface act’ and ‘deep act’
(ibid.))5 but also problematize their ‘wrong’ emotions. Without deintegration, individuals 
will be caught in the web of discourses and social structures that reproduce society (King 
2005: 151). The deintegration requires the reframing of messages, situations or emotions 
in ways that are not aligned to the dominant framing rules (ibid.: 154).
Rules for framing provide the social guidelines by which individuals ascribe 
definitions or meanings to situations; they are the ‘rules for managing feelings [which] are 
implicit in any ideological stance’ (Hochschild 1979: 566). They influence the rules for 
feelings or the social expectations about how people should respond to a situation 
emotionally as well as the display rules which govern how these emotions should be 
expressed. Frames are socially constructed and they differ in different situations; the same 
situation may be framed in numerous ways and depends on perspective. The way in which 
this perspective is attained depends on the social norms and values to which you subscribe 
and whether or not these are hegemonic in your particular culture. Extracting yourself 
from the emotions related to a dominant frame and feeling emotions related to an 
oppositional frame may be more complex than extracting you from the dominant frame as 
the dominant framing process is constantly being reinforced, reiterated, and socially 
valued. This level of immersion often means that you are not even aware that you are 
acquiring the emotions associated with them (King 2005: 154). The organizational 
                                                 
5 In order to feel the expected emotion it is possible to either surface act (pretend) or deep act and subsequently 
integrate the new emotional expectation (feeling rule) into the sense of the self (Hochschild 1979).
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structure of a social movement challenges members to recognize and understand the ways 
in which they participate in the reproduction of oppression and the status quo (ibid.: 163).
Breaching refers to movements´ breach of boundaries of what is acceptable in the 
system of social relationships (Benski 2005: 59). Movements stage events which aim to 
reveal the underlying assumptions that hold society together. 
Solidarity-Building and Self-Expansion
At the center of a mobilized movement is what Emile Durkheim called “collective 
effervescence” which is a product of “high ritual density” (quoted in Peterson 2001: 57). 
There is a physical assembly of people who participate in certain common action such as 
repeating certain gestures, chanting slogans, and who are aware of each one’s unity with 
each other (Collins 2001: 28). When these elements are present, participants feel 
solidarity. They become filled with emotional energy, which manifests itself in self-
confidence and enthusiasm. The emblems of the groups are created and allow the 
individuals to maintain feelings of dedication and to initiate new occasions of collective 
gathering. Finally, the emotional solidarity generates feeling of morality and own 
standards of right and wrong. Those who are outside the group are marked as unworthy 
or/and evil (ibid.).  
As has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, the activists’ collective identity is 
formed through formulating cognitive frameworks concerning the movement´s goals, 
means and environments. At the same time, a collective identity is not simply the drawing 
of a cognitive boundary. It includes an emotion, a positive affect toward other group 
members on the grounds of the common membership. Defining oneself through the help 
of a collective label involves an affective as well as cognitive mapping of the social world. 
Participating in social movements may be pleasurable in itself, independent of the 
ultimate goals and outcomes. Protest becomes a way of saying something about one's 
morals, and of finding joy and pride in them. One may also have negative emotions about 
one's identity, such as shame or guilt and many movements are motivated to fight 
stigmatized identities (Jasper 1998). 
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Movements constitute, and are reproduced through, a shared group culture; 
storytelling and rituals confirm and constantly reproduce important beliefs and symbols. 
Collective action is shaped and originates in the ‘moment of communion’ when people 
came closer to each other, physically in the crowd, through spontaneous emotional
outbursts and more intense relations with one another. This intensive emotional state 
might also be brought on by charismatic leaders, with help of chants, songs, gestures, and 
so on. A sign, an ‘image of a sacred thing’ may have a profound impact and connect the 
members. Through the ritual event, the members of the group remake it as a moral
community. Powerful emotions unleashed are the substance of group solidarity (Peterson 
2001: 58; see also Crossley 2002).
Emotions are structurally determined and micro-structural positions generate basic 
emotions (Scheff 2007). Culturally produced expectations and norms (Hochschild 1979) 
play a significant role in our understanding of the meaning of these experiences and how 
we behave in response to them (Summers-Effler 2005: 136). Based on these concepts, we 
may ask what kinds of social relational conditions favor emotions that enable movements 
to sustain themselves; how group cultures that support continued opportunities for 
building positive emotions (solidarity, high emotional energy, inclusion, pride) emerge 
from patterns of interactions (rituals, storytelling, etc.) within the groups.
Self-expansion refers to experiences of enlarging one’s self to include another or 
others. This experience is emotionally rewarding and includes nurturing love, where one 
sacrifices one’s own perfection to the perfection of one’s neighbor. In this moment the 
needs and feelings of the other are experienced as our own. These feelings are central for 
maintaining solidarity with the community /neighbourhood (ibid.: 137).
3. Gender in Women’s Movements 
One important question is the impact of gender differences on understanding why and 
how women and men organize and participate in contemporary social movements. Gender 
is an essential explanatory factor in the emergence, course and outcome of protest groups. 
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, political constraints and opportunities impinge 
on social movements. Changes in the larger political and cultural contexts can stimulate or 
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discourage people from participating in collective action. Changes in the gender regime of 
the institutional context are part of a broader set of political opportunities and limits 
(Taylor 1999: 14). The presence/absence and positioning of women in certain institutional 
arenas influence their access to the resources necessary for collective struggle, and the 
definition of goals and strategies. 
In addition, new theories of social movements emphasize that identity and social 
location form contemporary activism. The gendered divisions encourage or impede the 
mobilization of the participants partially depending on their varying access to material and 
symbolic resources (Kuumba 2001: 56). A sense of collective identity and ideological
frames are crucial in linking individuals to resistance struggles. Collective identities are 
used strategically in women’s movements (Taylor and Whittier 1995). 
Moreover, movements depend on whether aggrieved groups are able to develop the 
organization and solidarity necessary to mount a challenge. Pre-existing social resources 
such as informal networks, clubs, and formal organizations might provide incentives for 
people to take the risks associated with participating in protest groups. These mobilizing 
structures are frequently gendered. For example women-activists often draw on family ties 
and sex-segregated networks (Taylor 1999). 
How the gendered identities and symbols operate in the process of social movements
needs to be examined. The gendered nature of the movement includes contradictions; 
gender structures and ideologies might constrain the activities of social movements and 
the same gender patterns might enable certain actions and contribute to the emergence of 
social movements (Kuumba 2001; Taylor 1999). In my study of a maternal movement, 
changes in the post-Soviet gender order and the gender regime in the sphere of NGOs and 
in the military draft arena, as well as the activists’ interpretation of symbolic identification 
with Mother are crucial for understanding the processes of political mobilization or/and
women’s passivity.   
Maternal Movements and Symbol of Mother
The maternal movements are fuelled by and can strategically deploy their participants’
gendered subjectivities. At the same time, they are constrained due to the women’s limited 
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access to resources and power and the restrictions placed on women’s roles in 
contemporary modern societies (Kuumba 2001). 
The biological-essentialist interpretation of gendered subjectivity has a contradictory 
impact on the mobilization of women’s movements. On the one hand, it might contribute 
to strengthening the ties of solidarity among the activists. On the other hand, it might 
prevent them from creating broader alliances with the movements´ allies. For example, as
was mentioned earlier in this chapter, Forcey (1994: 355) criticizes the use of connections
between women and peace which is often symbolized as the mother and the preserver of 
life. However, mothers do not have universal essential qualities derived from their roles as 
nurtures. Such beliefs are shaped as a result of oversimplifying the notion of a woman,
denying her differences with other women and exaggerating her differences with men. We 
cannot assume a certain maternal peacefulness. Mothers’ profound unease with militarism 
is usually intertwined with patriotic impulses, the romance of violence and self-
righteousness on which militarism depends (Ruddick 1989).
A more useful interpretation of mothering may contribute to making caring to 
“travel out to become the responsibility of everyone” (Forcey 1994: 356). Caring labor 
should be a priority of society as a whole (Ruddick 2004). The strategy for peace politics 
should include a self-critical stance: One should realize that war is an activity, which is 
planned by human beings. It is important that women and mothers identify the actions 
which might cause suffering and actively oppose them: “A peacemaker’s hope is a 
militarist’s fear: that the rhetoric and passion of maternity can turn against the military 
cause that depends on it” (Ruddick 1989: 89).    
Within states and political regimes where the sphere of public politics is 
predominately constructed as masculine, women’s activities are often subsumed under the 
realm of motherhood. Such regimes try to depoliticize the women’s sphere of activity, 
constructing a discursive order in which women and family become sites for maintaining 
a conservative national state (Radcliffe and Westwood 1993). When women participate in 
political resistance, they are protected by the patriarchal relations; the police do not treat 
them with the same level of violence. But women activists may appropriate the 
conservative maternal discourse. The image of the weak and powerless female may be 
transformed to their advantage as a means of protection for mobilization, resistance and 
survival. Both the supposed insignificance of women within the institutionalized polity 
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and their mission of caretakers for the family give their protests a shield of legitimacy. For 
examole, in Chile, mothers and grandmothers of the “disappeared” developed their 
strategy step by step. They built solidarity networks through casual contacts with one 
another, then engaged in the more public processes of collective protest through 
discursive constructions of motherhood disseminated by the military regime, and 
eventually gained the support of other human rights groups (Schirmer 1993).
The Construction of Transnational Feminism
In a critical analysis of transnational feminist praxis, Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) 
proposes to approach the women’s movement in terms of an interdependent relationship 
between theory, history, and struggle. The very meaning of “feminism” is contested
continuously; there are no simple ways of representing women’s diverse struggles and 
histories (ibid.: 46). The term ‘women’ is not a given entity. The shared identity of 
‘Woman’ in women’s movements is a result of making connections between and among 
different struggles. For example, Mohanty explores the links among the histories and 
struggles of Third World women against racism, sexism, colonialism, imperialism, and 
monopoly capital. The movement, which was started by middle-class white women in the 
U.S. and Western Europe in the 1960-1970s, is locally and historically situated. 
Following Mohanty (ibid.: 46), the women’s movement can be viewed as an 
“imagined community” of oppositional struggles. It is ‘imagined’ as it suggests potential 
collaborations across divisive boundaries among women; ‘community’ because despite 
internal hierarchies, it suggests a commitment to “horizontal comradeship.” As Mohanty 
stresses, the foundations for these struggles is not a nation or sex, but rather the way we 
think about nation, class, and gender: the links we choose to make among and between 
struggles. Women of all nations can potentially participate in these “communities.” Our 
centrality in particular struggles, however, depends on our different, often conflicting, 
locations and histories. Women with divergent histories and social locations are united by 
their opposition to various forms of systemic dominance. Although these imagined 
communities are historically and geographically concrete, their boundaries are fluid. We 
are therefore unable to posit any homogeneous configuration of Russian Women who 
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form communities because they share gender and nation. Nations are not defined based on 
natural characteristics and gender cannot be defined as a universal entity.          
These specific processes and struggles are sometimes not explored in feminist 
studies which apply cross-cultural notions of gender and sexual difference. Analytical 
strategies employed in the writings of feminists have political effects in the context of the 
hegemony of Western scholarship. Hegemonic white women’s movements tend to 
appropriate struggles and suppress the material and historical heterogeneities of the lives 
of women in the Third World. For example, the concept of ‘gender order’ is an important 
analytical tool, but has limits, as it might exclude the analysis of power relations and 
processes of class, race, and ethnicity (ibid.: 23). Mohanty (ibid.) questions the privileged 
positioning of gender differences as the origin of oppression and of defining the female 
subject as limited to gender identity, thereby bypassing social class and national identity. 
Applying the notion of women as a homogeneous category to women in a non-Western 
context appropriates the pluralities of the simultaneous location of groups of women in a 
specific social class and national frameworks. Their historical and political agency is
subsequently denied. As a result, the specifics of the daily existence and the complexities 
of political interests that women of different social classes and cultures represent and 
mobilize are not considered (ibid.). 
Following Mohanty’s and other sociologists’ (de los Reyes and Mulinari 2005) 
ideas, this study incorporates the intersectional approach to the effects of the gender order 
and gendered subjectivities on the SOMO movement in Russia. The impact of class, 
nation, geographical location, political culture on different women’s gender positioning is 
considered. 
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Chapter 3
Data and Methods
Introduction
This chapter describes the empirical data and methods of this study. The dissertation is 
based on two different research methods. One is the analysis of the secondary literature 
about the historical and contemporary contexts of voluntary association and gender order 
in Russia, which is presented in Part II of the dissertation. The results of the study of the 
secondary literature about the military draft policy in post-Soviet Russia are presented in 
chapter 10. The second method is an empirical qualitative case study of the SOMO NGOs, 
which is presented in Part III. As I explain in more detail, the empirical study includes a 
pilot study of the HR NGOs and a main study of the HR SOMO NGOs. The results of the 
pilot study are incorporated both in Part II and Part III of the dissertation.   
This chapter begins by describing the way in which I collected my empirical data. 
Secondly, I explain and discuss the strategies and procedures of my analysis. In addition, I 
explain the strategies of representing the results of the study. Finally, I discuss some 
ethical issues in relation to my qualitative interviews and participant observations and, in a 
broader sense concerned with the potential impact of my qualitative study upon the 
respondents’ self-perceptions.
1. Data Collection
Sampling
I chose the setting of the HR SOMO for my empirical study through a two-step procedure 
of within-case sampling; in the pilot study of the HR NGOs and subsequently in the main 
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study. The sampling strategies evolved during the early phase of the data collection, 
which allowed me to take advantage of some unexpected findings, as I explain below.   
The Pilot Study of the HR NGOs  
In 2000, the relevant secondary sources which I consulted did not address the problems of 
civic activism from the perspective of its participants. It was a relatively new area in post-
communist studies. My research therefore started with an explorative pilot study. The 
preliminary research questions included who became a civic activist and how; the way in 
which organizations were formed and sustained; in which ways they were useful to its 
members, and how the meaning of civic activism was produced. 
The identification and selection of informants was made through strategic 
convenience sampling and snowballing. After consultations with several Russian 
sociologists who specialized in the research of civil society, I chose to study the human 
rights NGOs. This category of NGOs is more politically oriented and critical towards the 
political elites than the associations which deal with charity, self-help, or other issues
(Sungurov 1999a). This suited my research problem. 
The case of the human rights NGOs may be seen as ‘theory-based’ (Miles and 
Huberman 1994: 28). In other words, the HR NGOs were identified as empirical 
instances, or cases of my theoretical understanding of what constitutes a social movement 
organization. The organizations were chosen as cases of the same issue (social movement 
organization) as a result of the interaction between my ideas and the available empirical 
evidence (Ragin 1997: 10). 
The setting was also chosen based on practical considerations. As I lacked personal 
contacts among the NGOs activists, which was important to gain access to the field, I 
asked a Russian sociologist to introduce me to the NGO leaders with whom she had good 
contact. My research subject and my background as a Russian and a sociologist from a 
Swedish research institution made a good impression on the leaders. In addition, I knew 
that this setting was not the only case; I could easily find other human rights organizations 
in the same city, as well as in other cities. The setting was thus suitable and feasible for 
research purposes. 
Sampling within the setting of the HR NGOs occurred by the means of snowballing. 
The interviewees gave tips and information about additional organizations and activists.
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Snowballing is useful for identifying key informants in social contexts which are difficult 
to access. It may provide background information which helps to choose analytically 
useful respondents (Gustafson 2002: 44). The problem with this method, however, is that 
it might exclude informants outside the social network used by the researcher (ibid.). The 
initial idea of my pilot study was to identify important common patterns in the human 
rights activists’ self-organization. I thus strived to achieve a maximum variation among 
the informants who represented different HR NGOs (Miles and Huberman 1994: 28, 29; 
Ryen 2004: 78). In order to minimize the bias of the snowballing, I specifically asked the 
respondents to recommend organizations and activists, who differ on certain factors. This 
allowed me to include respondents of various ages (“young” HR-defenders as opposed to
a generation of former Soviet dissidents), working by different methods (analytical, 
practical), and in various social spheres (the mass media, migration, the army, prisons, and 
others). The respondents included 20 females and 16 males ranging from 22 to 60 years 
old with different professional occupations.
The Case of the HR SOMO NGOs
Within the setting of the HR NGOs, I chose the case of the SOMO NGOs based on three
different criteria of sampling: The SOMO is a confirming case which allows elaboration
on the initial analysis of the HR NGOs. Further, it meets some key criteria: It represents a
social movement, it is rooted in the local constituency, and it works using practical 
methods. Finally, the case is opportunistic as it follows a new lead and allows taking 
advantage of the unexpected, which I had discovered in the pilot study: the significance of 
gender (see Miles and Huberman 1994: 28). The factor of gender was not initially a part 
of the research design, but was added in the later phase of my study in 2003-2005. 
Two separate SOMO organizations located in different large cities were included in 
the case. The core activists in the organizations are women and both organizations 
mobilize around the issue of the human rights in the military draft arena. They have, 
however, developed different ideologies and group cultures. This sampling was not driven 
by a concern for representativeness of the case such as for the civil society or women’s 
movement in post-Soviet Russia. The choices of respondents and interactions were instead
driven by a conceptual question about forms and sense-making of grassroots 
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women’s/mothers’ civic activism. I needed to see different instances of the construct of 
maternal activism, in different places, with different people (see Miles and Huberman 
1994: 29). I sought to generate ideographic knowledge, which focuses on culturally 
unique features in the object of study (Ryen 2004: 26). The intention was not to generalize
the findings to other settings.   
Interviews
In the pilot study, from November 2000 to May 2001, I carried out 36 explorative and 
semi-structured qualitative interviews with members of 14 HR NGOs, located in two 
different large cities.6 The duration of the interviews varied from 40 to 90 minutes. All 
interviews were taped and partly transcribed. 
In the main study, 22 interviews with 17 activists of the SOMO NGOs, 2 men and 15 
women, were conducted in five rounds during my trips to Russia in 2000-2005. In one 
SOMO organization I interviewed 7 members and in the other I interviewed 10 activists. 
Some activists were interviewed twice. As not all the activists were involved in the 
routine daily work or they were involved only during certain periods of time, I did not 
have the chance to meet all members of organizations. 
The majority of the interviews were carried out on the NGO premises during 
working hours, except for two interviews, which were carried out at home and at a café. 
The activists have a high workload and it was hard for them to find time for the 
interviews. It was therefore often not possible to make very long in-depth interviews. The 
interviews were sometimes interrupted by long-distance phone calls from other cities or 
abroad. They lasted from three quarters to an hour and a half. All interviews were taped 
and transcribed. 
Several informal and formal interviews with young draftees and mothers of draftees 
who visited the SOMO were conducted. These interviews highlighted the organizations 
from a different perspective and helped to understand the complexity of the phenomenon.       
                                                 
6 I have interviewed members of organizations of Memorial, Civic Watch, Moscow Helsinki Group, Independent 
Legal Expert Commission, Centre for Development of Democracy and Human Rights, the Committee for Civil 
Rights, Interregional Foundation for Civil Society, Foundation of Glasnost Defense, Young People’s Centre of 
Human Rights, Civil Assistance, Youth Centre of Human Rights and Legal Culture, Forum of Migration 
Organizations, All-Russian Social Movement "For Human Rights", and the Centre in Memory of Andrei 
Sakharov.        
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The first round of the interviews with the SOMO activists was explorative and open-
ended: a conversation with a structure and a goal (Kvale 1996: 13). The respondents were 
asked about 1) biographical paths into and their motivations for activism 2) current tasks 
carried out in the organization 3) routine strategies, events, and the experienced 
difficulties in the organizations. Not all activists were equally willing to talk at length 
about their personal lives. Many of them had been interviewed before by journalists, who 
had seemed primarily interested in dramatic stories of the activists’ sons-soldiers. For 
example, one of the activists, who perhaps thought that I was also curious about her son’s 
story, refused be interviewed. Some activists were more open about their past, while 
others were very brief in their personal tales. This rendered the interpretation and analysis 
of the activists’ biographical paths difficult. 
In the second round, the interviews were semi-structured and focused on certain 
themes, which were identified through a preliminary analysis of the first round of 
interviews. The respondents were asked about five-six topics concerning their interactions 
with 1) the constituency of mothers and soldiers 2) the state and military institutions 3) 
journalists 4) Western donors, and foreign organizations 5) other NGOs, and 6) gender as 
a factor in their socio-political activism. The activists in both organizations had divided 
various kinds of work among themselves. Not every respondent could talk with detail and 
precision on all five-six topics. For example, Western donors and organizations from 
abroad were contacted mainly by leaders, who in both cases were the only people who 
knew English. Some members were mainly preoccupied with meeting their constituency 
on a daily basis, others worked exclusively with the legal aspects of individual cases. I 
slightly revised and adapted the interview questionnaire in each interview and followed up 
the activists’ individual perspectives. The purpose of the interviews was not to compare 
the narratives of the respondents. I asked, however, most respondents about all five-six 
topics and discovered different viewpoints on different aspects of their movement. I 
evaluated the consistency of the respondents’ narratives and reconstructed a common 
story of each organization.    
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Participant Observation, and Field Relations 
I used observation and participant observation to complement and go beyond the activists’ 
verbal narratives in the interviews. In the fall 2000, I started my research project with a 
two-month period of observations in one of the organizations. During 2001, 2002, and 
2003, I made additional observations in both organizations. Following Becker’s guidelines 
(1998) I spent time hanging around and trying to figure out what was going on. In the 
NGO locales, I observed the physical milieu, got impressions of the typical visual 
symbols, learned about the routine interactions among the actors and participated in them. 
For example, I took part in the “group of mutual support” which accompanied a young 
draftee during his medical check-up in the local military draft board. On other occasions, I 
joined the activists in the court, when they acted as lay defenders of a soldier’s mother 
who was taking legal action against the local draft board. Once, I participated in the 
SOMO’s officially sanctioned anti-war picket in the city.
Through the close interactions and relationships with respondents in the field, I 
personally experienced some aspects of the shared culture of the activist groups. 
Knowledge is not mediated only through the verbal language. There are other kinds, such 
as ‘bodily knowing,’ ‘knowing through feeling,’ ‘experience-based knowledge’ (Davies 
1999: 128). Other researchers stress that to experience emotions on site while 
participating in the activists’ actions is a method of understanding the emotional work that 
is conducted by the activists (Summers-Effler 2005: 140). Through participating in the 
SOMO’s events and routine rituals, I co-experienced feelings of despair, empathy, hope 
which were expressed, during the mass meetings and workshops of the School of Human 
Rights. These were regularly held by the activists for potential draftees and mothers. I was 
approximately in the same age as most of the mothers who attended the workshops, which 
made it easier for me to identify with their feelings. At the same time, being ‘too close’ 
created problems. For example, during participant observations I did not write down 
things which seemed unremarkable and some valuable data was lost (see Davies 1999). 
The problem with recording the data during the observations was that they were 
conducted during the first phase of the research process, when the research questions were 
still vaguely formulated. As a result, I tried to write down everything I could. In many 
cases the greatest amount of data was collected at the expense of a more selective focus on 
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the verbal and non-verbal details of interactions. Analyzing and interpretating this kind of
field notes is difficult. They were ultimately used mainly as a means for sensitizing the 
organizational contexts; a background to what was said and expressed in the interviews.    
Participant observations may also create problematic situations. Some field 
researchers have reported that they experienced their personality as plastic, they not only 
did things they would usually not do, but they also held opinions they would usually not 
hold (Fangen 2005: 148). I encountered similar problems. On one occasion, the activists 
asked me to take a soldier, who had run away from his unit and tried to commit suicide, to 
a temporal shelter with a family in the city. While I agreed to help, I realized that if caught 
by the police, I would risk my position as a researcher representing an official institution. 
It was a difficult dilemma; and I felt extremely relieved to hear that someone else would 
accompany the soldier. However, when I reflected on this episode afterwards, I realized 
that it was a valuable experience. It allowed me to feel what it means to participate in a 
high-risk movement.    
Erving Goffman (1989, in Fangen 2005: 144) argued that fieldwork is not good
enough unless the researchers keep up with the same body rhythm as the subjects and 
feels attracted by the members in the group. Many field researchers report that the local 
culture can only be understood by participating in it. For example, Öygarden studied the 
boxing milieu by participating in boxing and reported feeling knowledge “in his bones” 
(2001, cited in Fangen 2005: 148). There may be a risk of ‘going native’ and turning into 
a “non-observing participant” (Fangen 2005: 147). I preserved a distance to the field by 
trying to record the observational data as field notes or with help of tape recorder (during 
the mass meetings). In my case, the risk of ‘going native’ was minimized by the fact that I 
did not stay in the field for a very long time. Instead, I returned to the field after a break 
which lasted several months.  
I alternated between the roles of participant and observer in the field. Most of the 
time, I was not an “activist,” but a “sympathizing researcher.” In some situations such as
when I joined a “group of mutual support” in the local draft board, the military treated me 
like one of the “mothers-activists.” 
Field relations included both “closeness” and “distance” to the respondents (Repstad 
2007). In some situations, one consequence of researching the “oppositional” movement 
was to be perceived as its proponent. For example, when I interviewed a military 
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journalist, he tried to persuade me that I had chosen to study the “wrong” SOMO 
organization. He recommended that I instead should write about the pro-government 
SOMO where, as he put it, there were “real” soldiers’ mothers, who were “sad and very 
poor” (interview, November 2001). In the end, he tried to warn me: “When you get in 
trouble, call me, I will help you.” He seemed very friendly and sincere. I did not use this 
interview in the analyses and I tried to forget about it until the moment of writing this 
chapter. Applying the “memory work” (Haug 1987, cited in Esseveld 1999) and 
reflectivity resulted in a new understanding of the interview situation and I was able to see 
it as in a larger social context. In the field, the researcher is not only an observer, but is
also observed and socially constructed by the respondents (Hellum 2002: 46). The young 
military officer constructed and positioned me as a gendered and national subject. It is 
subsequently “natural” that a woman, who apparently took the side of the “disloyal 
citizens,” should be morally guided, disciplined, and given protection; which is what the 
respondent tried to do. Reflecting on this experience in the field allowed me to gain more
concrete knowledge about the hostile social context in which the SOMO acted. This in 
turn facilitated my analyses and interpretation of the interview narratives.    
The activists perceived me as being on “their side.” For example, they asked if I 
could write a book about them. I had to decline their proposal and explain that my 
research concerns a wider aspect of the SOMO movement, rather than just one 
organization. Other respondents perceived me as an outsider. My profession as a 
sociologist was sometimes viewed as a “boring science” or perceived as analogous with 
that of a journalist. This was sometimes a hindrance. At the same time, when I explained 
that I worked by methods, which highlight the voices of respondents, the activists spoke 
willingly to somebody who was interested in listening to their stories.  
These examples illustrate some of the problems regarding the asymmetric
relationship of authority and privilege between researcher and respondents. On the one 
hand, I was constructed in the field through a web of expectations and positionings. On 
the other hand, I preserved the discursive power to choose how to represent relationships
and events in the final research report. This produces a number of ethic issues, which I 
discuss in the last section of this chapter.  
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Documents
I collected and analyzed two types of documents: the Russian press articles about soldiers´
mothers (activists) and the SOMO’s own written and electronic documents. 
Selecting and Approaching the Press Articles
The collection of articles aimed at finding and selecting appropriate print materials which 
reflected a range of discursive representations of soldiers’ mothers in Russian mass media. 
The selection of materials for discursive analysis might start with formulating a research 
problem (Tonkiss 1998: 251). My research problem was: What is the significance of a 
certain use of language in these documents? How is a specific role for mothers put 
forward to address problems of the military draft in the Russian army? 
Thirty five articles published in 1998-2005 were identified and selected mainly with 
the help of the electronic search engines on the Russian Internet. A variety of discourses 
was assured through a sampling strategy including the media outlets belonging to different 
owners with a range of political-ideological standpoints. The following newspapers were 
selected as sources:       
? the state military daily Krasnaia Zvezda, 
? the government’s official daily Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 
? the openly oppositional weekly Novaya Gazeta, 
? the liberal moderately oppositional Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 
? the liberal Kommersant?-Daily oriented to the readers from the new middle-class 
and business elite, 
? AiF (Argumenty i Fakty), and
? MK (Moskovskii Komsomoletz), both of a broader popular character. 
In addition, several articles from other newspapers were included in the sample. The 
range of sources which I could use was limited to newspapers which publish electronic 
versions on the Internet and which I was able to access from my computer. The sampling 
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did not aim at being representative of the Russian press at that period of time. The 
following section provides an additional explanation of the strategies and procedures of 
my analysis of discourse.   
The SOMO Documents
I collected the written and electronic documents produced by NGO activists in addition to 
narratives produced by individual interviews. They include articles or papers which were 
written by some of the activists; I received them personally or downloaded them from the 
SOMO websites on the Internet. Further, I received the published stenographical reports
from the activists which included speeches and resolutions from their meetings and 
workshops. These publications were financially supported by different Russian and 
foreign sponsors.   
The latter kind of documents in particular widened the empirical scope of the study. 
For example, it allowed a study of the discursive processes during the mass meetings 
among the local SOMO groups within the movement. The documents reflect the 
atmosphere, tensions and shifts in the interactions among various groups of activists; 
between the activists and the military justice organs or the military officials. With the help 
of these documents, contradictions and negations of the meaning of civic activism in the 
SOMO movement could be traced on the level of inter-organizational communication.
One limitation of this study is that I did not have access to the organizations’ formal 
documentation, such as documents showing their financial status.     
2. Analyses 
I made two separate types of analysis: First, of the interview transcriptions and the 
activists’ documents and second of the press materials. This section begins with a brief
discussion of methodological considerations about the kinds of knowledge produced with 
the help of qualitative methods and the relationship between data and theory. I proceed to
outline the strategies and procedures of two kinds of analysis. 
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Data, Theory, and Analytic Generalization
What respondents say in interviews and write in documents can be analyzed at least in 
two different ways: as resource and topic. I approached these data primarily as a resource,
that is, as a source of true accounts of social situations (Seale 1998: 209, my emphasis). 
This approach treats interview data as a resource for discovering aspects outside the 
interview situation. Many interpreters and feminist social researchers hold a realist 
epistemological viewpoint that more authentic accounts may be gained in qualitative 
interviews of a certain format. It involves developing relationships of trust and proximity 
between researcher and respondents, being flexible in the interview situation and being as 
open as possible about our own agendas and the purposes of the research (ibid.: 208). By 
observing/participating in the ‘natural’ setting, while avoiding to become part of it and by 
using the respondents´ own words, I can show what they do and think (see Walsh 1998: 
224; Ryen 2004: 32; Miles and Huberman 1994: 8). I assume that I have gained access to 
the social reality from the perspective of the activists. The interviews and documents shed 
a light on their activities, subject positions, and sense-making which they describe as a 
result of belonging to a civic activism organization. I use their statements to illustrate my 
conclusions; the quotes are important for the reliability of the study (see Ryen 2004).              
This kind of approach is developed in critical research. The interviews are viewed as 
interactional contexts in which the social worlds of individuals, societies, and historical 
epochs can be made comprehensible as contextually embedded wholes (Richardson 1995: 
201). It is stressed that we do not have direct access to the experiences of the respondents, 
but rather to their representations of their experiences (Widerberg 1996). We understand 
the human experience as a narrative. I interpreted and understood the activists’ 
experiences through their personal or “biographic stories” and their “collective story” 
(Richardson 1995). The collective story of mothers-activists was constructed in the 
interviews and documents in opposition to the hegemonic “cultural story” (ibid.; 
Kincheloe and McLaren 2005). The cultural story is produced in the arena of military 
draft politics from the hegemonic perspective of the dominant actors including trans-
/national elites, groups of men, and others. 
Further, I integrated my approach to the data as a resource by treating it as a topic.
The accounts of the interviewees or their documents can be viewed as the linguistic 
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repertoire, on which they draw. Certain words, phrases, and ideas which are typical of 
certain popular discourses are used to achieve certain effects (Seale 1998: 212). Interview 
data cannot be read as a literal description of social action (Denzin and Lincoln 2005; 
Miles and Huberman 1994: 9). The interviews include a crucial discrepancy between the 
descriptive and interpretative dimensions of a conversation (Kvale 1996: 32). The data 
reveal the interpretative practices of respondents which occur in relation to the specific 
interactional and discursive occasion (Seale 1998: 213). In addition, the respondents 
construct their accounts in relation to multiple and changing social realities. For example, 
during the interviews, the respondents presented different explanations of the issue at 
different times. Sometimes they used “impression management” to construct self-
identities which reflected how they wanted others, including the researcher, to see them. 
An additional example is the shift in the collective self-representation in the documents. In 
the early 2000s, the SOMO shifted from using the language of “defenders of human
rights” to applying the terms of “women’s movement.”   
As explained above, the interview and documentary data in my study have the 
analytic status of resource and topic. I explain that by the complexity of the social reality, 
in which humans are both positioned within institutions and producing/changing them. In 
the narratives, the respondents partly reflect their social positioning through gender, 
nationality, socio-economic status, education and partly challenge and change it. The 
respondents´ interpretations of the events and their interactions are influenced by the 
social conditions. The memories and experiences which the respondents activate in the 
interviews are selective. The choice of the themes and experiences upon which they touch 
tells something about their positions and the collective experiences and beliefs that
dominate in the sphere of the NGOs in Russia. In the analyses I consider 1) what the 
activists say, 2) how they say it (linguistic repertoire) and 3) how they stage interactions 
with others.   
Connected with the analytical status of the data is the question of the possibility to 
make generalizations. The purpose of qualitative studies is not to generalize from the
sample to the population. An interpretative (narrative) explanation and understanding is 
produced by relating individual and group stories to the larger social contexts (Richardson 
1995). Further, a researcher looks for concepts and models which account for the 
empirical findings. Theories and hypotheses in a qualitative study are not ‘tested,’ but 
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‘generated’ by systematically comparing the data with existing theory and relevant 
empirical studies. 
To produce and critically develop concepts and models through interaction between 
data and existing theories is a way to create “analytic generalization” (Miles and 
Huberman 1994: 28; Yin 2009). The described actions and interpreted meanings can be 
explained in a more abstract way. For example, I constructed the concepts “maternal 
activist,” “courage” in the NGO sphere, and others. While these explanations may be 
considered “internally” valid, they may gain added explanatory strength if they are 
connected to theoretical models outside the actual empirical study (Miles and Huberman 
1994: 279). In my study, actions described and categorized in terms of “maternal activist” 
may be viewed as “framing” or “reframing” of the social reality by social movements. 
Furthermore, I suggested a framework for understanding reframing adapted to the context 
of post-Soviet society. The findings suggest that the theoretical construct of reframing 
may be developed. This development involved comparing, translating and synthesizing 
studies of similar phenomena in contemporary Russia, other post-communist countries, 
and in the transnational arena.                                         
In the following part of this section, I describe the strategies and procedures of the 
two kinds of analysis of the case study: coding and categorization of the interview 
transcriptions and activists’ documents and discourse analysis of the press articles. 
Coding and Categorization 
The analysis in a qualitative study is not a linear, but an “iterative” process. It does not 
start and end at certain points in the research process, but is ongoing during all phases 
(Ryen 2004: 116). In the pilot study of the HR NGOs, the transcribed and taped 
interviews were analyzed using techniques of coding and identification of recurrent 
themes (ibid.). Including a wide range of various organizations in the pilot study 
encouraged me to think comparatively and to identify similarities and differences in the 
activists’ accounts. The material shows a variety of activists’ individual motivations, 
biographical, and social circumstances of joining the NGOs. A set of themes crystallized
in the interviews, including: 
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? The relationship between the civil society and the state, as two separate and 
interrelated entities 
? The memory of the Soviet civic resistance and passivity
? The role of the Third Sector of NGOs: Is it charity or civil society?
? How a ‘voice’ of the local community is represented by the activists-intelligentsia  
? Western donors in the sphere of NGOs and their cultural, political, financial 
influences  
? The varying access of activists to material resources depending on education, age,
and place of residence 
Based on the findings of the pilot study I refined the research questions in the 
dissertation.  
In the study of the SOMO NGOs, analysis started when I began to make 
observations and conduct interviews in the field. I brought into the field some of the 
concepts from existing theories and empirical studies about civil society, NGOs, and 
women’s movement in Russia, which I had read.   
The next step in the analysis occurred as the taped interviews were transcribed. I 
made as exact transcriptions as possible, noting pauses and expressions of feelings. 
Listening again and writing down the activists’ narratives helped to identify the key 
elements in their collective stories. It was a beginning to find a pattern in the recurrent 
themes in the data.        
When I read and reread the transcribed the narratives of the interviews and the 
activists’ documents, I tried to understand what the written words might mean and 
represent. Some terms were subsequently given a significance of key words (codes) and 
were put together under a number of rubrics or categories. These rubrics and the contents 
which they covered guided my synthesis of theoretical notions. With the help of a 
theoretical perspective I tried to analyze what the respondents’ words represented. 
Interpretations were reconsidered, deepened, or changed. 
Coding is a step in which the analysis of the data is organized to become familiar with 
the settings and the events occurring within it, as well as with the research participants. 
“Codes are active, immediate and short. They focus on defining action, explicating 
implicit assumptions, and seeing process” (Charmaz 2005: 521). Civic activism may have 
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many meanings. The focus is on action: what do research participants see as routine? 
What do they define as problems? (ibid.: 523) I broke down the interviewees´ “stories”
and based on the data accounts, I defined and organized the major aspects of the SOMO’s
patterned action of civic activism. Data was compared with data, data with category and 
category with category. I focused on meaning and process by addressing subjective, 
situational and social levels (see ibid.: 522). 
In the following example I illustrate how the category “courage in the NGO sphere” 
was identified and interpreted in the data. The codes which have been identified in the 
interviews and put together under this category are presented in the left column of the 
table: 
“Builder of life” (in vivo concept) – the goal is
not organizational survival or PR-techniques
“not passive,” such as large and bureaucratic 
advocacy non-profit organizations 
represent “grassroots” constituency, respond to 
the individual grievances
“effective action,” getting along with the 
authorities 
“are limited” by the official political authorities 
   
When an organization exists for the sake of 
receiving grants, it becomes skilful in 
transforming a little success into a great victory 
and selling it to a good price. But our technique 
is different. We are the builders of life. 
(Interview with the SOMO activist, 2003)
Many other large, and good organizations 
including international organizations such as 
Human Rights Watch, are observers. Their 
[passive] position [can be often expressed like] I 
am sick, I did not understand, I do not feel like it 
at the moment. And it is not a big deal, because 
they stand at the side, because it is not a matter of 
human lives. (Ibid.)
When you are included in this, and the lives and 
freedom of humans depend on you, you certainly 
chose this individual grievance. Only when 
something accumulates, and takes form, you 
starts to see things … (Ibid.)
We work very efficiently with them, and we get 
along with the authorities, we can resolve any 
individual complaints, even the most 
complicated. (Interview with the SOMO activist, 
2005)
They set a line of absolute limit for us: You may 
go up to here, we allow you to work with the 
individual complaints. Some time ago, we could 
pressure the Duma to adopt amnesty [for 
soldiers-runaways] or an amendment to the law. 
But now, they have cut our wings. We became a 
kind of Ambulance, but our strategic goal 
actually is to abolish the conscription system.  
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A series of codes referred to sense-making of activism, such as related to maternal 
identity and grievance, a range of emotions, strategies for networking with other NGOs, 
organizational survival and finding sponsors, interacting with the authorities, “bridging” 
with women’s movements, and others were identified. The links between codes and 
categories were created. 
The categories were compared with models in existing empirical studies about 
maternal movements and the concepts from the gender-theoretical and theoretical 
perspectives on social movements. For example, I found some similarities between my 
data and existing empirical models of maternal movements in Russia, such as created by 
Zdravomyslova (1999), Caiazza (2002), Hojer (2004), Oushakine (2004), and Sundstrom 
(2006a). In addition, I find similarities between my data and existing theories about 
reframing in social movements within a “repressive” regime (Flam 2000), women’s 
movements in the transnational context (Mohanty 2003), construction of gender in the 
maternal movements (Ruddick 1989, 2004; Taylor 1999), and the gendered civil society 
of NGOs in the post-Soviet context (Salmenniemi 2005). At the same time, as explained 
in the final chapter of the dissertation, my findings suggest a few possible expansions and 
revisions of existing empirically based models and theoretical concepts. 
Discourse Analysis
Earlier in this chapter I described the way in which the mass media articles were identified 
and selected. The press material was analyzed using discourse analysis. Discursive
representations of the soldiers’ mothers in the mass media were analyzed to describe the 
discursive context, in which the activists’ movement was created. Discourses produced 
via mass media constitute an important social dimension in contemporary urban Russia. 
The data suggest that the SOMO activists constructed a sub-universe of meaning in 
opposition to the hegemonic discourse in the military arena. It was therefore necessary to 
go outside the setting of the SOMO NGOs to understand the significance of what went on 
within it.  
The language and texts may be studied as forms of discourse which help to create 
and reproduce systems of social meaning. It entails assuming a critical stance towards the 
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use of language in social settings. Texts are sites in which social meanings are reproduced 
and social identities are formed. A narrative discourse is an important cultural factor 
which some social groups might have en interest in controlling (Fahlgren 1999: 26). The 
power of a discourse consists in its ability to seem natural or obvious; reality is defined 
and produced through discourse (Foucault 1993). Different discourses do not have the 
same level of legitimacy or of power. Those which represent different ways of viewing 
and defining reality are in conflict; they participate in the discursive struggle about 
hegemony which in its turn influences and forms discourses. Hegemonic discourses are 
those which occasionally have a privileged position in defining reality (Lauclau and 
Mouffe 1984). Discourses might reproduce power relationships. The ideological function 
of discourse is fulfilled by closing down and fixating the meaning, which results in the 
exclusion of possible alternative understandings (Hall 1996; Sahlin 1999).
Analyzing discourse is chaotic, and there are no strict rules for how to do it, but 
some techniques exist which may be adapted and applied. I used the following main steps: 
I defined the research problem and selected the data set; I sort, coded and analyzed the 
text to find out the following: What are the recurrent categories, themes, and terms? What 
ideas cluster around them? What associations are being established? Is a certain reading 
implied by the way in which the text is organized (Tonkiss 1998: 255).
I coded and analyzed texts based on the research questions: What is the significance
of a certain use of language in the articles describing the arena of the military draft 
politics? How is the specific role of the mother of a soldier put forward to address 
problems of the military service in the army?   
I looked for the repetition of key words, phrases and images; consistency within and 
between texts, and for patterns of variations. I tried to identify how alternative accounts 
are rhetorically counted and combated (ibid.: 256, 257). Based on my theoretical 
perspective, I sought to understand how the use of language associated with the notions of 
mother and maternal feelings contribute to, or challenge, the hegemonic cultural meanings 
of sexual difference, class, nationality, and political culture.
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3. Representation 
This dissertation is based on my interpretation of the Russian activists’ actions and 
narratives, which are translated from the oral, everyday Russian language into the written 
academic English language. I have played the role of both academic researcher and 
cultural intermediary. I translated quotes from Russian not primarily word by word, but 
through a rewording which more adequately reflected the content of the statement. 
However, culture cannot be fully translated. Some shifts and loss of the meaning of 
notions and expressions have occurred. For example, the term “obschestvennaya”
organization can be translated as public, social, or voluntary organization. Some part of 
meaning of the Russian term is nevertheless lost or distorted. After this text was edited by 
an external English editor, I have checked the edition of the Russian quotes.     
The understanding of information is partly shaped by a person’s unconscious
cultural beliefs and conventional rules of feeling. This dissertation has therefore been 
shaped through a dialogue with my own biographical narrative. My Russian background 
and the social locations influenced the ways in which I gained access to the field, 
collected, interpreted information, and represented knowledge. My past life in the Soviet 
Union and implicit knowledge of the social rules were a great resource during the 
fieldwork and the social encounters in Russia. At the same time, my Russian origin might 
have made me blind to certain aspects of the phenomena I studied.  
My own unconscious understanding of Russian gender identity, political 
engagement, and national belonging were brought into the interviews. However, new 
knowledge was produced through my actions in the field and when I reflected on the 
consequences of these actions. For example, when one interviewee unexpectedly asked 
me a question about my husband, whether or not he was ever interested in how I manage 
the household economy, I could immediately understand and agree with her point. During 
the analysis of the interview, I related this part of the interview to the context of the Soviet 
gender discourse describing “strong woman and weak man, acting as a big child” (Gal and 
Kligman 2000). The other example is the alienation from political participation as 
something I could understand intuitively, relying on my memory of the Soviet past. I was, 
however, also able to compare memories with my recent experiences of a different 
political system in contemporary Sweden. Such comparisons helped me to detach from 
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my own preconceptions of the Russian-Soviet mentality and to situate the activists’ 
‘voices’ in the local culture.        
4. Ethical Aspects 
In a qualitative study ethical issues include informed consent, anonymity and 
confidentiality, how the data have been used and if feedback was received from the 
respondents (Ryen 2004: 156; Repstad 2007). When I met respondents for the first time I 
explained the purpose of the interviews and the study; I told them that participation was 
voluntary, that their anonymity would be protected and that nobody else would have 
access to the taped interviews and the field notes. I removed the information that might 
allow readers to identify the respondents in quotations from the interviews and 
documents. I have used only fictitious names and changed them in various chapters of the 
dissertation. In addition, I did not reveal the names of the organizations and their 
geographical location. I received ongoing feedback from the respondents when I returned 
to the field and presented (orally) my preliminary analyses and interpretations.     
A broader kind of ethical questions is: Who will benefit from my study? Do I 
damage or exploit people in any way (see Miles and Huberman 1994: 288)? These 
questions are related to the question of the researcher’s authority and privileges in the 
relationship with respondents. The key question is how not to produce the Other while 
thinking that the researcher is giving “voice” to and empower the marginalized groups 
(see Davies 1999; Fine 1994). I was aware that it is important not to represent women-
mothers as powerless ‘victims’ of the social order and the existing political regime. I 
focused on the interpretation of the activists’ “collective story,” which to a certain extent 
is in conflict with and challenge the dominant “cultural story” reflecting women’s 
subordinated position. My interpretations and analysis highlight the activists´ multiple 
positioning, as not only mothers, but also human rights activists, and participants in
transnational women’s networks. Further, I hope that this study contributes to some new 
insights and stimulates a continued conversation about grassroots activism, gender and 
democratic social change in Russia, in academic circles as well as among members of 
NGOs, starting with those who are able to read in English. It does not mean limiting to the 
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academic elite as I know that there is an ongoing active cooperative exchange of ideas 
between activists with various kinds of competence.         
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PART II 
CONTEXT - NGOs, GENDER ORDER, WOMEN’S NGOs 
IN RUSSIA
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Chapter 4
The Sphere of Non-Governmental Organizations 
Introduction
This chapter describes the historical background and contemporary conditions of the 
sphere of NGOs in post-Soviet Russia. It clarifies the dualistic legacy of the Soviet 
voluntary organizations, which were both subordinated to the state and provided services
for their members. The Soviet counter-cultural and informal groups are described. The 
size, participants, and socio-economic conditions of the voluntary NGO sector are 
explained. Further, this section describes the impact of the post-Soviet transformation on 
the Russians’ perceptions of socio-economic grievances and on civic culture. Finally, the 
chapter describes the ideology, the historical background and work methods in the human 
rights NGOs.  
1. The Emergence of NGOs
The civic NGOs in post-Soviet Russia have their roots in the Soviet social                       
organizations (obshchestvennye organizatsii) and particularly in the proliferation of the 
informal groups (neformaly) during Gorbachev’s perestroika. Since the perestroika period, 
independent citizens’ organizations reappeared on the Russian civic arena after being 
prohibited for about fifty years. By the early 2000s, a range of independent groups and 
movements, which had a voice and a certain degree of political influence, existed legally.  
At the same time, the past continues to shape Russian attitudes to civic engagement 
and state control (Sundstrom and Henry 2006: 319). To understand the way in which
elements of change and continuity coexist and interact in the sphere of non-governmental
organizations in contemporary Russia, the Soviet legacy of citizens’ organizations needs
to be considered as well as the main tendencies in the changing beliefs and attitudes 
towards civic self-organization. The following two sections explain the dualistic legacy of 
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the Soviet organizations, the phenomenon of informal groups, and the ways in which 
attitudes towards social activism in general are changing in the post-Soviet context. 
  
The Dualistic Legacy of the Soviet Social Activism
The emergence of independent groups and organizations involved a rebirth of autonomous 
voluntary associations in Russia. While voluntary and service organizations thrived 
throughout pre-revolutionary Russia and have a rich history, tsarist autocracy tended to
control voluntary associations (see Clowes et al. 1991; Hosking 2001; Bradley 2002; 
Pipes 1995), which continued and tightened further in Soviet Russia. 
The concept of civil society developed historically in the West assumes a clear 
distinction, and sometimes opposition, between state and society (Seligman 1992). But in 
the Soviet Union, by 1930, social organizations such as the trade union, the Komsomol
and others were either created by the state or closely integrated with it. Resources to the 
organizations came from the state and the organizations had equal opportunity to 
influence decision-making as a governmental ministry. These organizations contributed to 
reproducing the centralized state (Evans, Jr. et al. 2006).       
The scholarly understanding of Soviet social organizations as mere “transmission 
belts” between the Communist Party and the masses, lacking any autonomous life, 
however, has been criticized lately. Based on new work of Russian historians produced 
since the beginning of the 1990s and new empirical studies, researchers highlight the 
dualistic legacy of the Soviet organizations which were both subordinated to the state 
while providing services for their members (Evans, Jr. et al. 2006; Yurchak 2006).
The party’s control of social organizations intensified from the early 1920s and 
throughout the 1930s (Yanitsky 1991). The main tendency was to suppress spontaneous 
social initiatives and to direct all the organizations to achieving the goals of the state. The 
party leadership created the concept of a “new public” (novaia obshchestvennost’) in 
which social organizations were to be created at the initiative of the political regime 
(Evans, Jr. et al. 2006: 32). Many independent organizations were closed throughout the 
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1920s and the development of the nomenklatura7 system guaranteed that the top officials 
in social associations were approved by the party. As a result, the leaders of the 
organizations were appointed from above and owed their loyalty first to their superiors 
rather than to the rank and file (ibid.: 32, 33; see also Nichols 1996). By the end of the 
1930s, citizens were organized in mass organizations sponsored by the party and state, 
which aimed to embrace, to reform, and to support them from cradle to grave. In addition, 
individuals often viewed membership in these organizations as a necessary step in their 
professional or political careers.
The social organizations were given a dualistic orientation. For example, the trade 
unions were given a double role: they were supposed both to realize the party’s objectives 
and serve the workers’ interests by protecting them against administrators. In the post-
Stalin period, union officials in factories cooperated with management and when the 
workers’ interests came into conflict with the goals of plan fulfillment, the leaders tended 
to prioritize production tasks. Factory union committees, however, also tried to protect 
workers from abuses by managers (Evans, Jr. et al. 2006: 33, 40).    
The new citizens, Homo Sovieticus were constructed based on a combination of old 
and new symbols of being a member of the state (gosudarstvo) in Russia. In the Soviet 
regime created during Stalinism, the relationship between institutions, public involvement, 
and personal life/subjectivity was constructed based on ‘dissimulation:’    
  
The Bolshevik revolution did not erase the distinction between public and private and then 
re-establish it in a different form. Rather, it swept it away and replaced it, in the long run, 
with a division between the ‘social,’ which consists of transparent ‘public’ and ‘personal’ 
[lichnyi] lives, and an unseen, unrecognized private [chastnyi] which does not exceed the 
most intimate. The dissimulation covering this intimate sphere became the most profound 
practice of Soviet society. (Kharkhordin 1997: 360)        
Learning to command the language of the communist ideology was crucial for a 
successful dissimulation. Applying Anthony Giddens’ (1990) concept of a disembedding 
mechanism of the modern expert systems, the communist ideology may be seen as such a 
system operating within “Soviet modernity without civil society” in the 1930s (Kozlova 
                                                 
7 Nomenklatura, members of the privileged social-political elite, were the holders of higher-level positions which 
only could be filled on the party’s recommendation or approval. Lists of leading positions were kept in the CPSU 
Central Committee apparatus which held a monopoly on the power to fill the top positions of officials in the 
party itself, in government, army, security services, judicial organs, factories and enterprises, in the spheres of 
science, propaganda, and culture (Remington 1999: 34). The nomenklatura were served by a system of various 
privileges or indirect payments.
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1996: 214). The formation of the Soviet middle class was interrelated with political 
participation and learning the language of communist ideology. In this type of modernity, 
“adherence to the communist ideology” was a way to combine “progressive values” with 
the old types of collective community. How did different groups reproduce the ideological 
language? For example, young peasants, whose parents-farmers had been denounced as 
enemies of the communist regime during the enforced collectivization in the 1930s, often 
moved to cities. In their diaries, participation in social activism is described as crucial for 
personal survival: “Recently I started to view social activism not as a way to make a 
career but as part of my body, of my existence, as bread necessary for my survival” (June 
8, 1933, quoted in Kozlova 1996: 1648). While trying to survive, they learned to 
reproduce the ideological language by studying the texts of political leaders. They thus not 
only reproduced the discourse of state power, but also created certain social relations. A 
system of statements about society and self, a system of names and meanings constituted a 
foundation for mutual interpersonal understanding. 
Their personal voice is barely heard in their diary texts which is a rather normative 
language filled with clichés from political brochures. The Brief History of the CPSU
became a mask which was “impossible to take off from the face” (ibid.: 168, 170). For 
this category of people, the turning points of their personal life could be directly linked 
with official events such as the decree adopted in 1934. It stated that the right to vote 
would be returned to those denounced individuals who worked honestly for the state for 
five years. They were ready to forgive the state for the past injustices and to start to serve 
it: “I felt respect for the people who did that and this feeling may develop over time into 
love towards the state which does not despise me. Perhaps, it is a start of my new world 
view. The thought that I am accepted as a citizen in the common family of the USSR like 
anybody else obliges me to feel love to people who have done that for me. I find myself 
no longer among enemies, of whom I have to be afraid every moment and second.” The 
former peasants thus become persons with a “communist world view.” The Soviet citizen 
was, however, not a “political person and economic person” and would not be able to live 
in civil society (ibid.: 213, 214).       
This example illustrates how ‘dissimulation’ via ideological language, and fear for 
the regime could be paradoxically interrelated with experiencing citizenship in terms of 
                                                 
8 This and other quotes from Kozlova (1996) are in my translation from Russian.
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kinship and readiness to love and to serve the state (see also Månson 1997: 40). While a
new socialist sociality was shaped by transforming personal ties into formal-bureaucratic 
relations, it was not the same as that which was described by Max Weber. For example, 
Stalin was perceived not only as the “father of people” but also as someone who 
expressed “the right line of the party” and helped people to implement general laws of 
social development. The non-personal dimension thus became more salient than personal 
ties. At the same time, forms of sociality with roots in more traditional societies were 
replayed (Kozlova 1996: 198).           
Another paradox of the Soviet socialist modernity and the voluntary organizations is 
that the objective of building communism and creating the New Man is supposed to be 
achieved by subsuming society and individuals to party control. The Soviet citizen was 
supposed simultaneously to submit to party leadership, nurture collectivist ethic and 
become an independent-minded and creative person (Yurchak 2006: 11). In the 1970s and 
the early 1980s, this paradox permeated the sociality within the Komsomol which was 
supposed to organize youth activities. The leaders were frequently trained to acquire the 
skills of reproducing ideological texts and conducting formal ritualized events. While the 
pure formal rituals and authoritative ideological discourse had to be reproduced, the 
leaders frequently also identified with the human and good aspects of the socialist state 
(ibid.: 96). The interaction between heads of the local organizations and the rank-and-file 
members was built on the friendly consensus of the need to follow the rules, although 
breaking them would result in official sanctions. The local heads of the organizations were 
often perceived simultaneously as the authoritative representatives of the state institution 
and as “one of us” (svoi) or ‘normal people.’ ‘Normal people’ signified a relatively free, 
creative life, not reduced to ideological automatism or idealist resistance (ibid.: 114, 118). 
Informal Groups and Independent NGOs 
During the 1950s and 1960s, informal, mostly non-political, groups not sponsored by the 
Communist party, began to appear. They were often founded by young people who sought 
new forms of leisure activities such as clubs of sports fans, rock music enthusiasts, poets, 
and the like. The All-Union Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural 
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Monuments acquired a large number of members (Evans, Jr. et al. 2006). Some 
associations wanted to satisfy the needs of people with different kinds of disabilities
(White 1999). Since the early 1960s, the environmental movement emerged among 
scientists and writers (Yanitsky 1996, 2000b). The breach between the official Soviet
values and politics and the alternative values was articulated with emergence in the mid-
1960s of writers of “village prose” (derevenshchiki) (Petro 1995: 103). Often nationalist 
in orientation, these intellectuals raised issues connected with ecology.
After Stalin’s death and the beginning of Khrushchev's policy of thaw in the 1950s,
underground spheres of publicity started to appear including unofficial gatherings of 
intellectuals; samizdat9 publications, tapes of bards, and the oral tradition of political jokes
(Downing 1996). These spaces were circumscribed by primitive and laborious distribution 
technologies. The scope of the critique was limited because of the great danger of 
persecution and suppression by the state. While only a small group of political dissidents
took the risk, many individuals were emotionally engaged in cultural images that were not 
politically sanctioned. For example, Vladimir Vysotsky, a popular actor and bard, was 
productive simultaneously in the legitimate cultural sphere, playing Hamlet in the avant-
garde theater of Yuri Lubimov, and in the underground "singing of convicts in their own 
language" (Nielsen 1994). In the 1960s-1980s, the relative regular informal gatherings 
(tusovka) also took place in public spaces like cafés, ice cream shops, or clubs. For 
example, the café Saigon in Leningrad functioned during 1964-1991 as a special place for 
the counter-cultural bohemia of artists and poets, shadow-economy entrepreneurs, 
prostitutes, and drug addicts. The visitors were attracted by the intellectual discussion
outside the official sphere of norms and constraints (Zdravomyslova and Voronkov 2002). 
From the mid-1970s, dynamic networks and local environments including family, 
friendship, neighbors, or colleagues built enclaves of information circulation, which 
became more important than the space of the official mass media and formal professional 
associations (Roos and Rotkirch 1998). Trust and a chance to discuss personal problems 
                                                 
9 Samizdat media should be recognized as the stirrings of an alternative public sphere in the Soviet Union. The 
word was created from sam, self and izdat, publish; it appeared in the early 1960s as a new name for the 
thousands of the typed sheets that circulated illegally from friend to friend (Shane 1994: 27). The topics included 
officially forbidden poetry and political essays, or lists of individuals imprisoned for dissident activities. 
Historically, Soviet samizdat began to be an active media sphere following the post-Khrushchev repression of 
literary expression. A variety of concerns - religious, ethnic and nationalist, young people’s, environmental, 
peace-oriented – slowly began to be expressed by these means (Alexeyeva and Fitzpatrick 1990). 
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made Soviet friendship an unofficial moral value. Friendship became an ultimate value in 
the situation of terror and mass denunciations (Kharkhordin 1999: 318).
Michael Gorbachev, who became Secretary General of the Communist party in 
1985, aimed to restructure the Soviet economy and believed that resistance to reforms 
could be tackled by political changes that held ministers accountable to democratically 
elected politicians. He advocated a radical change in the electoral system, a choice of 
candidates, reform of the CPSU itself, and the growth of groups independent of the CPSU. 
In 1986, Gorbachev encouraged unofficial groups in support of perestroika. The idea was 
to create political and semi political associations among the loyal groups of the Soviet 
middle class which could act in support of perestroika or function as a kind of opposition 
parties by monitoring the government and the Communist party (Petro 1995; Tolz 1990). 
The decision was taken at the top to help the unofficial groups with premises, faxes, 
telephone lines, and other necessities (Reddaway and Glinski 2001: 122). Myriad of new 
social clubs and political groups formed, and subsequently larger movements and weak 
political parties (Urban et al. 1997; Hosking 1991). In 1990, the passage of the Law on 
Public Association provided the legal framework for the formation of a multi-party system 
(Butterfield and Sedaitis 1991). It occurred in a context of the remarkable waves of public 
contestation in the former Soviet Union. In 1995, the number of economic enterprises in 
which strikes took place, increased 34 times compared with 1990. During 1997, 17 000
more protest demonstrations took place in Russia compared with 1990. The number of 
participants in protest actions during this period increased almost ten times (Katzva 2003).
By the late 1990s, the wave of the protest movements, political euphoria, enthusiasm 
and civic activism were replaced with increased disillusion concerning public politics and 
collective protest action (Diligensky 1998: 233; Alapuro 2001). At the same time, the 
legal and economic status of the independent NGOs and non-commercial organizations 
were defined and negotiated.    
The first autonomous social organizations were, however, hardly capable of
channeling popular demands and representing interests in the political sphere (Fish 1991: 
217). The official institutions were unable to deal with the new independent organizations 
as legitimate representations of societal interests. In addition, the governing institutions’ 
power decreased. Independent groups subsequently faced weak state institutions. A 
second barrier was the continued controls on the mass media and the backwardness of 
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communications. The organizations were either not covered in the state mass media, or 
they received negative coverage. For example, the NGOs were often associated with 
facilitating economic crime. The alternative press remained small. Many organizations 
were unable to obtain computers and photo copiers, which complicated internal 
communication and the diffusion of ideas. Third, Russia lacked large-scale integrative 
societal institutions, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland. One additional obstacle 
was the political aversion and skepticism that most Russians felt (ibid.: 154-157).                            
The following sections describe the resources, opportunities, and constraints in the 
sphere of NGOs. First, the size, participants and cosnditions in the NGO sector are 
presented. Second, citizens’ common perceptions of social problems and the risks that are
faced in the context of the socioeconomic transition, changing civic values, and patterns 
of action including social activism and other strategies are depicted. 
2. Size, Participants, and Conditions in the NGO-Sector
During Gorbachev’s reforms, civil society was evoked as a panacea for political cynicism 
and disaffection. In the 1990s, however, the notion of civil society was replaced by 
discussions of political technologies, party-building, voting, and the like. In the mid-
1990s, many associations, which emerged during the late glasnost dissolved. Some 
associations survived with the help of support from foreign donors and consultants and 
were reorganized into the so called Third Sector of non-governmental, non-profit 
organizations. Some of them have survived by other means (Yanitsky 2000b: 252). 
The size of the voluntary sector grew rapidly in the late 1990s. Depending on which 
kinds of organizations are included, between 450 000-485 000 voluntary organizations 
were registered by 2000-2001 (Sevortyan and Berchukova 2002; Yakimets 2004; Russia, 
USAID 2001). About 60 percent are non-governmental and non-municipal organizations 
and are involved with social issues and services in the spheres of youth and children, 
women, ecology, people with disabilities, human rights, and so on10 (Yakimets 2002;
                                                 
10 About 40 percent of the organizations are trade unions, state and municipal non-profit organizations, consumer 
cooperatives and societies, habitation property owners’ associations, garden and summer house associations, 
religious organizations, non-state pension foundations, political parties and public political associations, stock 
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Russia, USAID 2001). At the same time, many active organizations or networks are not 
officially registered (Petrenko 2001; Sevortyan and Berchukova 2002). Researchers 
estimate that roughly one quarter of the officially registered organizations are active and 
engaged in civic issues. Approximately 2,5 million Russians are involved in these groups 
as employees and volunteers, providing assistance to about 30 million people (Yakimets 
2002). The development of the non-profit organizations varies across the country’s 89 
regions. Stronger organizations with access to technological, financial, and human 
resources are located in the main cities (Russia, USAID 2000). 
The heterogeneous sphere of the NGOs and the non-profits is formed through a 
combination of institutions, networks and strategies. First, it includes partly a range of 
Soviet legacy organizations which continue to offer useful services to various population
groups, and partly new Western-style advocacy organizations. Although the party-state’s 
control of women’s councils, professional organizations, and societies for individuals with 
disabilities has ended, the organizational structures remained (Henderson 2003: 44; Fomin
and Chikadze 1999). Many organizations from the Soviet era continue to provide services 
to disadvantaged groups. For example, Women’s Councils (zhensovety) help women to 
find employment, conduct charity work for poor families or assist victims of domestic 
violence (Sundstrom and Henry 2006: 310). They work more directly with the public than 
many Western-style advocacy NGOs. At the same time, the Soviet legacy organizations 
may hinder other forms of civic associations that are more autonomous from the state and 
more responsive to members. In some cases, they might maintain their official status and 
favorable financial situation, but do very little to help its constituencies (ibid.: 310). 
Although the activists sometimes still preserved the Soviet-era mentalities there are 
enthusiasts who also try to act differently (Henderson 2003; Fomin and Chikadze 1999). 
Further, some organizations that were formed in the early 2000s such as the politicized
youth movements Nashi or the Young Guard, are influenced by Soviet organizational 
patterns. They preserve a hierarchical vertical management system and cooperate closely 
with the state (Mardar 2008: 35).   
Second, during the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods, movements and 
organizations emerged simultaneously based on three types of demands including 
citizenship rights, material distribution, and post-industrial post-material values, such as
                                                                                                                                                            
foundations, state-industrial chambers, business associations, and the like (Yakimetz 2002; Russia, USAID 
2001).
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ecology, identity, and everyday democracy (Fish 1991: 62; Markova 1999). The variety 
of voluntary organizations may be categorized by the character of objectives, issue, 
membership, relationship to the state authorities, sources of financial support, and other 
criteria (see Sungurov 1999b; Yakimetz 2004; Henderson 2003). It is difficult to create a 
clear-cut typology of voluntary organizations as many of them fit in more than one 
category11 (Green 2002). 
Despite the great number of officially registered NGOs, the number of people who 
participate in voluntary organizations is relatively low, compared to many other 
countries.12 The average number of organizational memberships per person in Russia is 
0.65 which can be compared to 0.35 in Bulgaria, 3.07 in South Africa or 3.59 in the USA 
(Howard 2003: 65). In addition, the number of non-profit organizations in Russia today
(0.52 per one thousand inhabitants) is much smaller than it was prior to 1917 (7.14 per 
one thousands inhabitants) (Mardar 2008: 3513). The following section provides a more 
detailed explanation of general attitudes to participation in civic organizations. 
Motivations for becoming involved in civic organization(s) vary. Some of the 
activists want to contribute to society and others are people who have experienced
unfairness or social grievances and who join together. The Post-Communist 
Organizational Membership Study was conducted in Russia in 1999 with representative 
samples and aimed at estimating the relative significance of income, education, age, and 
gender for the average number of organizational memberships per person (Howard 2003: 
92). The results indicate that people with higher levels of income and education are more 
likely to be members of organizations. Regarding age, the most active group is 35-44;
subsequent age groups show a steady decline. The under-25 age group has relatively high 
levels of organizational membership. A generational shift is apparently taking place in 
Russia, with younger people participating more than their elders. Concerning gender, the 
                                                 
11 Livshin and Weitz (2006) point out that in practice Russian NGOs tend to fall into one of three categories. 
Elite NGOs are relatively wealthy organizations with million-dollar budgets. They are often associated with big 
Russian businesses or serve as “VIP landing grounds” where former government officials can occupy an 
influential position after leaving office. Second, “intermediary institutions” such as museums and social welfare 
organizations have characteristics of both government and non-government bodies. Wealthy donors sometimes 
purchase works of art, advanced medical equipment, or other expensive items for their favorite organizations. 
Finally, “grass-roots organizations” are the most numerous and varied. These NGOs have pursued a variety of 
causes, both at the national and local levels. They pursue non-partisan social advocacy.
12 According to the results of the social capital survey, less than 5 percent of Russians said that they belonged to 
a sports, music, or arts club, housing or neighbourhood association or a political party (Rose 1998: 11; see also 
Domrin 2003).
13 Materials by courtesy of Tom R. Burns, professor at the Department of Sociology, Uppsala University.
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findings show that men belong to organizations at higher rates than women. However, in 
Russia, women’s participation rate is 88 percent of that of men – higher than in the 
Western (78 percent) and Eastern parts of Germany (75 percent). Organizational 
membership tends to be higher in larger cities (ibid.: 102). 
Citizens rarely choose the non-profit sector as a career. One very optimistic 
estimate placed the number of people involved in the non-profit sector at about 1 percent 
of the country’s adult population (Henderson 2008).
Independent NGOs do not have access to sufficient non-state material and human 
resources to be able to act as stable, recognized channels for expressing various social 
groups’ demands to the state and the wider public (Sundstrom and Henry 2006). Civic 
activism in today’s Russia is sometimes compared with dissidence, i.e. individual forms 
of protest and action (Sperling 2006). The NGOs have limited power in practice and are 
not institutionalized strongly in the society. They lack outreach activities and have 
difficulties in gaining public recognition and support for their activities. For example, 
public demonstrations by NGOs or protest movements are rare. In a 2001 survey, 55 
percent of the respondents had never heard the term “civil society” (Sundstrom and Henry 
2006: 311). Donations are hindered by the financial hardships experienced by many 
citizens, their unfamiliarity with charitable giving, and their uncertainty about the 
intentions of the NGOs (ibid.). Instead of state-society engagement, some civic 
organizations are replacing the partially dismantled state bureaucracy and services. Non-
governmental organizations thus fill the gap. For example, migrant groups are often 
provided information about housing and employment that are not offered by the state 
(Sundstrom and Henry 2006: 316; see also Evans, Jr. et al.: Ch. 13).    
Elements of censorship in the mass media, economic oligarchy and pervasive 
corruption have created an unfavorable environment for voluntary associations 
(Sundstrom and Henry 2006: 314). Reliance on personal ties (sviazi) as a means of access
and influence is also complicating the development of stable channels of dialogue 
between organized civil society and the state. Activists have to identify individual allies 
within decision-making structures who can assist them (ibid.: 312). When their particular 
contacts disappear from the institutional structures, the activists’ influence over policy is 
eliminated.  
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The weak impact of civil society on the state in post-Soviet Russia is not only the 
result of the legacy of authoritarianism. It is also due to the powerful local and national 
criminal groups which are tied to all levels of government (Evans, Jr. et al. 2006: Ch. 6). 
They intervene in governance at all levels and sometimes openly threaten civic groups or 
journalists who stand in their way. By escalating the level of corruption and violence in 
state-society interactions, criminal groups cause citizens to be even more reluctant to 
address the state with their demands and concerns (Sundstrom and Henry 2006: 315). 
3. Post-Soviet Transformation and Civic Culture
During the 1990s, voluntary groups were built and acted in a context of political 
uncertainty, economic crisis, and moral confusion. Politics became an arena of open 
power struggles among new elite actors and a restructuring of governing institutions and 
ownership relations. In the mid-1990s, the disappointment with the results of reforms was 
increasing: 
During struggles against the authoritarian system, the Westernizing democrats declared 
the goals of achieving a law-based state responsible to people, affirmation of human rights 
and dignity, civilized market relations rewarding the honest and persevering labor. But 
what was the result of the victory of a certain coalition of “democrats”? [We have] a lying 
and utterly irresponsible state; ...wholesale corruption and criminalization of all spheres of 
life,  defenselessness of citizens, powerlessness of the legislative and judicial authorities, 
legal nihilism, “glasnost” dissolving in front of our eyes, and an open cynicism of the 
power-holders. (Vorontzova and Filatov 1997: 4)14
Socio-Economic Grievances
The social price of the reforms was extremely high for a majority of the population. As a 
result of the “shock therapy” market reform that started in 1992, the productivity of the 
economy declined by 12-15 percent in the first half of the decade, inflation surged from 
22 to 900 percent, and real wages fell (Henderson 2003: 42). The conditions had improved 
somewhat by 1998 but deteriorated again after the financial crash in August 1998. The 
                                                 
14 My translation from Russian.
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situation stabilized and improved in the early 2000s, mostly due to high oil prices in the 
international market. 
The living standards declined and the probability of falling into poverty increased. 
By the end of 1995, real wages had fallen by 55 percent. Pensions and other social 
benefits declined severely as well (Silverman and Yanowitch 1997: 18). In 1995, personal 
consumption was about one-third below its 1991 level (ibid.: 19). The quality and the 
availability of free health care declined, which in combination with increased stress of 
daily life and other factors, resulted in increased mortality, suicides, and alcoholism (ibid: 
25, see also Manning et al. 2000: 81). The cost of the reforms was distributed unevenly. 
The gap between the average income of the highest 10 percent and the lowest 10 percent 
increased from 3.44 times in 1991 to 13.5 in 1995 (ibid: 27). The rise of mass poverty was 
estimated officially to 29 percent of the population below the poverty line in 1995 (ibid.: 
46). The so called “new poor” was a new phenomenon which included families with one 
or two children with both spouses employed in the defense industry, science, public 
health, and so on but who were nevertheless unable to escape poverty (ibid: 50). 
The social safety net which during Soviet times was provided by the large industrial 
enterprises and the state has, to a large extent, been dismantled. During 1991-1995, state 
expenses for social issues, including welfare, public health, education and culture declined 
by 39 percent (Henderson 2003: 43).15 In 1996-1997, a period of aggravated instability 
and power struggles between political and financial groupings was marked by long-term 
wages and pensions’ arrears (Manning et al. 2000: 189). In 2007, according to All-Russia 
Centre of Life Standard, the income of 16,3 percent of the population was below
subsistence level. In about one third of Russian regions between 25 and 72,5 percent of 
the population lives in poverty (Golovachev 2007).      
Civic Culture 
One of the major consequences of the Soviet 'double' public sphere was the formation of a 
behavior based on a dichotomy between the public sphere and the non-official sphere of 
                                                 
15 However, at the most minimal level, the state subsidies for public utilities, such as free or almost free use of 
heating, electricity, water supply, transportation and other services were preserved. Similarly, a free public 
education and health care remained although in the most cases, more inferior to the fee-paying services 
(Manning et al. 2000: 384).   
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family and friends, and the widespread lawlessness and arbitrariness within the official 
administration. Oleg Vite (1996) points out that the patterns of interaction, thinking and 
feeling pursued in the non-official sphere could not enter the official arenas of social 
communication, although they were commonly known and accepted. At the same time, 
the formal legal norms which were proclaimed in the public discourse did not function in 
real everyday life. Individuals thus coped with their lives applying three types of 
normative orders. One of them was the written legal norms whose legitimacy was in 
doubt, another was the norms of common daily life practices, whose legitimacy might be 
considered temporary until the written rules were changed and restored. The third 
normative order was that of pervasive legal arbitrariness (see also Shlapentokh 1989).
The existence of incompatible normative orders opened up for corruption and abuse. 
People related to the public sphere with both cynicism and fear and they were not
encouraged to take the written law seriously. As Richard Sakwa (1995: 956) stresses, 
patterns of daily life under communism were marked by series of dualisms, individuals 
turned one face towards family and friends in “communities of kindness,” while they 
otherwise existed in a culture of fear, subordination and (mis)appropriation of state 
resources (which for understandable reasons was not considered theft). 
Friends and family remained very important throughout the post-communist period. 
Many people invested in their own private circles and did not feel the need or desire to 
join civil society organizations (Howard 2003; Alapuro and Lonkila 2000).
Changes in Russian social values and attitudes towards social activism are 
documented in social research. The old value models based on the powers’ “paternalist-
prohibitive” attitudes and the ordinary citizens’ “solidarity-collectivist” attitudes were 
largely replaced by “achievement-individualist-oriented” norms and values including all-
permissiveness, striving for personal success, wealth, and open anti-sociality and cynicism 
(Khoros 1998: 235). Regulska (1998: 314) stresses that in post-communist countries, 
individualist ethos indirectly facilitates the exclusion of citizens from the political scene
by the dominant political elites. The endorsement of liberalism by the political elites 
brought prominence to the ‘individual,’ which can be viewed as a reaction to the socialist 
times which only addressed an abstract human. Groups and individuals assert their value 
through emphazising differences. Liberalism also emphasises the sole responsibility of 
individuals for exercising their rights. Another dimension is that in communist countries 
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opposition to the official authorities was expressed on moral rather than political grounds, 
in the form of anti-politics. This rhetoric is still embraced by some local activists and is 
appropriated by the populist parties (ibid.). Aversion toward participation in politics 
publicly might be motivated in different ways. Diligensky (1998: 240) believes that it is a 
continuation of the Soviet “adaptive individualism” which implies that one relies “only on 
one’s own forces” and that one can adjust to any political regime as long as it guarantees
the minimal prosperity and freedom of conscience. People value their right on “right of 
non-participation,” a possibility to be “left alone” (ibid.: 239). Another kind of “willy-
nilly individualism” of a “silent majority” of the population is a result of experiences of 
grievance and marginalization (ibid.; see also Naumova 1999).        
Many studies reveal a high degree of general mistrust of public institutions. 
According to the 2001 New Russia Barometer, political parties were mistrusted by 48 
percent of the respondents and the parliament by 44 percent (Mishler and Rose 2005: 
1056). Trust in some public institutions is still relatively strong such as the army (70 
percent); the state security organs (57 percent), and the Orthodox Church (61 percent) 
(Gudkov 2001: 284). In the fall 2000, 78 percent of the respondents trusted President 
Putin, which might have been partly a reaction to the low credibility of other social 
institutions (ibid.: 289). Nina Naumova (1999) contends that levels of social dis-
/integration, trust in political authorities, and the population’s understanding of the 
meaning of the reforms are strongly correlated. Trust in social institutions and political 
authorities is not merely a question of deciding for whom to vote, but reflects a general 
attitude toward the course of the transformation. The bulging distrust in political 
institutions and alienation from the authorities correlate with an increased number of 
suicides committed in the 1990s. They increased by 17 percent in a sudden leap in 1992 
and continued to rise during the following years. The number of suicides in 100 000 
people was 38,1 in 1993, 42,1 in 1994, and 45 in 1995 (Gilinsky and Rumiantzeva 199716
quoted in Naumova 1999: 112). 
Too many control mechanisms, a harsh system of law enforcement, overlapping and 
mutually contradictory laws create a culture of “presumption of guilt” (Bliakher 2002: 
86). In a Russian-French comparative study on legal consciousness conducted in 1993, 
                                                 
16 Gilinsky, Ya. i Rumiantzeva, G. Osnovnyie tendentzii samoubijstv v Rossii: soziologicheskij analyz. 
Peterburgskaia sotziologiia 1997, 1.
86
Russian teenagers tend to associate law with “fault” and “punishment” which is explained 
by the Soviet legacy. In Soviet practices, the state’s power was often not based on law, but 
used it in its own interests. Citizens’ attitudes towards the state’s power include a mix of 
avoidance, subordination, fear, and fascination (Kourilsky-Augeven 2004: 27-28). As a 
reaction to encounters with nearly limitless arbitrariness from the executive authorities, 
teenagers claimed that they have unlimited freedom and a right to ignore others (ibid.: 28).
The problems, risks, and fears experienced in daily life are highlighted in many 
opinion polls. A “shadow, semi-criminal society under official liberalism” flourishes 
partly due to the Soviet legacy of double thought and double action (Pastukhov 2002). 
Dodging military service, petty theft of materials from the workplace, not paying taxes are 
widespread. The semi-legal practices intensify when the formal institutions are inefficient 
(Levada 2000). When three out of five Russians did not receive their wages or pensions in 
March and April 1998, people responded to the crisis by using their own personal 
networks and begging, cajoling, or bribing bureaucrats into violating the rules (Rose 
1998). In 1997, 40 percent of the respondents were most afraid of criminals, 34 percent of 
“the arbitrariness of the state officials and local bosses,” and 24 percent of the 
“arbitrariness in the work of agencies of the legal justice” (Diligensky 1998: 241). In 
1996-1997, half of the respondents were unable to stand up for their own interests, 20 
percent appeal to ‘state and voluntary organizations responsible for the services,’ 25 
percent believed that the courts could help them to solve problems, and 30 percent would 
choose to bribe somebody for ‘a direct arrangement.’ Twenty percent of the respondents 
were ready to participate in meetings, demonstrations and strikes, to create independent 
trade unions or engage in political party (Manning et al. 2000:  376, 379). 
These numbers did not improve in the early 2000s. In 2000, two thirds of the 
respondents whose rights were encroached did not dare to resist as they believed that 
standing up for their own rights against somebody more powerful would only make things 
worse (Shabanova 2000: 406). In 2003, 23-36 percent of the respondents ‘do not see any 
reliable way’ to protect life or property when they are threatened (Semigin et al. 2003: 
34). Almost half of the respondents would ask for help from friends and family, and half 
of them use the help of “influential acquaintances.” About one third of all respondents 
would bribe an official. 18-27 percent of the respondents would appeal to a Russian court 
(ibid.). Even those who deploy new democratic intermediating institutions must often beg 
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state officials to “grant” them that to which they are entitled (Shabanova 2000: 407). 
Many people prefer that the voluntary organizations work more closely with the
governmental agencies and that they are placed under their control. The state, not the 
citizens, is perceived to be the fundamental force in building a good society. Ordinary 
people rarely come into contact with voluntary organizations and do not trust them. These 
views are widespread not only among older people but also among the youth. As a focus 
group discussion in which university teachers in social sciences from Khabarovsk 
participated showed, the curricula still is based on the slightly corrected philosophy of 
‘strong state’ like in the Soviet time (Baranova et al. 2001:10).
On the other hand, anti-etatist thinking is wide-spread. When the communist 
ideology, the main symbol of statehood, collapsed, the idea of the state was replaced by
the idea of individual freedom. The notion of civic duty as service to the “Motherland and 
the cause of socialism” was devalued and a new understanding of personal calling and 
responsibility emerged. One is a purely selfish belief that “man lives for himself and his 
family and owes no one.” Another widespread belief among youth is that “a person should 
serve society and people” or “a higher justice, God.” When anti-etatist feelings 
predominate, social morality starts to change. For example, when people do not expect the 
state to be capable of reducing poverty, private mutual assistance and charity became 
increasingly common (Vorontzova and Filatov 1997: 5). Data about the anti-etatist 
thinking among groups of Russians are thus contradictory.  
The ideals of democracy and human rights have gained greater importance in public 
opinion. The majority see a positive value in the market economy. The majority of the 
respondents in a survey thought that the “market should develop on the moral grounds.” 
The surveys refute the prevalent ideas about the Russian people’s antipathy toward 
proprietors and their cowtowing to “the supreme authority of officials.” People are afraid 
of a “strong state” of the traditional Russian model and generally want to get rid of its 
absolute power. As the sense of duty towards “the state, the country, and the people“
declines, the responsibility for moral values and principles of justice grows (Vorontzova 
and Filatov 1997: 7).  
The legal culture seems to evolve towards more “socialized” and “judicial” 
conceptions of equality. For example, by 2000, teenagers no longer associated the idea of
freedom with total freedom but rather with civil rights and respect for the freedom of 
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others (Kourilsky-Augeven 2004: 29). Compared to 1993, adolescents’ sense of imposed 
duties was replaced by a sense of chosen responsibilities (ibid.: 31). Trust in the 
possibility to achieve justice through the legal system, however, remains low.  
4. Human Rights NGOs and Civil Society 
The human rights organizations and groups for civic control aim at monitoring the official 
authorities and advocating for legal justice on behalf of various marginalized groups 
(Sungurov 1999a). Groups focused on human rights comprise approximately 10 % of the 
associations (Henderson 2003: 46). They work in the sphere of social rehabilitation and 
the protection of victims of repression, prison reform, refugees, and forced emigrants, and 
the like. They function as advocacy groups by helping people to obtain what the 
government has promised, but which it has neglected to give them or pressuring the 
executive branch of the official authorities on behalf of various marginalized groups 
(Diligensky 1998). The human rights groups rarely receive financial support from the 
government or local businesses and are dependent on foreign aid (Henderson 2003: 46). 
The contemporary network of human rights groups is historically related to the 
democratic movement which was rooted in the political underground of the 1960-1970s. 
An organized movement of dissenters, shaped in 1965-1967, raised human rights issues 
and acted by gathering signatures on petitions and disseminating copies of samizdat
writings (Alexeyeva and Goldberg 1993). In their public writings, letters and petitions to 
the official authorities and the samizdat texts, the dissidents built their political identity 
and strategy around the socialist legality. The dissidents drew upon the official rights-
based and law-oriented discourse, which became widespread in the post-Stalin Soviet 
Russia. A discursive break in the official rhetoric was associated with Khrushchev’s 1956 
report on Stalin’s cult after which the rhetoric of norms and law begun to return. The 
dissidents secured a strong political position by identifying with a rights-based discourse 
(Oushakine 2001). 
The concept of human rights, which was created by the Soviet dissidents, was based 
on the historical Russian understanding of social justice:   
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In the classic Russian culture, the concept of law was approached with deep mistrust. 
Therefore many attempts were undertaken to build a just society beyond the law and even 
against the law. In the 1960s, a profound shift occurred in Russian culture, when in a 
highly specific way a traditional Russian idea of justice was combined with the Western 
idea of law. However, it happened in an indigenous way, as the Iron Curtain remained
solid. The human rights ideology came forth as a combination of the idea of law and the 
dreadful experiences of Soviet history. (Interview, November 3, 200117)    
      
In 1968, the main journal of the dissident movement, Chronicle of Current Events
was first published. After 1968, the movement became more political and learned to 
communicate their concerns via the media to the world outside the country’s borders. In 
the early 1970s, the KGB tried to suppress the movement and by 1974 the first generation 
of dissidents had been imprisoned or forced to emigrate. While the dissidents received 
great publicity in the West, the movement included only a small percentage of the 
scientific and cultural intelligentsia and remained isolated from the majority of the Soviet 
citizens (Evans Jr. 2006: 43). Petro (1995: 132) notes that the human rights activists 
lacked a clear objective; the concept of human rights was too abstract to implement. The 
general population considered the dissident activists to be either alien or insane 
(Tchouikina 2003: 132). The community of dissidents included networks organized for 
offering aid to the political prisons and their families. Material support was gained from 
friends or work colleagues, the anonymous donors were mostly from the intelligentsia, or 
from foundations created in the West by Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn (ibid.).   
The role of the dissidents was indirectly acknowledged when the official rhetoric of 
glasnost borrowed from the dissidents’ language (Oushakine 2001). During the period of 
glasnost and perestroika, human rights groups expressed strong anti-establishment ideas 
and beliefs (Alexeyeva and Fitzpatrick 1990). The democratically oriented groups, 
however, were partly absorbed into the new political elite or abandoned by the old-new 
establishment. They did not achieve any administrative power or influence over the 
reforms (Reddaway and Glinski 2001). But a human rights discourse survived the 
breakdown of the USSR and became appropriated by various civic groups.
                                                 
17 Interview with a member of the Memorial NGO.
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The Concept of Civil Society 
The term civil society was borrowed from Western political discourse. It was interpreted 
by the Russian, Central and Eastern European activists as a realm of informal societal 
networks which emerged alongside the formal state sector. This reflects the way in which
the communist system worked. The “stereotyped discourse of the public sphere combined 
with the rule of a secretive and clientelistic Party, left private networks, horizontal links, 
and face-to-face trust relations as crucial avenues of resource distribution” (Outhwaite and 
Ray 2005: 162; see also Hankiss 1988). 
The notion of civil society was revived in the 1970s-1980s by social science scholars 
and political activists. Historically, civil society was perceived by most political thinkers 
from Locke through Hegel and Tocqueville as a sphere between the family and the state 
and a distinct set of socio-cultural norms enabling citizens to refute both the excessive 
state and atomized individualism (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 147; Seligman 1992). Karl 
Marx, on the contrary, stressed the ‘egoistic spirit of civil society’ and saw it as a realm of 
conflict between special interests as opposed to the mutual responsibility within a social 
whole (Seligman 1992: 55). In the 1980s, the term was given a new life by activists of the 
anti-communist movements in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. They saw ideas of 
resistance to the socialist states, ‘anti-political politics’ and ‘détente from below’ as part of 
a rebirth of the civil society (Michnik 1999, quoted in Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 147). A 
‘genuine’ civil society for the dissidents in central and Eastern Europe included that which 
was not determined by the Communist Party.18 The central idea of civil society in the anti-
communist movement is that it consists of the sphere of public discussions and citizens’ 
voluntary associations which was neither merged with the market nor attached to the state. 
Through civil society people were able to overcome the post-communist chasm between 
the public and the private, expressed in the overt acquiescence to the system and the 
covert rejection of it. The revolutions of 1989 were not to oppose the state but rather to 
                                                 
18 In the Western social theory, debate on “new social movements” and developments in the Eastern Europe led 
to a debate about the liberal state, democratic processes, trust, and social solidarity. The leftists represented for 
example by J. Habermas saw in the revolutions of 1989 a chance to create in Europe a communicative civil 
society (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 147). The dissidents’ ideas were compatible with the new left’s visions of 
participatory democracy. The conservative scholars took the resistance to the socialist state as a confirmation of 
their view that citizens were resisting an oppressive state. For them, the civil society signified a triumph of 
capitalism over the socialist alternative (Hemment 2004: 220). 
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bypass, ridicule and undermine it. The autonomous self-organizing groups were to 
become an authentic public sphere alternative to the state (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 160). 
In the words of the Polish scholar and politician Bronislaw Geremek, 
The magic of the word 'citizen' in Poland or in Czechoslovakia came from the widespread 
sense that it referred less to one's subordination to the state and its laws than to one's 
membership in an authentic community, a community whose essence was summed up in 
the term 'civil society' (see Bradley 2002: 1). 
Russia did not have any mass movements or organizations like KOR or Solidarity in 
Poland. The notion of civil society entered the political and public vocabulary in the late 
1980s with mass “citizens’ initiatives” during perestroika, which were believed to 
contribute to the building-up of the ‘civil society’ (Belokurova 2001: 32; Yanitzky 1991). 
Methods of Work and Experience of Isolation 
Methods of work in the contemporary human rights NGOs include free legal consultation, 
assistance with legal proceedings, interceding with official instances on behalf of the poor 
and disadvantaged. Ideas and 'empowerment' techniques are disseminated during seminars 
addressed both to the mass population and to the NGO-activists. To influence the political 
elite, they lobby for legislative initiatives and organize rallies, demonstrations or theatrical
actions. Information is exchanged and disseminated through their print periodicals, 
brochures, and Web sites on the Internet. Analytical reports, conference papers, as well as 
self-help instructions for conscripts, soldiers, prisoners, and other groups of the 
population, are published. International contacts and links are essential parts of their 
activities. Joint projects, actions, seminars, and conferences are organized in cooperation 
with women, peace, and religious movements, as well as with human rights organizations. 
Hearings on the human rights issues, organized in the framework of the United Nations 
and European Union, are attended.
The Russian human rights NGOs frequently perceive themselves as the builders of a 
civil society, positioned in the intermediate sphere between society and the power-holders 
(Dzhibladze 1997; Kevorkova 2001; Kolesnikov 2001). They claim to represent ordinary 
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citizens whose interests are not articulated by contemporary political elites.19 The NGO 
activists distinguish their associations from the sphere of institutionalized politics such as
political parties and official administration. Most human rights NGOs, perceive 
themselves as non-political, and insist on drawing a line between politicians seeking 
power and public organizations which are working for the sake of ordinary people and the 
common good. Patomäki and Pursiainen (1998) stress that many organizations are aware 
that people would not trust them if they are in any way associated with political activities. 
These attitudes are connected with Russian and Soviet practices of understanding politics 
exclusively in terms of the state. 
The activists try to help aggrieved people to raise their sense of self-esteem so that 
"nobody can manipulate them for the political purposes" (Petrenko 2001). According to 
the human rights activists’ writings, they wish to activate people’s civic awareness 
(grazhdanstvennost). The goal is to create ties and consciousness among citizens outside 
the state thereby preventing the abuse of a person’s rights, check the authoritarian state 
and resist the arbitrariness of the official authorities (HCAC Reports 1996: 6). The 
activists, however, feel that organizations are often isolated from citizens-non-activists: 
When our organizations gained a legal status, we were delegated responsibility to 
represent interests broader than those pertaining only to the members. However, most 
were disappointed when they turned to these organizations with their problems. They 
claim that these organizations are like those in the Soviet past; although they are called 
civic they in reality pursue their own narrow interests.20 (Ibid.: 18)  
The isolation of the human rights NGOs from the broader society and within the 
community of NGOs is related to two conditions: The first problem is that while the 
activists need to communicate constantly with society at large about what they are doing,
they lack access to the means of communication. The only human rights newspaper was 
closed because it lacked financial resources. Other mass media outlets materials publish
materials at a non-regular basis. For example, while there are ten-fifteen freelance 
journalists in Moscow who write about civic organizations, they have difficulty publishing 
                                                 
19 At the First all-Russian urgent congress for human rights in January, 20-21, 2001 Yury Orlov, chairman of 
honor of the Moscow Helsinki Group, proposed to set up a party, which would work with the popular mass and 
help people: "Neither the Union of the Right Forces (SPS) nor Yabloko are political parties, but rather clubs. If 
after two president terms there emerges a party grounded on human rights concept, it will be a great success" 
(Veretennikova 2001). 
20 This and the following quotes from HCAC Reports (1996) are my translation from Russian.
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their materials. The amount of print from the civic organizations is small, from 50 up to 
1000 copies due to high costs of formally registering the NGO and the lack of financial 
resources for print. The style in which the materials are written makes them publications 
for the “own people” (activists) and “sponsors” (HCAC Report 1996: 18). This has to do 
with the second condition, the foreign financial grant system. 
The activists stress that goals defined by donors differ from the activists’ view on 
which issues are important at that particular moment. The grants are usually linked to 
projects aimed at developing “civil society” and a “law-based state” rather than offering 
aid to people who experience grievances. The activists therefore feel guilty towards 
thousands people who suffer. Further, the self-isolation of many NGOs has to do with a 
severe competition over financial grants (ibid.: 15-16). At the same time, it is considered 
wrong to concentrate only on protecting the interests of concrete individuals: “To focus 
attention only on the rights of certain individuals or groups without considering broader 
violations at the collective level is to betray the responsibility of a human rights defender” 
(ibid.: 27).  
The activists frequently resent a weak response to their civic engagement from the 
general public. For example Marina, whom I interviewed in the pilot study, is a highly 
educated jurist who is employed in the project for creating a network of young human 
rights activists in different regions of Russia. The activists organize seminars which aim at 
informing and educating young people about human rights, organize public actions, and 
edit informational bulletins. Marina argues that a historical legacy of the Russian citizens’ 
submissiveness to the official authorities continues. She stresses that 
Many young people do not have a clear understanding of what is happening around. Your 
values are the issue. Either you pursue your narrow selfish interests and want only to 
survive, or you stand on a civic position. … In some countries, a strong public opinion can 
pressure the authorities to change things. But here in Russia, on the contrary, everything is 
decided from above, but presented as people’s opinion; and people readily accept this so 
called opinion as their own. 
…It is so strange to see how some people are crawling for civil servants: please, for God’s 
sake, help me. But he is only a person whose job is to take care of your business. …the 
majority of people still believe that a civil servant is something like God or Tsar. 
(Interview, October 14, 200121)
                                                 
21 Interview with a member of The Young People Centre of Human Rights.
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The activists hope to transform this 'passive' position into an 'active' civic position. 
As another activist told in the interview, he is involved in promoting “empowerment, an 
acquisition of power and self-confidence,” and he believed that the notion of 
empowerment did not exist in the Russian language (Interview, April 200122).     
The academic intelligentsia is criticized for its readiness to accept blindly the ideas 
and rules of the official authority. Gregory was involved in the radical anti-establishment 
movement Democratic Union during perestroika. He argues that 'ordinary racism' 
becomes part of everyday life through the mass media images, the local administration, 
and voluntary organizations which cooperate with the official institutions. He believes that 
part of the social sciences in Russia encourages 'ordinary racism,' local policies of ‘soft 
ethnic cleansing,’ and that such social science education is harmful for the young 
generation. He created a small network of like-minded activists, who support his views 
and values and tries to find funding, which would allow him to pursue social research 
independent of the governing political elite (Interview, October 10, 200123).   
The organizations draw upon a discourse of knowing the rights, the private self, and 
a personal space which are usually not respected in the Russian conditions. The activists 
not only advocate for rights and check how laws are followed; they also attend to the 
moral grounds and demand improvement of laws. They also demand one-time decisions, 
based on the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in order to prevent 
abuses. 
Summary
This chapter has shown that the Russian civic NGOs are not actually starting from scratch. 
Independent organizations existed previously, but were previously illegal. In post-Soviet 
society, social norms and patterns of association are still heavily influenced by the 
communist past. In the first decade following the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s 
continued financial crisis provided a relatively unfriendly socioeconomic environment for 
the NGOs. The economic climate of the 1990s provided the impetus for organization and 
a focus on issues; but many NGOs struggled to find enough social and economic capital to 
survive. The non-profit sector that emerged in the first decade of the post Soviet period
                                                 
22 Interview with a member of The Centre for Development of Democracy and Human Rights.
23 Interview with a member of the Memorial Society.
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was relatively weak, fragmented, and poorly connected with political elites and with the 
populations it claims to represent. Many organizations are either holdovers from the 
Soviet era, or depend heavily on Western support for their survival. Leaders of many
organizations perceive themselves mainly as concerned with concrete problems of 
people’s survival. Only few NGOs attempt to shape the public agenda, public opinion 
and/or legislation. Many also lack a visible constituency. The large challenges facing 
NGOs include an unconcerned public and a divided civic sector.
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Chapter 5
Interaction between NGOs and the State
Introduction
This chapter describes the interaction between the sphere of Russian NGOs and the state. 
States are currently important actors in the arena of civic activism. The chapter describes 
the way in which the Russian state and political system changed in the 1990s and the first 
half of the 2000s. It proceeds to outline how the legal status of the NGOs has been shaped. 
It shows that a major shift in the official concept of civil society occurred under President 
Putin´s term in the 2000s. Further, the evolving policy of the Russian state towards the 
sphere of NGOs is described. Finally, the chapter discusses how activists and leaders of 
some NGOs perceive the limits and possibilities of influencing the policy-making. 
1. The Post-Soviet State and Political System
The post-Soviet socio-political system combines disparate elements as a result of changes 
and the continued Russian and Soviet legacy of powerful state bureaucracy that strives to 
preserve its political power. After the reforms started during glasnost and perestroika, the 
trend towards a more pluralistic society with a separation of powers continued from the 
late 1980s into the 1990s. The public sphere opened up for diverse voices, actors and 
interests. Western-style liberal democratic institutions were created. Politics emerged as a 
more or less autonomous sphere based on free political association and expression. The 
principles of liberal democracy, however, coexist with clusters of informal patronage
networks and attempts by the Kremlin to co-opt or suppress potential rival centers of 
power (Sakwa 2004: 129). The general alienation of citizens from institutional politics did 
not decline but rather increased even more after the Soviet era (Kollontai 1999).
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New Elites, Parties, and Mass Media
In 1986, Gorbachev called for fighting against Communist nomenklatura. He blamed 
managers for the economy’s inefficiency, and hoped that elements of direct democracy 
might stimulate economic reforms. The semi-democratic alternative elections to the 
legislature in 1989 and 1990 were allowed to replace some of the conservative 
bureaucrats. Although the main Soviet political institutions were dismantled in 1990-
1993, the new forces which rose to political power during the 1990s were closely related 
to the previous Soviet ruling strata. Candidates from the executives of large enterprises, 
the military-industrial complex, the higher echelons of the nomenklatura, including the 
intelligence services, entered the new Russian government (Reddaway and Glinski 2001: 
171). By 1999, former party officials, together with former state officials, constituted a 
majority in the Russian parliament: 51,9 percent (Hahn 2002: 500). Former officials of the 
Soviet regime comprised 60 percent of the new regime’s executives (ibid.; see also 
Kryshtanovskaya 2002: 34). 
A unique nomenklatura capitalism was produced through insider privatization 
schemes in which industrial, financial, and resource-exporting clans and oligarchs were 
privileged (Hahn 2002: 513). Executive power merged with politicians and a new group 
of wealthy financiers and entrepreneurs. The state resources turned into the private 
owners’ assets. Public assets and resources were plundered by private corporations and 
state apparatus (Khoros 1998: 238). The civil and legislative freedoms became a new 
resource for corrupted officials and organized crime (ibid.: 232). The linked unofficial 
economic and political networks became central to decision-making and the opportunities 
for public politics were limited (Vorozheikina 1994). During 1992-1996, the business elite 
consolidated into financial-industrial groups (so called oligarchs) which gained control 
over large industrial enterprises, transportation, construction, telecommunication, and
print and electronic mass media. They were able to influence appointments to the 
government, lobbyism in the parliament and the shaping of public opinion via mass media 
(Kryshtanovskaya 2002a: 27). Corruption and degradation were the result of the merger 
between political power and big capital (Reddaway and Glinski 2001). The government 
became unable to fight corruption, guarantee public security, collect taxes and provide 
social welfare (Shevtsova 1999: 280). A grey zone developed in the economy in which 
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many corrupted officials, business dealers, and big part of the population were involved. 
30-40 percent of GDP were estimated to have been produced and sold without paying 
taxes (Shevtsova 2003: 78).
In 1993, the super-presidential system was shaped by Yeltsin after the violent 
dissolution of the parliament granted more power to the president over the elected 
legislature and allowed the new-old elites to control the reform process. While the 
creation of political parties flourished in the late 1980s, the possibilities of smaller parties 
and movements to participate in the parliamentary elections were successfully limited by 
the ruling elite. In addition, the level of political identification with parties was low. Many 
parties did not have mass membership and were not seen as legitimate structures 
associated with different social-political projects. By 2000, the party building activism 
became less attractive and less accessible to most people. Total membership in all parties 
encompassed one percent of the adult population; party-politics became an “elite affair” 
(Sakwa 2004: 114).  
Creating pro-government parties or so-called ‘parties of power’ became a 
mechanism through which the ruling groups within the country’s political establishment 
attempted to influence the outcomes of the parliamentary and presidential elections
(Mankoff 2003). The pro Kremlin United Russia party emerged victorious in the Duma 
election in 2003. The support gained by United Russia in the elections was linked with 
Putin’s assurance that the party was important for the implementation of his policies. As 
the most political parties were without mass membership they tended to become election
brands and their role was determined primarily by media holdings. In the mid-1990s, new,
more professional, party politicians were given access to techniques such as opinion polls, 
public relations and political marketing services (Mickiewicz 1999).
All more or less influential mass media were controlled by the oligarchs until 2000
(Kryshtanovskaya 2002a: 45). The state mass media lost their dominant position due to a
lack of financial resources. By the late 1990s, in addition to the state holding company
VGTRK, three of the most powerful commercial politicized media holding companies 
included the media controlled by Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and the mayor of 
Moscow, Yury Luzhkov (Zassoursky 1999: 237-241; Zassoursky 2004). On the one hand, 
the emergence of private media outlets ended the dominant position of the official 
reporting and interpretation of events and increased pluralism in the media. For example, 
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the NTV channel, founded by Gusinsky´s financial corporation, challenged the official 
line on the first war in Chechnya in 1994-1996 by showing the brutality of the war 
(Mickiewicz 1999). On the other hand, the private owners were also a part of the ruling 
elite. The financial groups’ investment in or sponsorship of the largely unprofitable media 
were made because of political and economic influence. The big owners of media could 
influence public opinion and use their connections with the politicians to get privileged 
access to privatized national properties. The politicians in turn could get funds for their
election campaigns (Zassoursky 2004: 203). The media controlled by the private banks 
were often used for the purpose of “informational wars” against competitors or the 
enemies in the government particularly in 1996-1998 (Hagström 2000: 213; Zassoursky 
2004: 80-94). The style of kompromat (compromising materials) and scandal prevailed, 
frequently at the expense of objective and fair reporting. The mass media lacked a serious 
public debate on crucial issues such as the economy and the development of political 
parties in Russia (Oates 2006). Journalists who wrote stories had to consider the needs of 
their “patron,” or they would no longer have a job. Russia also became one of the most 
dangerous countries in the world for journalists (ibid.: 68).   
The ‘Stealth’ Authoritarianism
The composition and ideological attitudes of the political elite started to change after the 
financial crisis in August 1998. Some of the larger businessmen were ruined. The 
Berezovsky and Gusinsky´s media empires were destroyed. They had to escape to the 
West in 2000; Khodorkovsky was imprisoned in 2004-2005. At the same time, politics 
continues to serve the interests of certain elite groups (Shevtsova 2003). In the early 
2000s, the state strengthened its control over the television channels (Rantanen 2002). By 
the parliamentary elections in 2003, all the main TV channels were under the control of 
the government and could be used as an ‘administrative resource’ in a single direction. 
This resulted in the success of the party United Russia which was even supported by the 
president (Jack 2004: 321). The second war in Chechnya, which started in 1999, was also 
a catalyst for the effort of bringing the independent mass media under government control. 
In contrast to the first Chechenyan war, coverage of military operations on television was 
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tightly controlled and subtly ‘managed’ by the Kremlin (Simon 2005; Zassoursky 2004). 
Although some print outlets such as the newspapers Obshchaya Gazeta and Novaya 
Gazeta continued to oppose the official policy, the plurality and a range of reporting in the 
mass media were increasingly circumscribed. The power and ability of the journalists to 
inform the public were limited due to the unwillingness of politicians to accept a critical 
press, a weak tradition of professional journalism, and the audiences’ readiness to accept 
‘sanitized’ news broadcasts (Oates 2006: 69).       
The authoritarian tendencies increased during Putin´s presidency in the 2000s and 
were often justified by the need to strengthen “law and order” in contrast to the 
uncertainty and chaos of the turbulent 1990s during Yeltsin´s presidency (Clark 2004;
Shevtsova 2004). The president was frequently described by political analysts as the only 
person who “represents the people’s opinion” (Naishul 2004; see Sakwa 2004: 69). The 
new reconfiguration of political institutions has been understood in terms of ‘managed 
democracy’ (Clark 2004) and ‘monocentrism’ (Zudin 2002). By the early 2000s, despite 
the circulation of a variety of ideological currents, forces which became successful in the 
parliamentary election were ‘non-politically’ orientated and openly allied with the 
presidential administration. The rhetoric of ‘strengthening the state and the president,’ the 
increased number of men from the security and law enforcement institutions in 
government,24 the mass media’s newly pro-governmental orientation, attempts to 
formalize further and ‘line up’ political and civic associations characterized the politics of  
the ‘managed democracy.’ Hahn (2004: 1) argues that the concept of managed democracy 
is not quite correct and describes the regime created under Putin´s presidency as the 
stealth-authoritarian system25 (the Russian term is khitryi avtoritarizm, sly 
authoritarianism). This term signifies “a subtle, slight-of-hand, almost imperceptible 
authoritarianism that, by standing on the threshold of electoral democracy, sometimes 
seems to pass as one.” This system is viewed as consisting of six interrelated elements:
(1) a constitutional order that gives the executive branch and the president preponderant, 
but not dictatorial, power, enabling them to dominate and partially control legislative and 
judicial institutions and, most importantly, to run directly the organs of coercion and law 
                                                 
24 Another change in the make-up of the elites in the early 2000s was the growth in the government bureaucracy 
of the size of so-called siloviki (‘men of power’), representatives of military, security and law enforcement 
agencies and of the military-industrial complex (Reddaway et al. 2004: 5). Between 1998 and 2002, the presence 
of the military officers in the ruling elite on the high-level positions increased twelve times (Kryshtanovskaya 
2002b: 162). 
25 See also the analysis of this political regime as “bureaucratic authoritarianism” in Shevtsova (2004).
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enforcement; (2) weak formal institutions and rule of law; (3) strong informal institutions, 
networks, and practices - oligarchic groupings of firms, friends, and families penetrating 
the state and allied with state officials - and the broad use of kompromat and the threat of 
criminal charges to persuade actors to behave as desired; (4) a weak civil society; (5) often 
subtle violations of and maximum use of loopholes in the legal-constitutional order; (6) 
and control of the commanding heights of the country's mass media, the national 
television channels, from which the overwhelming majority of Russians get most or all of 
their news. Media hegemony allows the leadership to minimize the political impact of 
corruption, crime, and the regime's efforts to limit democracy. (Hahn 2004: 2)
In the context of ‘stealth authoritarianism’ the effects of the state’s policies towards 
the NGO sphere are complex and contradictory. These effects operate in the environment 
of expectations and strategies shaped through the NGOs’ interaction with the state in the 
1990s. The following section explains how this interaction was shaped and legally defined 
from the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.
2. The Legal Status of NGOs   
There are several ways in which the post-communist states can promote and/or increase 
the costs of the development of civil society and non-profit organizations on the legal 
level. Legislation stipulates the conditions for registering and operating NGOs, and states 
potentially support the growth of the non-profit sector through laws which grant NGOs 
tax exemptions, offer funding, provide tax deductions to individuals and companies for 
donating money to them, or create systematic channels for contacts between state policy 
makers and organized groups of citizens which engage in the legislative and other 
initiatives (Henderson 2008). Legal definitions of various organizational forms and 
registration procedures, the permitted scope of political activity affect the non-profits’ 
ability to pursue societal interests and check state power (Green 2002: 458-460).  
In the 1990s, Russian governments established a regulatory framework to allow 
NGOs to operate by guaranteeing freedoms of speech, print, and association. While the 
Yeltsin administration did not attempt to hold back the non-profit sector and citizen 
activism, it also implemented relatively few policy initiatives to encourage it. At the same
time, as discussed in the previous section, the state was weak as a result of the elite 
groups’ competition over the power resources; it frequently lacked legitimacy and 
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material resources. In general, this period was characterized by a lack of legislation 
creating a friendlier environment for the NGOs. There were also a few formal 
mechanisms of communication between NGOs and government which would allow the 
NGOs access to influencing government policy (Henderson 2008).
In response to the growth in the number of voluntary organizations during the end of 
the 1980s, the government began to codify a set of laws and regulations to regulate them. 
In 1987, the legislation on public associations which had taken effect in 1932 was 
rewritten and adopted after several attempts. New draft laws in 1989 and in 1990 were 
attacked by jurists for placing the voluntary groups under direct government control and
were also rejected (Tolz 1990: 35-36). A law “About voluntary associations” adopted in 
October 1991, allowed voluntary associations to exist through a formal procedure of 
registration without the approval of the official authorities, which was a major shift since 
the conditions of the Soviet regime (Zelikova and Fomin 1996; Yakimets 2004: 20). 
Subsequent laws including “On Public Associations,” (1995), “On Noncommercial 
Organizations”, and “On Charitable Activities and Charitable Organizations” (1996), 
established the legal status of noncommercial organizations. The legislation was 
apparently designed to allow civil society to function without state interference, and 
occasionally, with its help (Caiazza 2002: 28). 
The effect of new legislation was dubious: While it created a space for voluntary 
activism it also limited it by requiring official recognition via a potentially obstructive
labyrinth of bureaucratic regulations. The legal framework was unclear and registering
frequently meant additional work for activists as well as additional costs in registration 
and lawyer’s fees. Numerous documents had to be submitted, appropriate legal forms
fitting the official list of subcategories of organizations had to be decided, and so on 
(Henderson 2003: 49). The legal procedures could be more or less directly used as a 
means to increase control and to favor certain profile organizations. For example, the 
organizations were required to renew their registration with the Ministry of Justice by 
June 30, 1999. In some regions, authorities abused the process to force groups to change 
their activities and mandates. In particular, there have been many attempts to outlaw 
organizations that monitor the conduct of governmental institutions, especially law 
enforcement agencies, such as human rights and environmental associations (McCrath 
2002). Some of them were required drop the words “protection of human rights” from 
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their names and charters on the pretext that protection of human rights is the responsibility 
of the state, not of the NGOs (Dhzibladze 2002). At the same time, institutional channels 
for interactions between the NGOs and the state were designed. For example, the office of 
the Human Rights Ombudsman was established; in 2007 it received 48 235 complaints 
from citizens (Henderson 200826). 
The financial status of the public organizations essentially changed in the post-
Soviet period. While they had previously enjoyed solid financial support of the Soviet 
state, prospective state support was now defined as tax advantages, subsidies, selective 
financing of social programs through grants, and contracting organizations on competitive 
basis (Zelikova and Fomin 1996; Yakimetz 2004: 20). Legislation at the local, regional, 
and national levels, however, remained contradictory and changed constantly. Federal 
laws also left huge loopholes for corruption and exploitation. Each regional and local 
administrative unit had its own taxation system. Organizations had to muddle through a 
complex system and usually did so without a lawyer; few could afford one, and the 
government did not offer legal aid (Caiazza 2002: 29, 30).
Donations by private businesses to the NGOs were relatively scarce in the 1990s. It 
has been explained by the lack of an advantageous tax structure for businesses donations
to charities. Businesses could donate up to three percent of their profits, but owners were 
often unwilling to admit to making a profit, and thus attract state attention to their taxable 
incomes (Henderson 2008: 11). Another explanation includes the repressive political 
climate which makes it unpopular and dangerous for business leaders to support 
controversial issues. Many NGO activists report that like governmental officials, business 
leaders only support uncontroversial charity causes to create positive public relations 
images (Sundstrom and Henry 2006: 313). In the 1990s, there was no functioning 
mechanism for private firms and corporations to sponsor NGOs.27 Contacts with private 
businesses mostly take place “on the basis of personal ties” (Baranova et al. 2001: 7). 
Many activists admit that they are “ashamed to ask for money,” while businessmen either 
barely know about voluntary organizations, or do not trust them (Besprozvannaja 2001). 
Even if the citizenry had money and time to give, there were no legal incentives to 
stimulate activism (Henderson 2008).
                                                 
26 Henderson (2008) refers to Annual Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation 
for the Year 2007.
27 According to Livshin and Weitz (2006), charity giving by the Russian private companies was increasing in the 
early 2000s.
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Since 1999, a series of tax laws have been adopted which stipulated that the NGOs 
have to pay profit taxes on their grants, value added tax on their free services and 
deliveries of humanitarian aid to individuals and organizations (Dzhibladze 2002). 
Russian tax legislation seems to be based solely upon a business model. NGOs lack an 
independent tax status for providing benefits to the local community. This is particularly 
due to government’s distrust of the NGOs and philanthropists which are supposed to 
misuse tax benefits (Russia, USAID 2000, 2001, 2002).
If the state’s policies towards civil society during the Yeltsin’s administration can be 
described as “benign neglect,” President Putin has established a “vigilant state” 
(Henderson 2008). This shift is accompanied by a changing official discourse which 
reinterprets the meaning of the civil society and NGOs through a less state-adversarial and 
more corporate stance, compared to the early 1990s.    
3. The Official Discourse of a Civil Society
As explained in the previous chapter, NGO activists understand civil society as an 
informal community of citizens organized alongside and/or in opposition to the 
Communist /post-Soviet state. 
On the contrary, the mainstream definition of civil society is shaped in a broader 
political-ideological context and official rhetoric. In the second half of the 1990s, two 
main currents in the public discourse of civil society, a Zapadnik and a Eurasian may be 
identified in the print and books published in Russia. The first one is based on the 
ideological current of Westernism (Zapadnichestvo) with roots in the nineteenth century. 
It views Russia’s historical development in terms of ‘catching-up with the West’ 
(Patomäki and Pursiainen 1999: 64). Some authors state that the attempts to ‘modernize
politically’ the former Soviet Union by Western type institutions of free elections, a multi-
party system, freedom of speech, and so on have failed (ibid.: 65). In this interpretation, a 
law-based state and a genuine civil society may be created by a middle class of academics 
and industrialists and by a strong political leader (ibid.). The authoritarian state is viewed 
positively: It is able to combat the Mafia and the corrupt bureaucracy; it also permits the
autonomy of individuals and groups in the non-political spheres (ibid.: 66). 
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The Eurasian worldview is based on that idea that Russia is a unique Eurasian 
civilization created by the eastern Slavs and Turks (ibid.: 62). Its proponents criticize 
zapadnik Yeltsin for trying to reshape the national mentality after a model of Western 
consumerist societies (ibid.: 70). They argue that the idea of a civil society is incompatible 
with a central Slavophil trait sobornost (togetherness). Civil societies in the West are 
extremely individualistic and consumption-oriented, which does not suit crisis-ridden 
Russia, where people should accept a moral of ‘new asceticism.’ Some Eurasians argue 
that civil society existed in the Soviet Union in the form of a ‘politically united nation’ 
which was destroyed after 1991. It was followed by a ‘revolution of demands’ and 
‘political infantilism’ (ibid.: 70). Although elements of direct democracy were allowed 
and informal groups have emerged in the public sphere, they have a strong anti-state 
orientation. Russia’s mission in world politics is to represent values of sobornost, 
solidarity, and collectivism in opposition to Western individualism (ibid.: 72; see also 
Patomäki and Pursiainen 1998).                 
The political rhetoric in the early 2000s has been increasingly reshaped in terms of ‘liberal 
patriotism.’ This discursive formation is based on the tendency to substitute the ideology 
of a radical market for an ideology of statism (Shevtsova 2003: 192). The main idea is to 
reinterpret the transition from communism to capitalism not as an imitation of the Western 
model, but rather as a version which fits Russia’s culture and historical path (Jack 2004: 
330). A discourse of civil society was incorporated into this new trend of political 
discourse. 
Under Putin´s presidency, the meaning of civil society was linked more directly to 
the role of the state (Domrin 2003: 194). Many scholars and policymakers in Russia tend 
not to separate civil society as a domain that is independent from the state. The 
relationship between the law-governed state and civil society is believed to be one of 
“form and substance, a balanced and mutually restricting collaboration.” Civil society was 
viewed as complementing and completing the law-governed state (ibid.: 201).  
President Putin talked about the NGOs and civil society in a variety of speeches. His 
statements reflect a view of civil society and democracy, in which he wants both to join 
Europe and maintain the commitment to Russian traditions of centralized power and 
paternalism. His vision of civic activism is one in which “people, participating in civil 
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society, will regard as of primary importance not so much the idea of freedom, not so 
much the idea of interests, as the idea of service to a certain common cause” (quoted in 
Henderson 2008). Putin emphasized civic mobilization as patriotism rather than political 
protest. In his view, civic groups can serve as a force to pull the nation together in 
agreement on the main tasks facing the country. In speeches since 1999 Putin has 
complained both about the weakness of civil society and the inability of the state organs to 
effectively collaborate with it (ibid.: 18). 
The Putin administration was interested in establishing closer links with and control 
over social organizations that work primarily on issues related to the concrete problems 
associated with people’s lives. At the same time, Putin expressed suspicion towards 
Russian organizations that work on larger issues related to democratic freedoms and rights 
and which are often supported by Western foundations. In his State of the Union address 
in May 2003 Putin maintained that some NGOs were primarily concerned with obtaining 
financial resources from abroad, or served “dubious group and commercial interests” 
(Henderson 2008: 18). As a result, he argued, that these civic groups do not serve the real 
interests of the people, in contrast to the organizations on the ground who continue their 
work unnoticed (ibid.: 19).  
The Kremlin has classified NGOs as either friendly or critical. Friendly 
organizations promote Russia’s interests in economy and social sphere and create a 
positive image of Russia abroad. Critical organizations spoil Russia’s image abroad 
(Mereu 2004). 
4. The New Policy of the Non-Profit Sector 
In the context of the increasing centralizing trends in institutionalized politics, a more 
active approach towards citizens´ associations was established during the Putin
presidency. Formalized corporatist mechanisms of communication and financial support 
between the NGOs and the state increased. The new policy for the non-profit sector
includes the creation of the Public Chamber, the reconfiguration of the Presidential 
Council on Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, expansion of the Human Rights 
ombudsman’s office, increased government funds for NGOs, legislation allowing social
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service sub-contracting, and the Law on Local Self-Governance. The Duma has passed 
additional legislation regulating the non-profit sector (Henderson 2008: 17). The new 
policies have been met with criticism from academics and practitioners interested in 
developing democracy in Russia. Other authors stress that these changes rather than 
eliminating the opportunities for autonomous citizen activism, reshape the space of 
activism (ibid.). 
In the summer and fall of 2001, Kremlin organized the Civic Forum, a conference 
that brought together several thousand civic activists from across Russia and key 
government personnel. This was the first time that government officials and NGO 
representatives met to discuss pressing social issues in an effort to create more channels of 
communication and greater cooperation between NGOs and the state. 
The initiative was said to come up during a meeting between non-profit
organizations and President Putin. The idea was further developed by groups connected to 
the Kremlin, such as the Public Opinion Fund, the Effective Policy Fund and regional 
NGOs. From the very beginning, well known large-scope human rights NGOs were not 
invited to participate. However, after criticism from the leaders of organizations like 
Memorial, Social Ecological Union, Confederation of Consumers' Societies, the Moscow 
Helsinki Group, the organizational structure of the congress was changed. As a result, the 
Forum’s twenty-one-member organizing committee included seven government officials, 
seven members of pro-Kremlin NGOs, and seven members of "oppositional" NGOs 
(Alexeyeva 2001; Uzelak 2001).
The original plan was said to have been to organize the Civic Forum as an 
expression of support by the NGOs for the President at a single plenary meeting of five 
thousand participants in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. In addition, a Civic Chamber
was supposed to be elected. It was supposed to be a national NGO council which would 
‘represent’ the NGO sector in a dialogue with the official authorities. Some observers 
regarded the Civic Forum as an attempt by the government to create surrogate, parallel 
structures that would compete with independent social organizations (McCrath 2002: 
333). The NGOs could be a political resource for mobilizing public support for the 
president in the anticipation of painful social reforms in housing, energy, and health care 
which might have generated public criticism (ibid.). Other observers, such as Gleb 
Pavlovskii, a Kremlin adviser and president of the Foundation for Efficient Politics, 
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claimed that the 21 agreements signed between the NGOs and the officials represented the
foundation for cooperation between the state and society. The Civic Forum might have
signaled the government’s recognition that NGOs might be a useful partner in some areas 
(ibid.; see also Sakwa 2004: 127).     
In 2002, the president reconfigured the existing Commission on Human Rights to 
create the Presidential Council on Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights, with 33 
members from human rights and broad based social organizations as well as individuals 
from other institutions of civil society including political analysts, academics, and actors 
(Henderson 2008). At the same time, the status of the human rights NGO activists was 
regulated further by changes in the Code of Criminal Procedures and the Code of 
Administrative Procedures adopted in 2001 and 2002. For example, NGO activists and lay 
defenders were prohibited from representing people pro bono publico in court. Only 
professional lawyers, members of the bar, are allowed to represent their clients 
(Dhzibladze 2002). 
In the fall 2004, the government legislation to create a Public Chamber including 
representatives of the civic organizations was discussed and subsequently passed on July 
1, 2005. The key function of the Chamber is to submit recommendations to members of 
the Duma about domestic policy, legislation, and request investigations into potential 
breaches of the law and monitor state agencies. The members of the Chamber also serve 
on one of eighteen commissions that examine bills or provide advice and expertise to the 
Duma on a variety of pressing issues, such as public control over the activities of law 
enforcement and reforming the judicial system, information policy and freedom of 
expression in the media, health care, and so on.28 Membership in the Chamber is decided 
from the top down: the president appoints one third of the members who will appoint 
another third of the members. The two thirds then will pick the final third who are
nominated by regional social groups. This federal level Public Chamber is to be replicated
at the regional level in Russia’s 89 territorial units (Henderson 2008: 20).
In 2003, the Duma adopted the Federal Law on Local Self-Governance legislation, 
which may potentially affect the activities of the NGOs. Over one third of the regions 
began to put the legislation in practice in 2006. It provides additional formal opportunities 
                                                 
28 See the official website at http://www.oprf.ru/ru/structure/comissions2008
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for not just NGOs, for citizens more broadly, to organize and mobilize around particular 
interests (ibid.).
The federal government has started to provide financial support for NGOs. In 2006, 
the federal government authorized the Public Chamber to distribute 500 million rubles 
($15 million) to NGOs in a grant competition. The following year, the amount was more 
than doubled to 1.25 billion rubles ($50 million) to fund grant competitions in projects 
related to youth; health; civil society; socially disadvantaged groups; education, culture 
and art; and to support social related research (Henderson 2008: 22). Putin also instructed 
business leaders to become more socially responsible, and declared 2006 the year of 
philanthropy to encourage businesses to support the government’s four national projects: 
improving Russia’s healthcare, housing, agriculture, and education. However, the 
philanthropy of Khodorkovky’s Open Russia Foundation, which promoted the much more 
explicit political goal of developing civil liberties, was not encouraged (ibid.: 23). 
Various levels of government continue to provide small funding and in-kind 
donations to voluntary organizations, such as office space or conference facilities, 
particularly in regions in which foreign funding is less available than in Moscow 
(Sundstrom and Henry 2006: 313). State officials are, however, more willing to support 
more basic charity services including to veterans, individuals with disabilities, or 
orphaned children, than more radical advocacy NGOs which might have adversary 
relations with the state. Groups which agitate for rights and freedoms are not favored for
state funding.
After the Civic Forum in the fall 2001, Putin signaled that state officials should co-
operate with civic organizations. In February 2002, Prime Minister Kasyanov signed in a 
decree on establishing a dozen permanent NGO-ministerial working groups. All ministries 
were to report to him quarterly about their cooperation with the NGOs. A majority of the 
co-operation, however, remains on the level of pure declaration. Only few officials on the 
federal level genuinely recognize the benefits of cooperating with the NGOs. At the 
regional level, more substantial cooperation between the official authorities and NGOs 
were encouraged to mobilize the financial and human resources for addressing concrete 
needs in the local communities. Moreover, in some regions the activists are persecuted, 
organizations are denied registration or closed, offices are raided by the tax police, their 
leaders beaten up by the police, illegally detained or convicted (McCrath 2002: 333).   
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In 2006, the Duma passed legislation that increased the regulatory framework within 
which NGOs operate. The law amends four existing laws that govern the non-profit
sector. It introduced several new requirements for public associations, non-commercial 
organizations, and foreign NGOs. The new requirements restrict who may form an 
organization in the Russian Federation, expand the reasons for which registration may be 
denied, and increase the supervisory powers of the state (Bourjaily 2006; Henderson 
2008). Some maintain that while previous legislation was confusing, unclear, poorly 
drafted, and not particularly proactive, it was guided by the principles of information 
whereas the current legislation is inspired by the principle of permission (Henderson 
2008).
In what ways has the Putin administration’s policies affected the development of 
NGOs? The external reaction has been primarily negative. Kremlin is said to have created 
difficult requirements for the NGOs that seek foreign funding. Most Russian NGOs 
survive on donations from businesses approved by the Kremlin, or from the Civic Forum,
a government organization that monitors NGOs. This prognosis, however, overlooks 
many of the complexities of the development of Russian NGOs (ibid.: 24). The design of 
the new channels of interactions between the state and NGOs has provided them with 
increased institutionalized access to policy makers. As a result, NGOs might get an 
increased role in policy making, advocacy, and service provision in some cases and  
potentially risk increased co-optation in other cases. Other authors stress that the 
autonomy of the civil society is compromised by a close relationship between the state 
and society (Sundstrom and Henry 2006: 316). A more corporatist arrangement of 
relations between the state and civil society may be suitable for states in liberal 
democracies in Western Europe. But these types of close arrangements might be 
dangerous for post-communist states in which there is a history of an authoritarian regime. 
During the post-Soviet period, many citizens tend to believe that the state’s imposition of 
order is more important than democracy. Occupants of bureaucratic and political positions 
in turn tend to believe that the state should play a far-reaching role in governing society 
(ibid.: 318).
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5. The NGOs’ Influence on the State
Most NGOs continue to regard the state as having the main responsibility for social 
welfare, and themselves as its additional agency, which also should be supported. At the 
same time, many non-profits are critical toward the official social policy, dislike 
bureaucratization, or the officials’ excessive efforts to gain control over them (Baranova 
et al. 2001: 7). A new understanding of the value of the NGOs’ unique expertise in their 
areas of interest and new approaches to problems has emerged. The influence of 
foundations within the Third Sector results not from the monetary value, but more from 
their flexibility with regard to responding to needs, their willingness to innovate and take 
risks, and the pluralistic nature of their decision-making processes (Livshin and Weitz 
2006).
Human rights NGOs have an ambiguous relationship to the state: they both strive to 
preserve an autonomous status and to cooperate. They thus differ from the so called social 
service NGOs primarily on the matter of financial independence from the state authorities. 
The economic resources have to be found from sources other than the Russian state: 
grants from international foundations and organizations; through partnership in joint 
projects like TACIS; offering services for a fee; or in some cases, donations from 
businesses. The government’s initiatives to cooperation between the state and the civil 
society frequently evoke controversial responses within the human rights NGOs 
community. 
The human rights NGOs strive to pressure power-holders to be guided by their new 
values. The activists are often skeptical about the ability of Russian officials to cooperate 
with the NGOs. Human rights NGOs nevertheless view themselves not as “in opposition 
to the authorities, but rather as illuminating the authorities about what they are doing 
wrong in the situations regarding individuals and society" (interview, October 14, 200129). 
This method is based on the assumption that power-holders “can be slowly civilized and 
educated.” The risk, however, is that non-state organizations can be turned into “a pseudo-
civic adjunct to the state power … and lose their ability to represent the citizens who need 
be protected from abuse by the power-holders” (HCAC Reports, 1996: 21). The activists 
                                                 
29 Interview with a member of The Young People Centre of Human Rights.
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state that the human rights organizations generally failed to contribute to create 
“mechanisms able to ensure responsiveness of the legislative, executive and judicial 
authorities to citizens” (ibid.: 19). At the same time, the sphere of institutional politics 
became even more distant from ordinary citizens: “We can see that politics has become a 
sphere reserved only for the rich. Running an election campaign for the state Duma costs 
at least fifty thousand dollars while an average monthly income is three hundred dollars” 
(ibid.: 25).  
There are, however, also some more positive experiences. For example, new 
institutional forms of interaction between NGOs and governments introduced through the 
Civic Forum have stimulated the debate on how the NGOs’ social expertise can be applied 
in policy making. Social or civic expert is a new notion which has been introduced in the 
Third Sector. Grassroots civic experts accumulate unique practical knowledge of problem-
solving through years of volunteering in their area of interest such as the conflict in 
Chechnya, local self-government, or other areas. For example, the NGO leader Svetlana 
Ganushkina, who was invited to the governmental Commission on Migration Policies and 
appointed as a member in the Presidential Committee on Human Rights, has been working
with migration problems in an NGO for almost twenty years (Beliaeva, in Dorosheva 
2003: 30). 
Summary
This chapter showed that interaction between the NGOs and the state evolved during 
different post-Soviet periods. The results of the shift in the state’s policies towards the 
non-profit sector, designed and implemented by the Putin administration, are complex. 
The sphere of civic NGOs tends to be more directly connected to institutionalized politics, 
which in the semi-democratic context, creates a potential risk that the organizations might 
be co-opted. In many cases, however, a debate and self-awareness within the NGO 
community has been stimulated and intensified as a result of higher degree of 
institutionalized state-society interaction. 
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Chapter 6
Western Donors’ Gendered Interventions
Introduction
This chapter describes the complicated role played by foreign (Western) donors in the 
Russian sphere of NGOs. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S., Western European 
governments, and private donors that were committed to global democracy assistance, 
promoted independent civic groups in Russia through funding and education. This chapter 
shows that Western donors’ interventions which aimed at developing Russia’s civil 
society were based on a gendered neoliberal agenda. Further, it describes the unintended 
effects of Western aid, such as the (re)production of (new) social hierarchies and 
enforcing a form of cultural imperialism. Finally, it explains how the access to Western 
assistance created opportunities for the Russian civic groups’ agency and creative 
compromises.
1. The Donors’ Neoliberal Gendered Agenda
As Russia started to open up to the rest of the world in the late Soviet era, exchanges 
between Russian and foreign civic activists and groups increased. As was showed in 
chapter 4, the first independent groups were often led by people from the intelligentsia, 
including networks and discussion groups which opposed the communist state. Many of 
them fostered international ties and relationships through the official social organizations, 
via academic research institutions or former political dissident activism. In the early 
1990s, collaboration around different issues developed between Russian activists and 
activist groups in the U.S. and Western Europe. In the mid-1990s, these exchanges 
became institutionalized through the work of Western foundations and agencies. Western 
donors started to channel resources to civic groups as a part of their commitment to assist 
democratization and a market economy in post-communist countries (Hemment 2007). In 
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the 1990s, many Russian grassroots NGOs were neither entitled to any funding from the 
state, nor could they get income from membership fees or private contributions. The only 
available sources of income were thus grants from foreign foundations and commercial 
activities (Kay 2000). Bilateral and multilateral donors, international organizations and 
foundations were often the only forces, which actively worked to promote a non-profit
sector. A new infrastructure for global democracy assistance was shaped. The Russian 
activists were offered funding, technical assistance, and management training for non-
profit organizations. The government agency USAID was the most visible actor,30 the 
European Union, Great Britain, Canada, and the Scandinavian countries also sponsored 
civil society programs in Russia. They were joined by international agencies such as the 
United Nations and the World Bank, and by foundations, such as George Soros’s Open 
Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and international non-
profit organizations such as the Eurasia Foundation, IREX and others31 (Henderson 2003: 
63). The levels of funding began to decline in the late 1990s and early 2000s, partly due to 
the changed priorities of international donors (Hemment 2007; Sperling 2006).
Neoliberal Civil Society
The global interventions and the new infrastructure for global activism were deeply 
ideological. After the demise of the socialist alternative and its vision of a just social 
order, a new neoliberal vision of developmental interventions took hold. The increased 
popularity of NGOs with governments and official aid agencies, particularly since the end 
of the Cold War, has been a response to changed economic and political thinking 
dominated by so called ‘New Policy Agenda.’ It was driven by “beliefs organized around 
the twin poles of neoliberal economics and liberal democratic theory” (Moore 1993, cited 
in Hulme and Edwards 1997: 5). Markets and private initiatives were seen as the most 
efficient tools for achieving economic growth and providing services to people. NGOs 
                                                 
30 Sundstrom (2006a: 12) estimates that in 1990-2002 the total amount of U.S. government assistance to promote 
democracy in Russia was about $860 million.
31 The European Union has been a major multilateral donor of civil society development through its program of 
TACIS; during the period 1991-2001, it spent about 750-800 million euros on democracy assistance in Russia 
(Sundstrom 2006a: 12). According to Henderson (2003: 70-71), the private foundation the Charities Aid 
Foundation granted over $6 million from 1993 to 2002. The MacArthur Foundation gave over $17 million to 
support projects in the former Soviet Union from 1991 to 1998. The Eurasia Foundation distributed almost $38 
million in grants to the non-profit sector in Russia during period from 1993 to 2001 (ibid.: 7).
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and grassroots organizations were also seen as a component of a strong civil society acting 
as a counterweight to state power (Hulme and Edwards 1997). Civil society was therefore
understood firstly in terms of establishing markets. The new vision involved restructuring
the economy and redrawing state/societal relations through cutting back the state’s social 
responsibilities. The societal groups were to be responsible for caring for the old and the 
poor (Hemment 2007). 
A new global apparatus for activism was created and universal strategies were 
exported to new regions of the development industry such as the former Soviet Union and 
Central Eastern Europe. Some of these strategies were concepts that originated in 
progressive struggles for social justice: human rights, participation, women’s rights, and 
gender (ibid.: 139). The terms “NGOs,” “non-profits,” and “the Third Sector” were 
initially imported to Russia from the West. The Third Sector was imagined as the sphere 
of citizens’ initiatives and a part of a trio of which the first and second parts were the state 
and the private business sector (Hemment 2004: 217). When in the 1990s the term civil 
society started to signify the triumph of capitalism, a shift occurred in the thinking of the 
development aid agencies. Donors directed money to advocacy NGOs. They were 
influenced by neo-Toquevillian visions of civic development and the main thesis in 
Robert Putman’s Making Democracy Work (1993) that more horizontal or informal 
associational ties breed social capital which in turn nurtures democracy (Henderson 2003: 
65). The goal of building a civil society in Russia has been considered a ‘transition’ 
towards a society similar to Western democracies (Mandel 2002: 280; Wedel 1998). 
Donors hoped that an independent sector of NGOs might replace the discredited
bureaucratic state, decentralize services, and build democracy (Russia, USAID 2004). 
Assistance for democracy and civil society was linked to economic interests and market 
reform. A new middle class of property owners and entrepreneurs was assumed to emerge 
and nurture democracy (Henderson 2003: 281). Civil society became linked to the 
privatization aid. The international lending institutions and aid donors pressed for 
economic reform (Wedel 1998: 122). 
Western donors’ aid and education in post-socialist countries has been viewed as
“development project” shaped through asymmetric global power relationships (Walck 
1995). “Shock therapy” prescribed by the International Monetary Fund was implemented 
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by the Russian leaders with dreadful consequences for the population.32 Soviet-era social 
guarantees such as universal free health-care, full employment, and state-subsidized day 
care were dismantled and new structures were not created in its place. The Russian people 
had to cope with new problems of unemployment and hyperinflation without a social 
safety net.
The ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ are intertwined in the Third Sector. The rapid growth of 
the NGOs, in the world as well as in Russia, has been viewed in disparate ways: as ‘global 
civil society’ of empowered grassroots movements or as Western colonizing projects 
(Hemment 1998; Appadurai 2001; Matthews 1997). “NGO-ization” is frequently seen as a 
Western intrusion that reinforces East-West boundaries. Western donor agencies are seen 
as “trying to enlighten Russians with symbols of capitalism such as market and 
privatization” (Bruno 1998: 171). “The west is the donor, the moderniser, the site of 
“know-how” while the east is cast as beneficiary, recipient in a relationship of structural 
inequality, an “outsider” who wants “in”” (Hemment 1998: 35). Actors in the “East” have 
accepted the designation “lesser” to some degree, because it confirmed their victimhood 
as individuals oppressed by the Soviet regime. This discourse became a part of their 
strategy for resistance. At the same time, however, it has the effect making the “East” 
more primitive and serves to legitimize Western-identified development projects. The 
post-socialist Other was reconstituted as disadvantaged and in need of “development” 
(ibid.: 36). 
The Feminized Third Sector
The (Western) concepts of civil society and social capital are gendered (Gal and Kligman 
2000; Adkins 2005; see also Bystydzienski 1992). In post-Soviet Russia, advocacy for 
                                                 
32 International financial institutions played a central role in the contest between different scenarios of the 
economic reform in Russia. Western support was viewed as crucial for conducting reforms. In May 1990, 
Foreign Minister Shevarnadze argued that a Soviet transition to a market economy would require about $20 
billion in loans and aid from the West (Reddaway and Glinski 2001:175). In 1990, the 500 days program of the 
reform was approved by the Russian Supreme Soviet. However, it was disapproved by the potential international 
financiers. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) economists’ analysis of the Soviet economy was informed by 
an approach of ‘shock therapy’ which favors monetarism and unrestricted capital flows. The economic elite in 
the Soviet Union preferred the policy of immediate price deregulation in advance of legal privatization. The 500 
days plan was shelved and the 'shock therapy' was adopted as program of economic reform in the fall 1991 (ibid: 
177). In March 1997, following recommendation of the IMF experts, the policy of shock therapy was 
relauncehed despite the fact that the depression had reduced Russia’s GDP by almost 50 percent (ibid: 532).
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human rights, gender equity and women’s rights were promoted through Western 
assistance to civic NGOs while welfare systems were dismantled during the economic 
structural adjustment. The NGOs were set up as an embodiment of a ‘civil society’ project 
which aimed to legitimize the state’s reduction in social welfare (Gal 1997: 38). The 
societal organizations, staffed predominately by women, would instead provide social 
services. In critical scholarship, the new service-oriented NGOs are described as an 
apparatus which fills the gaps of the free market (Hemment 2007; Foley and Edwards 
1997; Hemment 2004: 217). The NGOs deal with social problems which receive less 
attention due to the processes of market development. In contrast to state social service 
institutions, NGOs are based on a philosophy of self-help and self-reliance. For example, 
the activists of Crisis Center, which were established as a transnational feminist campaign 
against domestic violence, worked to make women realize that the state is not going to 
help them and that the only solution is to help themselves (Hemment 2004). The NGOs 
are part of a project aimed at educating citizens to take individual responsibility and claim 
their rights, while in reality social institutions and structures of citizenship (e.g. the rule of 
law, as in my case study of the SOMO NGOs) do not function (see Hemment 2007: 141).
The gendered agenda of Western donors interacted with processes of constructing a 
new gender order in post-socialist Russia. Social services were redefined as belonging to 
the private sphere, wherein individuals and families were supposed to take the ultimate 
responsibility (Zelikova and Fomin 1996). The civil society was reinterpreted in terms of 
a feminized Third Sector of social service NGOs. During perestroika, civil society was a 
key slogan defined in terms of political mobilization against the communist state. In the 
post-Soviet context, civil society has been redefined from a notion pertaining to dissident 
political agency (of men) in the Soviet period to a notion of social service offered by 
(female) NGO activists (Salmeniemi 2005). The meaning of the practices of the socially-
oriented NGOs is cast in terms of solutions to the (private) problems of individual 
citizens. An additional distinction between private and public was made within the male 
public sphere of socio-political activity (Gal and Kligman 2000). The conceptual shift 
from ‘civil society versus state’ to the ‘Third Sector with the state’ is interrelated with 
defining civic activity as feminine:  
The idea of civil society as a third sector, not as a political opponent but rather as a 
helpmate of the state particularly in the social sector, entails a discursive shift from 
‘political and masculine’ to ‘social and feminine.’ (Salmenniemi 2005: 748)
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The political aspect of civic organizations tends to disappear in the framework of the 
Third Sector. If most civic activists are women, the Soviet hierarchic partnership between 
the state and women is being reconfigured. The Soviet state partly symbolically, partly 
materially appropriated the traditional male role in families; it created an alliance with 
women by defining motherhood as women’s civic duty towards the state (Ashwin 2000). 
The post-Soviet state is framed as an unequal partner of ‘social mothers,’ i.e. women civic 
activists.  The civic sphere is turned “into a sphere of care where women bear the social 
costs of the transformation” (Salmenniemi 2005: 748).         
The feminization of the Third Sector has also been explained by the priorities of the 
international community which reified it by emphasizing gender-sensitive politics that 
promote women in the NGO-arena. It has also been explained by women’s knowledge of 
foreign languages and their ability to connect with foreign donors; women’s traditional 
interest in and taking responsibility for social problems such as disabilities, health and 
children’s issues; a desire to escape corruption which is more associated with the formal 
political arena than the new civic arena; as well as women’s secondary status -- a situation 
which opens avenues of participation which lack monetary reward due to men’s lack of 
interest (Kuehnast and Nechemias 2004: 11). 
While the sphere of non-profits is associated with femininity, institutional politics is 
considered a masculine territory (Gal and Kligman 2000: 95; Marsh and Gvosdev 2002; 
Shiraev 1999). In the political arena, men dominate formal government structures and 
establish political parties. Although NGOs play an important role in offering citizens 
opportunities to tackle community problems and engage in public advocacy, women 
nevertheless find themselves sealed off from other domains of political power. Civic 
activism has become the only arena open for them (ibid.: 2, 10; see also Kochkina 2007). I 
describe further in Chapter 8, section 3, how a gendered symbolic frame of the NGO 
activism constitutes a framework for women’s civic activism.
As the following section explains, Western donors’ interventions gave rise to widening 
gaps between the large well-equipped NGOs and grassroots civic groups and 
constituencies due to the formalization of the NGO sector. Further, the Third Sector 
provides a structural and symbolic framework within which the former Soviet elites are 
reproduced.
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2. Formalization of Activism, Gaps, and Hierarchies
Although, as explained in chapter 4 of this dissertation, civil society is not completely new 
in post-Soviet Russia, the idea of projects funded by Western donors was that civil society
needed to be created from scratch (Mandel 2002: 282, 284). Western donors ignored the 
important role of the Soviet legacy of informal networks of mutual favors and solidarity, 
and considered the Russian civil society only as a ‘hostage to a totalitarian regime’ 
(Hemment 1998: 64; Gal and Kligman 2000). The approach to developing activism was 
mainly top down. The idea was to build a few large NGOs from the start, then hope that 
they would multiply from the center outwards (Henderson 2008). As domestic support for 
NGOs and non-profit organizations was weak, the effects of Western and Westernized 
support were a strange mix. On one hand, assistance helped to create a non-profit sector 
that did not exist ten years previously. A new vocabulary for activists, a new way of 
visualizing and creating linkages with the state, political society, other civic actors and 
citizens were formed. On the other hand, as donors supported mainly the NGOs that 
promoted issues such as human rights and women’s equality, they were working with a 
relatively narrow group of NGOs.33 Further, donors tended to fund projects which they 
wanted to see, rather than responding to domestic demands. This resulted in a civic sector 
divorced from the Russian constituency on whose behalf they supposedly acted
(Henderson 2008; Mendelson and Glen 2002; Sundstrom and Henry 2006: 312). While 
there was a great disparity between the resources obtained through Western assistance and
indigenous sources, dependency on the external donors might have encouraged the 
activists to be more attentive to the preferences of the donors rather than of their 
constituencies. Instead of encouraging informal grassroots initiatives, the Western funding 
of NGOs served more to build centralized and bureaucratized NGOs, which were poorly 
connected with practical activities (Henderson 2003: 10). The development of managerial 
skills and financial accountability was emphasized in the Russian NGOs, rather than 
representing the interests of the constituencies and the broad public. The salaried members 
                                                 
33 The donors’ focus shifted towards smaller regional civic groups after criticism for favoring groups in Moscow 
(Richter 2002). Starting in the mid-1990s, USAID worked to expand beyond the major metropolitan areas, 
where the larger NGOs were located, by sponsoring small grants competitions to distribute money to smaller 
organizations located all around Russia. At the end of the Yeltsin era, programs such as “You the People,” as 
well as the Community Service School Program, further move USAID away from the narrower NGO approach 
(Henderson 2008: 14, 15).
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of the NGOs were encouraged to regard their activism as a career rather than a social 
engagement (Richter 2002). As many critics stress, the so called “NGO-ization” of the 
voluntary movements brought in their professionalization and bureaucratization. Some 
activists complain that foreign assistance has undermined the democratic horizontal 
structures that prevailed during the perestroika era, encouraging instead an elite network 
of hierarchical professional organizations that confuse their own interests with those of the 
movement as a whole (Richter 2002; Yanitzky 2000a). The donors exercise a tight 
supervision over NGOs. While the early groups were based on principles of openness and
solidarity, “transparency” is a recurrent metaphor of project-speak (Sampson 1996: 129). 
“Transparency” suggests clarity of affairs, bureaucratic precision, economy and rational 
planning rather than a dream of a post-ideological world with no boundaries (Hemment 
1998). Organizations devote much of their time and energy to prepare reports for donors 
and the Russian tax authorities, and to write new grant proposals.
Funds are hard to obtain in Russia. Those who work in NGOs supported by foreign 
grants are viewed as transnationally focused elite who has more in common with each 
other than with local populations or social movements (Mandel 2002; Sampson 1996). A 
new social/economic group of individuals who survive on funding from aid and 
cooperation projects in the Western-style NGOs appeared in the 1990s (Bruno 1998).
They come from the technological and academic intelligentsia in the major cities; “a 
social group of well-educated, broadly ‘middle-class’ individuals who have acquired a 
‘know-how’ of the workings and thinking of foreign donor agencies and who are actively 
using this to procure their livelihood” (ibid.: 186).
The Third Sector contributes to the formation of hierarchies and competition 
between groups. One effect is the reinforcement of differences in status between the
intelligentsia, former communist elites and other groups in society (Hemment 2004; 
Mandel 2002; Kay 2000). The donors have to select the individuals and groups that 
become the recipients of funding. Former nomenclature cadres, often organized in patron-
client networks with access to international contacts, have learned to manipulate the new 
opportunities. Many educated young adults with backgrounds in the intelligentsia served 
as consultants, brokers, and partners and depended more on Western contacts and 
opportunities than on indigenous ones (Wedel 1998: 92; see also Mandel 2002: 284).
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The elitist social stratification among the activists’ groups was reinforced due to 
donors’ tendency to prioritize groups that use the “right” language (Bruno 1998: 171). 
“…Individuals who were very good at the “wooden language” of socialism have now 
mastered the jargon of democracy programs and project management (Sampson 1996: 
141; Mandel 2002: 279). These professionals are able to adjust quickly to whatever 
project they happen to work for.
Some NGOs learned to respond to the priorities established by external agencies.34
Proposals, which were ‘too’ local and which emphasized domestic issues did not receive 
funding as the Western donors could not relate to them (Mandel 2002: 284, 285; 
Henderson 2003: 10). The promise of Western money and access often inspired secrecy, 
suspicion, and competition among groups. Each group developed and guarded its own 
Western contacts (Wedel 1998: 92, 100). Organizations tend to concentrate on 
accomplishing a set of goals prescribed by the donors (Richter 2002). 
One of the consequences of the Western funding is a discursive discrepancy between 
the funded NGOs and other grassroots groups on the one side, and the general population
on the other. Groups that received funding tended to respond to the post-materialist values 
of the donors rather than to articulate the more urgent domestic issues (Henderson 2003: 
10; Hemment 2004). Another problem is that the form of activism desired and promoted 
by Western donors is based on Western models. NGOs are encouraged to incorporate an 
advocacy strategy, which involves gaining access to decision-making processes and using 
the activists’ expertise to advice and lobby decision makers on relevant policy 
discussions. This strategy is not always effective in Russian conditions where democratic 
norms or laws are frequently violated; the activists achieve few results (Richter 2002; 
HCAC Reports 1996: 22).
At the same time, many independent NGOs viewed foreign funding as a smaller 
threat to their autonomy than government funding. Access to resources offered by 
Western donors is invaluable for many groups. Although it is unequal, the interaction 
between recipient organizations and representatives for international donors constitutes a 
site of agency, mutual learning, and creative compromises.
                                                 
34 This kind of NGOs has been classified as DONGO, ’donor organised NGO’ (Fisher 1997: 448).
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3. Learning, Empowerment, and Fragility
The Russian activists’ access to Western donors’ and activist groups’ intellectual, 
material, symbolic, organizational, and social (friendships, solidarity) resources created 
conditions for empowerment, creative compromises, mutual learning, as well as for an
insecure and fragile work position. In a sense, the donors intended to teach the civic 
activists a new language, and a new way of thinking and acting. Western donors offered 
technical, monetary and moral support to activists in the voluntary sector. They regarded 
as primary goals to teach civic activists how to run an organization: define mission and 
goals, work with a constituency, register, social marketing, budgeting and so on. The 
office space, organizational newsletters, salaries for employees, computers, fax machines 
and copiers were funded. The activists were taught to connect with governments, other 
NGOs, and the public. The donors supplied trainers and training related to the civic 
development and the non-profit sector, sent leaders of groups abroad for international 
conferences and trips, financed translation of the necessary books from English to 
Russian, paid for research and supported domestic conferences and workshops for NGO 
activists. In addition, they provided moral support and encouragement (Henderson 2003: 
64; Henderson 2008). 
Although it is crucially important to criticize Western donors’ intervention in the 
Russian NGO sphere, it is also important to move beyond the critique (Hemment 2007: 
142). It should not obscure the potential for agency within the global exchanges. The 
arena of professional forms of activism is contradictory; and people who work within it, 
are aware of these contradictions, but try to make their activism matter (see Hemment 
2007; it is also indicated in my material in the case of the SOMO NGOs). They cannot 
afford to abandon this arena based on critical arguments. 
An analysis of the contradictions of the imported models of activism should be 
accompanied with a constructive political project. One example of this type of global 
activism is Julie Hemment’s (2007) participatory action research of women’s civic groups 
in Russia. Her own involvement in their work and relationships with them forced her to 
view global gendered interventions differently. She (ibid.: 143) stresses that while NGOs 
are often accused of de-politicizing resistance and co-optating activists, feminism in 
Russia and the imported concept “gender” became an explanatory framework that enabled 
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women activists to reinterpret the past and create new projects for personal and social 
change. The activists’ perceptions of empowerment cannot be dismissed as evidence of 
the “production of neoliberal citizens” (ibid.: 145).
In addition, the discussion of NGOs as elite enrichment should be nuanced. 
Hemment (ibid.) points out the fragility of the activists’ position and stability. Although 
involvement in NGOs can be regarded as a kind of career, it does not provide job 
security.35 The NGOs are often materially impoverished. They are sustained through 
voluntary work and by the financial support of spouses, children, and extended family.
The detachment of a group of professional activists from their constituents cannot be 
blamed entirely on foreign assistance. Difficult economic conditions and the overall 
fragmentation of Russian society and state make activism so difficult that keeping the 
network alive could be seen as achievement in itself (ibid.). The mutual suspicion and 
competitiveness among the activist organizations also predates foreign assistance. 
Attempts to overcome fragmentation of the voluntary sector have been made through 
special programs. For example, in 1997, there was a less successful attempt to establish a 
coalition of the St. Petersburg’s NGOs (Sungurov 1999a).
Summary
This chapter has shown that Western aid to Russian NGOs has been inspired by a 
gendered neoliberal missionary formula for development projects. The civil society-
building has been interpreted in terms of establishing markets and cut backs in social 
services that used to be provided by the state. The social service NGOs which are mainly 
staffed by women, were to step in and fill the gaps of the market by providing services to 
disadvantaged groups. The result is a gendered distribution of power and resources;
women tend to be associated with non-profit non-state sector. Women’s activism is
discursively framed in terms of a “feminized” Third Sector of NGOs. Civil society has 
been depoliticized and reinterpreted in terms of women civic activists’ (unequal) 
partnership with the state. Further, civil society was viewed as a moralizing project which 
aimed at educating citizens to take individual responsibility, while the social structures 
                                                 
35 One of respondents in Hemment’s (2007: 84) study describes how women are being ”used up” by their 
involvement into the Third Sector: “My heart aches when I think of how many excellent women I know who 
work in the Third Sector are ill. It takes so much from you, there is such uncertainty, we all get ill after a few 
years.”   
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(e.g. the rule of law) were not there. In addition, Western intervention contributed to 
formalizing voluntary activism and establishing NGOs as a site of bureaucratized, 
professional, elitist activity distanced from local knowledge and grassroots citizens’ 
initiatives. Western donors tended to create civic organizations from scratch instead of 
supporting the pre-existing grassroots groups. Finally, Western donors’ policy of grants 
increased the competition and split between Russian NGOs by creating new hierarchies 
and stratifications among activists. At the same time, however, Russian activists’ access to 
Western donors’ and activist groups’ intellectual, material, symbolic, organizational, and 
social (personal friendships, solidarity) resources created conditions for empowerment, 
creative compromises, mutual learning, as well as ultimately insecure and fragile 
occupation.
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Chapter 7
Post-Soviet Gender Order and Women’s Agency
Introduction
This chapter and the following one analyze a historically evolving gender order, which 
affects the limits and possibilities of women’s socio-political self-organization in Russia. 
This chapter outlines the main shifts in the gender relations and women’s positioning in 
post-Soviet Russia. It describes the Soviet state’s hegemonic discourse through which new 
sexual morality was formed; it also describes a centralist organization of men’s and 
women’s engagement in family, sexuality, work, and politics. The position of women was 
defined as “working mother” and “chaste mother of the nation.” Women’s voluntary self-
organization outside the Party-state was prohibited. Furthermore, this chapter highlights a 
sexualized and “privatized” category of woman, which started to dominate in post-Soviet 
Russia. Finally, it stresses specific forms of the daily life agency and resistance of women.   
1. The Enforced Emancipation of Women
Apart from a brief period in the early 1920s when the feminists AlexandraKollontai and 
Irnessa Armand were allowed to head the Women’s Department in the Party, conditions 
for women’s emancipation were defined by the male leadership in the Communist party-
state. The formulation of the issues and solutions for women’s sexual discrimination 
during the Soviet period can be described as an “enforced emancipation” of women 
(Liljeström 1995: 412). This kind of emancipation policy did not include women’s voices 
or a debate among women. Relationships within the domestic sphere never became a 
target of the official emancipation.  
The Soviet gender system established by the party-state during the 1930s-1940s 
included a paradox. It included an ideological construction of the “new Soviet woman” –
a pro-masculine androgynous creature, a socialism-builder who participated in social 
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production and political activities – while incorporating thinking in terms of gender 
polarization and women as a secondary sex representing the Mother, bodily dimensions, 
and family (ibid.: 418).                 
The foundation for the ideological and political organization of the Soviet society 
was formed by Russia’s rural legacy. The rural society of the 1800s was organized 
through sex differential homo-sociality and patriarchal norms. Work tasks, places, and 
personal characteristics were perceived in terms of sex segregation. Biological fatalism 
and misogyny were pervasive. The hierarchical asymmetric homo-sociality in 
combination with stigmatizing regulative and control mechanisms ensured that women 
would prioritize the demands and expectations defined by men, family, and kin. At the 
same time, solidarity and ties of homo-sociality among women were weak (ibid.). 
After the 1917 October revolution, a period of a lively public discussion in the 
1920s reflected different opinions on a new sexual morality. It stressed that misogynist
attitudes were part of the pre-revolutionary life which should be changed. The Party 
leaders’ views about a new behavior, however, were based on moralistic puritanism. 
While the entire society became an object of the party’s disciplinary methods and
propaganda and while sexuality was suppressed in the Soviet society, women and girls 
were targeted through especially severe regulative measures. The new norms involved a 
category of women viewed as androgynous person by ascribing her masculine features
based on thinking rooted in biological determinism. This way of constituting gender 
created contradictory expectations and demands concerning women's sexual identity and 
bodily representations: "the so called feminine attributes have at once to be smoothed 
away or hidden and maintained" (Liljeström 1995: 230).    
In the 1930s-1940s, the Soviet gender order consisted of intertwining the pre-
revolutionary sex differential and misogynist mentality based on biological-essentialist 
gender ideology with new ideological priorities. The ideal of Homo Sovieticus as a 
genderless androgynous asexual creature actually pertained to women. These women 
embodied the “new Soviet woman.” Through a range of mechanisms, the party regulated 
women’s duties and tasks regarding both paid work and motherhood. Discourse of 
biological determinism and a hierarchy between men and women was combined with sex 
equality (ibid.: 419). Although the official goals of the Bolsheviks were to achieve gender 
equality, they contradicted assumptions that were taken for granted of the domestic sphere 
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as women’s ‘natural’ responsibility and of Woman as antithetical complement to Man 
(Goscilo and Lanoux 2006: 7).
A Soviet Working Mother  
At the center of the Bolsheviks’ politics was women’s participation in paid work and the 
redefinition of motherhood. Women were integrated in the Soviet polity as they were
mobilized to fulfill the state’s Five-Year Plans, while they still carried full responsibility 
for childcare and domestic chores. The system of public day care and other social benefits, 
although inadequate in many ways, was developed to allow women to fulfill their double 
role of worker-mother (Rule and Noonan 1996: Ch. 6).
The fact that women were drawn into social production gave them larger economic 
and social independence from men. They were both guaranteed paid work and social 
benefits. To be a state employee meant more than to receive salary. The state often
assigned the work places, which often provided apartments, childcare, shopping 
opportunities, and vacations. Although Russian men often maintained higher salaries and 
social positions than women, the man’s salary was not solely responsible for the family’s 
material and social status (Rotkirch 2000: 17).
Motherhood was politicized. Women were believed to raise “the children - not of the 
individual men - but of the socialist state” (Ashwin 2000: 10). Mothers were to act as 
mediators between the state and the child. While the position of men within the family 
was undermined, women were thought to be liberated from the patriarchal family and 
protected by the Soviet state. A new understanding of female virtue connected the 
obligations of wife and mother with an active contribution to the building of socialism. 
Particularly in the 1930s-1940s, the significance of motherhood and the role of women in 
the family were re-emphasized according to the Party’s attempt to strengthen the 
institution of the family and to increase nativity. For example, abortion was prohibited in 
1936-1955. According to the 1944 family law, women who had raised ten or more 
children could be titled Hero mothers (Liljeström 1995: 273, 276). 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet public sphere remained a men's world. The 
myth of sexual equality and the ideology of a heroic worker-mother, however, were 
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preserved despite women’s lower positions in the economy and politics. Moreover, in the 
1970s women were criticized for having “lost their femininity” and become 
“masculinized” (ibid.: 340).
The gender-based separation between the private and the public spheres pertained to 
the construction of femininity and masculinity: Home was described as created by the 
“skilful and warm hands of a woman:” a “woman-wife could within family express her 
specific ability of creating trust, respect, mutual understanding, spiritual unity and 
emotional warmth between husband and wife” (Martynova, cited in Liljeström 1995: 
367). This emphasis constantly conflicted with demands that women should actively 
participate in the professional work and socio-political activities. The exclusion of women 
from access to the leading positions and decision-making outside the homes was 
legitimized through a constant discursive construction of polarization between masculinity 
and femininity.     
A paradox between a happily working androgynous, emancipated woman and a 
family-oriented mother of children had dire practical consequences for the lives of women
(ibid.: 423). For example, in a letter from a working-class woman in the provincial town 
published in Pravda in 1988, a woman described her life in terms of extreme poverty and 
lost feminine identity. Her husband had abandoned her and her health had been destroyed 
by working shifts in the industry. She lacked elementary life conveniences, could not
afford new clothes, cosmetics, or hair cuts. Her comment is, “it would be wrong to call me 
a woman, though I am not a man either” (cited in Liljeström 1995: 411).
A Chaste Mother of the Nation
Soviet Russia is an example of women’s co-optation into a revolutionary movement, 
which promises to improve women’s status in society. The Soviet state never succeeded in 
genuinely enfranchising its female population during the revolutionary struggles (Goscilo 
and Lanoux 2006: 10). Female revolutionary activists often encountered the dilemma of 
fulfilling the state’s expectations of the New Woman, when they left their kin and families 
for the sake of political agitation and education. Women’s political engagement and 
treatment by fellow revolutionaries was subsumed into surrogate motherhood. The Soviet 
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press fell back on stereotypes “lauding the women as virtuous, nurturing, self-abnegating 
maternal figures, though their very actions counted traditional gender roles” (ibid.; see 
also Liljeström 2000). 
Women were socialized into the Soviet system and were expected to become the 
system’s loyal agents. The Women’s Department of the Party (Zhenotdel) was established 
in 1919 with the double aim of spreading the message of the Communist Party to the 
female masses and addressing women’s needs. They were placed under the strict control 
of the Party (Stites 1978: 341). At the same time, the local branches of Zhenotdel not only 
organized meetings, distributed Party publications and established reading rooms, but also 
performed functions such as child and orphan care, food distribution, housing supervision 
and public health promotion. Stites (ibid.: 345) argues that the Zhenotdel represented “the 
working out ... of the feminist belief” and the Party feared that women might begin to 
define their own agenda. The Zhenotdel were abolished in 1930 after the ‘woman 
question’ was officially declared as solved (Liljeström 1995: 237).          
The state tried to use women as disciplinary agents in its struggle for ideological and 
cultural transformation. For example, in the war against drunkenness women were 
portrayed and deployed as allies of the state in the struggle for sobriety (Ashwin 2000: 12; 
Buckley 1996). Another example illuminates how women were encouraged not to stay
outside the officially designed public life. In the late 1930s, the officially supported 
“movement of housewives,” called “public spirited woman,” Obshchetsvennitsa, included 
women who were not directly involved in the social production. They were working 
without pay in hostels, canteens, schools, hospitals, factories, and offices (Buckley 1996). 
The movement was an attempt to turn married women into active supporters of the Party-
state's economic politics. 
Women were, however, involved in the political institutions primary as ideological 
workers at middle and low positions (Moses 1978). At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, 
which marked the beginning of de-Stalinization, the low number of women in leading 
Party positions was recognized. This critique, however, included mere a statement that 
women’s responsibility for household and child care were the main obstacles for their 
advancement. It did not address the gender related grounds for women’s discrimination. 
Women’s Councils (zhensovety) were created at large workplaces to mobilize women for 
the implementation of Party policy. These organizations mainly failed to contribute to 
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increased gender awareness among women (Browning 1987: 118; Racioppi and 
O’Sullivan See 1997: 30).  
Instead of access to positions that would give authority in policy decisions, women 
were ascribed an important iconic role in politics. A family role of ‘dutiful mother’ was 
projected into the public sphere as a symbolic model that represented political and social 
conformity (Novikova 2000: 122). Like in all other nations, Russianness is founded on
notions of masculinity and femininity. Nationhood assumed a female form. In Russian, 
the grammatically feminine noun “rodina,” related to verb “give birth” (rodit’), conjures 
up the emotive, familial and ethnic aspects of nationhood (Goscilo and Lanoux 2006: 9). 
After the mid-1930s, political posters appeared which depicted a mother and a baby girl
defending themselves against the intimidating Nazis. While it depicted the vulnerability of 
women and children it also showed a nation in need of protection against Nazism. During
the war, the state and nation visually merged with family and motherhood. A well known 
poster Za rodinu (For mother-homeland) represents soldiers under the figure of a woman 
in red clothes with a flag in her right hand and her left hand around a little boy. This 
woman, a strong matron, was a personification of Mother Russia (Rodina-Mat’) 
(Liljeström 1995: 273). At the same time, Russian and Soviet heads of state fostered a cult 
of masculinity, epitomized by imperial Russia’s all-male cadre of bureaucrats, military 
schools, and exclusive institutions of nobles, as well as by the Soviet Union’s ideological 
founding fathers, New Men, and Stakhanovite workers. Stalin, who personified masculine 
omnipotence, institutionalized a militaristic machismo that relegated women to their 
traditional roles of domestic reproducers (Goscilo and Lanoux 2006: 13). 
In literature, the Soviet woman was interpreted as the 'mother of a hero' (Mother by
Maxim Gorky), a heroine who chooses duty over love (Lubov' Iarovaia by Trenev), or a 
romantic girlfriend of a dying protagonist fighting for communism (Kak zakalialas'
stal'/How the Steel was Tempered by Nikolai Ostrovsky). In these works, "the traditional 
plot in Russian classical literature which revolved around relationships between spouses 
or lovers is replaced by the father-daughter conflict in which the father can be Comrade 
Stalin, the Soviet secret police, the army, or indeed the entire nation.” Instead of 
promising his daughter a union with a man, the father offers her a chance to provide a 
noble service on behalf of the grand political endeavor (Azhgikhina 1995). 
133
2. The Post-Soviet “Privatized” Woman 
In the post-Soviet state women are no longer guaranteed work outside the home and social 
benefits have been dismantled. Motherhood has been redefined as a private institution and 
responsibility. Men are expected to reassume what is regarded as traditional ‘male’ 
responsibilities (Ashwin 2000: 2). Work and motherhood are no longer defined as duties 
to the state, which no longer monopolizes the patriarchal role. During the Soviet era, 
women tended to view having children as a useful and valued service to society. Mothers 
socialized in the Soviet era tended to claim that their children were something they “gave 
to state” (rodila gosudarstvu) (Zdravomyslova 1996, quoted in Ashwin 2000: 26). Now 
they are being taught that ‘only you need your child’ (Issoupova 2000: 39). The duty to 
participate in public production is substituted by the economic necessity to provide for the 
family (Temkina and Rotkirch 2002). While the role of mother is still important, the 
emphasis in women’s “mother-worker” identity is on ‘working’ rather than on ‘mother.’ 
As the state system of social benefits has eroded, the significance of the personal social 
network and the kin has increased. Someone from the kin takes care of children and 
household while women work. Gender relations are thus constructed within the extended 
family, while the role of men in the family is marginalized. Another type of arrangement 
is when a working woman purchases private services for the household and child care, 
either by negotiating with the kin, privately hired care-takers, or the education and health
care institutions in the private sector. Women are still perceived as having the full 
responsibility for the organization of the household (ibid.). A third type is the woman-
housewife supported by the husband-breadwinner. Caring, motherhood, giving service 
combined with sexual attractiveness (a feature which was absent in the Soviet sexual 
order) are perceived as a woman’s identity. A man is the central actor in this arrangement. 
A new type of gender arrangement is a so called “sponsored woman,” based on 
commoditization of sexuality and a commercialized relationship (ibid.).
In the 1990s, women as a group became marginalized and impoverished. Neoliberal 
market-oriented reforms had a profound negative effect on women. They lost jobs and 
welfare provisions due to neoliberal structural adjustments. In addition, women, who 
remained responsible for domestic work including cooking, shopping and childcare, bore
134
the main burden of coping with the consequences of free market policies, in the form of 
high prices of food and services (Hemment 2007: 78). Data on poverty, gender, and age 
from the World Bank Report (1998) show that, women continue to be over represented 
among the ranks of the poor in post-Soviet Russia. Between 1990 and 1995, women lost 
seven million jobs while men lost two million (Rasnake et al. 2000). However, relying on 
their relatively higher levels of education, women have taken entry-level positions with 
opportunities for advancement. As a result, their income levels in managerial positions 
have begun to rise, from 50 percent of what their male counterparts earned in 1994 to 70 
percent by 1997 (ibid.).
The number of women in political institutions declined considerably in Russia after 
the Soviet quotas of women's obligatory participation were removed36 (Kay 2000: 55).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Union of Russian Women 
(URW) created an electoral block "Women of Russia" which successfully ran in the 
parliamentary election campaign 1993. In total, women comprised 13.5 percent of the 
legislature. Although still low the number of women has doubled since 1990 (Rasnake et 
al. 2000). In the Upper House of Parliament, the Federation Council, women accounted 
for only 5.3 percent. At the regional level the proportion of women elected to local 
legislatures amounted to 9.9 percent (ibid.). After the 1995 parliament elections, the 
proportion of women in Duma fell to 10.2 percent in 1995 and to 7.7 percent in 1999. In 
April 2000, the percentage of women in Parliament was respectively 7.7 in lower chamber 
and 0.6 in upper chamber. In the Judiciary women made up 15.8 percent of the 
Constitutional Court justices (ibid.). 
In the executive branch of the Russian government, women were represented at the 
bottom level of the hierarchical ladder. For example, in 1995, 44 percent of state 
bureaucrats were women, while they comprised only 3.9 percent at the upper level 
(Rasnake et al. 2000). In June 1996, President Yeltsin issued a decree "On Increasing the 
Role of Women in the System of Federal Bodies of State Powers ..." and subsequently 
nominated several women to administrative and judicial posts (ibid.: 20). In April 2000, 
no woman was appointed at the ministerial level and 19 percent of appointees at sub-
ministerial level were women (ibid. 4-9).    
                                                 
36 When situated in an international perspective the representation of women and the rate of women's 
participation in national politics in Russia is not as divergent than those in the United States (higher), very close 
to those in the western European states, though lower than those in Scandinavia (Gal and Kligman 2000: 94).
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Under increasing competition for all resources in the market economy, women are 
discriminated against in crucial spheres of access to qualified well-paid work as well as to 
sources of institutionalized power. According to a survey conducted in 2002,37 women 
experience discrimination in the labor market. More than half of women believe that men 
have more opportunities to find jobs according to their qualifications (57.8%), to get a job 
in general (52.5%), and are paid more (55%). Women see a clear discrimination in the 
sphere of politics which in contrast to civic activism allows access to institutionalized 
power. 52.7% of the respondents believe that men have more opportunities to participate
in politics (Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2002).   
There are only few spheres of life in which women experienced equal or even more 
rights and possibilities than men: Education (72.7%), family (70%), recreation during 
vacation (66%), leisure time (56.8%), and participation in civic life (50.7%) (ibid.). 
Most women believe that their life situation deteriorated in the post-Soviet period. It 
became harder to receive education of one’s own choice (65%), to find a job (80%), to 
meet a life partner (53%), to rear children (86%), to get a management position in the 
work place (47%), to manage a household (47,5%), or to protect oneself from violence 
(72%). At the same time, many women (45.8%) stress that they have gained more 
opportunities to realize themselves in business, politics and civic activity (ibid.).   
‘Sexual Liberation’ Based on Traditional Roles     
Traditional views of what constitutes ‘normal’ men and women, have acted as a vehicle 
for change in Eastern Europe. ‘Freedom’ was associated with the freedom to enact more 
fully a traditional feminine or masculine identity, without the restrictions of the socialist 
state (Watson 1993: 71). During glasnost, the communist policy of women’s 
emancipation was criticized and rejected. It was officially acknowledged that the “solved” 
status of the women’s question was a myth. Women held fewer leading positions and their 
upward mobility within the party lagged behind that of men (Buckley 1989: 201; Rule and 
Noonan 1996). In the seventy years of Soviet state power no woman was ever head of 
state and no woman (with exception of Alexandra Kollontai) ever joined the Politburo. 
                                                 
37 Respondents were 1406 women in age groups from 17 to 50 years, from 12 administrative regions, Moscow 
and St. Petersburg (Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2002).
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Exhausted by the need to carry the ‘double burden’ in an economy of shortages, women 
wanted to leave their workplaces at factories and boring offices and return to the home. 
‘Genuine liberation’ of women was understood in terms of the consumption and lifestyle 
of the middle class women in the West (Lissyutkina 1999: 169). At the same time, the 
Western-style feminism was criticized as an element of left-wing political culture (ibid.) 
Glasnost also allowed a reinforced conservatism in the official view on women as 
belonging back in the family. Differences between the public and the private spheres as 
well as between gender-based social roles and tasks were thus strengthened. Mikhail 
Gorbachev was among the most authoritative of those who openly expressed 
traditionalism. He emphasized that women did not have time for "pure feminine tasks" 
such as "to take care of the household, foster children and create a nice atmosphere in the 
family" and that this should be changed (cited in Liljeström 1995: 389; see Rule and 
Noonan 1996: 84). The ways of this conservative and traditional patriarchal reconstruction 
of the notion of femininity can be traced firstly in the descriptions of women's 'true nature' 
and 'eternal characteristics' and secondly, in the more active opposition of feminine 
stereotypes as an antithesis to a Soviet woman. Openly misogynist attitudes were 
expressed based on views on women as second class citizens, deficient people. For 
example, a professor in psychology argued that women intellectuals are "false women" 
(Liljeström 1995: 390). In the mass media the "over-emancipated Soviet woman" was 
made responsible for all kinds of social problems such as youth hooliganism, male 
alcoholism, and the high rates of divorces. The opinions that "women should not at all 
participate in politics" and "do not need work for her incomes" were publicized (ibid.:
390, 391). During perestroika and glasnost with the democratization and freedom of 
speech, new ideals created new expressions for sexualizing women’s bodies and 
promoting a biological view on gender relations. On the one hand, the control over 
women’s sexuality and fertility increased with the publication of manuals with advice on 
sexual behavior. On the other hand, women’s bodies were commercialized in the name of 
“sexual liberation” and market economy. The number of visual images of sexual violence 
increased. Images constructing (hetero)sexuality constitute primary tools and ways for 
preserving male supremacy (ibid.).
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The Intersection of Gender, Class, and Nation
Women are not a monolithic group; they are also defined socially through class, ethnicity, 
age, geographic region, and so on. National projects as well as class formation, which 
demand specific gender arrangements, invoke particular symbolic representations: For 
example, strong males such as fathers and warriors protecting chaste females, the mothers 
of the nation and its maidens, or responsible males supporting their wives and children. 
The changing status of men is thus inextricable from the changing status of women; they 
transform in tandem. They work through each other and are intricately tied to the 
emergence of class and national identity (Gapova 2004: 101). 
Changes in the gender order are interrelated with the creation of a class system and 
the ideology of nationalism in the post-socialist context. After the late 1960s, social 
concerns about the emasculation of males were expressed in the Soviet Union. Gender 
debates were spurred by an article published in the leading publicist weekly Literaturnaya
Gazeta (Zdravomyslova and Temkina 2001) which stated that Soviet men appear to be 
physically weak, more prone to diseases and to have a shorter life expectancy than 
women. They were not capable of taking care of themselves and needed supervision and 
guidance from their wives and mothers. Gapova (2004) argues that the reason for the 
perception of men as weak was related to the lack of “opportunities” for developing a
traditional masculinity. In other words, the Soviet gender order made it difficult to 
confirm masculinity as constructed through access to “money” (broadly understood). 
Class is partially about income, and the Soviet “lack of masculinity” was the issue of a 
lack of class. 
In this classless society, men’s material resources were not superior to those of 
women who were generally materially dependent on the state and not on individual men. 
During perestroika, women were to be liberated from their dual role, and given the 
opportunity not to work and become better mothers and housewives. The “liberation” of 
women (an euphemism for sending them home) was linked with other social ideals such 
as glasnost and political reform, and therefore acceptable along with other bourgeois class 
values. These redefinitions are on the one hand related to the symbolic and material 
creation of a class system; on the other hand, to processes of imagining the nation. “The 
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national idea provides a justification for the emerging system of class and gender 
inequality by ‘veiling’ its true goals with nobler ones – those of ‘national freedom,’ and 
more specifically, of protecting ‘our women’“ (ibid.: 94). For example, throughout history 
the nation’s military casualties were equated with its losses from abortion and 
contraception. The nationalist position combines patriarchal views on reproduction with 
liberal freedoms such as freedom of the press. Historically, liberty and equality were
defined as attributes of the fraternity (Pateman 1988) from which women were excluded. 
Women are seen as bearers and reproducers of the national culture and therefore need to 
be “protected” (Gapova 2004: 95). Declining fertility rates, the abduction of Russian 
women into the global sex trade, and an exodus of Russian sex workers abroad have been 
paradoxically interpreted as signs of male humiliation (Goscilo and Lanoux 2006: 21).     
In the post-Soviet society a social group of “the new rich“ was produced mainly 
among the usually well educated and connected. Most of the young entrepreneurs, bankers 
and real estate brokers had a jump-start within the old Soviet nomenklatura and 
Communist Party or were highly positioned Komsomol leaders which included very few 
women (Gapova 2004: 97). The manliness of the “new rich” is also confirmed through a 
“sexual” consumption: new men’s magazines publish high-quality pornography and a
whole industry of high-class sexual services emerged. In the early 1990s, the editors of 
Russia’s leading pornographic magazine Andrei claimed to bolster democracy and human 
rights in Russia through their struggle for “porn liberation.” Such claims, however,
conceal sexual exploitation and violence against women (Goscilo and Lanoux 2006: 21).
The creation of a capitalist (Western-style) middle class and normative masculinity are 
connected; women became objectified in the process. The subordination of women takes 
the form of a “redomestication:” protecting women and generally placing them within the 
private sphere. It was believed that “the idea of necessity, of pleasure, of beauty, finally, 
of the sacredness of housework, of the work for their families, their children, their 
husbands and, by this, their own happiness” is most needed for women and that by 
adhering to it they will best serve the common cause (Gapova 2004: 98). 
Reproductive choices were constrained: In 1998, federal funding for abortion was 
eliminated by a vote in the Duma (Sperling 2006: 166). Nationalist demagogues placed 
fertility issues at the top of the agenda. In 2003, they succeeded in limiting abortion rights 
for the first time since the Stalin era (Goscilo and Lanoux 2006: 20). Prostitution, which 
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increased formidably, is perceived not only as a social phenomenon but also a discursive 
metaphor for a national crisis. Russian authors continue to mythologize and romanticize 
the woman-prostitute as a symbol of suffering and redemption, or a symptom of the evil 
of Western capitalism. They thereby overlook the social problems of prostitution, sex 
trafficking, and the mail-order bride industry. The government declared sex-trafficking 
illegal and punishable by law only in 2003 (ibid.: 21).     
3. Women’s Daily Life Agency and Resistance 
Through its policies and rhetoric the state sanctions and promotes certain femininities, 
while marginalizing or suppressing others. However, “this project is never complete, as 
women resist and challenge the state’s notions of appropriate female identities and 
actions, and the state’s impacts are spatially uneven” (Radcliffe 1993: 197). Women and 
men are active in constructing their own gender identities, within the constraints 
associated with the geographical and historical contexts. Changes in gender order might
emanate at the level of individual interactions, in which sexual identity is materialized and 
norms are enacted in social practices.
In Soviet Russia, hierarchy and asymmetry pervaded the symbolic, structural and 
individual levels of the gender order. At the individual level, however, there were no
premises or opportunities for formulating thoughts for a subversive counter-discourse. 
The expressions of protest were limited by punitive legislation, which stigmatized and 
suppressed deviant behavior. A prevailing biological definition of women’s gender 
identity and their symbolic subordination turned the constitution of gender into a set of 
conceptions, which were difficult to articulate. Gender-related assumptions remained 
unarticulated “truths” that were taken for granted (Liljeström 1995: 423).  
During different Soviet historical epochs, however, women expressed their
discontent and protest in a range of specific ways. For example, in the 1930s during the 
enforced collectivization of peasants’ private households, when the state expropriated 
grain, tension spread among peasants. Women’s riots (bab’i bunty) became a common
form of protest. Women stood at the village market and cried out their discontent and 
demands in a shrill tone. In the official press the riots were labeled as mass hysteria, 
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meaningless violence and disorder. The resistance strategy involved a certain gendered 
pattern. Women were able to protest, as they were less likely to be accused of “anti-
Soviet” activity. When the authorities tried to restore order, however, the men could join 
the riot under the pretext of “protecting” their own wives, mothers and daughters. 
Women’s riots were usually the beginning of a general riot in the village. The official 
press explained them as the result of the women’s “backwardness,” and their low cultural 
and political level. Baba was the “darkest” sector of the backward peasant people and
viewed as children. The women therefore escaped punishment and the Party’s reaction 
instead involved trying to improve propaganda work among peasant women. Violence 
was very seldom used against bab’i bunty (ibid.: 288). 
Women’s discontent included complaints at the kitchen table, embittered letters to 
the editor column in the Soviet press, and an increased number of divorces initiated by 
women and their refusal to accept the pro-natal pressure from the authorities (Liljeström 
1995: 308). Women expressed more indirect protests by refusing to give birth to many 
babies, as demanded by the Party. After 1936 when abortion was criminalized, illegal 
abortions increased. In 1940, the number of births equaled that of 1935. Women had thus 
rebuilt social networks for illegal abortions. Instead of giving many births, women tried to 
take advantage of new opportunities for education and professional careers. They became 
aware of ways of life outside the traditional role. The Party’s attempts to control women’s 
sexuality were resisted by these choices (ibid: 292). 
The officially endorsed identity of the ‘working mother’ coexisted with alternative 
informal arrangements of gender relations, such as a “shadow gender contract” (Temkina 
and Rotkirch 2002: 190-192). The Soviet women became skilful survivors in an economy 
of shortages, by managing the art of informal favor exchange blat. For example, they 
managed to buy food that was not available in stores or find place in a nursery through 
friends and friends of friends (Ledeneva 1998: 120, 121). 
“Extended motherhood” (Rotkirch 2000) may be seen as a continued tradition of 
extended family as well as a strategic resistance to the official system. The double and 
triple burden of women and the inadequate system of public day care resulted in the need 
to rely on the help of their own mothers (babushka) to take care of household chores. The 
babushka had the major responsibility for unpaid household and childcare work. In 
Russian tradition, children were responsible for taking care of their elderly parents and 
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babushka repaid by caring for small children and the household. Despite the official 
propaganda which advocated a nuclear family consisting of parents and children, the 
families often included three generations. Practical solidarity between adult daughters and 
their mothers developed and the family became an unarticulated and disguised form of 
resistance against the Party’s “nuclear family-oriented” directives (Liljeström 1995: 293).      
    A small feminist dissident movement emerged in the Soviet Union at the end of the
1970s including two groups with different social visions in opposition to the dominant 
ideological regime. One was based on the socialist ideals and social experiments of the 
1920s and the other was founded on the religious identity of the Russian orthodoxy (ibid.: 
308).38 Most women did not, however, accept feminist ideas. First, the majority of Soviet 
citizens were loyal to the political leaders. Second, women lacked the experiences and 
traditions of a grassroots’ mobilization. As women have to compete with each other for 
the scarce resources, ties of solidarity among them were undermined (ibid.). 
Women instead strived for autonomy and self-realization by focusing more on 
family and efforts to look feminine. A contradictory cult of domesticity was a reaction to 
the official program of participating in the work force as a basic premise of liberation. 
Official emancipation was associated with poorly paid, dull or physically tough 
workplaces such as the railways or construction sites and facing misogyny and open 
violence from men. In this context, women longed for devoting themselves to family life,
home, fashion, and romantic love. In the 1980s, traditional sexual identities of “real” men 
and women were increasingly viewed as a return to “normality” distorted by the Soviet 
system. A desire to look “feminine” was often not associated with the Soviet women’s 
desire to attract a man. It was rather a protest against the dominant kind of femininity. 
Male chivalry has historically been absent in Russia and women’s longing after a 
romantic chivalrous man was a way to articulate their needs (ibid.: 309, 413, 416; 
Lissyutkina 1999).           
This context helps to understand why women rejected Western feminism, the 
knowledge of which was based on its defamed representation in the Soviet press. For most 
women, feminism equaled “lesbian women who hate men” and preaching a de-
feminization of women, engaging in paid work and politics at the expense of devotion to 
family and childcare (Liljeström 1995: 414; see Sperling 1999).
                                                 
38 Feminist groups in contemporary Russia are described in more detail in chapter 8 of this dissertation.  
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In contrast to a devotion to family and the domestic sphere, other types of agency 
regard the workplace as a crucial way to flee from the drudgery of the family and 
household chores. For many working class women, their workplaces rather than their 
homes were the center of their life. The work collective provided a profound satisfaction. 
Not the official units, but rather informal groups created by women, including informal 
leaders and norms of mutual care and friendship. These collectives were sources of 
togetherness and communication (Liljeström 1995: 415). For example, in the 
autobiography of an elderly working class woman from a Siberian town, published in 
1998, who periodically lived with a violent husband and his kin, work is experienced as 
“the friendly family” (Rotkirch 2004: 167). Work is the constant source of pride, success, 
and self-esteem in this woman’s life. The workplace never betrayed her; it fed and healed 
her, and unlike her husband and sons, did not forget her birthday (ibid.).   
A new female subject, able to articulate her own interests in the political sphere, 
began to emerge in post-Soviet Russia. The articulation of needs and interests of various 
groups of women is one link in the resistance against the “new” post-Soviet gender order. 
Creating women’s groups and independent organizations, described in the next chapter, is 
a form of agency and protest in this new Russian context. 
Summary
This chapter has shown that in Soviet Russia, the Bolsheviks’ regime was established 
through the hegemonic discourse about the new (sexual) morality of Homo Sovieticus and 
the state’s centralist organization of men’s and women’s varying involvement in paid 
work, family, sexuality, and politics. Women’s voluntary self-organization outside the 
Party-state was forbidden. The “new Soviet woman” became a paradox through which the 
rural Russia’s legacy of biological determinism, sexual polarization, and hierarchy 
between the sexes could be reproduced and modified in the Soviet society. At the same 
time, women expressed discontent, protest and resistance through specific forms of
consciousness and agency in everyday life. Further, in the late 1980s and during the post-
Soviet period, the tendencies of constituting a female subject as a sexualized and 
privatized category in opposition to the male-dominated spheres of politics and paid work 
became predominant. 
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Chapter 8
Women’s NGOs and Feminism
Introduction
This chapter describes different types of women’s NGOs and the emergence of a feminist 
movement in post-Soviet Russia. It clarifies the material and symbolic frameworks in 
which the women’s groups’ activities are imbedded. Further, it explains sources of 
tensions and negotiations between various types of women’s NGOs. Finally, it describes 
the role of the transnational feminist groups and the concept of “gender” in the Russian 
women’s movements. 
1. Types of Women’s NGOs   
Since the perestroika, women-activists of different political orientations have started to 
organize according to their own interests, separately from men. They had often realized 
that women’s issues were “overlooked by men” and that discrimination clearly is directed 
toward women (Sperling 1999: 57). New organizations have developed in different ways. 
Some organizations work mainly on an individual basis trying to help women during 
times of personal crisis. Other organizations try to achieve a long term change in women’s 
status by criticizing overtly gendered division of labor and gender roles. Although the 
focus of the women’s organizations are diverse, in scope, and strategies of actions, 
activists show a feeling of group consciousness as women and express the goal of 
changing the status of women in Russian society (ibid.: 30, 27). Various organizations
have different access and approach to official politics. Some are able to pressure political 
representatives and others express distaste for contacts with formal politics. The reasons 
for self-organization “combined a need for self-help, crisis management and moral 
support with recognition of the advantages of an association in terms of lobbying 
activities on various levels and representation of the group’s interests” (Kay 2000: 126).
144
According to various sources, one or two thousand women’s organizations existed in 
Russia by the early 2000s (Richter 2002; Uhlin 2006: 61). These numbers do not include 
all existing organizations, as many women’s groups have not registered for financial 
reasons. 
   Since the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, grassroots groups of women emerged 
as a protest against the political and economic direction of the reforms. Women’s 
unemployment and impoverishment frequently spurred self-help associations.
Organizations established in the late 1980s embraced various business groups, courses, 
enterprises, and provision of funds to protect women from unemployment and to cope 
during the decline in state welfare services. Many engage in reeducation and employment 
training programs, often in conjunction with branches of federal employment services 
(Sperling 1999: 227). Other organizations help women to find new jobs, to retain self-
esteem and to deal with sexual harassment in the work place (Bridger 1998). In many 
cases, business and charity were combined.
Further, a large number of mutual support groups for mothers were created, such as 
single mothers, mothers with many children, or mothers of children with disabilities. 
Some large charity organizations were created which helped needy women and children 
(Sperling 1999, Kay 2000). Another type of organization included women’s political
clubs and advocacy groups which aim to promote women to decision-making levels in the 
political, economic, and cultural spheres. Other types of organizations include support 
groups for professional women which offering both material and psychological support; 
crisis centers and hotlines for victims of rape and domestic violence; feminist counseling
and consciousness-raising groups; research groups specialized on women’s issues. A 
number of women’s groups are associated with political parties (Sperling 1999: 26, 27; 
Rule and Noonan 1996: 85; Kay 2000).  
Several larger networks of women’s groups were active throughout the 1990s and 
the early 2000s. They include the women’s councils (zhensovety) of the former state 
organizations, and explicit feminist groups of intellectuals in the Independent Women’s 
Forum (IWF), the Women’s League and the NIS-US Women’s Consortium. The network 
of women’s councils is related to the Soviet legacy of official women’s organizations. 
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Former State Organizations Zhensovety
Besides the new independent groups that were created in the 1990s, former state social 
organizations continued to function after they changed their organizational status. Many 
former official organizations zhensovety were revived during perestroika and subsequently 
reorganized as non-state groups which distributed material aid and organized events to 
celebrate holidays such as March 8th, the International Women’s Day. In the late 1980s, 
these women’s councils existed throughout the Soviet Union; there were about 230 000 
councils with more than 2.3 million members. The zhensovety were mainly involved in 
social welfare and activists were “engaged as unpaid stopgaps for the system” (Racioppi 
and See 1997: 108, 109). Several researchers concluded that these organizations focused 
on activities that extend women’s traditional roles; they tried to ease women’s domestic 
work, child care and family relations. 
In 1990, when state sponsorship of social organizations was withdrawn, the Soviet 
Women’s Committee was transformed into the Union of Women of Russia (UWR), a 
voluntary union of women’s councils and NGOs, which was not directly associated with 
the state. One of the priorities became to help women to adapt to economic reforms. 
Employment opportunities were described to women; instructors were brought from 
abroad to teach courses on the market economy to women who were trying to start their
own businesses. The demand for services was far larger than what the Union could 
provide with its limited budget (Racioppi and See 1997: 78). The Union of Women of 
Russia also tried to increase women’s political influence. In 1993, the Union successfully 
participated in the parliamentary election campaign. It formed a Women’s Block with two 
other women’s organizations (ibid., see Caiazza 2002: Ch. 4). In the State Duma, UWR 
acted first as a group with distinct political interests rooted in women’s roles as mothers 
and wives. It supported policies that would help women to perform their roles of primary 
caretakers such as protective labor legislation, maternity leave, and child support stipends. 
Men were not perceived as recipients in these policies. UWR did not seek to change 
gender roles or to include men in women’s traditional roles (Caiazza 2002: 53). Its 
approach to women’s issues fit the dominant conservative gender ideologies.              
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Groups of Feminist Intellectuals
Another important actor in the women’s movements during the 1990s and the early 2000s 
was the network the Independent Women’s Forum, created mainly through the effort of 
academic women employed in women’s studies research centers, established in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg and other major cities. 
In Soviet Russia, political dissidents were not interested in feminism, believing that 
women’s issues were not characteristic for Russia and that throwing out the communist 
regime would solve all the problems (Azhgikhina 2000: 10). Women who were involved 
in the dissidents’ groups were assigned a secondary role of muse, assistant, and girlfriend. 
Some young women’s refused to accept this patriarchal role division and formed the first 
women’s groups (Zdravomyslova 1996: 47). As mentioned in the previous chapter, a 
small feminist movement emerged in Leningrad in 1979-1980: Its leader Tatiana 
Mamonova published an almanac "Woman and Russia" which was distributed through 
samizdat. The almanac expressed women's protests against the military invasion of
Afghanistan, humiliations of female prisoners, abuses in maternity hospitals and women’s 
prisons, and violence against women. The group, however, dispersed as its members were 
persecuted by the security police, and four were forced into exile (ibid.; Rule and Noonan 
1996). 
Another feminist group emerged in the late Soviet period among highly educated 
academic women. A few young women researchers in Moscow and St Petersburg were 
able to choose to write dissertations about women’s issues (Posadskaya 1994). They were 
able to access and read feminist literature in English, which was kept hidden from the 
general public in the archives of libraries, spetskhrany, opened only on special official 
permission. For these researchers feminism was not a movement that articulated gender-
based discrimination, but rather a way to connect with the progressive debate in Europe 
through reading and personal contacts. The late-Soviet feminist researchers did not pursue 
any political mobilization project; they were small loose groups. The activists were 
mainly interested in achieving individual change of consciousness, a ‘self-realization.’ 
They thus hoped to facilitate a moral change in society (Hemment 2007: 76). This type of 
feminism developed by intellectuals was not directed against men and patriarchy, but 
against the Soviet state. For example, the state was accused of not providing tampons. It 
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was also a protest against a Soviet “weak” male figure allegedly brought into being by the 
state (ibid.: 77).
The Soviet leaders had ratified the UN Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. As the situation for women deteriorated as a result of the 
democratic and free-market oriented reforms in the 1990s, official data on women’s 
situation had to be collected and feminist scholars were in demand. Feminist researchers 
were able to study and criticize the processes of the reforms from within state structures 
(Hemment 2007: 78; Posadskaya 1994).  
At the same time, some feminists organized outside formal structures.  They started 
as a small, informal, friendly group of researchers called LOTUS (which in Russian 
means Getting Free from the Stereotypes). The 'informal' associations were officially 
registered when it became legal in October 1990. Moscow-based feminist groups and 
women’s organizations met in 1991 and 1992 in the city Dubna to discuss women’s issues 
and to create networks. The groups, however, remained small, and were mainly 
concentrated in university milieus. They were not well connected with each other, and 
were not oriented towards a broader mobilization (Hemment 2007: 79). The Dubna forum 
attracted attention from international donor agencies as a new movement of Russian 
women. By 1994, The Independent Women’s Forum (IWF) included more than 300 
organizations throughout Russia (Rasnake et al. 2000). 
The Forum sought to ally itself with the feminist movements of the US and Western 
Europe. The leadership of the network was dominated by female academics. Many of 
them were involved in cooperative research projects and had visited the West to attend 
conferences and to present papers. They acquainted themselves with the work of women’s 
organizations in Western countries.      
The Network IWF collaborated with other pro-Western networks of women’s 
organizations in Russia such as the Women’s League. The Women’s League was an 
umbrella organization established in 1992 and was open to any group that supported the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. It was 
set up by women with good connections to government institutions. The activists 
considered Russia to be a deeply patriarchal and authoritarian society and intended to 
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empower women to become autonomous and to build a civil society (Racioppi and See 
1997: 156). 
2. Conditions for Organizing 
Women’s organizations are shaped within the material and symbolic framework of the 
formalized gendered Third Sector. In the 1990s and the early 2000s, due to the lack of a 
financial infrastructure for NGOs, some organizations have had to turn into small 
businesses thereby losing the sight of their primary goal of supporting women (Bridger 
1998). Most organizations are run on a volunteer basis and they lack money and other 
material resources. The organizations do not primarily rely on membership dues, but 
depend on economic support from the local administration or Western donors. While 
some organizations such as the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers and crisis centers for 
women have a significant constituency for their services it cannot be mobilized to support
the organizations financially or as a pool for recruitment to the movement (Sperling 2006: 
165).  
By the mid-1990s, many women’s groups, particularly advocacy groups based in 
Moscow became the recipients of foreign grants. The feminist groups became well-
funded, although they lacked ties with a broad constituency. At the same time, charities 
and service-providing groups received less foreign aid despite larger constituencies (ibid.: 
163; Henderson 2003). A number of service-providing women’s groups instead received 
financial support from state bureaucracies at the local and regional levels and some 
donations from Russian businesses.
Funding from Abroad  
Funding from abroad has been offered to bolster the position of women in the wake of 
economic hardships as well as to foster Western-style gender equality in the non-Western 
world in general. Due to the Western funding of training sessions and conferences, 
women from different organizations, cities and regions have been able to meet each other 
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and network (Henderson 2003: 91). Foreign funding has made it possible to publish books 
about women’s health, and sexual harassment at work written from an empowering 
feminist perspective (Sperling 1999: 229). 
As explained in chapter 6 of this dissertation, however, one of the side effects of 
Western funding is that it has created power relationships, bureaucratization, and the 
problem of equal access to funding. Sperling (1999: 237) quotes one of the activists: “The 
foundations … act through a bureaucratic apparatus that they created themselves. And it is 
precisely in this sense that one can speak of the formation today of a new nomenklatura
… within the women’s movement.” The IWF, Moscow Centre for Gender Studies, and 
some other organizations were perceived as privileged grant receivers (Henderson 2003).       
As many feminist groups are detached from a domestic constituency, the women’s 
movement is sometimes criticized for being “foreign” (Sperling 2006: 165). Strings were 
attached to the foreign grants. For example, while foreign donors prioritized certain issues 
defined in the transnational campaigns including domestic violence and human 
trafficking, Russian grassroots groups viewed economic issues of unemployment, 
housing, and child care as more critical (ibid.; Hemment 2004). Foreign grants and 
resources became centralized in the hands of “an insider, Westernized clique” within 
women’s organizations (Henderson 2003: 121), by groups mainly located in the capital 
and big urban centers (Sperling 1999; Richter 2002). This situation created resentment 
within the women’s movement. The unfunded groups believed that they would need to 
forge a clientelistic relationship with one of the program officers at the Moscow office to 
receive a grant (Henderson 2003: 137).
Women’s Attitudes toward Civic and Political Activism  
The symbolic framework of women’s activism in Russia includes two key elements: a 
normalization of the “privatized” image of women and the feminization of the Third 
Sector of NGOs.  
Women’s organizations emerged in the context of the post-Soviet gender climate 
embedded in the dominant mass media, political and social discourse, in which the 
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perceptions of women as actually belonging in the domestic sphere were normalized (Kay 
2000). 
During the Russian transition to a free-market economy, open forms of 
discrimination of women in the labor market helped many activists to understand what the 
discrimination of women meant and in which ways women’s problems differ from men’s 
(Sperling 1999: 57). Discrimination based on gender and age is, however, often not 
recognized by women. The Russian feminist Anastasia Posadskaya explains that the 
effects of discrimination include a “kind of political and psychological paralysis” (cited in 
Racioppi and See 1997: 130). Women were unable to take action in part because of the
dramatic changes in the public interpretations of their lives and partly because they have 
never been able to see themselves as independent agents:
Women were always told by our propaganda that they are emancipated and have reached 
the highest levels of society… Now these women are fired from their jobs. Now these 
women are told that their real or natural place is at home, that they will be given a very 
early pension, so that the economy is not harmed by their inefficient labor. On a personal 
level, this is terribly frustrating, this produces confusion. (Ibid.) 
Discursive factors partially explain why feminism as a social movement is currently 
so often rejected in Eastern Europe (Gal 1997). In the historically concrete civil societies 
only certain identities and activities can count as part of the public (see Flam 2001). The 
linguistic phrasing differs. For example, problems of increased prostitution and violence 
against women, which perhaps would be framed as “women’s issues” in Western Europe, 
are understood in gender neutral terms as a result of the disorder produced by rapid 
economic changes. Women feel equal to men as workers; this feeling is retained from the 
official ideology of state socialism (Gal 1997: 43). 
There is also evidence of a certain degree of awareness among women of gender-
based discrimination and the importance of women’s public organizing. According to a 
survey conducted in Russia in January, 2002, many women believe that it is possible and 
important to engage in civic activism and to increase the role of women’s organizations in 
society. The majority of women (both members and non-members of NGOs) distinguish
between notions of politics and civic activism. Women are mainly less interested in 
politics and more interested in civic activities, including among other things, the 
articulation of women’s specific interests. They believe that the expression of women’s 
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interest should dominate civic activism. Many women, however, do not want or do not 
have the opportunity to participate in such organizations (Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2002). 
Respondents tend to agree with the opposite viewpoints. For example, on the one hand, 
58.7% do not see a difference between women and men’s interests and contend that it 
does not matter who represents their interests in the political institutions as long as their 
interests are represented. On the other hand, approximately the same percent of 
respondents (61.8 %) contend that women are better able to represent and protect their 
own interests. The contradictory character of the women’s perceptions might reflect the 
current lack of effective mechanisms for representing women’s interests. As existing 
women’s organizations do not represent these interests efficiently, women feel that it does 
not matter who actually represents them, although they stress that it is necessary (ibid.). 
Moreover, about 70% of the respondents are unaware about the existence of 
women’s organizations in their cities and regions.39 The results of the survey show that the 
women’s organizations are not very visible in politics and in the development of civil 
society. They are seemingly unable to articulate the interests of different groups of 
women. A range of women’s needs and expectations from organizations include: 
psychological support in difficult life situations (54.4%), help to find a job (45.7%), to 
protect the interests of children; from leisure to issues articulated by the committees of the 
soldiers’ mothers (42.3%), material support to women with a troubled economy (41.4%), 
to fight drug addiction, alcoholism, prostitution, and so forth (26.8%), fighting all forms 
of discrimination against women (24%), protection from domestic violence (18.3%), help 
in starting one’s own business (9.4%), political struggle for women’s rights (8%). The 
high percentage of respondents who believe that the organizations should offer women
psychological support is probably the result of the tremendous socio-psychological stress 
experienced by women during the last decade (ibid.).
  
In many post-communist countries, women identify political action with “masculine 
behavior, power struggles, private property disputes, corruption and hypocrisy” (LaFont 
2001: 208). In Russia, the legacy of a profound split between the private and the public 
spheres, disapproval of female emancipation and gender equality, and weak civic 
                                                 
39 This means that around 30 percent of the respondents knew about women’s organizations, which probably 
shows that the role of women’s NGOs became more visible since 1997. In a 1997 survey conducted by the 
Levada Centre only about ten percent of respondents knew and approved the activities of women’s organizations 
(see Kochkina 2007: 119).
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structures make it very difficult to articulate women’s position in politics. According to 
survey data from 2002, only 13-22 percent of women believed that women and men have 
equal opportunities to be elected as a deputy of parliament, a member of government, or a 
president (Semigin et al. 2003: 99). 
In-depth interviews with candidates to the local legislature in St. Petersburg in 1994 
demonstrate that politically active women live with a feeling of inner split40 (Temkina 
1996: 169). They frequently present themselves as contradictory constructions. They are 
only involved in activism because their more desirable role in the family is not achievable 
at the moment. Women’s behavior in politics might be viewed in different ways. It might 
be seen in terms of stereotyped gender-related features. ‘Female attractiveness’ is used as 
a weapon against men: “she must kill a man by her appearance” (ibid: 170). A female 
‘nature’ gain particular significance: “a woman has a natural sense of protection. A man 
builds a house, a woman creates order there. … she will create stability and balance, she 
will be against confrontation” (ibid.: 171). 
Women assert a ‘woman-housekeeper’ role in the political arena taking care of the 
social sphere and leaving other issues to men. At the same time, male politicians often 
play the ‘woman card’ by including a token number of safe dependable women in their 
team (ibid.: 11; see also Konstantinova 1998). Based on ‘gynocentric’ ideas, attributing 
different psychological natures to men and women, women-activists argue that female 
compassion can change politics if women enter into the political institutions (Sperling 
1999: 63).  
Women who choose a life of political activism generally do not act as strong 
advocates for women’s rights. This lack of enthusiasm is explained as a reaction to the 
Soviet legacy which treated women’s issues in a paternalistic manner and which was low 
in prestige. Emphasizing women’s themes in the political life thus became associated with 
undermining one’s professional standing. These politicians believe that issues of 
consolidating democracy and an effective economic system are more urgent (Kuehnast 
and Nechemias 2004: 11).        
The members of the political movement Women of Russia which in 1993 entered the 
parliament viewed themselves as a ‘social’ force, which perhaps for a short time was
                                                 
40 Genovese (1993: 5) points out the conflict experienced by politically active women, who “must come to some 
understanding of herself as a person and as a political figure that resolves, manages, or represses the tensions 
between her merging self-view as capable of functioning effectively at the highest political levels, and the 
generalized social view that neither she nor any other woman has that competence.”
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pushing into ‘political’ roles (Buckley 1999: 159). Women’s activism in politics was 
understood in terms of ‘replacing’ men, which was justified by the failure of men to 
defend the interests of the ‘elderly, children and women’ (ibid.). 
The interpretation of women’s civic activism is influenced by a biological-essentialist 
understanding of sexual differences, which in accordance with the Soviet past treats
women’s secondary position as the result of natural differences. Civic activism is 
associated with more informal collective action, home/family, and attributes which pertain 
to woman’s perceived gendered role. Women who are involved in non-profit 
organizations are frequently constructed in terms of morality, collectivism, wisdom, and 
the ability to self-sacrifice (Salmenniemi 2005). Women’s activism is framed through a
metaphor of “social motherhood;” women are considered to perform the same tasks in the 
public-political sphere as they perform at homes: to care, nurture and raise children
(Salmeniemi 2005: 746; see also Hemment 1999). 
3. Tensions and Negotiations   
Differences and divisions among women’s groups create tensions as well as dynamic 
negotiations. The tensions and divisions are concerned with the framing of the 
significance of women’s activism and the unequal access to the sources funding. 
To many members, the activities of grassroots women’s NGOs symbolize a 
challenge to the dominant images of women as persons who belonged at home and who 
could only act in politics as an adjunct to a man (Kay 2000: 132). At the same time,
however, most organizations did not organize their work as - and did not perceive it - in 
terms of feminist from a Western perspective (ibid). Moreover, the notion of feminism 
was often criticized among women-activists as an expression of individualism and 
separatism, associated with a struggle against men (Sperling 1999: 64). This was one 
source of tensions among different groups, such as between the grassroots women's 
organizations and the Independent Women's Forum which allied itself with the feminist 
movements in Western Europe and the US on one side, and the Union of Women of 
Russia (UWR) connected to the Soviet past, on the other. The grassroots activists 
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associated The Union of Women of Russia with the official party-controlled Soviet 
Women's Committee and its network of zhensovety which were used for handing down 
party directives. They expressed distrust in the organization, which used to be run by 
members of nomenklatura (Kay 2000). On the other hand, the grassroots NGOs, which 
mainly focused on practical work to improve the lives of ordinary women, rejected 
excessive theorizing and abstract debates. Grassroots women’s organizations distrusted 
the Independent Women's Forum (IWF) as a group of privileged academic women who 
published articles in the West and who were distant from practical approaches. In the 
1990s, only a small group of highly educated women became interested in the theories of 
Western feminism (ibid: 177). 
The UWR gained more credibility from its ability to provide practical support for 
women. The UWR’s ‘official’ standing, however, also alienated its own members who 
described it as a large, faceless organization. They described their involvement with it in 
instrumental rather than personal and emotional terms. Some of the activists argued that 
the UWR members “are still the same party nomenklatura as before. It is not really the 
right organization to unite all women in a movement to fight for their rights” (cited in 
ibid.: 178). 
On the other hand, after having been in contact with the IWF some of the grassroots 
organizations felt that they were not regarded as sufficiently ‘feminist’ and denied access 
to the Forum’s networks: “They look down at us, you see they are all academics and ex-
party types and they look at us as second or even third class citizens … they look on us 
just as a load of silly women who get together and sit around drinking tee” (cited in ibid.: 
179).  Feminism risked being viewed as a form of Western cultural imperialism. The West 
was associated with wealth, and Western feminism increased a sense of alienation from 
feminism among Russian women, faced with poverty and unemployment. “They go on all 
these trips, for no obvious reason. They aren’t going to stay here and concern themselves 
with women drug addicts or keep on trekking to the town hall to fight for proper, decent 
conditions in the abortion clinic” (cited in ibid: 183). At the same time, however, activists 
and academics within the IWF discussed strategies for improving collaboration among 
different women’s groups. Criticism about the lack of working-class women in the 
network dominated by the intelligentsia was common (ibid.: 185).  
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In contrast to Moscow and St. Petersburg, movements in smaller and more distant 
cities (for example, Ivanovo and Cheboksary) were more unified, but were tiny and less 
diverse. The groups in the smaller cities were not fragmented due to a perceived affiliation 
with the state or the Communist party. They did not receive any funds from Western 
foundations. In smaller cities, groups could easier forge political alliances within the elite. 
Members of the women’s councils zhensovety held a seat in the city legislature or was the
representative in the republic’s parliament (Sperling 1999: 39, 40). In Moscow, the 
women’s groups’ opportunities to influence policy making on the national level were 
more limited. The motives for the organization differed between big and small cities. As a 
result of the economic crisis (e.g. in Ivanovo), the women’s organizations were motivated 
by the impoverishment of the provincial residents. This factor was less important in 
Moscow, where despite the economic problems, many groups still were able to be devoted 
to non-material goals (ibid.: 41).
Global “Gender” and Transnational Negotiations 
Although most women’s organizations do not view their activities in terms of feminism, 
conceptions of “gender” and gender-based discrimination were introduced in women’s 
movements by explicit feminist groups. As explained earlier, groups of highly educated 
women activists act as ‘brokers’ who negotiate contacts with international activists and 
Western donors’ agency representatives. The concept of “gender” helped women to make 
sense of the socio-economic inequalities (Hemment 2007: 143). The intermediate role of
Western-oriented activists in the Russian women’s movement, however, was ambivalent. 
The “mainstreamed” conceptions of gender imported to Russia mainly represented the 
“cultural” feminism of Western white middle-class women and the development industry 
promoted by the international lending institutions (Ghodsee 2004; Hemment 2007). 
As explained in chapter 2 of this dissertation, the transnational women’s movement
is characterized by asymmetric power relations (Mohanty 2003). The material and 
historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in non-Western societies are often not 
recognized by hegemonic white women’s movements. The Western feminist approaches 
to Slavic women can also be short-sighted. Holmgren (1995: 19, 20) stresses that the 
legacy of Cold War rhetoric and the market-speak of Western developmental politics 
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(including “mainstream” feminism) continue to polarize women in Russia. Western 
feminists often focused on the Soviet women’s achievements of guarantees of work, but 
dismissed aspects of their daily life and struggles including unrelieved domestic labor, the 
lack of consumer goods and services, and the political victimization they shared with men. 
Russian women are historically not viewed in terms of gender. Feminism was 
denounced as a product of the ideology of privileged middle- and upper-class women. The 
category of gender was a non-term in pre-revolutionary Russian and Soviet societies. The 
unifying categories of oppression were class and resistance/allegiance to the state. In the 
Soviet Union, despite women’s double burden and practical inequality no campaigns for 
domestic revolution emerged. The domestic sphere instead became enchanted as a space 
protected from the influence of the state. Despite the changes in society during the post-
Soviet era, the domestic sphere is still often experienced as a counter pole to the sphere of 
unscrupulous business and ineffective politics. In the beginning of the 1990s, some 
women viewed the “return to the home” as a self-investment and a moral act. In post-
Soviet society, women who face many material hardships are continuously conditioned to 
reject the allegedly middle-class bias of feminism with its focus on individual fulfillment
(ibid.: 20, 21). 
At the same time, the dominance of state/society opposition in Russia has a limiting 
impact on women’s self-images and lifestyles. The role of the heterosexual good mother 
apparently continues to dictate most Russian women’s ideal and obstructs an acceptance 
of more non-traditional identities such as lesbians and bisexuals (Holmgren 1995: 23). 
It is important not to presume certain oppressions and impose solidarity. Despite 
inequalities of post-soviet capitalism and “male democracy,” Russian women have not 
only been made victims and innocent accomplices, but could work the system to gain 
political and economic power (ibid.: 26). As many researchers have stated, however, in 
the post-socialist context a cultural feminism, which is imported from the U.S. and used 
by many local NGOs, tends to meet the special needs of women within the status quo, 
without challenging the decline of living standards and neoliberalism. The hegemonic 
Western culturalist-feminist conception of gender as an essentialist category of difference 
fails to recognize the complexity of the post-socialist context and the importance of 
understanding emerging class differences (Ghodsee 2004: 11).  
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To understand specific processes and oppositions in the Russian women’s movement we 
need to explore how the struggle of women’s groups against the impoverishing effects of 
the neoliberal reforms, the authoritarian state, sexism, and the attempts to impose ‘from 
above’ certain version of feminism, are linked.
During the post-Cold War period as international lending institutions started to 
promote ideas of gender equality and the need for women’s organizations, “gender” 
became a new central concept in the development industry. It was “mainstreamed” into 
the agendas of the lending institutions. Like civil society and social capital, “gender 
equality” became a measure of states’ democratic rank (Hemment 2007: 81). Western-
oriented feminist women in Russia became a part of the global activism and the 
institutionalized and bureaucratized field of NGOs. Many women in elite organizations, 
however, were frequently skeptical about transnational campaigns run by foundations. 
They were not always sure how to apply the “project-speak” of the development industry 
to the Russian reality. They also felt uneasy about the material gulf that existed between 
them and the local groups of women in the provinces. They sometimes doubted the 
relevance of their work: “maybe the third sector and nongovernmental sphere are just a 
load of rubbish (erunda)? What is the difference between this and business?” (Cited in 
ibid.: 72).
Women’s issues have been selectively defined within Western donors’ projects. 
Campaigns that were defined by the donors were encouraged while “local” women’s 
groups’ projects were often excluded (ibid.: 83). The issues of class and material 
inequality were made invisible (Ghodsee 2004). The type of feminism that has achieved 
hegemony through gender mainstreaming is what Chandra Mohanty (2003: 6) has called a
”free-market feminism,” a “neoliberal, consumerist (proto-capitalist) feminism concerned 
with women’s advancement up the corporate and nation-state ladder.” Gender 
mainstreaming in the context of the Third Sector NGOs demobilized and co-opted social 
movements (Lang 1997; Hemment 2007). The concepts of gender and civil society have 
been emptied of their radical content. 
At the same time, the Third Sector and the concept of “gender” are important in the 
imaginary repertoire of Russian women activists. Feminist concepts were renegotiated 
during the seminars held by transnational feminist advocacy groups for the Russian 
women’s groups. At seminars, resources and discourses became objects of a struggle 
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(Sperling et al. 2001). Many women that mobilize against oppression in different forms do 
not conceptualize their activity as “feminist,” but rather link their ideas to own national-
historical and class-specific contexts. This process of mutual transformation involves 
conflicts and inequality in transnational advocacy networks (TAN).41 Outside actors often 
have more resources, and their definitions of what is important to challenge, and of the 
other as “not feminist” produce controversy. Ideas and practices, however, interact with 
local contexts and are altered (ibid.: 1159). 
In Russia, TAN’s elite-focused tactics often came in conflict with alternative local 
strategies which rather seek to develop grassroots mobilization (ibid.: 1160). In the 
seminars, Russian women’s groups argued that consciousness-raising at the local level,
not institutional politics, should be the main focus of Russian women’s groups. They 
criticized the American “experts” for not comprehending how little institutional 
infrastructure existed in Russia, that laws were rarely actually implemented, that it was 
meaningless to lobby politicians who lacked the power to do what was requested of them, 
and how little access to mass media meant. The main benefit of the seminars was 
considered to be learning “the technology to unite us,” which included techniques for 
speaking in groups, listening to each other, forming networks around a concrete issue, and 
thinking about strategic actions at the grassroots level (ibid.: 1172). 
Further, Russian participants challenged the American experts’ tendency to think of 
women’s issues in terms of family policy and employment. Women in the Russian groups 
framed their concerns more in terms of a wider community. They stressed that grassroots 
women need to confront the economic and social disorder: combat alcoholism, promote 
peace, and clean up environmental hazards. The Russian groups were more interested in
issues related to peace and crime reduction than in family or employment policy issues. 
There were also different ways to make sense of civic activism. While Russian activists 
insisted on it being “not politics,” the American activists saw it as “fundamental to 
politics.” Russian activists, especially in their degree of opposition to the government, 
tend not to see their local practical resistance as politics. Feminist scholars, however,
                                                 
41 TAN mobilize small numbers of individual activists who use specialized resources of expertise and access to 
elites rather than relying on demonstrations of mass public support and overt confrontations with authorities. 
They offer opportunities for consciousness-raising experience and networking as well as models for effective 
local action (Sperling et al. 2001: 1157).
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stress that as housework is not viewed as work even by its practitioners, civil society’s 
practical grassroots politics is made conceptually invisible as politics (ibid.: 1171).        
Summary
This chapter has shown that in the sphere of women’s self-organization, former state 
organizations zhensovety coexist with the new independent grassroots NGO and small 
feminist organizations representing women-intellectuals. The unequal access to funding 
from abroad creates tensions and social hierarchies among women’s groups. Feminism 
was denounced by most women’s groups in the 1990s and the early 2000s. The 
mainstreamed concept of “gender” was introduced “from above” into the Russian 
women’s movements through Western foundations’ selective granting policy. At the same 
time, there is a slow process of renegotiating feminist concepts by different women’s 
groups.    
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PART III
CASE STUDY OF THE SOLDIERS’ MOTHERS NGOs
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Chapter 9
A Brief History of the Soldiers’ Mothers NGOs
Introduction
This chapter briefly describes the emergence and activities of the SOMO NGOs during 
1990-2004. It is mainly based on materials about the SOMO umbrella organization that is 
located in Moscow. The movement of Mothers was created and sustained in the socio-
political context of the military draft arena, which is described in following two chapters.  
Different SOMO Organizations
Various kinds of soldiers’ mothers groups were formed in the 1980s. On the one hand, 
grassroots groups of soldiers’ mothers united parents whose children had died or had been
abused as a result of cruel hazing in the army barracks (dedovshchina42) (Pinnick 1997: 
144). On the other hand, Committees of soldiers’ mothers were officially established to 
undertake “preventive measures against the non-regulation relations,”43 for example, in St 
Petersburg (Smena, April 13, 1988, quoted in Zdravomyslova, 1999: 13). Some of the 
organizations of soldiers’ mothers, attached to the military draft commissions 
(voenkomaty), were established at the initiative of pro-reform military officers and active 
citizens. It was considered an attempt to improve relations between the army and society 
and to allow parents of soldiers to exercise civic control. During perestroika, these 
organizations were usually created within the Soviet institutions to democratize them. The 
activity of these Committees of soldiers’ mothers attached to the military commissions 
was supervised and directed by the military staff (ibid.: 58). This type of organization
continued to exist throughout the 1990s. Governments and military authorities initiated 
the creation of organizations similar to the SOMO, but under official control. In 2004, the 
                                                 
42 A social and historical background of this phenomenon in the Russian army is explained in more detail in 
chapter 10 of the dissertation. 
43 An official term used to describe the norms of cruel hazing in the military barracks.  
164
Ministry of Defense set up new Unions of the military servicemen’s parents. Some local 
SOMO groups have changed their names and joined the governmental project 
(Deriglazova 2005: 8).
The Human Rights SOMO NGOs during Perestroika
The independent human rights organizations of the SOMO emerged as an alternative to 
the soldiers’ mothers committees set up under the supervision of the military authorities. 
The SOMO movement is characterized by two goals: to protect the rights of military 
servicemen and potential draftees and to end the participation of conscripts in armed 
conflicts (Deriglazova 2005: 7; Kuklina 2004). In 1989, the Committee of Soldiers’ 
Mothers (CSM) was founded in Moscow and by the early 2000s the SOMO, whose 
coordination center was located in Moscow, claim a web of 300 regional committees and 
2500 volunteer activists (Traynor 2000).44 A separate human rights organization in St.
Petersburg, established in 1991-1992, subsequently adopted a pacifist ideology with a 
religious tone (Zdravomyslova 1999; Hinterhuber 2001). 
In Moscow, the core of activists consisted of mothers of students who had been
drafted into the army after the educational deferments from the military were substantially 
circumscribed in 1980. In 1982, for the first time in seventeen years, full-time students 
were drafted into the military. A sudden change in the draft policy evoked debate and 
different kinds of protests from educators and students. In the spring of 1987, a group of 
educators opposed the draft of students by pointing out its disruptive consequences in a 
round-table discussion, which was published in the influential weekly Literaturnaya
gazeta. In early 1988, educators wrote an open letter to Gorbachev campaigning for a 
reinstatement of student deferments. In the fall of 1988, a series of protests and 
demonstrations were organized by students in several universities around the country 
(Solnick 1998: 194, 199). While the Defense Ministry’s draft policy was criticized, the 
military officials responded by mocking the educators (ibid.). 
                                                 
44 To verify this number is difficult. However, a list of local branches issued by the activists from Astrakhan 
includes some hundred and fifty addresses (retrieved from http://www.astranet.ru/win/organiz/k.htm on April 10, 
2001).
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In the spring call-up of 1989, several students in the first-year class from the 
Moscow Energy Institute were drafted. One of their mothers, Maria Kirbasova, wrote a 
series of letters to the officials in the Ministry of Defense, protesting her son’s assignment 
to a training program which did not fit his specialty (Solnick 1998: 195). As the young 
man became suicidal, the commander, told her: “So what? Look, when he hangs himself, 
we’ll look into what happened” (Caiazza 2002: 124). Defense ministry officials routinely 
rejected mothers’ requests and protests (Solnick 1998: 196). In the summer of 1989, the 
Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers (CSM), established in Moscow, initiated a sophisticated 
media and lobbying campaign targeting the deputies of the new Congress of People’s 
Deputies. A widely read Moscow daily, Moskovskii Komsomolets, began regular coverage 
of the CSM’s affairs. The activists set up a vigil outside the Kremlin. The mothers handed 
leaflets describing violence within the military ranks to the deputies of the Congress. The 
new deputies in their turn saw the CSM’s demands as an opportunity to demonstrate the 
power of the new Congress by winning over the powerful Defense Ministry on an issue 
with broad popular appeal (Solnick 1998: 197). 
As the Committees’ activities began to receive coverage in the press, its ranks grew 
around the country. CSM affiliates sprung up in the Baltic States and in several regions 
across Russia, where it attracted parents whose sons were victims of dedovshchina or who 
were drafted into service despite ill health. Finally, under pressure from the activists, and 
a mass media campaign, the decision to release 176 000 students drafted in 1987-1988 
was ratified in July 1989. This decision affirmed the power of the new Supreme Soviet 
and the fact that in the late 1980s, the national legislature became a forum through which 
the grievances could be redressed (ibid.: 199).  
The CSM’s new initiative was to demand a volunteer army. In the early 1990s, the 
activists worked with deputies of several Supreme Soviet Committees – the Committee on 
Public Health, the Committee on Youth Affairs, and others. Due to the pressures 
generated by the CSM, which relied on public support and the relatively independent 
media, military reform received top priority on the agenda. 
Ill or victimized conscripts became the primary focus of the CSM’s routine work. In 
1989-1990, under pressure from the Supreme Soviet the military revealed their practices 
of filling draft quotas by calling up unfit conscripts (Solnick 1998: 202). Ex-convicts and 
invalids were often enlisted in the army; in addition, dedovshchina and ethnically related 
166
violence forced many conscripts to flee their units. Many of them fled to local CSM 
organizations which offered them safety and counseled parents on how to process the 
complaints. The local chapters of the CSM held weekly meetings to advise parents on 
how to qualify their sons for legal exemptions from military duty on medical and family-
related grounds. The activists organized a well-developed system of providing advice and 
protecting the rights of soldiers.45 They obtained and distributed copies of the unpublished 
guidelines for medical deferments. The draftees were advised to come to the military 
commission with medical documentation and to argue for a classification of ‘unfit for 
active service’ (ibid.: 207, 208). 
In 1990, under pressure from the activists, Gorbachev appointed a presidential 
commission which included soldiers’ mothers and Supreme Soviet deputies to investigate
the causes of non-combat deaths in military units (Solnick 1998: 204). The CSM and the
Supreme Soviet lobbied to disband the military construction brigades (stroibat) which did 
not follow international treaties that ban the use of forced labor. Although the activists
received support from some reform-minded politicians and members of the military, their 
initiative also evoked much irritation and concern from the military establishment. In 
1991, the Defense Ministry tried to neutralize the institutions that challenged its authority. 
Reporters who covered stories of dedovshchina in the armed forces, and draft evasion as 
well as the outspoken young deputies in local soviets were called up for service. Mothers 
active in the CSM were viciously attacked in the military press (ibid.: 210, 211). In 1995, 
the activists struggled without success against the passing of a bill in which the Defense 
Ministry restored the two-year conscript service as it had support in the parliament 
(Caiazza 2002: 109). 
Anti-War Campaigning
After the SOMO’s forceful opposition to the military operations in Chechnya in the fall of
1994, they were less welcome in President Yeltsin’s inner circle (Caiazza 2002: 136, 214). 
In 1994-1996, when reports from the conflict in Chechnya informed of civilian deaths, 
                                                 
45 See about the methods of the CSM at their website http://www.ucsmr.ru/english/articles/article002.htm, 
assessed on February 6, 2006.  
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destruction and the deployment of poorly prepared soldiers to terrible conditions, the 
SOMO NGOs became one of most powerful voices in the broad anti-war campaigns. In 
November 1994, the CSM was the first Russian NGO to issue an anti-war statement. It 
organized and supported women who marched to the front lines in Chechnya and searched
for missing soldiers and who entered military bases and dragged their sons-soldiers from 
units all over Russia. Many new grassroots organizations emerged and networking 
between organizations from different cities intensified. In addition, many international 
contacts were established during this period (Zdravomyslova 1999: 169). In 1995, the 
activists organized a March of Maternal Compassion and Protest against the War in 
Chechnya. Over 300 participants walked from the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in 
Moscow to the Chechen capital Grozny. The walk was organized by the CSM with 
support from various international women's and human rights groups, including the East-
West Relations Committee and Quaker Peace Services. They aimed to draw public 
attention to the atrocities in Chechnya, to provide humanitarian aid to the region, to 
research and report on casualties in the region and to search for missing soldiers. As the 
planned route of the march proceeded directly down the line of military engagement in 
Chechnya, the demonstrators were stopped by the federal armed forces. 150 marchers 
were detained for five hours and forcibly returned to the city Narzan, outside of 
Chechnya.46 In addition, the SOMO initiated dozens of other actions across Russia to 
protest the military actions in Chechnya, including picketing the State Duma, hunger 
strikes, and letter-writing campaigns. For example, during the first two months of the 
Chechen conflict alone, the presidential administration received more than 110 appeals 
from the SOMO groups. The presidential staff prepared an overview of the concerns for 
the president, entitled "On Appeals from Soldiers' Mothers" (see ibid. footnote). 
Another dimension of the CSM’s efforts to influence the military policy included 
lobbying on behalf of soldiers and officers associated with military operations in 
Chechnya (Caiazza 2002). Knowing that the Constitution allowed the State Duma to grant 
amnesties without approval from the Federation Council, the government, and the 
president, the CSM tried to convince the Duma to grant amnesty and immunity against 
                                                 
46 See the CSM website at http://www.civilsoc.org/nisorgs/russwest/moscow/colleen/soldmat.htm, assessed on 
February 5, 2006.
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legal prosecution for deserters and conscientious objectors. In 1995-1996, 500 soldiers 
who refused to fight in Chechnya on conscious motives were thus relieved of criminal 
charges.47 After the end of military operations in Chechnya, when the general amnesty for 
the Russian and Chechen soldiers in captivity was passed by the Duma in 1997, the 
activists were able to convince most deputies to support the additional provision which 
included deserters and evaders (ibid.: 134; see also the CSM website48). Although it was a 
one-time measure, it created a precedent in the military service policy. Another initiative 
was passed by the State Duma in 1998-1999. It included amendments to the Law of the 
State budget concerning the burials and identification of members of the military killed in 
Chechnya. In 1998, the CSM campaigned for amnesty of 40 000 soldiers-fugitives who 
fled from violence in military barracks. It was passed by the parliament in June 1998.49
The SOMO’s anti-war protests continued after the military operations were resumed 
in Chechnya in 1999. They issued Statements and open Letters addressed to the state
authorities demanding a peaceful political settlement. In the early 2000s, the conditions in 
which the SOMO acted changed profoundly because the mass media became more 
effectively controlled by the military. Moreover, after the tragic events of bombings of the 
residential buildings in the cities Buinasksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk the mood of 
nationalism and vindictive militarism increased (Caiazza 2002: 141). The SOMO found it 
more difficult to get press coverage and popular attention, but continued to organize press-
conferences on human rights violations. They collected alternative statistics on the 
number of casualties in the war and demonstrated that the official figures of human losses 
were unreliable.50 The activists sought more openness between the state and the 
population and called for the regular publication of official lists of the wounded, dead and 
missing in military action (Sperling 2003: 248). Unlike the period of the first war in 
Chechnya, not many other organizations went out with anti-war protests. Some mass 
actions were organized, however, such as a demonstration in Moscow on February 19, 
2000 which attracted about 1000 people (Caiazza 2002: 244). Networking with branch 
organizations inside Russia, women’s organizations in the former Soviet republics and 
from abroad remained important. Congresses and conferences served to consolidate the
groups internally as well as to demonstrate their position to the broader society. 
                                                 
47 See the CSM website at http://www.ucsmr.ru/english/ucsmr/history.htm, assessed on February 6, 2006.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 See the CSM website at http://www.ucsmr.ru/english/ucsmr/hra.htm, assessed on February 6, 2006. 
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In 2004, the United People’s Party of Soldiers’ Mothers was founded. The main goal 
of the political program was to implement the military reform (the CSM website;51
Romancheva 2004; Kostenko and Melikova 2005). In October 2004, the activists took an 
initiative to begin consultations on peace negotiations between the SOMO and the 
representatives of Chechen fighters in exile in Western Europe. This action provoked a 
furious reaction from the official Russian authorities (Samarina 2004). The Duma deputy 
former military general V. Alksnis accused the SOMO in “performing the political order 
of the West … by destroying the defense ability of Russia.” He suggested that the General 
Prosecutor’s Office and the Minister of Justice start an investigation of the organization’s
financial sources (Deriglazova 2005: 8). However, a survey of women’s opinions about 
the SOMO conducted by the Levada Center in November 2004 showed that 72 percent of 
female respondents believed that the “activity of SOMO benefits Russia” and only 5 
percent supported the opinions put forward by the deputy Alksnis. 65 percent of the 
respondents positively evaluated the possibility of “the SOMO to be a mediator in peace-
talks between Federal forces and Chechen separatists” (ibid.).   
Domestic and International Recognition 
The activists’ role in promoting peace and human rights was acknowledged both within 
and outside Russia. Within Russia, the activists claim to represent about 4 million soldiers 
and sailors, about 8 million parents, the majority of male students and all the young boys 
of 16-18 years old and their parents.52 The role of the SOMO in protecting servicemen and 
their parents’ rights is widely recognized both by supporters and opponents of the 
movement. The organization is trusted, well-known, and is visited annually by dozens of 
thousands of draftees, deserters, soldiers and officers (Deriglazova 2005: 7). 
The SOMO has been awarded a number of international prizes for their activities in 
Chechnya and their protection of soldiers’ human rights. In 1995, they were honored with 
Sean McBride medal (Germany) and Prof. Rafto Award (Norway); in 1996 they received 
                                                 
51 Press release “We Create a Party: United People’s party of the Soldiers’ Mothers,” retrieved February 8, 2006
from http://www.ucsmr.ru/party/pressrelease.htm. 
52 See the CSM website, retrieved February 6, 2006 from http://www.ucsmr.ru/english/ucsmr/hra.htm.
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the Right Livelihood Award (the Alternative Nobel Prize), and in 2000 Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation Award (Germany).53
While the military was initially annoyed by the activists, a better cooperation 
between the SOMO and the military staff had been established by the mid-1990s. On 
some occasions, they were able to resolve difficult cases on mass human rights abuses, to 
investigate cases and to punish the guilty parties. These instances, however, were 
exceptions rather than the rule, as the army practices of covering up abuses remained 
strong. At the same time, in most regions of Russia, the SOMO representatives have good 
contacts with both the local military units and draft boards (Deriglazova 2005: 7). While 
the governments after Gorbachev had to tolerate the movement’s legitimate demands, they 
also tried to subjugate it. Since 1988, all governments have had meetings with SOMO
representatives, replied to their requests and included them in the official commissions on 
military reforms and draft commissions. At the same time, there were attempts to limit the
activity of Soldiers’ Mothers to the areas of “mothers’ competence” like visits to military 
units, organizing additional supplies to soldiers and creating a good image of the army
through patriotic campaigns. Official criticism of the SOMO activities has been growing 
since the second Chechnya campaign started (ibid.). 
                                                 
53 See the CSM website, retrieved from http://www.ucsmr.ru/english/ucsmr/history.htm on February 6, 2006.
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Chapter 10
The Arena of Military Draft Politics 
Introduction
This chapter describes the socio-political arena of military draft politics, in which 
institutional and ideological opportunities for the collective action of SOMO NGOs were 
shaped. It firstly outlines the Soviet tradition of military service and new challenges to the 
military draft system in the 1990s. It proceeds to explain the problems of hazing in the 
army and general discontent about military duty in post-Soviet Russia. Finally, the chapter 
describes the character of the military reforms policy pursued during this period of time. 
1. The Shift in the State Military Politics 
In the late 1980s, the new political thinking about foreign policy proclaimed by 
Gorbachev led to serious cuts in the military budget. This coincided with a crisis within 
the Soviet conscription army triggered by the Afghanistan war and a decline in the army’s 
social prestige. These changes put the problem of military reform at the center of political 
struggles and public debate. During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the previous privileged 
position of the military sector and its immunity from public criticism were questioned. 
A new phenomenon in the relations between the military and society was the 
appearance of protest movements and voluntary organizations which raised their voices 
against widespread brutality in the military barracks and legal violations during the 
regular military draft campaigns. They made these cases a matter of public debate and 
court investigation and promoted ideas for military reform (Caiazza 2002). The 
participants in the voluntary groups, such as the Soldier’s Mothers, Memorial, the 
Antimilitarist Radical Association and many others, attempted to make the military policy
more open to civilian control using the new opportunities of political activism. The limits 
and possibilities of civic activism in this sphere were often determined by the existing 
tensions between and among the political and military elites. At the end of the Cold War,
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the need to maintain large armed forces seemed to have disappeared. The new political 
elite wished turn to cooperation with former enemies. In 1988, Gorbachev officially 
confessed that the war in Afghanistan was a mistake and the last troops left Afghanistan in 
February 1989. The new thinking in foreign policy, which included elimination of the 
Soviet military presence abroad and a qualitative cut-off of military manpower and 
armaments, annoyed the military as well as a section of the political elite (Deriglazova 
2005: 4).
Historically deep-rooted trust of the Russian population for the armed forces was 
challenged in the 1990s (Sundstrom 2006a, 2006b). The increasingly eroding legitimacy 
of the armed forces and continued isolation of the military policy from the society during 
this period is the context in which a public debate on the problems of the enlistment 
system, poverty and lawlessness in the army took place.
Compulsory military duty is one of the key issues in the debate about military 
reform. According to the existing system, every man is eligible and could be drafted 
between the ages of 18 and 27 for service in the armed forces. A right to alternative 
service did not exist in the Soviet Union. It was granted for the first time in Russia by the 
new constitution in 1993, and was regulated by a law which was approved in July 2002 
and took effect in 2004. 
The Soviet Tradition of Military Duty 
In Soviet times, military service was perceived not only as the means to guarantee 
national security, but also as an institution serving an important political socializing
function. Service in the army was directly linked to the notion of patriotism and loyalty to 
the state and was considered valuable for individuals as well as for the state (Deriglazova 
2005: 2). Beliefs and images about the Russian soldier and his exceptional courage and 
patriotism were important parts of the official propaganda (Golts and Putman 2004). The 
army was also seen as a means of ethnic integration in society because it brought together 
representatives of more than the USSR’s ninety nationalities. For the less advantaged 
young men from the rural areas, where standards of living were much lower than in the 
cities, the army often served as a way of social mobility (Deriglazova 2005: 2). Service in 
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the Soviet army was also seen as an important phase in male upbringing and acquiring a 
masculine identity (Kay 2006). The universal draft was broadly accepted in the Soviet 
society. This can be explained by the tradition of conscription coming from the eighteenth 
century, by the attention given by the authorities to promote the acceptance of obligatory 
service in the army, and the positive image of the army created by the collective memory 
of the Red Army’s victory in WW II (Deriglazova 2005: 3). 
As military power was important for protecting the system from external and 
internal threats, the military was given a privileged status in the state and was one of the 
most developed sectors. In the political system, the political and military elites were 
tightly interrelated, and after Stalin’s death they became corporate castes isolated and 
detached from the society. State control over the economy allowed directing funds for 
military aims, but there was no form of citizens’ control over military institutions (ibid.: 
3). Golts and Putman (2004: 124) relate the military’s administrative autonomy and 
privileged position to the historical legacy. Since the rule by Tsar Peter the Great, the 
strength of the state has been associated with a massive military force and Russia’s 
security was linked to the state’s ability to draw upon the full capacity of citizens for 
national defense.  
In the last decade of the Soviet Union, however, the number of draft age men had 
dropped significantly due to lower fertility rates. The attitudes toward military duty and 
especially the attitudes of the draft-aged youth changed. Military service started to be seen 
as an unpleasant obligation which interrupted education or professional training 
(Deriglazova 2005: 3).  
2. Challenges to the Military Draft System
Due to the tradition of unquestioned authority of the military establishment, the military 
controlled the draftee policy and kept secret information about its principles and details. 
Soviet conscription policy was not openly discussed by the Party or defense officials 
(Solnick 1998). After 1987-1988, however, the issue of deferments and exemptions from 
military service became a matter of debate and political contests. The system allowed 
deferment or exemption from service in the army. The draft was supervised and 
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administrated by local draft board (prizyvnaia komissiia) which was supervised by 
military commissions (voenkomaty) directed by the Ministry of Defense. The draft boards 
granted deferments or exemption from the service in the army on several grounds such as 
being a sole source of support for parents, young children or siblings, full-time enrollment
in higher or special secondary education institutions, and ill health (ibid.: 177). Health 
deferments were granted based on medical classifications defined by the Ministry of 
Defense which assigned each distinct physical or mental condition to a certain 
classification. However, the guidelines of the classifications were never published and 
appealing decisions made by medical certification commissions was difficult. At the same 
time, it was commonly known that deferments were often for sale and that voenkomat
officials could be bribed to arrange them (Solnick 1998: 178). Urban middle class men 
could avoid the service in army by entering the full time high education or by resorting to 
bribes. “The army was developing an increasing class bias” as it seemed that mostly the 
rural and urban working youth lacking right to deferment was drafted (ibid.: 215).
In the 1970s and 1980s, the health of the draft pool continued to deteriorate due to 
poor nutrition, alcoholism and pollution and the number of legitimate draftees accordingly 
decreased. By 1980, the pool of eighteen-year-olds shrunk as military operations in 
Afghanistan required greater amounts of conscripts. The army faced severe problems with 
drafting a sufficient number of fit conscripts. By 1987, the Ministry of Defense revised the 
class of deferments, which were granted to students and to conscripts in poor health. The 
new medical guidelines limited the conditions for which draft boards could grant medical 
deferments. For example, youth with asthma, tuberculosis or with histories of mental 
disorders were no longer exempted from service (Solnick 1998: 192). 
Another problem was that the defense planners set conscription goals regardless of
the existing size of the draft contingent. As the new regulations about medical deferments 
were never published and appealing the decisions of medical certification reviews was 
almost impossible, local draft boards could fulfill their conscription goals by bending 
already weak guidelines even further. As a result, some of the conscripts who were drafted 
later proved to be unfit to serve (ibid.: 193). In general, the draftees’ education level fell, 
and the number of draftees with a history of criminal activities and drug-use increased 
(Deriglazova 2005: 5). As a result of a shortage of eligible draftees, young conscripts with 
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inadequate training were sent into active operations during the first and second Chechen 
conflicts in 1994-1996 and after 2000 (ibid.: 6). 
The worsened conditions of the military service are firstly related to the 
impoverishment of the army. As a result of a serious cut in the military budget, a 
reduction in the number of military personnel and the conversion of military and military-
connected production, the share of military spending in post-Soviet Russia decreased from 
15 percent of GDP by the late 1980s to 4.7 percent in 1992 and to its lowest point at 2.4 
percent in 1998. In 2004, military spending was budgeted on a level of 2.69 percent 
(Deliglazova 2005: 4). The state budget share for national defense accordingly decreased 
from 20.69 percent in 1994 to 14.74 percent in 2003. Combined with a general decline in 
the level of income for the majority of the population, this all negatively affected the 
status and living standards of the military professionals. Especially the lower level 
military personnel became more impoverished along with the majority of the population. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, a ‘new’ military elite emerged which successfully lobbied for its 
interests and reached a high standard of living, while the majority of serving field officers, 
servicemen, draftees and military personnel continued to be one of the poorest social 
groups. Political leaders could not provide the resources necessary for investments in the 
army and support for military pensioners (ibid.: 4, 5). Due to the reduced budget and 
increased chaos, the army became unable to pay salaries, to feed, house, clothe, and train 
its troops properly. Health problems and mental disorders rose, and suicide levels were 
high. Crime and fraud thrived because of the terrible conditions; supplies and weaponry 
were stolen and sold by soldiers to illegal paramilitary organizations (Caiazza 2002: 104, 
105).
The Hazing System of Dedovschina
During the decline in discipline among draftees and the deepening social conflicts in the 
army, new recruits became frequently subject to cruel hazing from officers and senior 
enlisted soldiers. This phenomenon called ‘non-regulated relationships’ (neustavnyie
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otnosheniia) or dedovshchina54 became especially widespread during the Afghanistan war 
(Deliglazova 2005: 3; Solnick 1998: 175, 184). Calling up a great number of individuals
who had completed terms in prison introduced “a certain jailhouse order” to the military 
units (Solnick 1998: 203). 
Groups of parents of soldiers collected accounts of internal violence and investigated 
deaths and beatings of their children. In 1990, they argued that each year at least 20 
percent of military servicemen committed suicide due to hazing in the army (Solnick 
1998: 185). According to statistics of advocacy group Mother’s Right, up to 5 000 soldiers 
died of abuse or suicide in 1995 (Caiazza 2002: 106). In 1994, officially statistics stated 
2111 deaths 432 of which were suicides. In 1996, murders within the armed forces 
increased by 27.3 percent and suicides by 24.5 percent according to the newspaper 
Nevavisimaia (ibid.). Many of these deaths were often associated with dedovshchina. 
Officially, 2 234 young men were victims of hazing in the army; fifty five of them died, 
and 335 were seriously injuried (ibid.). 
In the late 1980s, journalists covered many manifestations of hazing which had 
previously never been discussed openly. Tragic consequences of brutality in military 
barracks were exposed in the press. In 1987-1988, the media provided great coverage of
the trial of a young Lithuanian soldier Arturas Sakalauskas who was beaten, burned and 
raped by several of his fellow soldiers at night on a transport train. He answered by 
shooting them as well as a civilian conductor. The case was described in the popular daily 
Komsomolskaia Pravda, debated on TV- and radio-programs, used as material in the 
documentary film, and invoked a confrontation between the army and the civilian mass 
media. It was admitted in the course of investigation that the young soldier was frequently 
humiliated and abused in this military unit and that the commanders and political workers 
were permissive regarding the matter (Zdravomyslova 1999: 55; Solnick 1998: 185). 
                                                 
54 The noun dedovshchina is derived from ded (or starik) which means ‘old men’ and is used about the 
conscripts who do a second or third year of the military service compared to the soldiers completing a first year 
of their service (Zdravomyslova 1999: 167). According to Kharkhordin (1999: 310), the system of hazing or 
“eldership” (dedovshchina) informally practiced in the Soviet army is an example of an informal collective-
building within the frame of official kollektiv. It relied on the informal leaders (“the elders”) who coerced new 
recruits to help to fulfill the requirements of the regiments. After a year of service the recruits themselves could 
become members of such group of informal leaders and start to oppress and harass the new conscripts. This 
informal hazing system was installed in the 1950s and became a common element in army training. 
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The military was annoyed that glasnost was applied to military affairs and that the 
cases of brutality were debated publicly. They usually argued that violence in the army
rather reflects the poor “military-patriotic upbringing” that young men received at home 
and at school before they became soldiers (Solnick 1998: 187). 
In the 2000s, crimes, dedovshchina, death in peace-time, diseases and poor living 
conditions remain in the Russian army. According to official statistics released by the 
Ministry of Defense in November 2004, 11624 crimes had been reported that year; 932 
servicemen had died, 423 of which occurred during service. 24.6 percent of the deaths
were suicides. Many crimes committed in the units were not investigated (Deriglazova 
2005: 9). 
Social Discontent about the Military Duty     
Broad discontent about army service was officially documented for the first time in 1980 
in a sociological survey about young men’s attitudes. 13.5 percent of 2000 respondents 
did not recognize the importance and necessity of military service and 42 percent feared 
for “military discipline and obedience,” supposedly reflecting concern over the hazing 
(Solnick 1998: 189). Several years of the war in Afghanistan, which had become known
through eyewitness accounts by soldiers and journalists, demoralized the army. People 
throughout the country were touched by the effects of the war as the number of casualties 
grew and most families faced the risk of sending a relative off to fight in Afghanistan (see 
Sperling 2003). In the late 1980s, when press coverage of the Afghan war became more 
detailed and more combat veterans returned to civilian life, resistance to army service 
became more intense (Solnick 1998: 190). Previously isolated instances of draft evasion 
started to increase rapidly. The Party committees received many letters concerning 
Afghanistan and the draft (ibid.: 190, 181). Anti-draft sentiment started to increase in 
many non-Russian republics, especially in the Baltic, Georgia, Moldavia, and Western 
Ukraine. In 1990, several republics passed laws creating ‘alternative service’ for 
conscripts who were not willing to serve in the army. Draft evasion was thus in effect 
legitimized and went unpunished while local draft boards simultaneously granted more 
exemptions on recognized grounds (ibid.: 207). 
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The Russians have contradictory opinions toward obligatory military service. On the 
one hand, most of them do not actively oppose the right of the state to call people to 
military service. On the other hand, people do not condemn those who use all possible 
ways to avoid it (Golts and Putman 2004: 148). Draft dodging and evasion has been one 
of the consequences of the declining legitimacy of the army, due to the deteriorating
conditions of the military service, the brutality and lawlessness in the army, and its 
involvement in the military operations in Chechnya. Military service is increasingly
perceived not as a “sacred obligation” but as a source of danger to one’s life and health. In 
2002, 72 percent of respondents in a poll by the All-Russia Centre for Public Opinion did 
not want their relative to serve in the army.55 Attitudes toward military service differ 
depending on social class, age, region, political preferences, and other factors. In a 2002 
survey, 34 percent of the respondents said that they would serve and that young men must 
serve in the army while 17 percent stated that they would not serve and young men should 
have the right to choose. Three ideas about the army have been observed in Russia: Those 
embracing a ‘traditionalist’ idea see the army as an institution which provides career 
opportunities and helps to gain a higher status. According to the ‘modern’ idea of military 
service, the army is a necessary step in personal growth and maturity. From a ‘post-
modern’ viewpoint based on the calculation of individual’s losses and benefits, army
service is perceived as a biographical failure.56  
Public opinion polls in 2004 showed that the army occupied the third place among 
trusted institutions at the relative low level of 28 percent after the presidency and the 
church. The majority of respondents, 53 percent in 1998 and 71 percent in 2003, 
supported the elimination of the draft and the introduction of contract enlistment. In 2004, 
support for the continued draft increased to 40 percent while 54 percent remained in 
support of contract enlistment, according to results of the national survey57 (see also 
Deriglazova 2005: 9).
                                                 
55 A report retrieved February 4, 2006 from http://www.wciom.ru/?pt=52&article=276.
56 See the FOM, at http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/problem_soc/army_problem/ed024227, retrieved 
February 4, 2006.
57 See a report by the VTsIOM January 24-28, 2003, at http://www.wciom.ru/?pt=52&article=141, retrieved 
February 04, 2006. This tendency shifted in 2005. In January 2005, the proportion became respectively 45 and 
48 percent. See a report by the VTsIOM, at http://www.wciom.ru/?pt=52&article=1080, retrieved February 04, 
2006.
179
Enforcement of the draft remained problematic in the 1990s and the early 2000s 
(Solnick 1998: 214). By 1996, fewer than 13 percent of those called up actually completed
their military service (Caiazza 2002: 107). In 2004, the average national level of drafted 
men is 10 percent of the eligible pool. Moscow hold the record for the lowest number of 
drafted men – about 2.7 percent of those eligible, with 60 percent being classified as 
having “limited eligibility for health reasons” (Deriglazova 2005: 5). According to 
official and non-official statistics, between 30 000 and 40 000 young men dodge the draft 
every year (ibid.; Sperling 2003: 249). In 2004, the Ministry of Defense suggested that 
students’ deferments be abolished due to the decreased number of eligible young men and 
continued draft dodging. This new initiative evoked a broad negative response in society 
(Deriglazova 2005: 9).
3. The Military Reforms
The problem of reforming the Soviet army became an issue of public debate. In December 
1990, two competing proposals for military reform were published. One, prepared by a 
group of deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet, suggested a rapid transition to a 
professional volunteer army and suggested that alternative service be permitted during the 
transition. The Defense Ministry offered less radical but nevertheless significant reforms, 
including a reduced term of service and alternative non-military service. The Ministry’s 
draft was adopted as the basis for discussion (Solnick 1998: 211). In February 1993, the 
parliament passed a new law on military service. While universal military service 
remained the basic principle, the law contained provisions for alternative service and 
contract service; a volunteer service as a first step toward a professional army (ibid.: 214). 
In 1992, 1997, 2001 and 2003 several programs aimed at a reform of the military system 
were approved (Golts and Putman 2004). 
Representatives of liberal political forces such as the parties Yabloko (Apple) and 
the SPS (the Union of Right Forces), supported a turn towards a professional and 
contractual army (Deriglazova 2005: 5). The main official argument against contractual 
service is that Russia cannot afford a professional army. On July 10, 2003, the 
government adopted a special program of military reform (Tsimbal 2003). The 
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implementation of the reform seems to be a difficult and prolonged process. By 2008, at 
most 15 percent of the armed forces will be composed of volunteers and universal 
conscription remains the main organizational form (Golts and Putman 2004: 151). 
The right of conscientious objection was stipulated in Russia's 1993 constitution. 
Russia sought full membership in the Council of Europe, and the inclusion required 
provisions allowing conscientious objection (Caiazza 2002: 110). Solnick (1998: 211) 
argues that many people viewed alternative service as a replacement for the military 
construction brigades (stroibaty),58 not as community or medical service. The law on 
alternative non-military service, which was introduced in the State Duma in 1994 and 
finally passed in July 2002, mainly reflected the pro-military faction’s vision. The efforts 
of civic groups to influence the content of the law were unsuccessful. Many analysts
considered the law on alternative service a punishment (Caiazza 2002). Each applicant for 
alternative service must prove his pacifist credentials before a military tribunal and serve 
up to 42 months (21 months for people with a higher education). Those completing
alternative service are supposed to live in identical conditions to other conscripts, for a 
longer period of time, and their only privilege will be not to wear arms (Weir 2003; 
Waisberg 2004). Offering conscientious objectors a longer term of non-military service on 
construction projects satisfied the need for military construction brigades in the civilian 
economy. 
Civilian control over the military is far from well developed. The content of the 
military reform developed in 2002 for the period 2001-2010 was never published in the 
open press (Deriglazova 2005: 9). The main direction of the reforms in the 1990s was to 
preserve or to rebuild Russia’s military power without radical transformation. The 
political, social and economic conditions of the system of military duty, however, have 
changed. Russian society is no longer prepared to make sacrifices for the political and 
military elites’ goals which no longer possess the necessary tools to force the society to 
follow. Deliglazova (ibid.: 10) stresses that military and political powers tend to see 
groups in society as an object rather than as a subject of politics and that there is no open 
debate or cooperation between the military establishment and society. Evading and 
                                                 
58 When in 1987 medical deferments were revised by removing exemptions from chronically ill youth and youth 
with birth defects, they were classified as ‘fit for non-combat duty” and were often assigned to military 
construction brigades (stroibat). The military construction troops were actually often employed in the civilian 
rather than the military economy (Solnick 1998: 201). 
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dodging the draft and deserting from the units may be seen as mass reaction to the 
problems in the army in this political context.  
Summary 
This chapter has shown that the arena of Russian military draft politics offered limited 
institutional and ideological opportunities for civic activist groups in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Military politics became an issue of public debate after the end of Cold War and 
due to problems with enforcing the draft. The increased anti-draft sentiment has been 
related to the wars in the Northern Caucasus and to the brutal hazing in the military 
barracks, which were openly discussed in the mass media. The civic groups’ efforts to 
advocate military reforms, however, achieved limited success due to a strong resistance 
from the powerful military establishment.     
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Chapter 11
Discursive Images of Soldier’s Mother in the Russian Press
Introduction
This chapter presents an analysis of discursive representations of soldiers’ mothers in the 
Russian press. As explained in chapter 3, I selected thirty five newspaper articles 
published in 1998-2005 on the Russian Internet. Newspapers of different ideological 
orientations were included in the sample. I analyzed texts based on the research questions: 
What is the significance of certain use of language in the articles describing the arena of
military draft politics? How is the specific role of mother of a soldier put forward to 
address problems of the military service in the army? I looked for the repetition of key 
words, phrases and images; consistency within and between texts; for patterns of 
variations. I tried to identify how alternative accounts are rhetorically counted and 
combated (Tonkiss 1998: 256, 257). I sought to understand how the use of language 
associated with the notions of mother and maternal feelings contribute to, or challenge,
the hegemonic cultural meanings of sexual difference, class, nationality, and political 
culture. This kind of discursive analysis allows an understanding of a complexity of the 
ideological limits and opportunities faced by the SOMO movement in the arena of 
military draft politics.   
This chapter describes three types of discursive images of mothers of soldiers
identified in the press materials: ideological-hegemonic, counter-discursive, and legalist-
pragmatic.
1. Ideological-Hegemonic Image of the Loyal Mother 
Dominant ideological practices and discourses shape our view of social reality. 
Ideological hegemony operates through cultural forms, meanings, and representations 
which produce consent to the status quo and the positions of individuals within it 
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(Kincheloe and McLaren 2005: 309). The effect of such representations is subtle, 
ambiguous and situationally specific forms of domination (ibid.: 310).    
A narrative discourse is an important cultural factor which some social groups might 
have en interest in controlling (Fahlgren 1999: 26). To tell a story with a beginning, 
middle and end is an efficient way of producing a discursive meaning. Through a 
narration individuals can be taught to live in a meaningful relationship to the social order
in which they live their lives. A narrative creates a special way of seeing, a specific gaze, 
and a viewpoint.  The need to represent a reality by telling a story is embedded in the wish 
to moralize the events which are described (ibid.).
Narratives represented in the mass media are embedded in a broader discursive 
context. The ideological-hegemonic image of a soldier’s mother is interrelated with a 
mass medial discursive context reproducing cultural meanings of gender, nationality, and 
political culture.  
Official Discursive Context
In the 1990s, images of war and gender in the mass media were often linked with 
Russianness, and a sense of national belonging. The images of Russianness not only 
reproduced national identity, but also represented a dream of masculinizing the “female”
body of the country and reflected the nationalists’ project of “saving the authenticity of 
Russian identity from the immoral Western influences” (Novikova 2000: 122). For 
example, in a series of clips, which were broadcasted on Russian television, optimism and 
manhood are reasserted through plots about war, peasant harvest and men’s friendship. 
One clip showed two grandmothers washing a small naked boy. Washing had a special 
symbolic meaning of spiritual and bodily cleansing in Russian traditional culture. In this 
clip, it symbolizes the renaissance of masculinity while the preceding clips provide a 
context, inscribing the future of the boy into the tradition of defining war/peace as 
masculine/feminine in the Russian historical context (ibid.). 
At the same time, these ideological-hegemonic representations in the mass media 
were challenged in the literary prose. In military memoirs published by two different 
women-writers, the symbolic link between masculine/military and the maternal/wifely is 
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reversed and reveals what had been silenced in the post-Soviet ideology. The Soviet war
mythology produced a stereotypical image of a woman who was both a battlefield heroine 
and a good mother and wife. In the memoirs of women from the war in Afghanistan, the 
identity of a fighter for a larger cause given to them by the military is contrasted with the 
sexual exploitation of their bodies. There is humiliation and sexual harassment behind the 
masquerade of female agency. These women had to erase their war experiences to be able 
to survive emotionally and to match the cultural model of a virtuous worker-wife (ibid.: 
127). 
In the official political rhetoric, the mother of a soldier has been historically framed 
in different ways. During the Great Patriotic war in 1941-1945, in the official Soviet 
iconography, the Mother, pictured as a matron holding a baby boy in her arms, blessed the
soldiers marching to the front to fight “For the Motherland!” (Liljeström 1995). On the 
contrary, during perestroika the female grief over the lost soldiers-husbands or sons was 
included in the official anti-military rhetoric. For example, at a Politburo session in 
October 1985, Gorbachev justified his proposal to end the Soviet military involvement in 
Afghanistan by reading aloud from letters of bereaved mothers, who questioned the 
political grounds of the war and criticized the government for sending untrained new 
recruits to military operations (Elkner 2004: 8). During the military operations in 
Chechnya, however, representations of soldiers’ mothers in the press were again mainly 
associated with militarism and patriotism. The military encouraged parents to induce 
patriotism in their sons and thereby prevent further decline in the popularity of the 
military service. Mothers’ organizations which criticized the military and problems in the 
Army were simultaneously denigrated in the press. 
Elkner (2004) shows, that the military press and some other media outlets vilify and 
actively discourage the uncontrolled involvement of women’s organizations in the 
problems of the military units. The SOMO activists used tactics of uninvited inspections 
of military units, gathered information about hazing and other forms of maltreatment of 
the conscript soldiers and distributed this information among other parents as well as via 
the democratic media. The credibility of the activists was questioned in articles published 
in the state military daily Krasnaia Zvezda in the early 1990s. The poll results, which 
measured the attitudes of the soldiers’ mothers, were used to demonstrate that mothers are 
better informed about their sons’ condition in the army than about current political affairs. 
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They were concluded to be politically illiterate and only concerned about personal 
matters. They were said to exploit a controversial public openness about dedovshchina in 
the army in order to keep their children away (ibid.: 4). Firstly, the protesting mothers 
were considered ‘unbalanced ladies,’ fuelled by female hysteria, egoistic and ignorant 
about politics and the armed forces. It was argued that the openness about the army’s 
problems in the media needed to be restricted: “Only military people should read this, 
they understand it and are in the position to draw the correct conclusions, but there is no 
need to frighten mamas and grandmothers” (quoted in ibid.: 4). 
Secondly, the SOMO activists were represented as bad mothers. They were blamed
for being overprotective mothers who raised infantilized sons incapable of enduring army
service. In the military’s accounts of dedovshchina, the young recruits were called 
“mama’s boy,” said to be “feminized,” weak, and selfish as a result of a “ladies 
upbringing” (Elkner 2004: 5). The military accused the members of the committees of 
soldiers’ mothers of being poor patriots as none of their sons were fighting in Chechnya 
(Sperling 2003: 247).
Thirdly, the mothers-activists were called ‘traitors,’ and part of a conspiracy aimed 
to destroy the army.59 Conservative military writers claimed that the “democrats” “created 
the movement of soldiers’ mothers” to use them against the army and to demolish the 
Soviet Union (Elkner 2004: 5). The role of the activists was described as “speculation on 
the problems and tragedies of the army” (ibid.; Sperling 2003: 247). In the newspaper 
“New Petersburg” (28th June, 2000) the SOMO activists were accused of “pro-Chechen 
propaganda,” encouraging draft evasion instead of “teaching draftees to fulfill proudly 
their duty to the Homeland.”60 In 2004, a series of publications questioned the SOMO 
NGOs’ initiative to start negotiations with the Chechen leaders about a peaceful resolution 
to the conflict. The state officials advised the activists to hold themselves to their own 
tasks of defending the human rights of soldiers (Samarina 2004).  
The usefulness of some SOMO organizations was questioned in the public 
statements of state officials (The Moscow Times, January 9, 2003; see also Deriglazova 
2005: 8). The soldiers’ mother activists were criticized for interfering in a matter of the 
state for which they did not have the necessary competence, and for supporting criminals, 
                                                 
59 Pinnick (1997: 145) points out that in 1994, Yeltsin commissioned a report from his staff, ‘On appeals from 
soldiers’ mothers which concluded that the ‘emotionalism’ of these women’s groups was exploited by political 
parties and movements ‘to advance their own political demands.’        
60 Retrieved December 2000 from http://www.city.spb.ru.
187
namely the people who dodge the draft. When it became known in 2004 that the SOMO 
activists had founded a political party it evoked a scandal around the organization. They 
were accused of being financed by foreign organizations and by the oppositional 
‘oligarch’ Boris Berezovsky who was living in exile (Ampelovsky et al. 2004).61 An 
official assignment was given by the State Duma to the Moscow Office of the Public 
Prosecutor and the Ministry of Justice to inquire into the activities of the Moscow CSM. 
The organization was claimed to be associated with an “anti-army campaign” “financed 
by Western money.” Moreover, the activists were said to have nothing to do with soldiers’ 
mothers, but rather “professional political actors who receive salary, have hundreds of 
offices all over Russia, and carry out propagandist and publishing activity.” According to 
Alksnis (2005)62 they used “saint title of soldier’s mother” as a mechanism for 
“laundering money.” The SOMO organization was associated with professional politics 
and opposed to the “mothers” who “make sacrifices for the sake of homeland.” 
The SOMO HR NGOs are sometimes accused of publishing information which is 
used by draftee-aged young men to avoid military duty. Ol’kina (2001) stresses that the
SOMO “describe in detail how the military service can be escaped; After a careful reading 
of these books practically any draftee can be illegaly freed (otmazat’).” A slang word 
otmazat’ in this context refers to faking a disease or paying bribe in order to be exempted 
from Army service.
The Brave, Selfless, Patriotic Mother 
The ideological-hegemonic image of the soldier’s mother in some newspaper articles is 
produced through recurrent themes that describe a brave, selfless, and patriotic woman. 
The dominant cultural meaning of gender and nationality are linked to a moral loyalty 
towards the homeland, the Russian Orthodox religion, and the army.  
The article “Soldiers Call Her Mother” (Kulikov 2000) describes how a woman 
courageously went to Chechnya in search of her son who had been kidnapped by the 
Chechen warriors. She sold her apartment to collect money to pay a ransom to the 
                                                 
61 See also at the website of the radio station Echo Moskvy, October 20, 2004.
62 At the website of the party Rodina (Motherland), retrieved January 11, 2005 from 
http://www.rodina.ru/interview/show/?id=218.
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kidnappers. Her son was eventually killed by the Chechen warriors with brutish cruelty 
for refusing to convert from Orthodox Christianity to Islam. His commander, who first 
assumed that he had deserted from his unit, granted him posthumously Order of the 
Courage and honored his mother for raising a good son. The local church helped the 
woman to buy back her apartment. She eventually found some consolation in the thought 
that her son “perished not only for his faith but also for his Fatherland.” “In Chechnya, he 
defended us, his friends and family;” he was not “a traitor.” When the second war started 
in Chechnya in 1999, she followed it on television. She saw that soldiers were badly 
clothed, and decided to gather humanitarian aid and to send clothes to them. The soldiers 
were grateful and wrote her a letter. A mother learns to accept the tragic reality of human 
loses in the time of war and to be proud over a heroic death of her son. In a symbolic 
sense, she continues to be a Mother, now for the Russian soldiers doing their military duty 
in Chechnya. 
A soldier’s mother is described as loving, courageous, psychologically strong, and a 
loyal citizen. Her love for her son is a central trait and she endures enormous sacrifices 
trying to find and rescue him. The name of woman in the article, Lubov,’ means “love” in 
Russian.  
While the story describes tragic events including macabre details, there are few
linguistic expressions of grief and distress. The woman is instead represented through 
intense activity, which is expressed through a plentiful usage of verbs. The article, which 
is only 2.5 pages long, includes about fifty verbs pertaining to the image of a mother. Of 
these verbs, 42 words signify action. Only 3 words signify feelings of pain and shock, 
such as “gave a cry” (poplakala), “was horrified” (byla potriasena), “remember 
fragmentary” (pomnit otryvkami). 
The woman’s strength is stressed by a comparison with her husband, who died on 
the fourth day after the son’s funeral: “The man’s heart did not stand [the pain]. But how 
was it for a woman to survive such experience?” The underlying meaning in this 
comparison confirms a gender difference. Strength and courage are linked to selfless 
voluntary work and care about the Russian soldiers. The woman overcomes her grief by 
being “useful to others.” She travels regularly with humanitarian aid for solders in 
Chechnya: “Now is not time for crying, I must help.”     
189
Another key theme that recurs throughout the article and which is related to the 
image of the mother of a soldier is a contrast between “bestial” Chechen “bandits” and 
honorable young Russian soldiers. Nationality is reproduced and linked with gender and 
political loyalty.  
One additional recurrent image in the article is the contrast between “simple people” 
(prostyie ludi) and “official authorities” (vlast’). The officials are described as indifferent 
to “a mother’s pain” and sexist. An advice which the unit commander gives to the mother 
is: “find a warrior, become his mistress, and he helps you to find your son.” The officials
are careless and inefficient, which is showed by the “crazy way” to organize the military 
operations in Chechnya. In addition, they perceive citizens first as criminals: the woman’s 
missing son was assumed to have deserted and was sought by the police at the mother’s 
home. The article stresses several times that the official authorities did not help the 
woman in any way and “people in the big offices do not care about the destiny of a 
soldier’s mother.” The main idea around which these themes cluster is that people should 
not rely on the state for help; they should rely instead on self-help and self-organization.        
As a result, this discursive representation of a soldier’s mother expresses the 
meaning that protection of Russianness (religion, territorial borders and human lives) 
should be a concern of “simple” people, strong women, and loving mothers. This 
interpretation of ideological-hegemonic discourse adds to the analysis of feminization of 
the Third Sector in chapters 6 and 8, which showed that female civic activists were 
constructed as those who were to bear the social costs of the transformation.     
The theme of a mother’s selfless voluntary work is represented in the other articles in the 
sample. Voluntary activism of members of the military servicemen’s families is linked 
with self-help, charity, and a close cooperation with the state and military authorities. For 
example, a short article describes how a group of mothers of soldiers mourn their sons 
who perished in Chechnya. Supported by the city administration and the local draft board,
they decide to plant an apple tree garden in memory of their sons (Yuzhnyi 2000). 
Matrosova (2003) characterizes activists of All-Russia Charity Union of Servicemen’s 
Families, established in 1991 by wives and mothers of officers, as “serving the 
Fatherland.” They started a charity campaign Help to Russia’s Soldiers aimed at gathering 
and sending necessities to the soldiers in Chechnya. They also help the families of 
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perished soldiers and officers, cooperate with the Defense Ministry, the voluntary 
organization Generals for Democracy, and participate in the television program Maternal 
Field of Russia. An article Charity Marathon (w. a., 2000) informs about a charity 
campaign “People, a Force Against Terrorism and Violence” organized by Council of the 
Servicemen’s Parents of Russia together with the president’s administration under the 
patronage of the president and Russia’s Patriarch Alexii II. The article Right to a 
Dignified Life (Pavliutkina 2003) describes a meeting of organizations of widows and 
bereaved mothers with the military deputy candidate of the Duma. The women presented
their demands and proposals to a Moscow city military procurator who was running in the 
parliamentary election campaign. They asked that the Duma deputy candidate work to 
ensure that the military draft boards do not take bribes, deserters return to the military 
units, and the like. They demand improvement in draft laws and expanded social 
guarantees for military retirees, individuals with disability and relatives of perished 
servicemen. The article supposedly shows that the political authorities pay attention to the 
mothers and widows; that they are given an opportunity to submit their opinions and 
demands concerning military policy. At the same time, through such discursive 
representations a gendered power asymmetry in the political institution is normalised and 
confirmed.  
Another theme in the discourse of loyal military mother is the extreme poverty of 
bereaved mothers of soldiers in a society divided by class. This population group depends
on scarce social support from the weakened state. The article Bereaved Mothers were 
Shown Attention (Khazova 2001) describes how, the mothers of soldiers who perished in 
Chechnya were granted financial aid of (the ridiculously low) sum of 638 rubles (about 
twenty U.S. dollars) in the State Duma. The money was collected during a “star auction” 
organized in one of the night clubs in Moscow and was divided between 869 families 
registered in the NGO Mother’s Right. It says that social class differences determine who 
is sent to the war: “We sold clothes of pop-stars to rich people who do not participate in 
the military operations in Chechnya in order to help the poor people who participate in the 
military operation in Chechnya.” Another article stresses that social protection of mothers 
who lost their sons in Chechnya is insufficient; women have to struggle for survival, 
especially widows who lost their only breadwinners. They are frequently unable to pay 
their apartment rents for months (Politkovskaya 2004b).   
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2. The Counter-Discursive Image of Mother-Activist
The dominant discursive meaning of the mother of a soldier is contested in articles written 
from a perspective of self-organization of citizens against the ‘totalitarian’ and
unresponsive state. The article You have to fight, my dear son: Once again about mothers 
in the Chechen war (Politkovskaya 2000) provides a negative image of a mother of soldier 
acting in accordance with the official pro-military politics. A soldier, who runs away from 
his military unit dislocated in Chechnya, is taken care of by a local woman. She hides him 
and feeds him, and contacts his mother. However, the mother won’t come after her son. 
On the contrary, “by her own hands she sends him to the military prosecutor office” and 
then back to the army. The writer stresses that the family is a private sphere which should 
be guarded from the interference by the state and ideological brainwashing. She argues
that the mother’s biological instinct makes her predisposed to resist these encroachments: 
“What is happening with mothers? What is happening in our country? …the biological 
instinct once again steps back and surrenders to intensive political propaganda” (ibid.).    
Bogoslovskaya (2000) stresses that a human life never was valued and spared in the 
Soviet Army; this legacy continues today. The manpower is only “cannon fodder” 
delivered by civilians to ambitious military commanders. The strategies of the 
organization of soldiers’ mothers are described as “a method of defense developed for the 
totalitarian society.” “The scheme is the following: You say here are the laws, according 
to the laws I demand my rights, I am not evading my duties, but give me my rights. What 
can be argued against that?” The SOMO activism is embedded in a human rights rhetoric 
of the “classic liberal doctrine with its basic principles of freedom, equality, individualism 
and a state ruled by law:” “When a family manages to defend a son’s right to life, health, 
and human dignity during his enlistment and military service, when it is possible to 
achieve that without paying bribes, by the legal way, then people change and turn into
Citizens. They come to the organization of Soldier’s Mothers like winners” (ibid.). The 
SOMO activists need to teach the parents how to protect themselves by using the legal 
code: “Not all the parents were capable even to formulate their pain and their trouble in 
the official letter. They neither knew where to turn to” (ibid., see also Politkovskaya 
2004a). 
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Other articles stress, that behind the official attacks on the Soldiers’ Mothers 
activists is an attempt to disguise the inefficiency of the military institutions. The activists 
try to protect soldiers from hazing by the officers. Soldiers often run away from their units 
and head directly to the SOMO offices. This irritates the military and they attack the 
activists, using minor violations of formal organizational procedures as a pretext, or 
insinuating that they work for foreign money, and the like (Pas’ko 2003). The army’s
organization is old-fashioned and therefore inefficient. Instead of trying to look into the 
wrong military strategies, however, the military accuse “women who give birth to 
soldiers’” (Latynina 2004). The activists are accused of living on large financial grants
from Western foundations. In reality, however, the human rights-defenders are very poor; 
they occupy only a tiny office which is usually overcrowded by soldiers and mothers 
“with sad eyes.” The way in which they use the grants is thoroughly documented and 
strictly reported. At the same time, the state officials receive grants from international 
foundations as well. For example, the Ministry of Defense received a grant for medical 
rehabilitation and production of prosthetics for wounded servicemen. When activists 
applied for financial aid on the behalf of a soldier, however, their application was turned 
down (Politkovskaya 2004a). 
The SOMO activists highlight violations of soldiers’ rights by the state and military 
officers. They highlight the illegal usage of soldiers as a free labor force, which became 
more widespread in the post-Soviet army since market economy relations have entered the 
army. For these crimes, the courts sentence high ranking officers only to mild 
punishments. It therefore remains lucrative for them to involve soldiers in for example 
building private summer houses. Soldiers do not complain or report these violations to the 
public prosecutor because they still escape the misery and violence in the military 
barracks (Kostiukovsky 2005). This exposing role of the activists is stressed in many mass 
media articles. The activists also accuse the military of the scandalous scale of 
embezzlement of the army’s resources, which they believe explain the poor conditions in 
the army and the increased draft evasion (Kondrashov 2001). 
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Loving Mother and Party-Politics 
In the mid-1990s, the Russian media represented the SOMO movement as “not violently 
angry but simple, gentle, peaceful mothers looking for their sons” (Caiazza 2002: 128). 
The horrible consequences of dedovschina were often revealed in the press through 
images of mothers who were indignant over the “heartlessness” of the military officials 
(Reif 1998). The unpopular character of military politics is illustrated by images of 
maternal grief of mothers of soldiers (Politkovskaya 2001). Other articles do not describe 
the Soldiers’ Mothers activists as grieving over their loss, but rather as strong, smart and 
capable of organizing to protect of their own and others’ children. Every tragic story of 
soldiers and their mothers become a matter of concern for the SOMO activists; they try to 
understand soldiers’ difficulties and to help. They also try to approach these problems 
from a larger political perspective on the army as a whole (Bogoslovskaya 2000).
The Mothers’ decision to found a new political party - the United People’s Party of 
Soldiers’ Mothers - is described as an unusual action. It is justified with a reference to an 
emergency caused by the current political situation. For example, this initiative is 
described as being “enforced” on and “squeezes out” the women (Politkovskaya 2004c). It 
has to do with the fact that the parties Yabloko and the SPS failed to be elected into the 
parliament in 2003. These were parties which the Mothers could mainly lobby for their 
military reform initiatives and receive help in cases when a Duma deputy inquiry was 
necessary to protect the soldiers. The major motivation behind the Mothers’ initiative is to 
represent the interests of ordinary people by putting an end to the universal conscription 
army system. The party is created ‘from the earth’ by the ordinary women, who in 
contrast to the political establishment, lack large economic and administrative resources 
(ibid.). The genuine grassroots character of this party is said to be proved by the fact that 
the activists follow their strong maternal feelings rather than a rational sense: “The 
Soldiers’ Mothers employ primarily their passion for protecting our children and our trust 
in them doing that sincerely. No any other political capital. Their joint pressure aimed at 
protecting children and sweeping off everything standing in its way comes from the very 
nature of a human being” (ibid.). 
The SOMO are represented as mothers whose sons were in Chechnya and who 
sacrificed their own health for rescuing them. They are deeply inspired to put enormous 
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energy into their mission including a political struggle for peace and military reform 
(Politkovskaya 2004a). The mothers’ political activism is justified and defended from the 
officials’ accusations by referring to their biological maternal instinct. 
The language of gender-based discrimination of women is rarely deployed when 
talking about soldier’s mother. It did, however, emerge in the articles that commented on 
women’s political party building. The first congress of the SOMO party is described as a 
“project based on the academic category of gender” marked by extraordinary emotional 
atmosphere: “If our men could not stop the terror, it means that women need to take care 
of that, we cannot let our children to be enemies, exclaimed a deputy from Dagestan” 
(Zakatnova 2004). One of the activists stressed that “until now all the conversations about 
the uniting of the democratic forces were hindered by the men’s refusal to give way to 
women“ (Kostenko and Melikova 2005). It is stressed that “women’s interests are not 
represented in Russian politics: we lack strong women’s parties and women’s 
organizations able to influence the official power” (Barabanov 2004). 
3. The Legalist-Pragmatic Image of Mother-Expert
The SOMO human rights groups are presented in some articles, not only as opposing the
government, but also as promoting a new ‘civilized’ mode of resolving conflicts between 
a citizen and the state via legal investigation. The activists are represented by an image of 
civic experts in the sphere of the draft law. 
The human rights groups of mothers are praised for nurturing a new mode of 
behavior among citizens. Kulikov (2002) stresses that Mother’s Right encourages 
bereaved parents of soldiers not to keep silent if they believe that the commanders of 
military units are guilty of the deaths of their children. They should persecute the units 
legally and it is the last responsibility, which they can fulfill, towards their children: The 
state should be “punished by ruble.” The bureaucrats usually resist the claims and create 
special formulations of the causes of a soldier’s death which allows the units to escape 
legal charges. It is, however laudable that “citizens have learned to resolve the conflicts 
with the state in civilized legal way.” It is unlikely that court persecutions might help to 
stop dedovschina, but the fact that citizens initiate legal cases not only against other 
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citizens but also against the state organs is seen as a positive trend (Kulikov 2003; 
Babakin 1999). 
This kind of mass media images represents the SOMO activists as having specific 
expertise concerning the legal and procedural aspects of enlistment in the military service. 
The weekly Kommersant ? Daily and the magazine Profile refer to the SOMO activists as 
an authoritative source of information about draft campaigns and military reforms. 
Journalists refer to the SOMO’s critique about deficiencies in the work of local draft 
boards as an additional argument in favor of transforming the conscription-based army
into a contract-based army (Barinova and Rudnev 2005: 32). 
Non-activist mothers need information on how to act in situations of conflict. In the 
weekly Aif the readers’ letters are answered and commented in a regularly published 
column “Society -- The Army”. Current issues about the draft policy are debated in the 
column by lawyers, the military public prosecutor, and members of the SOMO NGOs.
         In the comment on a letter from the parents of a draft-aged man, who sued the local 
draft board for not accepting their son’s medical diagnosis, the lawyer stresses, that the 
courts tend to ally with the local officials. She advises the parents to undertake a more 
‘offensive’ stance and to sue several state agencies in different courts. The lawyer points 
out that “complaints and legal prosecutions are the weapons for reassuring the rights of an 
individual.” A young man is allowed to stay home during the court case, which can take a 
long time (Borta 2004). The members of the SOMO NGOs advise the readers on how to 
find information about receiving deferments from army service on medical and other 
grounds (Vais 2005). They stress that mothers and relatives should not trust the medical 
examination conducted by the military-medical commission under the local draft board. 
They must arrange a medical check-up of the potential draftee in advance by competent 
specialists independently from the draft board. The relatives have to ‘fight’ for a correct 
judgment of the military-medical commission on the case. The SOMO activists explain 
how the unjust decisions can be appealed (Kochetova 2000). They point out what is legal 
and what is not. For example, the military draft committees illegally arrange raids on the 
potential conscripts in the streets (Markov 2004). The SOMO NGOs publish statistics of 
parents’ complaints on the local military draft committees. They show that the draft 
committees striving to fulfill the draft norms take advantage of parents who are ignorant 
about their legal rights. A failure of medical commissions to accept a diagnosis obtained 
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from the medical centers thereby enlisting chronically sick draftees might have tragic 
consequences (Tuchkova 2000).   
The human rights organizations protest against deploying new, untrained recruits, 
who have not been examined properly by medical and psychiatric experts to a combat
zone (Nikitina 1999). The military operations in the Northern Caucasus make serving in 
the army even less attractive. The previous decree by the president that the new recruits 
could be sent to Caucasus only after at least one year service and by a voluntarily 
agreement was changed. Conscripts could be sent to the hot spots after six months of 
military service and without consent. The human rights SOMO activists argue that this
decree is only semi legal and that it violates human rights; it was signed under pressure 
from the Ministry of Defense (ibid.). 
Summary
This chapter has shown that at least three kinds of discursive images of soldier’s mother 
may be identified in the sample of Russian newspaper articles. In the official discursive 
context, war and gender in the mass media were often linked with a sense of national 
belonging. The ideological-hegemonic image of a soldier’s mother is interrelated with this 
context. The mother is represented as courageous, selfless and patriotic. It is stressed that 
not the official authorities, but “simple people” and self-sacrificing mothers take 
responsibility for the problems in the army. This discourse supports the dominant cultural 
meanings of gender, class, nationality and political loyalty to the regime. There is
consistency between this discourse and the feminization of the Third Sector of the NGOs. 
The second discursive image of the mother of a soldier is counter-discursive and is 
produced from the perspective of the regime-critical human rights groups. It describes 
mothers as biologically predisposed to protect the rights of her family and sons from an 
undemocratic state. The third discursive image is legalist-pragmatic. Mothers are 
represented as activists and lay experts in the sphere of draft law. They act as brokers 
between the official draft institutions and the families of draftees. In contrast to the 
counter-discursive image, this discourse represents mothers-activists not as opposing the 
state, but rather as promoting a “civilized” legal way to resolve conflicts in the state.       
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Chapter 12
Maternal Framing in the State Military Field
Introduction
This chapter focuses on how the SOMO participants express claims and grievances of the 
soldiers’ mothers as a social group and how they use a narrative of motherhood to make sense of 
belonging in non-governmental activism. It examines how the ‘maternal’ reframing of the 
activists’ shared experiences and strategies interacts with their social position and power 
relationships within the gendered arena of Russian military draft politics. Reframing is both a 
strategic and a social process. It is a mechanism by which the institutional discourse in the 
military policy arena, the SOMO movement’s ideology, emotional culture, and interpretative 
frames are connected in the activists’ social practices. As explained in chapter 11, other 
authorized speakers and institutionalized discourses of a ‘loyal soldier’s mother’ constrain the 
claims made by the activists. The activists use the ‘maternal’ reframing, partly to accommodate 
and partly to challenge a dominant discursive construction of motherhood disseminated in the 
arena of state military politics. 
The chapter studies the following questions: 1) How and why are the SOMO’s collective 
identity and strategies of delivering services to the aggrieved constituency framed through a 
narrative of motherhood? How do the activists constitute the ‘injustice frame’? 2) How are the 
SOMO NGOs socially positioned through gender, socioeconomic status, and regional location 
within the military draft politics arena? How does ‘maternal’ framing interact with the SOMO 
positioning? 3) What actors are represented as the Other in the movement? How do the SOMO 
oppose the military’s construction of mothering in the NGO field? 
1. Maternal Grievance and Advocacy   
Networks of SOMO activists emerged primarily as mutual support groups of mothers whose 
sons were serving in the army. The groups, which I studied, view themselves as a movement 
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representing the claims of mothers of soldiers. They construct a collective identity through a set 
of narratives, symbols, and feelings which are linked in different ways to a mother-child bond 
and mothers’ experiences of grievances. The maternal frame is in its turn related to the issue of 
military draft diagnosed as a social problem. At the same time mothers, “naturally” worried 
about their sons-soldiers, are identified as actors who are entitled to have an opinion on this 
issue. The military, officials, and the state are pointed out as responsible for the soldiers’ 
problem. The following section explains how some activists became involved in the movement 
through a process in which their emotions and interpretation of their personal maternal 
grievances are framed as social injustice and transformed as a result of becoming activists. 
The Maternal Identity of Activist
When asked how they joined the SOMO movement, several respondents told of their 
painful experiences from the time when their sons were serving in the army as conscript 
soldiers. They became involved as a way to find resolution for their personal strains 
associated with the suffering of their sons-soldiers. The activists’ personal grievances, 
however, are transformed and framed as social injustice. The meaning of activism is 
interpreted by Irina and Masha as a voluntary and selfless “service to others” and caring 
about saving the lives of young men. 
When Irina’s elder son was serving in the army she visited him in his military unit. 
He always showed up covered with bruises and seemed deeply depressed. It was obvious 
to Irina that he was beaten up and bullied by other soldiers or officers in the unit. 
Although she was sick with worry for her son’s life, she did not know what she could do 
to help him: “I was in despair. The only thing one can do [in this situation] is to pay 
bribes” (interview, November 20, 2000). Her younger son has a weak heart and she was 
afraid that he would not be able to survive a term of military service. She knew that he 
probably should receive an exemption from the military duty, but the medical commission 
at the local draft board did not acknowledge his medical diagnosis. As a single mother, 
Irina could not afford to pay bribes or to pay for a visit to a private medical clinic, where 
her son’s diagnosis might have been defined and documented. Despair and anxiety for her 
sons’ destiny pushed Irina to look for extraordinary ways out of the situation. She turned 
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to the Soldier’s Mothers organization where she was able to get financial aid, necessary 
information and advice. Her younger son eventually received exemption from the military 
service and her elder son was dismissed early from the army. This experience had a 
profound effect on Irina. Her involvement in social activism transformed her feelings of 
powerlessness and eventually changed her worldview. In the SOMO, the ideology of 
human rights taught her to view her situation in a completely different way: 
I realized then that there is a lawful way to resolve such situations, that I do not need to 
pay bribes. I was very depressed at that time, but this experience gave me a new 
motivation to continue to live. I wanted to share this feeling with the others and I engaged 
enthusiastically in this work. (Interview, November 20, 2000)
Looking back on her past experiences, she recognized that she did not understand 
many things and was acting like a ‘little mother,’ who was ignorant of her own rights. She 
started to see her individual problems as part of social problem which led her to build a 
new self-identity as a ‘counselor’ helping others. In the SOMO NGO she tries to help 
mothers as well as soldiers who are victims of hazing in the military barracks and to 
educate them about the possibilities of protecting their rights in these situations. 
  Another respondent, Masha’s path into societal activism also started in the painful 
maternal experience which pushed her to seek a contact with other mothers. Her story 
illustrates how self and society intertwines when individuals are brought together due to
similar problems and become recognized as activists by others. In 1987, when her son was 
16 years old, she started to think about his future service in the army. It was a period of 
ongoing war in Afghanistan and she was afraid that her son would be sent there. She 
wanted to find ways to avoid his enlistment in the army. It was during the period of 
glasnost when the newspapers wrote relatively openly about controversial issues. So 
Masha both heard from the other people and read in the newspapers that there were
groups of soldiers’ parents whose sons were missing in Afghanistan. For the first time in 
her life, she started to be interested in politics and broader societal issues.
She tells that even if her family was lucky, because in 1989 when her son was 
drafted, the Soviet troops had already left Afghanistan, political tension started to increase 
in the country and many violent ethnic conflicts erupted in different regions. Her son’s 
unit was sent to Azerbajdzhan, a Soviet republic in the south, and was assigned to a 
military unit which recently withdrew from Afghanistan. 
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In December, 19, 1990, the Soviet troops entered the capital Baku and tragic events 
followed. I do not know if his unit participated in them. But as I know they were sent to 
suppress the uproars in Tbilisi. My son suddenly found himself in the combat unit on a 
war footing. (Interview, September 28, 2001) 
In the interview, Masha tells about her personal worries and a “natural” concern for 
her own child with the help of language and symbols which constitute the SOMO’s shared 
group narrative. The fear and anxiety she felt about her son are transformed into a feeling 
of indignation, and thinking in terms of collective tragedy and soldiers in general:
  
It was a kind of inner protest… naturally, I feared for my son’s life. I wanted also to 
understand what happens to our children, suddenly the soldiers started to be killed in 
Azerbajdzhan, during Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It was a real military operation in 
which the soldiers were killed and peaceful citizens lost their lives. I was alone [with these 
feelings] and I wanted to do something, to intervene in this tragedy. This condition pushed 
me to search for women who felt in the same way. (Interview, September 28, 2001)
A core group of activists emerged as a basis of the future NGO:      
They were just mothers who gathered in the evenings, wherever they could, often in the 
High School of XXX, which offered them a room. We had a lot of agitated discussions… 
We, a core group of 15-20 people, who organized the meetings, saw or phoned each other 
regularly. General meetings with other mothers were crowded, up to 500 people gathered. 
(Interview, September 28, 2001)
We were trying to somehow resolve our own problems but the other women started to 
consider us as a kind of Committee. They came to us with their problems, folks, little 
mothers … so we dealt with our own problems and at the same time learned how to help 
the other people. We so to say undertook such a mission. And we learned and grew into it, 
gradually, step by step. (Interview, September 28, 2001)     
Similar to Irina, who described how she was transformed from a ‘little mother’ into 
a human rights activist, Masha’s story shows how spontaneous ties of solidarity between 
mothers were eventually partially formalized and structured as a relationship between core 
activists and other women who were offered help. 
At the same time, many activists’ relationship to the constituency is very informal 
and felt as a relationship built on genuine compassion. This rule of emotion in the shared 
culture of the organization creates opportunities for continued interactions. Masha stresses 
that her empathy to mothers and young draftees resulted in years of tireless voluntary 
work: 
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It is a certain state of soul. I feel that I cannot live in the other way, without this work, it 
became my way of life. Even when I was at home with my newborn baby, I continued to 
give consultations to women in the neighborhood. My elder son says to me, you do not 
need to work all the time. But I feel that if I do not help and do not teach them how they 
should manage things, a boy might get into trouble, he can be killed. If something happens 
to some boy, I feel, I could have prevented that, I am aware of that all the time. I feel like 
an ambulance, which must arrive on time. (Interview, September 28, 2001)   
This quote shows how maternal identity and solidarity with other mothers’ sons is linked 
with the self-identity of activist. The maternal narrative constitutes a foundation for the 
SOMO activists’ motivational frame, through which they are encouraged become 
involved in the movement. Constructing ‘maternal’ readiness for a selfless ‘caring labor’
(see Ruddick 1984) operates also as a diagnostic frame which helps to convince others 
that a problem needs to be addressed. The following section analyzes how the ties of 
‘natural’ love between mother and son is an important symbolic tool that is applied to 
convince others of appropriate strategies, tactics and targets (prognostic frame) and to 
represent the SOMO as entitled to have opinion on the problem of the military draft.  
Dear Little Boys - Acting on Behalf of Soldiers 
The injustice frame in the SOMO’s shared culture is created based on the activists’ 
conviction that a conscript soldier is an especially vulnerable and legally not well-
protected category in the Russian society. The soldier is a victim of widespread 
dedovschina, lawlessness in the closed institution of the army, and violation of the draft 
laws by the military recruitment boards: 
While a military serviceman recruited on the basis of a contract can decide to end a 
contract a conscript soldier does not have a right to choose. Further, the existing system in 
the army allows concealing crimes committed against a soldier; murder can be presented 
as an accident or a suicide. Soldiers are [powerless] people, completely at the mercy of the 
others. (Interview, September 28, 2001) 
Boys, who are recruited in the army as conscripts, became wounded and disabled. In their 
encounters with the bureaucrats they are humiliated and denigrated. They say, they can’t 
stand it, it means that the state needed them [in the military front], but nobody needs them 
here [in the civilian life]. The pension is tiny, and they are not entitled to any social 
benefits. They are left alone, isolated with their kin. (Interview, December 28, 2004)  
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In the regular lectures at the SOMO’s School of Human Rights, which I attended 
during the fieldwork, it is often stressed that in Russia’s long history of totalitarian 
militarized state conscript soldiers were always the lowest social strata treated as “canon 
meat” and “dirt under the nails” (Participant observation notes, November 2000). The 
activists refer to sociological publications, according to which the Russian/Soviet army is 
an institution which systematically suppresses soldiers’ individuality and autonomy 
(Levinson 1999).   
Furthermore, the SOMO represent soldiers as ‘children.’ They stress that 16-year-
old draftees routinely invited to officially register with the draft committee and newly 
recruited 18-year-old soldiers are just teenagers. They are thus especially vulnerable and 
their mothers should protect them. The SOMO’s shared culture draws upon the idea of 
mothers’ biological instinct to protect their own children. Applying Sara Ruddick’s (1984) 
notion, mothers are ideally capable of “preservative love:” 
Let’s say like this. Who is a mother? What is our original mission? …we give birth, we 
give life to a human being, isn’t it so? And everything is said by this. If we give life, we 
are also responsible for the preservation of this life. (Interview, October 1, 2001)     
Following this line of argument, it seems obvious, that mothers-activists should take 
care of injured aggrieved soldiers and that they also are entitled to have opinions on the 
issue of the military draft. Moreover, they should be given important positions in the 
institutions representing soldiers’ interests: 
It has been said here about the establishment of the Department of Social Protection for 
Military Servicemen [at the Ministry of Defense]. I think these departments should be 
headed not by the military, but by us. We are not social workers, but we are the main link 
between military servicemen and their parents. And we are parents who suffered the pain 
of loss. (The Third International Congress, 2002: 57)   
By linking the frames “soldiers as children” and “a strong mother-child bond,” 
activists formulate their movement’s anti-war and anti-draft goals, and lay claim to 
represent the opinions of mothers in military policy-making. They thereby accommodate 
the ideological-hegemonic discourse of a loyal mother of a soldier and challenge the 
marginalization of women’s NGOs in military politics. The following quote exemplifies 
how maternal framing operates through the image of “soldiers as yesterday schoolboys” in 
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the speech given at the Congress of the SOMO representing NGOs from different regions 
all over Russia:    
What are our demands? It is obvious that we cannot stop the war. But we can demand to 
reestablish the rule that only those soldiers who served no less than twelve months and 
who volunteered, should participate in military operations. Of course, it is only a tactical 
move, which does not resolve the problem of war, but it anyway serves our goal in the 
long run. 
But our main efforts should be concentrated on the goal to abolish the principle of 
conscription in the army. Otherwise, we cannot resolve problems of state security in 
Chechnya and these problems will continue to be placed on the shoulders of yesterday’s 
schoolboys. A huge pyramid including a large-size government, state administration, and 
all burden of state security are put on the shoulders of a little soldier. We must struggle 
against that. Eighteen-year-old boys cannot bear this burden and pay with their own lives. 
At age of eighteen they are not aware of how precious life is, they think it will last for 
ever… but it is taken away from them! (The Second International Congress, 2000: 36) 
The activists feel that they carry the ultimate responsibility for the lives of the 
soldiers who contact their organization. They stress that they actually do not intend to 
extract any selfish gains from their membership in the organization. It is volunteer work 
which can be compared with a selfless caring work of a mother:      
If you are working like a mother, this work is absorbing and very hard. You work and 
think only about one thing: how you can help a person. Because we know, they come to us 
like to an island of last hope. If they do not receive help here, it is finished for them!  We 
never ask anything for us personally, [as members of the organization]. We know that at 
stake are the lives of boys and mothers who come to us. We perceive our tasks 
responsibly. (Interview, December 28, 2004) 
The pressure of responsibility is so heavy that the activists even have to seek a 
psychological help to learn how to cope. This is their way of managing the emotion of 
anxiety: 
When a boy comes to us and you see that his situation is terrible, but you do not know 
how you can help and you keep thinking of him all the time. Sometimes you wake up in 
the middle of night and suddenly find a solution to his problem. We realized that to work 
like this is not very healthy for us. So we turned to a psychologist at the State University 
and they helped us to get rid of that. (Interview, December 28, 2004) 
Motherly feelings are a necessary reference in cases when the activists intercede 
with the military on behalf of soldiers who have run away from their military units. When 
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they make phone calls to the military commanders, they describe the soldier as ‘dear little 
boy’ (mal’chishka). The military, amused or irritated, argue that soldiers are no longer 
‘children.’ Finally, they have to tolerate the activists’ way of talking. In some cases, the 
military refuse to listen to the SOMO’s arguments that a soldier ran away because of 
dedovschina, and that he should not be punished, but on the contrary, should be offered 
help. The activists contend that they say these things, because they rely on maternal guts 
which cannot be deceived. They also can deploy the laws strategically; they sometimes
take photos of bruises and wounds on young men’s bodies which can prove that there 
were marks of violence when a soldier arrived at the SOMO office. 
We refer to the fine print part in the criminal code which stipulates special treatment of 
cases when “soldier is forced to leave the military unit.” If a boy came to me, all in
bruises, beaten up, if he is exhausted and dirty, what can they say? Sorry, but I am a 
mother, I know how my child feels and I would never let him look like this! Any mother, 
any woman reacts immediately: something is wrong! (Interview, December 28, 2004)
Belief in the importance of protective maternal love is so strong among the anti-draft 
activists that they vilify mothers who are unwilling or incapable of protecting their sons-
soldiers:
In principle, mothers who want to give their sons away to the army are an exception. We 
perceive such women as freaks, as freak mothers. Not every mother has the skills to 
transform their love into concrete actions, but the majority succeeds in achieving this goal. 
(Interview, September 28, 2001) 
This quote illustrates how the activists create a collective identity by drawing a
symbolic boundary between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ mothers. Being a ‘good’ mother is not a 
biological instinct, but rather a result of a reflexive action and taking a stand. The identity 
of a ‘good’ mother is perceived as a consequence of a political action. This can be 
compared to the point made by Sara Ruddick (1989), discussed in chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, that engagement in the anti-military struggle does not arise automatically 
from woman’s biological instinct, but is created through conscious efforts. 
Expressing a feeling of solidarity and empathy towards young soldiers who unable to 
stand dedovschina often run away from their military unit, the activists create an affective 
term ‘little runaway’ (begunok) which they use instead of the official notion ‘deserter.’ 
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This way of speaking contrasts the formal language of the military. This creates a 
symbolic boundary between the “we” of activists, on the one side, and the military, and 
non-activist mothers, on the other side. When rescuing soldiers is framed in terms of 
helping the ‘little runaways,’ a conventional gendered construction of mothers-activists as 
caring and compassionate is partly reproduced and partly challenged and revised through 
bridging the frames of ‘mothering’ and ‘human rights protection.’           
For example, Olga works with helping soldiers and mothers who have problems very 
similar to those she had experienced herself, during her son’s military service. She 
explains that when a soldier is beaten up and constantly bullied in the military barrack, it 
is extremely difficult to prosecute those who are guilty. Nobody dares to witness as
soldiers know that they will have to stay in the same unit until the end of their service. 
When a soldier runs away from his unit and appears in the SOMO office, the activists 
therefore have to find another way to help him. They most often try to prove that he is ill 
and should be retired from the military service before the end of the term. 
A SOMO activist accompanies a runaway soldier on his visit to the military 
prosecutor and act as his ‘societal defender.’ They try to prove that he had to run away 
from the military unit because his life and health were threatened. Olga stresses that the 
parents are most of all afraid of the military prosecutor: 
The parents are terrified by the thought that their ‘little runaway‘ might be prosecuted as a 
criminal for leaving his military unit without permission. I think this fear is caused by a 
deep distrust to the legal system. (Interview, November 20, 2000)
SOMO activists encourage mothers of draftees to collect medical documents about 
their children’s health condition and not to feel ashamed to document officially their sons’
diseases. The activists know that the military medical commissions often ignore draftees’ 
health problems which usually deteriorate in the army. In order to prove that a runaway 
soldier has health problems, the activists establish contacts with the medical clinics which 
are autonomous from the military draft system, so that they can obtain the necessary 
documents to use in court trials or in negotiations with the military. 
Olga usually helps a soldier to get examined by such ‘civilian’ physicians. After all 
necessary documentation is sent to the public military prosecutor and military 
commanders, the soldier is sent to the military hospital for observation, and there “the 
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major fight takes place between parents and the military medical staff” (interview, 
November 20, 2000).
By inventing “new words” the activists challenge taken for granted beliefs of 
mothers who usually incorporate the official top-down language, used by the military 
commanders and jurists, constitutive of hierarchical subjugation in the state military field. 
The military unit commanders call them “deserters.” The parents usually talk about 
“leaving the unit by own will.” This is a prosecutor’s formulation which the parents use. 
Parents consider their child to be guilty while he is actually a victim. Such psychology of 
servile submission is engraved in our consciousness. It is brought from the experiences in 
the Soviet Union. To get rid of it is rather difficult. We want people to understand that 
they have a right to life, dignity, health and a right to defend these rights according to law. 
(Interview, November 20, 2000)   
                   
The SOMO thus try to reframe a stigmatizing ‘deviant’ subject position of soldier 
deserter. A new word begunok allows an interpretation which enables them to advocate 
for the needs of young soldiers. Instead of positioning him as a criminal, the soldier is 
presented as victim of the system. He is potentially an active citizen “able to defend his 
rights.” In addition, the mother’s own feelings of empathetic relation to her child, which 
are wiped out by the masculine official state-legal discourse, are brought to the forefront. 
Olga can easily identify with the mothers’ concern about their sons as she herself 
experienced similar situations. The gender regime in the state-military sphere can be 
challenged by allowing soldiers’ vulnerability to be expressed and privileging 
parents’/women’s lived experiences within a bureaucratic institutional framework. The 
activists hence construct an oppositional sub-universe of meaning by politicizing the 
needs and interests of mothers/parents of soldiers.
Due to their devoted work and ability to achieve concrete results, organizations receive 
recognition and respect among soldiers and the broad public. Those, whom the activists 
have helped before, might phone and congratulate on New Year Eve, which is one of the 
most popular holidays in Russia. Word of their organization is spread among people; 
friends and relatives of those who have received help from the organizations. Signs of 
gratitude, acknowledgement, and trust from ordinary people constitute the movement’s
moral capital. For example, Katia protests loudly when I ask if their constituency is felt 
like visitors or clients of NGO:
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Visitors!? One soldier, whom I helped three years ago, was here a couple of days ago. He 
said that he still remembers that here was the only place where nobody shouted at him, 
listened to what he had to say and helped him. Visitors are those who receive something 
and then leave and never come back. But if people come back, it means that they 
understand our work, it means that they support us. They can come to us again like to the 
old friends when they need help or advice. It is great, because it means that people trust 
us. (Interview, December 28, 2004)               
As many examples in this chapter illustrate, motherly emotion and the idea of a 
mother-child bond is an important symbolic resource in the movement (see also Lally 
199963). The central significance of a maternal narrative in the SOMO movement can be 
explained from a feminist perspective. It states that social constructions of women and 
men’s experiences are formed in societies organized via divisions into women and men’s 
spheres of life. For example, Dorothy Smith (2004) stresses that women’s standpoint is 
embodied in the foundation of childrearing, family and compassion for others. This 
perspective provides an explanation for the fact that the participants of the SOMO are 
mainly women. In addition, we can explain why some young men in the age of draft, who 
join the SOMO groups as volunteers, usually do not become members of the organization. 
Considering the gendered character of citizenship and legal framework in the 
contemporary nation-state (Yuval-Davies 1997), women activists are relatively freer than 
men to participate in the anti-draft movement. For men, participation involves a greater 
risk as they can be legally charged with avoiding military duty. 
Further, the significance of the maternal narrative in the SOMO has been explained 
from the perspective of social movement theory of framing. Caiazza (2002) stresses that 
the SOMO’s great popularity in Russia has been explained by the fact that the group’s
ideology resonates with the dominant social constructions of women’s gender identity in 
terms of motherhood. This dissertation argues, however, that, even if women are 
structurally positioned as primary caregivers, which generates predictable emotions, the 
significance attributed to these emotional responses is a result of cultural and situational 
processes. As the following sections in this chapter show, the interpretation of maternal 
emotions in the SOMO movement shifts across various local groups of activists. 
Moreover, in the SOMO’s shared group culture, maternal love is interpreted in a way 
                                                 
63 "I don't know where mothers get their courage. They don't think of danger. When I was looking for my son, I 
felt my own life made no sense if my son was killed. Why should I live if he was dead?" (Lally 1999: 1)
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which allows the activists to deintegrate from the official meaning64 ascribed to the 
voluntary activism of soldiers’ mothers in the arena of military politics. 
In the Russian public sphere of the early 2000s, issues of the army and military draft 
were often incorporated into the nationalist rhetoric. The anti-draft and anti-war groups 
trying to assert their socio-political agency were therefore sometimes openly harassed in 
the mass media or co-opted by the official military administration. The SOMO’s ability to 
sustain an independent status in the NGO field depends on the activists’ limited access to 
the material, human and cultural resources accrued from a social position within a 
disadvantaged constituency. The following section explains how the interpretation of the 
maternal collective identity and civic agency is related to the various activist groups’ 
different access to resources.  
2. Resources and Positioning in the NGO field  
The SOMO groups draw a line between themselves and the voluntary groups of soldier’s 
mothers set up within the framework of other formal organizations, such as the 
government, military agencies and mass media organizations. Some respondents stress 
that from the very beginning, they strived for a horizontal participatory network able to 
articulate the mothers’ own perspective, and particularly not only the viewpoints of 
bereaved mothers.     
“Own Horizontal” Organization
Ludmila said that although new voluntary organizations including groups of soldiers’ 
mothers, appeared in the late 1980s, they were still organized as top-down and were 
governed and directed from above. Moreover, their work seemed to have been 
deliberately disturbed and limited by the power-holders:
Different organizations of soldiers’ mothers were created, both official and unofficial, for 
example, the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers at the House of Military Officers, the 
                                                 
64 See about the hegemonic-ideological discourse about a mother of soldier in chapter 11 of the dissertation.
209
Committee at the daily newspaper Smena. In 1991, the Committee for Social Protection of 
the Military Servicemen under President and the Committee under the Superior Soviet 
were set up and included parents of soldiers who had been killed. But every time when I 
made phone calls and needed something, either nobody was there or nobody cared about 
the matter of my concern. Parents’ organizations were pitted against each other. We even 
saw once how some members started to punch one another. This atmosphere was created 
in order to block organizations and to obstruct their impact on larger society. (Interview, 
November 8, 2000)
Ludmila saw groups of soldiers’ mothers in the picket lines, narrating their horrible 
stories, marching in demonstrations towards the parliament building, sitting in hunger 
strikes and demanding laws about social benefits for mothers whose sons-soldiers had 
been killed. At some point, she understood that all these efforts were quite pointless. She 
realized, for example, that soldiers’ mothers were frequently manipulated by politicians, 
more interested in their personal political careers than in representing the mothers’ needs: 
At an international human rights conference, I promoted a talk of XXX. She was a mother 
of a soldier who had been killed in the military barrack in a beastly brutal way; stabbed to 
death by forks. At the conference she was used as a screen for a parliament deputy XXX 
who in his turn helped XXX to be appointed a Minister of Defence.
Such mothers of soldiers were facing the hardest conditions. They could not share their 
sorrow with anybody, because [in the Soviet time] it was not allowed to open the coffin 
and to tell the truth [about how the soldier had died]. And the women were eating 
themselves from inside, because they knew the truth [but had to keep silent]. Such a 
mother could be paid attention, flattered and taken care of. [Imagine that] a woman living 
in a little village receives a telegram, which says, put on you a black dress and headscarf
and come to Moscow. She is brought to Moscow and is allowed to stay in a hotel. She is 
invited to the party congress and demonstrated like in the theater. At the same time they 
arrange their own business and political careers behind her back. (Interview, November 8, 
2000)   
Ludmila was appalled to realize that in the new civic organizations political activists were 
more often engaged in power struggles than in discussing and formulating political 
visions: 
After the People Fronts, we had the experience of creating political parties. We saw with 
our own eyes what was going on. We wrote the program of the Democratic Party 
expressing ideas from the bottom of our hearts. I tried to discuss questions; party is a 
superstructure over a base, but who constitutes our base? What are we going to do 
afterwards? They said, we’ll see when we are there. It is like the Bolsheviks; first we gain 
the power and then we’ll see. I understood that all these parties and voluntary 
organizations are still established according to the totalitarian principle of a pyramid, 
including leaders and subordinates. (Interview, November 8, 2000)
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Ludmila’s experiences of political activism led her to the idea that mothers could 
defend their interests only if they create an own “horizontal” organization. She and a 
couple of her friends decided to create an organization in which “everybody is equal, there 
are no bosses and no subordinates, but a strict discipline and a common goal” (interview, 
ibid.). The emergence of an independent organization of soldiers’ mothers met mixed 
reactions from both the already existing voluntary groups of bereaved soldier’s mothers 
and from the military establishment: 
We gave an announcement on the radio – a social organization of Soldiers’ Mothers. We 
emphasized that we were different [from the other SOMO organizations]. The 
representatives from the General Staff were the first to pay a visit. The anarchists came 
with a black flag and tried to give us an image of an aggressive group. There were some 
scolding articles in the press.  XXX [chairwoman for the SOMO NGO cooperating with 
the military draft commissions] phoned and staged a scandal: what right do you have to 
call yourselves mothers of soldiers!? What is exactly the percentage of the perished 
soldiers at your organization!?  (Interview, November 8, 2000) 
Maternal Framing and Material Resources
The movement has been framed as mothers organizing independently of the military.  To 
sustain an organization costs money, and like many other grassroots groups, the SOMO 
cope with a reality of material scarcity and have limited access to resources. The 
organization’s first period was particularly difficult. In the beginning, the activists 
received a small office space with subsided rent, but they lacked technical office 
equipment. They could only work as volunteers, after working at their ordinary jobs. They 
were uncertain of how they could help mothers and what methods they should apply in the 
voluntary work.
The XX party gave us a room and a telephone. It was a tiny room, which became so 
crowded that no air was left to breathe. Crowds of people poured in. I remember I was 
standing in the corner of the room, had got neither a pen nor any experience, felt 
completely overwhelmed by all these problems. In the beginning, only the broken-hearted 
women whose sons had been killed would come. Men did not come at all. The young boys 
did not come. 
The atmosphere was depressing, sounds of sobbing, and a constant smell of tranquilizers. 
It was very hard also because we often did not know what to do and how to help people. 
We were giving consultations and kept records in our journal. We worked this way for
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four years. Then the Soros Foundation helped us, they gave us a computer, a fax and a 
copying machine. (Interview, November 9, 2000)       
The SOMO need to pay rent, materials and equipments, communication costs, and 
salaries to staff and hired lawyers. They also try to remunerate members who work full-
time in the office. Groups of SOMO activists, located in different regions of Russia, have 
different access to resources. Their resources are also circumscribed through the activists’ 
positioning by gender, socioeconomic status and regional location.
Gender and Socioeconomic Status
Not all members of the organizations can afford to work without pay. Some of them 
receive pensions, are employed elsewhere, or are supported by their family members, but 
some depend on the small salaries they can receive for full-time work in the SOMO 
office. Many respondents’ involvement in voluntary work has been prompted by their 
unemployment. They started to work more regularly in the organization after they had lost 
their paid jobs. Many women were affected negatively by the post-Soviet transition to a
market economy which created a large group of ‘new poor’ (Silverman and Yanowitch 
1997). In a situation when the position of women in the labor market became weaker 
compared to the state-socialist era, the role of the economic support of sons and husbands, 
and family in general, has increased. For example, Masha worked in the factory until 1994 
and had to quit her job because her wages decreased rapidly to a ridiculously low level. In 
addition, she was not paid regularly. Thanks to the economic support of her husband and 
her elder son she was able to become a full-time volunteer in the organization. The 
respondents sometimes attribute their inability to find job to gender and age. Katia 
received help from the organization and was able to rescue her son-soldier during the war 
in Chechnya. She was asked if she could stay and assist the SOMO activists. At that time 
she was laid off from her job, and she decided to volunteer in the organization (interview, 
December 28, 2004). The loss of her job made her feel depressed: “at that time I was 45 
years old, for a woman it was extremely difficult to find a job.” At the time of my research 
she was supported financially by her husband, son and sister; she said that her family 
believed that their organization “is doing a necessary job” (ibid.). Zoia was also 
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unemployed when she came to the organization. Support from her son and husband allows 
her to work as volunteer. Voluntary work is also a way for many women not to lose their 
professional competence by applying it in the NGO, which is regarded as a meaningful 
occupation beyond the scope of paid jobs.
Bourdieu (1986) and Foley et al. (2001) maintain that while an individual may have 
access to resources in a specific social network, the network as a whole may be embedded 
in an oppressed constituency.65 Based on this theory, I analyze how the SOMO activists’ 
access to social capital is related to a positioning of networks of women-activists within 
the broader system of social stratification. Not only do most of the respondents belong to 
the category of a relatively poor, but the SOMO social networks as a whole are also 
placed into a disadvantaged constituency. Young men and parents who go to the SOMO 
NGOs usually are residents of regional small cities or villages. They tend to enlist in the 
army because they cannot afford to enroll in higher education, or to bribe officials in the 
draft board to get an exemption from the army. “The rich people are not interested in our 
movement. They either bribe their children out of conscription or send them to study 
abroad. Our army is predominately of a peasant and working-class character,“ says one of 
the SOMO activists (interview, January 4, 2005). 
In many cases, respondents stress that NGO activists’ work fills the void left after 
the retreat of the welfare state. Many families face tremendous difficulties when their son-
soldier becomes injured during the military service and needs expensive medical care that 
is not provided by the state. Pavla (interview, October 1, 2001) told me about a soldier 
who lost his arms, legs and an eye after a grenade explosion. His mother wrote a letter to 
the SOMO asking for advice about how she could cope with situation. The one-time 
subsidy of 75 000 rubles offered by Ministry of Defence was not enough to pay for 
prosthesis. She had to quit her job because according to the existing legal framework, she 
received only a ten-day-leave for taking care of her son. The activists unsuccessfully 
                                                 
65 Social capital is linked to a possession of a network of relationships of mutual acquaintance, recognition and 
undertaking obligation to act in accordance to certain norms and rules (Bourdieu 1986: 248-249). The extent to 
which an individual is empowered by participation in the social network depends firstly on the structure of the 
network itself and the individual’s position within it. It depends secondly, on the social location of the entire 
network within the broader socioeconomic context, which shapes the ways in which specific networks link or do 
not link their members to resources (Foley et al. 2001: 276-277). 
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sought financial aid from the Red Cross, banks, and private firms. After the soldier’s story 
was broadcast on television and published in the press, several individuals and 
organizations donated money for the prosthesis. Pavla (ibid.) stresses that existing
bureaucratic framework is poorly adjusted to such situations: 
We have thousands of such mothers who ask us for help. They risk to get fired from their
job. In principle, they can receive a four-month-leave for taking care of a handicapped 
relative, but to receive a formal status of a handicapped often takes a very long time. 
External Funding
It is particularly difficult for the human rights SOMO NGOs to find domestic sponsors 
due to the controversial character of their anti-draft movement:  
The problem is that many other organizations are able to secure funding inside the country 
but we cannot. Those who have money are not interested in helping us. They do not have 
problems with their sons, and they are not interested in the problems of the army. They 
can send their sons to the Great Britain to study and let them stay there permanently, no 
problems! On the other hand, to help us means for them to ruin their relationships with the 
official authorities. (Interview, January 4, 2005)         
The SOMO groups, like some other human rights and women’s organizations are 
therefore dependent on funding they can receive from Western donors. They thus have to 
adjust to the ‘social life of projects’ (Sampson 1996) defined according to the priorities of 
various Western foundations. 66 They try to learn to write project applications. The salaries 
to the unemployed activists which can be secured via funding from the international 
sources are still meager and irregular.   
We have to adjust to those goals which might be funded by the foundations. We need to 
think how to write about our work in such a way that they can understand it. They are 
delighted to find money for us but we also need to help them. It is really a hard work. 
If salaries are built into the project, it usually includes one or two employee positions. For 
example, we have now three salaries in a German project, each $200 a month. In sum, we 
receive 600$ US and split them between those who work here every day because they do 
not have any other possibilities to get a work elsewhere. But when the project grant comes 
to an end, it is the end of funding, and it is like adieu! We do not have any salaries. We do 
                                                 
66 The need of the Russian NGO activists to adjust to the Western donors’ priorities has been discussed in 
chapters 6 and 8 of this dissertation.
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not collect membership fees, what kind of fees we can talk about anyway!? (Interview, 
September 28, 2001)
Funding from abroad has become an indispensable resource for facilitating the 
consolidation of the movement. The women were able to run many inter-organizational
training seminars, learn more about the legal system and the functioning of the courts, and 
hold their congresses. “It meant glasnost and it gave us a possibility to gather people,” 
says Ludmila (interview, January 4, 2005). The activists realize, however, that they are 
less prioritized within the Western politics of sponsorship partly due to their involvement 
in the sphere of military affairs and partly due to the fluctuating character of the 
international political market:
Before the Chechnya war nobody wanted to help us and we were not in contact with 
anybody. Once we tried to make something about it and even somehow put together a 
project application, but we did not understand at that time that you need to have special 
skills for writing an application, which we did not have. They did not even reply to us. 
Later on, many sponsors said to us that they could not help us, because “it is your 
inter-state problem.” Certainly, the military sphere is an especially tender spot for every 
state. However, the outbursts of our energy during the First Chechnya war persuaded them 
somehow, and so they started helping us. But still, I can tell you we are sitting on the 
hungry ration. When we make a project together with the Centre for the Human Rights it 
is another thing, but our own particular theme does not suit their priorities. (Interview, 
January 4, 2005)     
The tendency to be overlooked by Western sponsors increased when the priorities at 
the international NGOs lending market shifted after the terrorist attack on the US in 2001. 
In the early 2000s, the activists accepted grants offered by the former Russian financial 
oligarch in exile Boris Berezovsky, whom many Russians perceived as a political 
opponent of Putin’s regime. The activists were not interested in the political motivations 
behind Berezovsky’s charity activities; they were happy to receive the financial means for 
hiring lawyers to represent the aggrieved soldiers’ interests in the legal court.     
Groups of the SOMO that are located in the big cities in the European part of Russia and which
include women-intelligentsia with foreign language skills are in a more privileged position 
compared to regional groups and groups whose members are mainly women from working-class 
background.
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Maternal Frame and Regional Differences  
The SOMO’s collective identity is shaped through multiple interpretative frames of 
different groups located in big cities and various regional centers. The maternal framing in 
different SOMO groups varies depending on their location on Russia’s uneven socio-
economic map, which is divided into a ‘center’ of more prosperous European big cities 
and a ‘periphery’ of disadvantaged regional cities and rural areas. The way in which the 
various groups deploy interpretative schemes is illuminated in the stenographic materials 
of two congresses of activists, held in 2000 and 2002 and attended by around a hundred 
representatives of various SOMO groups. 
Differences between the activists’ groups are related to the local conditions in the 
regions including different ways of organizing the relationship with the local
administration. Activists’ personal biographies are also an important factor. While groups 
in the big cities include/represent often mothers of young men who are able to obtain 
exemption from military duty, regional groups include/represent bereaved mothers or 
mothers of sons who are fulfilling their military service. Group ideology is another 
difference. Regional groups tend to focus more on the pragmatic social issues such as 
social benefits and entitlements of retired soldiers. Groups in the big cities (including 
often representatives of the former Soviet intelligentsia) are more interested in developing 
the movement’s anti-militarist and anti-draft orientation.    
In the regions suffering economic decay, young men in the draftee age are often 
unemployed or unable to enroll in tertiary educational institutions. In the regional 
organizations, activists stress that their local conditions, differ from those of the capital 
city and St. Petersburg; many mothers of large families cannot afford pay for their sons’ 
professional education. These families view military service as a possible way out of 
poverty and unemployment; young draftees hope to be able to get professional training, 
they want to stay in the army on a contract after the end of the mandatory service and earn 
money. They agree to serve in the ‘hot spot’ of the Northern Caucuses. The regional 
SOMO groups seek to establish a working cooperation with the local governments and to 
protect the interests of these families. They demand that the state provides medical 
treatment, jobs and housing to the retired soldiers and war veterans. Some groups try to 
help soldiers to receive medical rehabilitation after retirement or so called “combat 
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money” which is often not paid fully or on time (The Third International Congress, 2002: 
60). While some of these organizations have been established with support from the local 
administration and branches of the Communist Party others were not:  
Our committee has existed from 1989. We work on the voluntary basis, without any 
financial support. First, everyone donated a ruble each and we bought envelopes, paper 
and pens, it was organized by the district committee of the Communist Party. When a 
military unit was stationed in our town, we checked how soldiers were fed, clothed, and 
washed. We celebrated the boys’ birthdays. We were fifteen or twenty persons, who 
brought their own food; meat, salads, ham. We arranged send-offs of every soldier when 
he was recruited in the army. We established a Day of a Draftee; it was actually our 
initiative. But the new administration does not support us at all; they even do not help us 
with the office rent. Now, my elder son served in Chechnya, but none of the soldiers in 
our region received “combat” money. The boys do not have jobs and do not enjoy any 
social benefits, they got nothing. (The Third International Congress, 2002: 60)
This interpretation of the SOMO objective clashes with the anti-war position of 
other groups. At the Congress, leaders of many groups called for a more principled anti-
militarist standpoint among the SOMO. They criticized mothers who let their sons be 
recruited to the military forces that were participating in the operations in Chechnya. For 
example, one organization received a letter from a mother who wrote that because their 
family was very poor her only son enlisted in army and volunteered to go to Chechnya in 
order to earn money. In the army he became prosecuted and jailed because he stole food. 
Now his mother was begging the SOMO to help her to extract the money that her son had 
earned from the military authorities. While the group was thinking of some plan to help 
the woman, the leader decided that they should not reply her request: 
My colleagues were shocked by my decision. But at that moment I realized that as long as 
we help them to receive the so called “combat” money and to obtain social benefits and 
privileges – they will continue to enlist in the army and continue to serve in Chechnya. 
We, women, who during these ten years accumulated much larger experience than any 
little mother, have to explain them that to participate in a war on the territory of your own 
state is a disgrace. We are simple Russian women and we should stop to pretend that we 
represent some kind of elite of progressive women. We should not write statements and 
resolutions of Congress, but a letter of a mother, a letter from one mother to another 
mother and to explain that she must foster a son who refuses to earn money through 
destroying other families and places of origin. (The Third International Congress, 2002: 
79)      
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Differing interpretations of the movement’s goals and collective identity of the 
SOMO lead to internal divisions among activists. The leader of the Committee admits that 
they cannot strive to achieve some formal unity in the movement:
We cannot cooperate with the organizations which take money from parents and say: “It is 
not to me, but I need to pay a bribe to the officer.” We cannot cooperate with the 
organizations which say: “Everything is all right. Our soldiers serve in good conditions. 
We have been there and brought them everything they need. We are not against the 
conscription – it’s all right if it continues to go on.” We will never have the same strategy 
as them. So we can unfortunately not say that we are united. (The Second International 
Congress, 2000: 53)     
3. The “Others:” The Little Mother and the Military 
The opportunity to create an organization and to have access to a free zone of ‘home 
space’ (Bhabha 1994) provides the opportunity to create a new ideology, emotional rules 
and transforming the collective identity of a soldier’s mother. As explained in chapter 10, 
the military administration possesses symbolic power and resources, which allow it to 
impose a certain definition of the role of women in voluntary organizations. As a result of 
interpretative and emotional work in the SOMO, the conventional definition of collective 
identity of a mother-activist in the state military field is challenged by constructing the
‘Little mother’ as the “Other” of the movement. As the following section shows, activists’ 
self-understanding is related to “cognitive-moral liberation” (Flam 2000: 74), experienced 
as a movement from the ‘kitchen into politics.’  
Moving “from the Kitchen into Politics”
Many respondents described how their maternal self-identity underwent a transformation 
when they became members of the NGO and learned about the human rights ideology. 
The maternal identity can frequently be empowering in interactions with the military. At 
the same time, it is more often associated with a marginalized position in a context as 
women tend to be excluded from actively participating in the social-political sphere. Some 
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respondents described how they realized that their own consciousness has changed and 
that they try to raise political awareness of mothers-non-activists. This kind of narratives 
shows that the women have recognized their subjugated position as a result of their 
involvement in the NGO.   
Masha stated that she was confused, frustrated and felt lonely when her son-solder 
was sent to the ‘hot spot.’ She was unable to help him and stated that at that moment of 
her life she felt like “just a little mother” (mamochka). She was 35 years old, “too young 
to be involved in politics, especially for a woman who spent her whole life in the kitchen” 
(interview, September 28, 2001). She admits that she “lacked experience, knowledge, and 
resolution” (ibid.). Her feelings of confusion and powerlessness, however, turned into a 
sense of pride and self-assertion when she became a member of the SOMO Committee.
‘Little mothers’ is also how the activists slightly sarcastically call the mothers of 
soldier who show up at their organizations, often sick with worry, weeping and barely 
receptive to the activists’ ideology of empowerment. Nina said that she understands well 
how those women, who come to the meeting at the SOMO NGO for the first time, feel: 
“They do not understand much of what is said here. It is exactly the way I felt when I 
came here; I was in a hurry and wanted only to get an answer to one little concrete 
question” (interview, November 20, 2000). The activists thus use a slightly ironic notion 
of ‘little mother’ to try to deintegrate their self-understanding from the conventional 
images of women as lacking political awareness and the mothers of soldiers as consumed 
by feelings of grief. They nevertheless also express empathetic understanding of other 
women.    
The Soviet Legacy and Compliant Femininity 
According to activists, the expression ‘little mother’ is also sometimes used by members 
of the military who are annoyed by mothers who interfere in the draftees’ routine medical 
check-ups in the military commission: “Little mother, leave the room please!” (Interview, 
November 28, 2000). In the activists’ vocabulary, ‘little mother’ is more likely to signify
women’s naïve attitudes toward the representatives of the military institutions, the official 
political propaganda, and their inability to have an opinion independent from their 
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husbands, who often argue that their son should fulfill military duty. According to 
activists, such women continue the Soviet mentality by embodying a blind unreflective 
loyalty to the regime:   
These people are not responsible and reasonable … In an idiotic manner they are prepared 
to hurt their own child for the sake of the so called public good [embodied] by the state. It 
is like in this song, … ”people and Party are united,” which means that we need to make 
sacrifices for the defense of the homeland. This is a song in the spirit of the Stalin times. 
The young people understand it all very well and do not trust anybody blindly. But these 
little mothers come here in a flock: oh, the military commissar told me that he will not be 
sent anywhere [to the zone of military operations], the unit commander promised me!
We try to beat out of them this infantilism already at the stage of the military draft. We try 
to make them to realize that, firstly, the country is involved in war, secondly, that besides 
a military commissar there exists a law and other things which matter; and finally, that 
they should not pay bribes to anybody! (Interview, January 23, 2003)
These quotes illustrate a strategy of breaching (Benski 2005: 59), that is, creating 
the effect of ‘disaffection’ with the dominant cultural norms and taken-for-granted loyalty 
to the state (Flam 2005: 21). By articulating these symbolic meanings they also reject the 
historical position of “inert mother of nationhood” (Gal 1997: 43). 
Some women’s inability to take an active political stance from the grassroots’ 
perspective is another sign of a continued Soviet mentality which the activists reject. They 
are disappointed by the fact that particularly in the beginning of their movement, many 
people turned to them as to official agency. They dropped by and wondered “whom 
should I leave my application to?” (Interview, October 28, 2000). Many women who 
come to the organization do not believe that the members are grassroots activists who 
mobilize by their own efforts. The respondents are appalled by this misunderstanding: 
I tell them, girls, we are mothers just like you. We are a voluntary organization! They look 
at me for a few seconds and say: No, you can not have such a power if the government 
does not support you! (Laughing). (Interview, December 28, 2004) 
  
Many times people even tried to accuse the SOMO activists of their mistreatment by
the local draft boards. The activists interpret such attitudes as a Soviet legacy of the 
passive reliance on the state, they call it sovok (‘dustpan’ - a denigrating metaphor for a 
Soviet person) and izhdivenshchetvo (‘parasitic smugness’). The inability to distinguish 
between organizations set up by citizens from those supported by the official structures, is 
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a result of the Soviet legacy, which the activists discuss at the seminars at the School of 
Human Rights. 
Other aspects which seem to prevent non-activist women from getting involved in 
voluntary organizations in the post-Soviet society include the reemerging patriarchal ideas 
that woman’s place is at home: 
Sometimes some mothers volunteer to work in the organization. But they stay only until 
their child gets the military card. Then they have their own matters to take care of even if 
they do not work. I would tell them, try to use this occasion to realize yourself somehow! I 
am not myself a person who can stand being a housewife. But many women enjoy that. 
They get busy with husband, child and a cat. In a sense, I can understand them, how much 
can we earn here? 3000 ruble sometimes, but not always. Still, I cannot stay at home, I 
just feel so useless, both to myself and to other people. (Interview, December 28, 2004) 
The movement does, however, recruit new members. The activists describe this
process as growing grass – “slow, quiet, but steady and persistent” (participant 
observation, field notes):
It is necessary that a plant grows… our organizations grow from below. We cannot just 
send somebody to the regions. We can ask some little mother, please help us. If she wants 
she will help but if she doesn’t, she won’t. They decide it themselves. But people do join 
[the movement], and they are terrific people! (Interview, January 23, 2003)  
Opposing the Military’s Maternal Frame 
A symbolic link between the struggle for peace and woman/mother is central in the 
articulation of the SOMO’s protest against the current military policy:    
In Krasnaia Zvezda67 they either state that we fight against international terrorism or deny 
the fact that a war is going on in Chechnya. Anyway, nobody talks about peace. But we 
want peace. This is our principle position, as mothers of soldier, as mothers in general and 
as women. (Interview, January 4, 2005)
The activists admit that they apply the symbol of mother strategically: “The military
said it to us themselves: You are using the high status of motherhood. Yes, it is right, we 
do! But actually we wish to accomplish something else” (interview, January 23, 2003). 
The activists try to oppose the military’s definition of a maternal organization. 
                                                 
67 A newspaper of the Ministry of Defense.
221
The SOMO activists stress that in order to protect the interests of soldiers they had 
to carry out many functions which actually belong to the realm of the state:  
By the initiative of the regional governor, the military draft committees send the soldiers 
who return from the military zone to our organization. In our region, those who served in 
the zone of local conflicts are entitled to some social benefits. When they came to us, we 
check their documents and military cards to make sure that their injuries and participation 
in the military operations are registered. In eighty percent of cases, they are not written 
down in the documents! Actually, it is not our work, but we must help children, we 
explain that it is important for them. It seems that as social organizations we substitute the 
work of the state organizations. We must make them do their jobs properly. (The Second 
International Congress, 2000: 109) 
The activists strive to cooperate with the military and local governments to be able 
to help the soldiers. As a result they perform the tasks which contribute to positioning 
women-activists as playing secondary roles in state politics. The activists are, however,
aware that the voluntary work of Soldiers’ Mothers organizations is partly exploited by 
the local administrations, which often try to give them the responsibility of responding to 
citizens’ complaints and dealing with complicated individual cases. Indirectly, the 
indispensable role of the activists is recognized in this way. 
We have taught our colleagues, if the local officials refuse to assist you, tell them, all 
right, tomorrow, I will close the office and send all people to you. Then they come 
immediately with apologies and say, you misunderstood me, and so on. No doubt that they 
need us. (Interview, January 23, 2003)      
At the same time, the activists from organizations in the large cities usually try to
dismiss attempts to take control over their organizations. At the Congress, a chairwoman 
wants to make clear that representatives of the military authorities should not expect them 
to fulfill ‘compassionate (zhalostlivyj) female work,’ although the activists never refuse to 
help soldiers and their families. She stresses that they are an independent organization
which does not take orders from the military: 
I want to stress that we do not owe anything to anybody. We ourselves68 started to do this 
voluntary work in order to help our children and grandchildren. Therefore, only those who 
work here can demand something from the committees of soldiers’ mother. I understand 
that it is very tempting to shift off on women’s voluntary organizations, questions of 
compassionate help to those people whose sufferings can be blamed on the state. Of 
                                                 
68 Emphasis in the original text.
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course we are helping and will continue to help them. But I wish that not all responsibility 
is put only on us. (The Third International Congress, 2002: 38)        
The activists admit that even if they are able to help many families of soldiers, in the 
conditions of the existent political system it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to 
achieve broader goals beyond urgent individual complaints. The symbol of Ambulance, 
central in Masha’s maternal narrative about the activist identity, quoted in the beginning 
of this chapter, gains another meaning in Galia’s reflections about constraints and limits 
they experience in their movement. She stresses that the official authorities try to define 
their goals in terms of a routine practical work and prevent them from articulating political 
goals:  
In this situation, they set an absolute limit for us: You may work with the individual 
complaints. And we work with them very efficiently, and we get along with the 
authorities, we can resolve any individual complaints. But it does not change anything. 
With every new draft, new complaints come. Some time ago, we could pressure the Duma 
to adopt amnesty [for soldiers-runaways] or an amendment to the law. But now, they have
cut our wings. We became a kind of Ambulance, but our strategic goal actually is to 
abolish the conscription system. (Interview, January 4, 2005)             
Summary
This chapter has shown that the goals, values, and strategies of SOMO activism are interpreted 
and negotiated among and within the heterogeneous groups of activists with reference to the 
troubled experiences of mothering a son-soldier within a disadvantaged constituency. These 
experiences are narrated from a gender and class position within a context of economic scarcity, 
dependency on uncertain sources of external funding and the welfare state’s retreat. Maternal 
love to one’s child is an important empowering cultural resource, and is crucial for the activists 
to gain acknowledgment and support in the broader society. At the same time, the symbol of 
loyal soldier’s mother is imposed through dominant discursive practices in the state military 
arena. The SOMO movement is expected not only to collaborate with the authorities, but also to 
stay away from independent action. The SOMO are partly aware of the oppressive conditions in 
which they act. Constructing ‘little mother’ as the “Other,” the movement disidentifies from the 
compliant femininity, implied by the ideological-hegemonic construction of motherhood in the 
state military discourse. 
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Chapter 13
Emotional Work in the Human Rights Community 
One afternoon in the late fall of 2000, a small group of women, who had just attended a work-
shop “School of the Rights: Save Your Son,” organized by the human rights voluntary 
organization Soldiers’ Mothers, was standing in the street outside the building. They seemed to 
be very upset and talked intensely. One of them, with marks of tears on her face, was nervously 
smoking. She suddenly addressed me when I was passing by, leaving after a day of fieldwork in 
this NGO:
– Tell me, what shall I do? We received a letter from the military committee. They want to draft 
my son. But he is my only son! Should I hide him at my relatives' in the countryside!? 
(Participant observation notes, November 2000)
Introduction
The previous chapter showed that the SOMO’s maternal frame and new rules of feeling in 
the field of military draft politics are interrelated with the activists’ social positioning 
through gender, socio-economic status, and center-periphery location. This chapter 
examines the way in which the SOMO oppositional sub-universe of meaning is produced 
and sustained with a focus on the human rights framing and emotional work associated 
with it. 
The SOMO’s identity of human rights advocates is shaped in the context of the 
official authorities’ benign, hostile or degrading attitudes toward their movement, in a
society characterized by widespread lawlessness, chaos, and political violence. One set of 
questions examined is: How does the SOMO activists’ shared interpretative schema grow
out of their narratives about human rights, and civil society? How have their strategies
come to include the efforts to build the ‘rule of law’ from below? What role is played by 
symbols referring to the collective memory of the Soviet dissidents’ high moral ground 
and exemplary deeds and how is it incorporated in the human rights frame? How is the 
‘alternative’ symbolic reality created and maintained through interactions with the trans-
/national human rights groups and routine storytelling? How do feelings of solidarity and 
confidence allow the SOMO activists to manage anxiety and fear?  
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The second set of questions is: How do the SOMO activists try to help their 
constituency and simultaneously to transform the collective identity of soldiers’ mothers? 
How do routine interactions, including offering legal help and experiences of self-
expansion, help to maintain solidarity with the larger community of mothers? What are 
the limits of solidarity, due to differences in ideologies and personal lifestyles? How are 
mothers-non-activists encouraged to overcome demobilizing feelings of resignation and 
cynicism and to learn to feel solidarity, anger, and pride for being able to resist injustice 
directed against their sons?  
   
1. The Sub-Universe of the Human Rights Community   
The construction of ‘alternative’ symbolic reality and strategies in the SOMO movement 
are partially the outcome of emotional and cognitive-organizational processes (see Flam 
2000: 71). These processes allow the activists produce and protect their sub-cultural 
values, beliefs and self-images associated with human rights ideology. They accomplish a 
cognitive-emotional liberation, which “involves detaching loyalties and other positive 
emotions from the institutions and organizations to which they were hitherto attached” 
(Flam 2005: 31). As a result of such emotional liberation, their old emotional attachments 
fade and new emotional bonds are constructed. Individuals become more open to joining 
like-minded individuals in the social movements. This process includes working on new 
obligatory rules of feeling among the participants. In this chapter I show that ‘emotional 
work’ (Hochschild 1979) in the SOMO’s practices is both an unintended effect of its 
shared group culture and the result of more conscious methods developed by the activists. 
Confidence and Solidarity 
The SOMO civic groups were created during the rise of the democratic movement when
many former Soviet dissidents became leaders of the new human rights organizations. 
Establishing social ties with them and learning their philosophy and methods of anti-
225
authoritarian struggle, helped to shape the SOMO’s ideology and repertoire of actions. It 
also instilled a stronger sense of collective power: 
When we started to work in 1989, we purchased the brochures the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It was like the baton passed on by the Dissidents: Here is a 
document and you [the government] have ratified it, so let us work according to it. At that 
time XX played a great role in the movement. When he was released and came back from 
detention, he saw that the new organizations emerged, and because he knew members in 
the XX personally, he tried to help us to mutually coordinate our work, he phoned 
everyone and kept us informed posted. It meant obviously a great deal at that moment that 
we emerged as a united coalition, not just as some isolated separate groups. (Interview, 
September 28, 2001)
      
The SOMO borrowed from the book of a Soviet dissident69 a tactic of civil 
disobedience by sending many official letters of complaint demanding constitutional 
rights (interview, November 8, 2000). Some of the activists became acquainted with the
human rights ideology through their own participation in the democratic movements in the 
late 1980s. The new interpretive lens and types of social relationships are incorporated 
into respondents’ autobiographic narratives. By routine storytelling, activists make the 
new social relationships and symbols into a common sense of their oppositional symbolic-
cognitive reality. At the same time, a new emotion culture – shared norms about 
appropriate feelings - is developed. One example of how the activists internalize the 
norms of their sub-culture is emphasizing that one feels profoundly ashamed after failing
to behave in the ‘right’ way. Shame is a self-control mechanism, which we feel when we 
believe that we fail to live up to certain norms and standards (Flam 2005: 22).     
For example, Ekaterina told in the interview that she had been interested in social 
activism since her adolescence. In her youth, she had learned about the Soviet dissidents 
through the friends of her family, whose parents were killed during the Stalinist terror in 
1937. The friends of her family were members of an underground youth group, which 
signed the protest statement against the repressive action of the Soviet troops in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the 1980s, their friends got killed in a car accident, supposedly 
arranged by the Soviet security police. She says that it was a tremendous shock for her. 
She admits that she always knew that something was “wrong” with the Soviet system: 
                                                 
69 And the Wind Will Return by Vladimir Bukovsky. Bukovsky lives in Great Britain, Cambridge since 1976 but 
became an important figure in the democratic political groups in Russia in the 1990-2000.  
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I was not apolitical […] I wanted to know what was going on. I always listened to the 
‘enemy’ radio.70 But at the same time I was an active Komsomol member and in principle 
I was living within that system. I cannot say that I stood up [and protested] somewhere in 
the square. I am still ashamed that I did not do that. I knew about Afghanistan, I 
understood that we were not defending our interests there and that the war was a crime. I 
was 22 or 23 years old then and I could have expressed a critical opinion in the public 
forum. (Interview, November 9, 2000)
In the interview, Ekaterina assesses her own way of behaving in the past from the 
perspective of her current moral and cultural norms developed through her participation in 
the anti-militarist movement. It reflects her process of emotional-cognitive liberation –
although she was ‘living in the system’ she started her deintegration by withdrawing her 
emotional attachments to its norms and values.   
There is a cyclical relationship between the culture and micro-structure of social 
interactions. The SOMO sub-cultural norms and rules of feelings create new opportunities 
for interactions with Russian and international human rights advocacy groups; beliefs and 
rules of feeling are internalized and reinforced through these types of interactions and 
established social/organizational ties. The SOMO have established contacts with the 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights. For example, during the first war in Chechnya in 1995, the SOMO helped 
many soldiers’ mothers to travel to Chechnya to bring back their sons. Some of the 
SOMO and the Chechen women’s groups were invited to the UN session to make a so 
called “independent presentation” about the conditions of human rights in Russia 
(interview, November 9, 2000). They first listened to the Russian government’s official 
report and then presented their own report, photos, and other documents about the war. 
The SOMO had prepared the materials and the report in cooperation with other human 
rights NGOs in Russia. Their picture of reality was obviously different from the presented 
official viewpoint: “When blood was flowing like water in Chechnya, the Minister of 
Justice stood and told that in Russia we have achieved harmony in relations between 
different ethnic groups” (interview, ibid.). The “we” of the movement is produced and 
associated with revealing what they see as a truth and therefore felt instilled with a higher 
morality than their opponents. 
                                                 
70 The Soviet citizens were forbidden to listen to the critical anti-Soviet-oriented radio station Voice of America.
227
The activists attended training seminars arranged for the NGO members where they 
acquired both the new organizational skills and learn about the human rights philosophy. 
For example, one of the respondents went to Warsaw in Poland for two weeks to attend
workshops at the Human Rights School run by a well-known activist Mark Novitsky. She 
says that it helped her to become more confident about her sense of belonging in the 
movement. She felt a part of a larger international human rights movement, not only a 
member of a relatively isolated group of women, frequently intimidated by the official 
authorities. 
I became convinced that we have a lot in common with the philosophy of human rights. 
How we talk about these things at our School of Rights is similar to how the matter is 
treated at the Helsinki Foundation. It gave me more confidence. (Interview, April 20, 
2001)   
Activists feel emotional energy when they participate in the movements’ rituals such 
as international conferences and workshops. A sense of confidence and solidarity in the 
SOMO are produced through routine exchanges of practical knowledge among the 
Russian and international human rights organizations. On one occasion, I attended and 
taped a meeting between the SOMO leaders and a representative for the Norwegian 
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. It took place during the second war in Chechnya 
and B. was a member of the official group from Norway which was planning to go to 
Ingushetia in the Northern Caucuses to meet with refugees, local authorities, and NGOs. 
He came to the SOMO to receive first hand information about the situation in the 
Northern Caucuses from their perspective. 
The way in which the participants talked in a relatively informal manner, sometimes 
rapidly exchanging brief remarks and finishing one another’s sentences produced a feeling 
of solidarity at the meeting. Norwegians spoke in English with one of the SOMO leaders. 
She in her turn translated her colleague’s answers into English. As they exchanged views 
on the factual situation, they simultaneously negotiated their interpretation of the meaning 
of certain events: 
B.: Have you been during those years in contact with someone who is a terrorist or 
whatever you call it, who is fighting on the Chechen side?
Olga: You cannot look at the Chechen people through the lens of two colors – terrorist or 
not.
B.: No, but I do not want to use those expressions.
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Olga: We cannot even look at them as ‘fighters’ or ‘non-fighters.’ I remember during the 
first war one of the women said to me: Olga, I know your position and I know that you are 
with us and I like you very much, but you are my enemy. And I said, and it was really my 
feeling, that I understood her. After what happened to them, I would feel in the same way.
B.: Ok.  (Meeting, September 28, 2001)    
When the discussion concerns matters that B. and the SOMO members do not 
understand in the same way, laughter is a way to diffuse embarrassment generated by 
diverse beliefs and to maintain a sense of solidarity among the activists. For example, 
responding to B.’s question about the SOMO statistics on the human losses during the 
war, Olga states that the official statistics underreport the number of the human losses by 
at least two and half times. 
B.: Do you have any idea of how they are dating this statistics? 
Olga: How they are counting the losses? If there are bodies after the military operation, 
they are counted. But those who have disappeared are not counted. 
B.: so there are … missing soldiers?
Olga: a soldier who has disappeared is neither counted as killed nor as missing, he is just a 
criminal.
B.: (silence)
Anna: (laughing)
Olga: (smiling): He is a criminal, officially he is a criminal. And nobody sends documents 
to search for these soldiers, because they are just criminals. Neither those who are 
wounded and die afterwards in the hospitals, are counted as the losses. They just have not 
returned. We have many such examples on how the level of the human losses is made 
look lower. We can give you our written report on this matter. (Ibid.) 
The laughter in this conversation seems inexplicable and absolutely inappropriate 
unless it is understood as a way of diffusing shame/embarrassment (see Summers-Effler 
2005: 144), which arises due to the Norwegians’ difficulty to understand what the SOMO 
activists mean. At other moments during the meeting, laughter also serves to confirm the 
common interpretative schemes of the speakers: 
B.:  How do you see your organization treated by the government or maybe more 
precisely, by the military structures?
Olga: Our organization is not treated by the government at all. (Laughter)
B.: Ok. (Ibid.)    
In a different way, a broader feeling of solidarity among the SOMO activists is 
produced through the powerful image of the movement as able to rise above the ‘narrow’ 
political issues and presenting an Appeal to the Government:   
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Dear female friends, dear eternal soldiers’ mothers! I say eternal, because some of us lost 
a child, others are devoted permanently to the work with soldiers. Chechnya is a horrible 
disaster, for all of us. Let us talk about those boys who will, with God’s help, go through 
this slaughter-house and survive. The war will follow them the rest of their lives. They 
will continue to fight, when they are asleep, because their mental health is broken. 
Therefore, let us appeal to the Government. They may call it whatever they want: a war, a 
conflict, or fight against the bandits. But they should establish a social status of military 
servicemen who participate in this slaughter-house. A child who returns from war should 
be protected. (The Second International Congress, 2000: 105)  
    
Managing Fear among the Activists
Members of the human rights movement are aware that they live with a constantly lurking 
danger of repression and physical assault:
Some people use words carelessly saying, in our civil society and so on … but in reality 
we do not have any civil society, none! But we want to build it, we are dreaming of the 
time when it will exist and we lay our brick in the foundation of this civil society. And we 
understand that somebody has to carry out a work which is ungrateful and messy, because 
we know that murders happen and heard about threats [against us]… We see that some 
people who actually have a good relationship with us do not want to get involved and they 
avoid to mention our name publicly, because … you know, God protects those who watch 
out for themselves. (Interview,71 April 19, 2001)              
In the very beginning, we undertook consciously a tactic of keeping a low profile; we 
realized what a dangerous place we were poking our noses into. Towards the state 
officials, we played a role of fool-girls: we know nothing, we can nothing. (Interview, 
November 8, 2000)        
The activists have to manage anxiety and fear of verbal or physical assault on a daily 
basis. As explained in sociology of emotions, the social superior expresses anger in order 
to make people in inferior positions obey the established social rules (Flam 2005). In the 
interviews, the SOMO activist told about experiences of confrontation with anger and 
hatred openly expressed towards them by the military or the police. For example, in the 
late 1980s during the perestroika Ekaterina joined the democratic movement People Front. 
She stood in the pickets, marched in the demonstrations, and helped the non-Communist
candidates to run election campaigns. Once she was arrested by the police and was 
prosecuted for participating in the ‘unsanctioned’ demonstration. She was kept many 
hours at the police station. When she was going to be interrogated, one of the policemen 
whispered to her that she should demand to be represented by a lawyer. The chief 
                                                 
71 Interview with a female member in the human rights organization Civic Watch.
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policeman became furious, swore and shouted at her: “You want democracy! I’ll show 
you a democracy!” (Interview, November 9, 2000). Ekaterina stresses that at that time she 
did not know much about her rights; if it would have happened to her now when she is a 
NGO activist, she would not feel so afraid and powerless as she did then. Her present 
colleague Olesia in the SOMO, who was then a member in the human rights movement 
showed up at her trial to speak in her favor, although they did not know each other 
personally at that time.  
This story not only illustrates and reproduces the feeling of solidarity in the 
movement. It is also an example of the activists’ belief in the importance of “knowing 
your rights” and the ability to protect one’s rights through the legal system. These notions 
are important symbols in the SOMO’s shared culture. Routine storytelling about applying
legal methods in their daily work with the soldiers also highlights how references to the 
law might protect the activists from the verbal assault by the military. For example, Sveta 
is an unemployed lawyer who volunteers in the SOMO organization. Although she 
stresses that the activists have established good working contacts with many commanders 
of the military units, she nevertheless talks about her experience of being assaulted when 
she was helping one illegally drafted soldier to be retired from his military unit:
When I had to go to the military unit and to talk with them, I realized that it is not possible 
to talk to these people in the normal human way. They scream, yell at you, and try to 
prove something … I realized that with these people … you can only communicate
through the law. I went then to the public prosecutor and obtained the official protest from 
him. With this protest in the hand I returned to the unit, and … easy and quite, they even 
drove the child to the gate by car and let him go outside the territory of the unit. 
When they see that I grasp quickly how to apply the law, they won’t mess with me. 
Usually, they are then willing to compromise, not letting it lead to a legal action. 
(Interview, December 28, 2004)          
The “law” works almost magically in this story. Telling these stories has the 
unintended effect of mitigating the SOMO activists’ fear and anxiety. It also gives weight 
and meaning to the main symbols such as the “law” and “legal way,” which is the basis 
for a shared group culture. A feeling of enthusiasm in the movement is thus produced and 
sustained.  
At their mass meetings, some activists advocate the need to study the laws and to 
apply them in the daily work of mothers-activists as the means to win respect and 
compliance from the military:          
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Juridical ignorance causes the rude behavior of the military who do not respect the 
Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers as partners with whom they work in the normal way. 
But if we work at protecting the rights through the legal courts, we receive respect and can 
be considered as [legitimate] organization. (The Second International Congress, 2000: 
110)     
The SOMO activists also manage their fear and anxiety more consciously. Laughter 
plays important role in the movements (Flam 2005: 29; Goodwin and Plaff 2001). Natasha 
talks about frightening experiences of being the object of the hostile attitudes and 
nationalist propaganda in society and the methods of managing this feeling. At the human 
rights NGO workshop she learned how the Polish Solidarnost movement used ironic 
laughter and dramatic effects as fear-management devices:  
There are some fearful words signifying a category into which you are terrified of being 
positioned. For example, they call us the “fifth column” or there is a notion of “Chechen 
terrorist.” Those are really frightening words! God save, if you are stigmatized by them. 
The activists of the Polish Solidarity used to make special t-shirts on which such words 
were written: for example, Chechen terrorist. People wore these t-shirts and went around 
in the city. (Interview, April 20, 2001)    
The SOMO draw on the analogous methods with elements of humor and ‘role play’ 
in their own training seminars organized for the mothers and fathers of potential 
conscripts to help them to mitigate their fear of police and the military drafting board.
Recognizing that one is a part of the transnational human rights movement is an 
important aspect in the construction of the SOMO’s collective identity. It helps to feel that 
they have high social status in a certain milieu, which in turn generates a sense of pride 
among the activists. At the same time, they explicitly establish an important rule of feeling 
- which is that one refuses to feel intimidated, suppressed, and silenced: 
My viewpoint is that there are people with heightened sensitivity for social justice - what 
Lev Gumilev72 called ‘passionaries.’ When they apply this feeling not only to themselves 
but also to other people and when they are ready to help other people – they are human 
rights advocates. In 1998, I attended the World Congress on the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Declaration on Human Rights. …I felt that we all are united by a common feeling that we 
want that everything done fairly. When I came back, I said, guys, we do it all right. At the 
Congress I heard a lot of phrases like “our government does not hear us, our authorities do 
not recognize us, we cannot accomplish this and that.” But in our community, it is not 
accepted just to complain. If you are not heard, it means that you cannot make yourself 
                                                 
72 Lev Gumilev (1912 - 1992) is dissident historian, geographer, and ethnographer in the Soviet Union. His 
"passion" theory is concerned with the human ability to sacrifice for the sake of ideological purposes.
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heard, if you cannot get things done, it means that you do not use the right methods, if you 
do not manage it on your own, ask for help. (Interview, September 28, 2001)         
       
The fear is also managed as a result of socialization into the role of human rights 
advocate through internalizing the movement’s values and norms. For example, Irina sees 
her role of a human rights activist as educating people about the risks of political passivity 
and ignorance in the Russian society. At the interview, she described vividly those risks 
and drew a picture on a sheet of paper:
There is Moloch which devours our dear children, and here are people who like an 
obedient flock move into the jaws of Moloch. I feel myself like a Guide. I tell people, do 
not go there, but here goes a path leading to the sun and happiness. Some people actually 
come here and maybe a large number of them do. You see, here is a nice grass-plot with 
flowers, they stay there. But if you take one step further, you bump into the barbed wire 
surrounding this place. This is how things are in our state: If you say something too 
daring, you will be silenced. Very few people move further and come over the wire. It is 
not easy; most of us choose to stay in a place between the Moloch and the barbed wire. 
(Interview, April 20, 2001)
The significance of the transnational human rights community for the SOMO is 
illustrated by the role the Western mass media play in their movement. In many cases,
they are crucial for the ability of the Russian activists to make their critical voices heard
by audiences of the domestic mainstream mass media. For example, when some of the 
SOMO organizations were accused by a Duma deputy of “working for Western money” 
against Russian interests and attacked in the popular Russian newspaper (see chapter 7 in 
this dissertation), a response in favor of the activists appeared in the French newspaper Le 
Monde (interview, January 23, 2003). The SOMO’s relationship with Russian journalists 
is complicated. For example, Masha (interview, ibid.) stated that when they first started 
their movement during the perestroika only foreign journalist interviewed and wrote about 
them. The largest Russian commercial newspaper Kommersant and others subsequently
started to publish materials with reference to them as a source of information. In this way, 
“somehow some kind of a pressure takes place.” For a long time, however, the journalists 
treated the soldiers’ mothers as “the marginal simple women (baby)” (ibid.) and did not 
recognize them as a serious political actor. This situation seemed started to change after 
the Civic Forum in the fall of 2001: 
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After the Civic Forum, they started to accept that we also have no less right to discuss the 
military reform than the politicians and the militaries do. It is essential that the journalists 
no longer see us as just the marginal simple women (baby). Now, everything that we 
speak about is taken seriously. But they still think all the time that we are the parents of 
the killed soldiers. They ask, were your members’ sons killed? No, in our organization
nobody’s sons were killed. (Interview, January 23, 2003)      
Most journalists still take the position “I see nothing and hear nothing” regarding the 
problems of military draft politics unless they have a personal attachment such as draft 
age children (ibid.). 
One additional device of managing fear among the activists is participating in the mass 
meetings and listening to the public speeches. For example, the activists stress that the 
movement could overcome the tremendous obstacles – the contempt and the denigrating 
attitudes they face as a movement of women in the masculinized and male-dominated 
institution. This generates a feeling of pride among the audience.
In 1995, every lieutenant, not to mention generals and Ministers of Defense, kept saying 
to us: “Who are you? Where do you poke your noses into? The armed forces!” The 
Committees of soldiers’ mothers have proved that civil society in Russia is not without us. 
They say that women are powerless and ignorant. But we made the military listen to us, to 
start with. Then we began to influence the situation in the army. The military understood 
that we the SOMO activists won’t leave them alone until we get our way, no matter what 
is the rank of the officer. They understood they cannot get rid of those simple women 
(baby), so it is better to cooperate with them. Now they understand that we are not 
chicken. (The Third International Congress, 2002: 51)                 
Legal Help and Self-Expansion
The activists produce and maintain solidarity with the larger community of potential 
supporters of the movement by offering legal advice and help to mothers and soldiers. 
They view themselves as a “bridge of legal justice between the power-holders and the 
citizens” (interview, December, 28, 2004). It is a typical frame in the activists’ self-
presentation: 
We are not playing in the legal field. We are playing in the field of lawlessness. Although 
legislation exists, the laws of the Russian Federation live their own life, and people live 
their own life. As a human rights movement, we must link life and laws together. We can 
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make the state to act according to laws. If we work correctly, professionally and 
persistently, we can achieve better results. (The Second International Congress, 2000: 71)  
Through routine interactions with people outside the circle of the core human rights 
activists, solidarity is produced via the SOMO activists’ experiences of self-expansion –
of “enlarging one’s self to include another or others” – which are felt as rewarding 
(Summers-Effler 2005: 137).     
Firstly, the activists had to educate themselves in order to be able to offer qualitative 
legal help on a voluntary basis. 
We have accumulated tremendous experience. We know what to do and how to do it
because we studied the laws. The military, the public prosecutors, and the doctors 
understand that we know a lot and that we use the laws in the correct way. They know that 
it is difficult to argue with us. (Interview, December 28, 2004)
The activists have learned to orient themselves in the complicated sphere of the 
laws, diverse decrees, administrative and legal documents concerned with the mandatory 
military service. They have developed their legal skills combined with practical 
knowledge about the situation in the local military units and contacts with the military 
commanders:
In the morning one boy came [to the organization]. He was bullied in his military unit and 
he ran away. Probably, he was recruited in the army illegally in the first place. We will 
decide where to put him for the medical examination. Beyond this, I will write an official 
complaint on his behalf. I already know how the system works in this military unit, so I 
am not just sending a letter somewhere. I write that it concerns such person due to such
causes and we ask to do this and this. In principle, they never refuse to do what we ask. 
Really, we do not ask that much and only what [the soldier] is entitled to according to the 
law. (Interview, September 28, 2001)     
Sveta, a lawyer-volunteer in the organization, stresses the SOMO’s innovative role 
in developing legal practice. They were the first, she argues, to discover a special area 
within a jurisprudence they call “the draft law.” It includes not only the legal code but also 
the numerous decrees by which military life is ruled. Most citizens are not familiar with 
these documents. The activists’ diligent and creative studies have produced a lot of 
knowledge about the draft law:
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In the beginning, we did not know how to work with the legal courts. We found one guy -
he has worked in twenty years in the office of the chief military prosecutor. We always 
ran to him with our questions. I cannot say that he helped us, but he could tell us what is 
legal and what is not, and then we had to find a way within the limits of the law, and to 
understand how we can use it in our interests. Therefore, with time we gain such high 
skills, our women are real masters!  (Interview, January 4, 2005)      
Sveta helps parents of the conscripts who take legal action against the local drafting 
boards. She stresses that legal investigations are demanding; they frequently become 
protracted and can take up to a year due to the many delays and misunderstandings. Partly 
it depends on the fact that local drafting boards often do not show up in court, and partly 
on the limited knowledge of judges about the sphere of the draft law. She says that the 
SOMO members work patiently with some judges, showing them and explaining content 
and meaning of documents, with which judges are often not familiar (interview, 
December 28, 2004).  
The SOMO published a brochure “We go to the court: Opinions, examples, 
information” in which they document how they work with judges, formulating questions, 
informing, and trying to make them understand and persuade them to consider their 
perspective ‘from below’ on the legislation and legal practices in the sphere of the military 
draft. 
The Expansion of Self 
Solidarity with the larger community is produced through interactions with the aggrieved 
soldiers/military officers and mothers. Unselfish help to others generate a rewarding 
feeling of expanding the self. This enjoyable feeling helps to sustain the activists’ 
engagement in the movement despite their hard and unpaid work in the organizations.     
This work is really addictive. I have already got used to helping people, because I feel it is 
really rewarding to see the result of your work with your own eyes. I usually visit the 
military draft boards and it is really great to see what you can achieve. 
And then it spreads from mouth to mouth among people, and new persons come to 
us all the time. You see, in our country people are generally very ignorant about their legal 
rights…and some cases especially tug at your heart-strings. (Interview, December 28, 
2004)      
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The activists stress that some people are unable to understand what motivates them 
to continue with their work. For example, one journalist called them “fool girls working 
for free” (ibid.). The women, however, find other benefits in their voluntary work, besides 
the satisfaction of the pure material needs:   
I realized that working in the Organization is my calling. I really enjoy helping other 
people and I do not wish to do anything else. Even if I do not receive a salary, the moral 
satisfaction is tremendous! When I help someone, and they come to me and say, now we 
finally got the military card, thank you! I can not tell how much happy I am. My soul is 
singing and I want to dance of joy. (Interview, December 29, 2004)         
The emotional-cognitive liberation, which the activists accomplish, imbues them 
with a feeling of personal development. Katia recognizes that she has developed a new 
sense of solidarity with women and a habit of thinking about grievances of people, outside 
her own family:   
The work in the organization taught me to see other people and to relate to them in a
different way. When you live your ordinary life and do not come in contact with these
problems, it seems that life is more or less as it should be. Everything is all right at home, 
nobody is hungry. What else does a woman need? And it never comes across your mind 
that at the same moment another woman might be crying because somebody has unfairly 
humiliated her and abused her son. But now it became so that you live not only by your 
own life and by concerns of your family and kin, but you also care for lives of the other 
people in your surrounding. (Interview, December 28, 2004)     
Ira relates her socio-political engagement and voluntary work to her existential 
searching and a profound shift in personal value system and sense of self-identity:  
For me, it is clearly a task of serving other people. I have come a long way in this task. 
Previously, I searched for earthly values. I thought that love to a man makes life worth to 
live, later on children constituted the main meaning of my life; afterwards I thought that 
achieving a success was the most important thing. But finally I realized that none of that 
was giving anything to me. Now I feel that God is the most important in my life and other 
things should be submitted to it. I realized that I have got a gift from God. It is a talent to 
listen to people, to understand them and to be a counselor. (Interview, November 20, 
2000)  
However, this kind of solidarity has limits. The activists frequently express 
disappointment and bitterness about the differences in the beliefs and standpoints between 
them and the larger community of their potential supporters. The SOMO want to 
transform people’s consciousness and hope that their concept of civil society and ‘rule of 
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law’ can spread among as many people as possible. They therefore stress that they see 
their organization as the opposite of a charity organization. People should not be the 
passive receivers of help and expect the activists to do things for them. As one respondent 
put it, “we are not giving a fish but rather a fishing rod” (interview, November 15, 2000). 
Aid can be given in different ways. We want to see that it is not taken in the consumerist 
manner, that a person does not only receive help but is also learning something. We tell: 
We are going to teach you what to do, where to turn to, if it is needed we will support you, 
we’ll write an intercession. But in the first hand, it is your decision to do what you are 
going to do, keeping it within the limits of law. (Interview, December 28, 2004)
We understood that we as an organization do not matter at all. The most important task is 
to hand over information to people; the information, which is concealed from people. So, 
we are saying to them, here you are, you get it all, there are these experiences and such 
methods, but we cannot interfere, the choice is yours. (Interview, November 8, 2000)
The activists stress that they wish that mothers and young men were more 
supportive of the movement’s ideological message. 
Many people are happy to get freed from the obligation to serve in the army, and they stop 
there. Only a few of them adopt the philosophy of human rights and move further. 
(Interview, November 20, 2000)
People have basically a commonplace attitude to the war in Chechnya, like, do not let 
them draft my son but I do not care about the rest! They are just visitors, 99.9 percent of 
them! It was some period in the past, when many of them volunteered to work here, for 
example, to answer phone calls and things like that, but not anymore. Maybe, people just 
got used to the fact that they can receive aid without pay and they take advantage of that. 
(Interview, December 29, 2004)
2. Emotion Work among the Constituency
Through their routine interactions with the larger community the activists encourage 
women and mothers to overcome demobilizing feelings of resignation and cynicism and 
to learn to feel solidarity, hope, and pride for being able to resist injustice directed against 
their sons. 
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Recognizing Fear 
One of the central problems discussed by the activists concerning mothers and young 
draftees is their fear of the bureaucrats in the military draft boards. Activists try to explain 
the causes of this feeling to people, and to make them to recognize their fear, and to teach
them ways in which they might overcome it.    
Local SOMO organization regularly arrange The School of Human Rights to inform 
mothers/parents and potential conscripts about the legislation on the military draft, to 
teach them ways to protect their own rights, and to help with advice on individual cases. 
In one of the organizations in my study, the School was held twice a week. When I 
conducted my fieldwork in the fall 2000, up to 80-100 persons usually participated in the 
lectures and seminars (see also Hojer 2004). The activists usually start by asking the 
audience to explain why they came here and what kind of problems with the military 
service they are trying to solve. Many concrete detailed questions are asked and people
generally express fear, frustration, and uncertainty. 
The activists usually give a short lecture introducing the basic ideas in the Law on 
military service, the Russian Constitution, and the UN Declaration on Human Rights. In 
the interviews, activists stated that many parents of the conscripts in the post-communist 
society are especially ignorant about their rights, because the Soviet system (and the 
situation remains the same today) has primarily socialized them into awareness about their 
duties (interviews, December 28, 2004; November 9, 2000). During the lectures, the
activists explained in a concrete way, what every mother/family should do, and which 
steps to take, in order to get a legitimate exemption of her son from the military service. 
The most complicated cases of exemption, with which the activists were dealing,
concerned with a draftee’s poor health. 
An important part of the lectures was the historical experience of living in the 
‘totalitarian’ system. The parents who attended the School belong to a generation which 
experienced and was formed by the Soviet history of militarized society, political terror, 
and wars. Individual fear for the bureaucrats was explained as a result of the Soviet 
people’s historical collective experiences. Mothers and young men therefore have to work 
with their fears and get rid of them in order to resolve their problem with the military draft
board. One of the methods used at the workshop was role play in which women and men 
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worked in pairs, performing the roles of “bureaucrat” and “citizen,” and others (field 
notes, November, 2000). Mothers and draftees were also to memorize articles from the 
constitution and the parts of the law on military service which they should quote during 
their encounters with officials in the military board (see also Hojer 2004).  
A doctor was occasionally invited to the School to give a lecture about the negative 
consequences of the Soviet health system on the reproductive health of women; one of the 
topics that was usually discussed was birth traumas, which is experienced almost by 
everyone due to wrong routines at the birth clinics (for example, it was pointed out that 
newborn babies were taken away from mothers and only brought back for breastfeeding). 
Based on this information, activists argued that “no one is healthy” in the post-Soviet 
society (field notes, November, 2000). Mothers were told that it is their responsibility to 
write down a list of her son’s diseases since early childhood as well as the family’s history 
of alcoholism, mental diseases, and violence. Mothers are also recommended health 
centers which could be trusted to carry out an “independent” medical examination of 
draftees. Mothers were to collect the necessary medical documentation and to write an
official letter of complaint if the local military board refused to accept documentation or, 
as it happened often, to make them disappear.            
One additional method of managing fear was to build small “support groups” among 
the mothers and draftees, to exchange information on the local draft boards and to 
accompany one another to the military committees during the medical check-ups. 
Alexander is a university student who attended the School of Human Rights and also 
worked for some time as a volunteer in the SOMO organization. According to the 
activists, he experienced a lot of fear of the military draft board bureaucrats (interview, 
November 18, 2000). Alexander refused to serve in the military. He associates the army
with violence of which he disapproves. “The only war I can justify is a defensive war; I 
think that very few people want to serve in the army and fight in Chechnya” (interview, 
November 19, 2000). The meaning of civic duty and the military service has changed 
radically since the end of the Soviet society:
What does it mean to fulfill a duty to the homeland? Those who serve in the army do not 
fulfill their duty to the homeland but rather their duty to the marshal or the chief 
commander. Leaders, military or civil, do not embody the homeland. In the past, it was a 
different society and the attitudes toward the army were different. Nowadays, it is rare that 
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people talk about civic duty, morality of war and of the armed forces. The discussions are 
of more mercantile character. 
If you have money, you can avoid conscription, you can pay a bribe through your contacts 
or directly to them; it costs 2500 USA dollars, or you can buy the necessary medical 
documents and to acquire an exemption from the service. (Interview, November 19, 2000) 
Alexander refused to bribe the military officials. He explains why he became active 
in the SOMO organization: 
For me, it is important to help who like me are called up to the military service and rack 
their brains not knowing how to solve this problem. They are depressed, in despair, lack 
self-confidence, and are extremely anxious about stepping over the threshold of the 
military committee. Why are people so afraid of bureaucrats in general and of the military 
committee in particular? There are some objective reasons for why one should be afraid of 
them. But still I think we should not do that. We are afraid of the bureaucrats because we 
are not used to demand something from them or at least to ask them of something 
normally as human beings. We are used to beg them and to ask for mercy and to belittle 
ourselves. (Ibid.)          
           
Alexander gained a temporary exemption from the military service because of his
university studies and was trying to receive a permanent exemption on medical grounds. 
The military committee has turned down his request once. He was going to claim that he 
was unfit again. He asked a “group of support,“ including two mothers, one SOMO 
activist, and me (the field researcher, sociologist) to accompany him during the medical 
check-up this time. When he presented his claim, doctor who examined him refused to 
pay attention to his claim. We, the support group, were waiting in the corridor. When 
Alexander asked us to come in into the examining room to witness how he was treated, 
the doctor became furious, he swore at Alexander and ordered him to strip naked in front 
of us. He obviously intended to embarrass and humiliate the young men in this way (field 
notes, November 17, 2000). 
The SOMO activist explained to me afterwards that this doctor was infamous - many 
people were hurt by him - and that this local drafting board was known for cases of 
corruption:  “They have a system of taking bribes there. Therefore, we must do something 
to shake them” (interview, November 18, 2000). After what happened to him in the local 
draft board Alexander decided to sue the doctor and he received an official apology from 
him.  
Relying on the ideas discussed at the School of Human Rights and support gained 
from the SOMO, Alexander managed his fear and a sense of personal demeaning. A 
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conviction that he was doing the right thing helped him to turn his distressing visit to the 
military-medical check into a protest action. Based on his activism in the SOMO he 
expresses his alternative understanding of the meaning of civic duty, which is a feeling of 
compassion and solidarity towards his peers and is willing to volunteer to help them. His 
interpretation of the social identity of a male citizen has changed and obviously differs 
from the conventional meaning. 
Instilling Hope and Pride 
As a result of the SOMO rituals and the interactions between the SOMO activists and 
mothers in the larger community, people are encouraged to view their feelings and 
experiences as the consequence of the broader societal and historical processes in Russia. 
They are not, however, encouraged to feel anger towards the state bureaucrats. The
activists try to instill hope that bureaucrats might change, “they are also people;” they can 
get to know the law and to learn to obey the law (interview, November 20, 2000). 
Religious belief is viewed as a source of psychological strength and a means of 
maintaining solidarity and hope among both core activists in the organization and among 
them and the larger community:    
Actually, we can not steer how “support groups” act. People are different, some of them 
are conscious, others are not, some are combative others weak, some are well prepared, 
others are not prepared at all; some have lost their maternal instinct while for others, their 
son’s life is the most precious thing in the world. All these circumstances lie beyond our 
control. Therefore, we rely on the will of God. We usually refer to the prayer which says, 
“Do not wait to be consoled but console yourself the others, do not wait to be understood 
but try to understand the others, and do not wait to be loved but love yourself the others.” 
This expresses very clearly what we mean: Those who are helping other people will 
receive help in return. (Interview, October 28, 2000)
The School of Human Rights is a routine ritual in the practices of the SOMO 
organization. It starts with a collective prayer, and follows certain procedures. The 
meaning of workshops, lectures, and individual consultations is interpreted within the 
frame of the SOMO’s shared culture, as explained in this chapter.    
To make mothers to feel pride instead for shame and fear is another important task 
and focus in the work of the SOMO activists. One of the methods is to focus on women 
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who “succeeded” in resolving their dispute with the drafting board during the School of 
Human Rights. They are invited to tell their story in public. These mothers are called 
“victorious” (pobeditelnitza) and they sometimes produce proudly her son’s “military 
card” which is personal ID card given back by the military board to those who have 
retired or who have been permanently freed from the military duty (field notes, November 
2000). 
     
Summary 
This chapter has shown that the emotional work and process of cognitive-moral liberation 
produce signs of newly emerging collective identity of human rights advocate in the 
SOMO movement, which struggles for women/mothers to be recognized as political 
agents in the state military sphere. The activists encourage a dis-affection from routine 
emotions of loyalty to the state. By participating in the SOMO actions and routine rituals, 
women learn to manage their fear of the anger directed at them by social superiors 
(policeman or state military official). They also learn not to suppress their own anger felt 
in moments of unjust treatment and humiliation of them and their sons. They learn not to 
be ashamed of being ‘bad’ mother of a ‘deserter’/unfit for the military service – allegedly 
not able to raise a physically fit and patriotic male child. The new moral norms and rules 
of feeling include hope and contempt directed towards the official authorities, solidarity 
with soldiers’ mothers, pride of their ability to protect their sons’ legitimate rights, and 
their ability to manage fear. The activists work in order to enable their constituency to 
overcome demobilizing feelings of resignation and cynicism. New standards of injustice 
and new principles of civic bonding are thus developed.        
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Chapter 14
Creating a Grassroots Women’s Movement  
Calling all sisters. Calling all
Righteous sisters.
Calling all women. To steal away
To our secret place. Have a meeting
Face to face. Look at the facts
And determine our pace. Calling all
Women. We want to reach – first and 
second
And Third world women
Come together! 
Socialism, capitalism, communism
Feminism, womanism, lesbianism
Here-and-now or futurism
We just can't afford a schism
We got to get together or die.
Now is the time for an evolution
Let's all search and find a solution
For how we'll make it to the next 
revolution
Or die. Oh yes. 
And don't forget your lunch!
Calling all Women, Ruby Dee73
Introduction
As showed in chapter 13, the SOMO create an ‘oppositional’ reality of a human rights
community while forging confidence and a sense of solidarity, which are necessary for
critical action undertaken by a subordinated social group. This chapter examines why and 
how the SOMO activists start to identify themselves as part of the Russian and 
transnational women’s movement and decide to set up a political party. It shows that they 
attempt to give a voice to grassroots women in the political arena, where women are 
marginalized and/or represented by elitist/intellectual feminist groups. The chapter 
examines how the SOMO create grassroots women’s movements in the context of the 
partly bureaucratized and depoliticized NGO field. The SOMO disidentify from 
discourses and groups, which depoliticize the interpretation of the needs of grassroots 
women or incorporate it into the formalized sphere of “civil expertise” or elitist feminism. 
                                                 
73 In My One Good Nerve (1998), Wiley, John & Sons, Inc., p. 168.
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The grassroots women’s movement is created as an “imagined community” (Mohanty 
2003) through connecting women’s various struggles, staged from social locations of 
gender, class, nation, and culture. In its collective identity frame, the SOMO incorporate 
the feminist pro-Western concept of “gender” bridging it with frames of grassroots, 
human rights, anti-draft, and maternal movement. 
The questions examined in this chapter are: 1) How do the SOMO articulate the 
politicized interpretations of the needs of the soldiers and the mothers needs, as opposed 
to the entrenched gendered discourses in the pro-government organizations in the NGO 
field? 2) Why and how do the activists disidentify from the styles of some human rights 
NGOs and feminist NGOs in the political arena? 3) How and why do they renegotiate 
their perceptions of the sphere of party politics?  4) How do they reinterpret the concept of
“gender inequality” from a perspective of grassroots women’s anti-military and anti-draft 
human rights movement?
1. Making an Issue of Mother’s Needs 
The gender identities of men and women are crucial for the state’s ability to maintain 
military armies (Forcey 1994; Ruddick 2004). The state-military institutions are supported 
and sustained through a gendered discourse about a masculine soldier and a self-
sacrificing mother. In Soviet Russia, as explained in the chapters 10 and 11 of this 
dissertation, symbols of the Soldier and the Mother of a Soldier have been central in the 
state’s ideology and the politics encouraging certain kinds of male and female behavior.
These powerful images were important symbolic tools deployed in the state’s ideological 
apparatus. The meanings and behaviors which challenged the state-military institutions 
were excluded from official politics. For example, questions concerning disciplinary 
problems among soldiers and officers including the inadequate life conditions for soldiers 
and staff in the army were not openly discussed. Further, women’s experiences and 
grievances with regard to their sons’ military service were not articulated in the political 
arena. They belonged to the sphere of “family,” personal and domestic relationships and 
were therefore sealed off from mainstream politics. “Official politics” and “domestic life” 
are thus constructed as separate and closed domains (cf. Fraser 1989). As a result, the 
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conventional definitions of men and women’s civic duty are taken for granted: Men serve 
in the military and die for the nation if necessary. Women give birth to and raise sons to 
become brave and loyal soldiers. 
In post-Soviet Russia, the conventional definitions of men and women’s gender 
identities associated with national identity are continuously reproduced in different ways. 
For example, as shown in chapter 11 of this dissertation, the definitions are reproduced 
through mass media images of soldiers’ mother(s), which present women feeling pride 
over their sons’ heroic deeds. The dominant definitions are confirmed in the shared 
culture of the pro-state voluntary groups of soldiers’ mothers, subscribing to the 
‘compliant’ (Connell 1987) versions of femininities. Taking up the position of “social 
mother” in the Third Sector NGOs, the activists confirm the partnership between the state 
and women civic activists, bearing the social costs of the post-Soviet transformation (cf. 
Salmenniemi 2005; Hemment 2007).
The Controversy over Dedovschina
The respondents in my study call the pro-state soldiers’ mothers’ NGOs “parallel” 
organizations, stressing that they are supported by the military officials who are trying to 
curb the influence of human rights SOMO in society. The human rights SOMO constitute 
a counter-hegemonic public, which politicize the interpretation of definitions of men and 
women’s gender identities linked with membership in the nation-state. For example, they 
make an issue of the grievances of mothers in the cases of dedovschina when their sons 
are abused in the military barracks. By including women’s feelings in the public debate,
the SOMO renegotiate the boundary between the “official political” and the “domestic” 
spheres established by the dominant groups.    
Dedovschina is a controversial subject in the arena of military service politics. Its 
widespread scope and gravity is denied by the pro-government soldiers’ mothers’ NGOs.
A controversy around dedovschina reflects the diverse standpoints of women’s 
organizations, expressed in the public debate between the pro-government and the human 
rights Mothers’ organizations published in the press. The following part of this section 
briefly describes the content of this debate and shows how the human rights SOMO 
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politicize their interpretation of soldier’s mothers’ needs and how the depoliticizing
interpretation is produced in response. 
The Ministry of Defense has cooperated with the organization the Council of the 
Military Servicemen’s Parents of Russia since 1991 (Falichev 2004). In May 2004, the 
organization held its seventh Congress which discussed questions about rebuilding the 
prestige of the military service, social protection of the servicemen, the role of family in 
the patriotic education, and pre-army training of the youth. The Congress was attended by 
officials from the military and civilian ministries as well as the state administration. The 
organization’s chairwoman stressed that military service was always important for “real 
men” in Russia; she appreciated the opportunity to meet the state and army officials, and 
the new politics of “cooperation between the civil society and the state.” In the military 
press, in the article Consolidation of Efforts: An Open Dialogue between the Army and 
Civil Society the Council is praised as a “constructive organization which helps the armed 
forces to work with the servicemen and draftee-aged youth” (ibid.). The activists were 
given credit for being concerned, not about “personal interest but rather about the state 
affairs.” The Congress has been described as “uniting.” Its participants decided to 
establish the public offices opened for the draftee-aged youth and staffed by volunteers 
soldier’s mothers and personnel from the Educational Departments in the military units 
(ibid.). 
In response to this event, the chairwoman of the human rights organizations of
Soldiers’ Mothers stated in another publication that the Council of the Military 
Servicemen’s Parents cannot be considered part of the civil society (Mukhin and 
Samarina 2004). The Ministry of Defense supports the voluntary organizations, which 
persuade parents not to hide their children from their military service. It has helped the 
Council to set up the branch organizations all over the country and ensured the 
cooperation of the local military draft boards with them.
The article Maternal Mandate contrasts the standpoint of the pro-government 
Council with the views of the human rights organization Mother’s Right (Chernova 2003). 
The author stresses that the human rights organizations of soldiers’ mothers are critical of 
the Soviet traditions; they embody a modern democratic approach to the reform in the 
army, to civil society, and the legal system. According to this approach, one cannot 
perceive the military service as young men’s civic duty towards the state. In the modern 
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high technological army, ‘brains’ are more necessary than the ‘canon fodder.’ The army
should therefore be formed on a voluntary and professional basis. According to the author, 
this reform is still not implemented, because conscript soldiers are exploited as a free 
labor force for economic and political causes. As the current generation of children is 
being brought up in privately run kindergartens and schools, however, the boys are not 
indebted to the state. Their parents do not need to feel like ‘serf citizens” that have to 
repay their debt to the state by letting their children serve in the army. The article argues 
that the phenomenon of dedovshchina is widespread in the army and that everyone is 
exposed to it, either as victim or as perpetrator. Parents should therefore try to get a 
deferment from the military service if their sons are not strong enough. If a soldier is 
abused in the barracks, a mother should immediately interfere and take her son out of the 
military unit. It is better to violate the bureaucratic system than to lose a son. They should 
also write an official complaint to the Public Prosecutor (ibid.).   
In response to the standpoint of the human rights organization of mothers, the leader 
of the Council contended that every male citizen should be trained for military operations, 
because of the unstable security situation (Chernova 2003). According to her, the 
conditions in the army are not so horrible - dedovshchina occurs only in some units, not 
everywhere. Even if the officers frequently use the conscript soldiers as free labor, it is not 
of great importance. The most important thing is that they are fed and accommodated 
properly. She did not support the idea of professional army, but advocates a reduction in 
the term of the military service. The subject Basics of military training should be 
reestablished in the secondary schools, like it was in the Soviet times. She rejects the idea 
of alternative military service, because young boys usually are not used to do household 
work, and are therefore better suited for military tasks. The work of the voluntary 
organizations is to reassure mothers that their sons will be all right in the army. The 
activists visit the military units regularly, bring presents, and arrange concerts and 
birthday parties for soldiers. Not all the military commanders are cooperative, and the
women have to convince them that their presence in the unit has good effect. If a boy is 
abused in the barrack, the leader of the Council encourages his mother not to try to take 
her son out from the unit but to come to their organization. The NGO activists write a 
complaint to the military commander and ask for medical examination and disciplinary 
measures (ibid.).
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This printed debate reflects the role played by the counter-hegemonic public 
constituted by the human rights SOMO groups. The experience of mothers is a starting 
point in the HR SOMO’s critical perspective on the problem with violence in military 
barracks and the institution of the army as a whole. A conflict between individual and the 
state-military institution is brought into the public sphere. The activists argue that as the 
relationship between the family and the state has changed, the definition of civic 
obligation should be reinterpreted. The HR SOMO stress that in the post-communist state 
it is impossible to demand that young men serve in the army based on principles of public 
good and loyalty to the state. The mandatory service in the army actually has become a 
form of exploitation of a free labor force, including mainly men from large and poor 
families. The military service should therefore be a voluntary and paid occupation. 
The activists contend that the former Soviet relationship between the state and 
women has changed. While the relationship used to be defined in terms of kinship-like 
reciprocity (cf. Ashwin 2000; see also Ch. 7 of this dissertation), women in the post-
Soviet society should demand that their maternal rights are legally protected and respected 
by the state representatives. For example, at the Congress of the soldiers’ mothers groups, 
the activists wanted to warn the parents of conscript soldiers not to “trust” the staff in the 
military draft boards:   
Parents are for some reasons so trusting. They think, he is a doctor, he will see that a boy 
is sick and make an objective decision. Unfortunately, in this country, your child is no 
longer needed by anybody except you! The doctor or the military committee does not 
care. So tell the parents: “Do not give up until you have tried all the possible means! Go to 
the legal court.” Recently, the organization Mother’s Right won the court case of Dimitry 
who was recruited in the army and died of heart attack after seven weeks. His mother 
struggled with the draft board for two years but she did not know that she could appeal to 
the court. Explain to all parents that they can appeal the decision of the draft board; they 
should not be afraid to go to the court. (The Second International Congress 2000: 115)
The politicization of the interpretation of soldiers’ and mothers’ needs is a result of 
the activists’ constant struggles in different social and geographic locations. For example, 
even if dedovschina has been relatively widely discussed in the central mass media since 
the late 1980s, deaths in the military barracks during peace time is a very sensitive and 
controversial topic of public discussion in the regional cities. A member of the SOMO 
from Siberia describes the strong resistance they faced when they brought up the issue:      
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Why do we receive coffins from places where there is no war? Boys die of diseases, of 
hunger, of lack of medicine, of dedovschina. The most horrible is that they kill and 
eliminate the evidence, and call it an accident. We edited a Book of Memory for those 
who died during peace time in Siberia. The military committee refused to tell how many 
soldiers were killed, but I managed to get the numbers from the local social agency. It 
took two years to edit the book and to find sponsors for publishing. They demanded to 
“remove all the materials concerning deaths in the military barracks.” The military 
committee was against the publishing of the book. (The Second International Congress 
2000: 75)
Disidentifying from the Pro-State SOMO        
The SOMO activists reinforce the identity of the human rights movement by
disidentifying from the “compliant” (Connell 1987) femininity represented by the 
voluntary groups of mothers which cooperate closely with the Minister of Defense: 
They are not human rights organizations, but are attached to political power-holders. The 
Minister of Defense pats bereaved mothers of soldiers on the back, invites them to the Day 
of the Army on February 23 and the ceremony of the Military Oath. They are asked, 
“Bless your son, Mother,” and so forth. (Interview, January 4, 2005)
There is an ongoing debate and divisions among the women’s groups within the
field of state military politics. Some voluntary groups, argues Olesia, depoliticize the 
movement by limiting it to pragmatic and uncontroversial issues. Such groups are 
obviously favored during official events arranged by state officials. For example, at the 
Civic Forum organized by the president’s administration as a series of round tables with 
participants from citizens’ NGOs and from the government, a leader of a less 
controversial SOMO group was elected as a chairwoman at the section on the military 
reform in the army. Olesia tells about her experience of participation in Civic Forum:   
It was a struggle. You know, the idea came actually from the president’s administration. 
The initial idea was to ‘stand the NGOs up in the line’ (postroit’), to appoint a boss and to 
work with organizations through one single boss. I said no, I am not going to take part in 
this mess; we let nobody coordinate us. But we were lucky this time.
In the list of the participants from the so called organizations of soldiers’ mothers, were 
three swindlers. A long time ago we distanced ourselves from some groups, because they 
took payments from people. The topic we proposed for the discussion was Military 
service, military reform and human rights in the army. XX from the organization XX was 
appointed a chairwoman of our Round Table. I phoned her in advance and she sent me a 
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list of questions for discussion. I was stunned: “Civic control over the form of the military 
service personnel’s underwear.” I knew they were toads, but that they were such fools?! It 
took the price! However, XX got sick! So I chaired the discussion instead of her. 
(Interview, January 23, 2003) 
The military authorities represent the army as a uniting national symbol, around 
which the Russians should unite, against ‘those from abroad.’ A representative for the 
local government specifies exactly what they expect the SOMO to do: 
What kind of help do we want to receive from the committees of soldiers’ mothers? First 
of all, to work with the health care system, it is so bad that the medical board let boys with 
mental disease, drug addicts and alcoholics to pass through. … The committees of 
soldiers’ mothers should also pay attention to the education system. So many different 
parties emerged, that it is impossible to understand what they are about. But the questions 
of patriotism, education of our youth stand on the second, third place or are denied 
completely. [….] I believe, comrades that committees of soldiers’ mothers should not be
in opposition to the military and the army. Let us together, in alliance, decide all the 
questions, so that the problems of the army do not agitate society so much. (The Third 
International Congress 2002: 17)
The military authorities want the various groups of soldiers’ mothers to be organized
as one organization that will cooperate with the military under their guidance. They 
disapprove and reject the political character of the SOMO groups:      
Before lunch, I felt like I attended a political rally where parties, movements hold 
speeches, mostly of an anti-military character. I wanted to leave. I thought, where are 
those mothers, where is their pain, where are the tasks they formulate, and where are their 
proposals? …The soldiers’ mothers are like a feedback signal to the military 
administration system. When we have regular communication concerning concrete 
matters, not some political ideas, we can work unanimously. Why separate two sides --
here are we, mothers, and there are you, the generals? I can tell you, we have eight 
generals whose sons perished in Chechnya. You should not stand in opposition to the 
army. You are mothers and we are children, speaking symbolically. … We should be 
solving our problems together. (The Second International Congress 2000: 58, 59) 
The human rights SOMO try to resist the military’s attempts to co-opt their 
movement. Based on the officially recognized idiom of rights and civil society, the 
activists are able to substantiate their claims with help of the vocabulary of the human 
rights movement. They can negotiate compromises in the Third Sector, use narrative 
conventions about state/society opposition, maternal identity, and so forth to construct a 
collective story of their movement, and the new mode of civic activism within the 
framework of the autonomous NGO. Drawing upon these resources, the SOMO politicize
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the interpretation of the needs of soldiers’ mothers and resist the hegemonic and 
conventional discourses, in which women’s positioning is defined by intersecting social 
categories of gender and national identity.
  
2. “Courage” in the NGO Field
When I ask Olesia in the interview about her view on the women’s movement in Russia, 
she says that the women’s coalition (The Women’s of Russia74) in the parliament became 
“a failure, they turned out to be weak” (interview, January 23, 2003). She stresses that in 
politics it is important to show “courage, [which means, to try to achieve] something 
important, something that really matters, otherwise it all becomes meaningless!” (Ibid.) 
Based on the analysis of her and other respondents’ interviews, formalization and 
collusion with the political elite sometimes prevail in the NGO community. For example, 
some of the human rights NGOs and women’s organization tend to be bureaucratized and 
easily accept compromises with the political elite, which leads to corruption of important 
principles. When the non-governmental sphere is institutionalized as the Third Sector of 
non-profits, providing a “social service” is sanctioned and sometimes directly supported 
by the state. When the NGO activism is interpreted in terms of “civil expertise,” it tends to 
be depoliticized and activists are turned into helpmates of the state bureacracy. 
Resisting Formalization and Collusion    
The human rights NGOs are often involved in monitoring the political-legal system rather 
than concrete work with citizens’ social problems (interview, November 12, 200075). At 
the same time, interviewees in my study stress that the HR activism has changed and the 
new meaning of a rights-defender appeared in post-Soviet Russia:   
                                                 
74 The Women of Russia constituted of three groups the Union of Women of Russia (the heir of the USSR’s official 
organization the Soviet Women’s Committee), the Association of Women Entrepreneurs of Russia and Women of the 
Fleet, was elected in 1993 to the parliament but did not reach the 5 percent barrier in order to qualify for the 1995 
Duma elections (see Buckley 1999; Caiazza 2002: Ch. 4).   
75 with a member in The Civic Watch NGO.
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There is a new understanding of a HR defender. He is not just writing [political] 
statements, but is helping people to learn about their rights and to assert them. At the 
seminar in 1995, the old school HR movement argued that HR defenders should stand up 
for fundamental rights and freedoms. But activists from the regions said, we should go to 
people and protect them, in a law-abiding and civilized way. (Interview, October 11, 
200176) 
Organizations become more professional; they both collect information about a certain 
problem and offer help to people. It is because it is morally wrong only to collect 
materials without trying to help people and you will not get the information, unless there 
is a constant flow of people [coming to your organization]. (Interview, October 3, 200177)
Many HR activists, however, are skeptical about the way in which this subtle
balance between collecting information and helping people is maintained in practice. 
Activism frequently takes a form of “chewing information about HR violations”78   
For Marina, a SOMO member, the HR NGOs differ from the other kinds of 
voluntary groups, because they try simultaneously to resolve ‘individual cases’ and 
transform the ‘system’ (interview, January 4, 2005). The SOMO believe that many 
organizations actually do not pursue the principles of the human rights philosophy: “they 
know about it but do not take seriously” (interview, April 20, 2001). The question is if 
such organizations can be seen as belonging to the civil society. One of the respondents 
stresses that the term “rights” refers to different dimension than individual/group 
“interest:”  
Many organizations calling themselves HR-defenders exist more like official agencies. 
There are more akin to bureaucrats than to HR activists. I think that many of those who 
call themselves HR-defenders mix up the notions of human rights and of group interests. 
The latter belongs rather to the sphere of politics or private interests. This confusion of the 
notions probably has to do with our Soviet legacy. If we had some voluntary organizations
that time, they were organizations of the disabled and of similar kinds. That is, they
defended the interests of a certain group, their needs in the narrow sense of the word. But 
we must distinguish between a person’s interests and rights (Interview, April 20, 2001). 
                                                 
76 with L., member of The Memorial NGO.
77 with C., member of The Memorial NGO.
78 “Unfortunately, our human rights activities are often limited to various coming-together, round tables, and 
endless conferences. They occur nearly every week - it can be the Civic Forum, Democratic consultation, Anti-
military Committee, and so on. This is obviously slightly bureaucratizing the human rights movement; it needs 
more lively force. Most often everything ends up with the endless monitoring and chewing of information about 
the human rights violation. Well, such projects are supported by the foundations, and some of them are certainly 
useful. [...] But when voluntary organization duplicates sociological research in a primitive form, it is not very 
good either.” (Interview with K., a human rights activists, Assistant of a parliament deputy, October 15, 2001)
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The SOMO activists are critical of some organizations, which merely collect 
information about the government’s violation of human rights, but do not propose any 
policy for changing the situation: 
The very idea of monitoring is then corrupted. We have learned that the goal of 
monitoring is to try to influence future development. You should not only gather 
information, but you should also accomplish something concrete in order to improve the 
situation. It is what the Poles have taught us in the School for Human Rights of Marek 
Novitsky. (Interview, January 23, 2003)  
What makes it difficult for the SOMO to cooperate with some HR NGO activists is 
that they “love politics,” which sometimes results in immoral compromises, when they 
participate in the Working Groups in the parliament. For example, some HR NGOs were 
unable to resist pressure from the military within the parliamentary working group which 
discussed the Law on the Alternative Military Service. These organizations, according to 
Olesia (interview, January 21, 2003), seem not to “really care” about the matter because 
“they did not have people behind them.” What they care about is the “formal procedures.” 
Many HR activists have learned skills to “conduct elegantly negotiations and conferences 
… Even if they are not going to run election campaigns, they still want to be perceived as 
political figures.” She even argued that some activists behaved like “traitors” during the 
discussion of the draft of Law on the alternative military service. During their Congress, 
the SOMO expressed their standpoint in a discussion of the official politics of the 
alternative military service: 
I believe that we must stand firmly on the principles we believe in. Certainly, I can 
understand that there are political games and compromises. But it is what the politicians 
do. The HR organizations must formulate their own principles and pressure them upon the 
parliament. We do not need to sabotage their work but we must explain why a citizen has 
a right to follow his own conscience and should not be punished for that. (The Third 
International Congress 2002: 24)     
The so called ‘pseudo-organizations’ of HR activists appear as a result of the 
conditions of financial scarcity in the NGO field. The HR community is marked by 
material poverty in general and by profound differences between the “elite” and the 
“proletarian” in particular. Social differentiating depends on the grant policy of the 
international foundations. The grants are offered mainly to well-known HR activists and 
organizations, most often located in the central big cities. For example, young activists or 
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activists who are not fluent in English have little chance of getting a grant (interview, 
October 12, 200179 and October 14, 200180). The subject of alternative military service 
became “fashionable” in the early 2000s and grants were available from many Western 
foundations for organizing workshops and conferences. As a result, some not serious
“dead-born trickery organizations” were formed by individuals who wanted to survive and 
earn money (interview, January 21, 2003). The major problem with the formalized and 
bureaucratized NGOs is that “people come to them with hope and leave with nothing” 
(ibid.). Olesia presents her own interpretation of a ‘professional’ position of a human 
rights activist setting it apart from the sphere of formally institutionalized politics:
You should stand firmly on the professional position: I am a human rights defender; I 
defend the rights of those who come to me. But if you start like a politician to take into 
consideration their [the military’s] interests, or to try to gain something for yourself, then 
you lose everything. (Interview, January 21, 2003)
Olesia (ibid.) stresses that new organizations appear in “astronomic numbers” but 
she knows several “serious” organizations which she can trust; she knew that they “will 
do everything correctly.” 
Women’s movements also suffer from colluding with the official political establishment. 
The reputation of the Duma coalition Women’s of Russia was ruined in the eyes of the 
SOMO, because it was unable to work for peace during the first Chechen war. The SOMO
reject a system of gender quotas in political institutions; they advocate finding other ways 
to resolve the problem of women’s marginalization in institutionalized politics:
Yes, it became so that we do not have women in politics… But I do not think that [quotas] 
is a solution. It does not matter if you are a man or a woman; the important thing is what 
kind of person you are. (Interview, October 1, 2001)     
At the seminar arranged by the Council of Europe we had heated debates about the quota
system in politics; they said, 30 percent of women should be elected. Well, I said, we had 
women in the parliament and what is the result? The Union of Women of Russia is a 
continuation of the [Soviet] Committee of Soviet Women. [During the first Chechnya 
war] they sent a swift answer to our appeal: “We cannot support your initiatives.” They 
meant it was all right to fight the Chechen people; the only thing they cared about was that 
our soldiers should be fed properly. It was an absolutely Bolshevik position. The result of 
their absolutely male behavior is that now it is difficult for women to get elected at all. 
                                                 
79 With a member of The Interregional Foundation “For Civil Society”.
80 With a member of The Human Rights Centre of Youth.
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Now women [from our movement] try to get elected at the local level for a start, in order 
to restore the reputation of women politicians.  (Interview, September 28, 2001)         
The Soviet legacy of incorporating women’s organizations into the state-
bureaucratic system makes the activists inclined to mistrust organizations which cooperate 
with the official elite and which are not rooted in local communities. At the same time, 
grassroots women’s groups such as the young lesbians, an organization which appeared in 
1995, have won the respect of the SOMO by the fact that they “honestly stood in the anti-
military pickets” together with them (interview, January 23, 2003).  
Resisting the “Civil Expertise” Structures
According to the SOMO activists, the efforts of the state to supervise and to build the civil 
society in Russia from above tend to reproduce the gap between society and bureaucratic 
structures. For example, the Commission for Civil Society and Human Rights was set up 
under the presidential administration. The Commission includes the leaders of many 
human rights NGOs, well-known journalists, artists, political scientists and others. Olga 
stresses that the Commission plays a significant role mostly by informing the president 
about the existing problems. It cannot, however, solve the concrete practical questions. 
For example, the SOMO activists tried for two years to lobby for the increasing the 
extremely low pensions paid to the conscripts with disabilities who had been injured in 
Chechnya. While they received a positive resolution from the president, the question was 
not solved due to bureaucratic obstacles. Olga ponders the appropriateness of the 
membership of the SOMO in the Commission and thinks that they should perhaps leave it 
as a form of a public protest. The Commission is necessary, however, as at least some 
channel for a “conversation with the Power,” because the “government is unresponsive 
and difficult to reach out to” (interview January 4, 2005). 
Olga constantly works to reach a deeper and a more consistent understanding of 
politics, the NGOs and civil society in Russia. She explains why she thinks it was so 
difficult to reach a decision on the question the SOMO had raised in the Commission:
Why was it impossible to resolve this practical problem? It is because we, non-
governmental organizations, we act in the civil society. But they over there do not have 
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such mechanisms which would force them to do something. They only use general 
slogans, but every department is entangled in its own interests, and every person is busy 
with his own business. The Power (vlast) became more and more closed and alienated 
from society. They develop in two different directions, without coming into any contact 
with one another. (Ibid.)
          
She points out that the initiative of the president’s administration to establish a Civic 
Chamber to represent the civil society is a reaction of the political elite to the fact that the 
population has lost trust in the parliament after the Duma became subsumed under the 
authority of the president:
While they try to preserve the one-man management in the Duma, they create the Civic 
Chamber which allegedly will advise the Duma on what issues are important. But the 
members of the Chamber are in the first round appointed personally by the president. 
They are in the second round choosing others and so on. You can understand, how 
extremely strict are the criteria for choosing the candidates. Apparently, it will be a 
governed Civic Chamber. It will talk in the name of Civil Society, like yes, President, this 
law should be adopted. It is like in the Soviet time, when we had such public 
organizations. (Ibid.)    
Olga describes the crucial role of the genuine grassroots organizations in fostering 
future political leaders capable of bridging the gap between the political elite and ordinary 
citizens. 
The existing political elite consist of a narrow group of people who constantly appear on 
television and radio programs and so on. They seem to run out of ideas and to lack 
political resources. Obviously, we cannot expect to hear any new ideas from them. 
People understand that the power-holders are by themselves and ordinary people 
are by themselves. On the contrary, we are one bone and one flesh with ordinary people. 
Some of our leaders in the regional organizations are terrific women, remarkable leaders! 
(Interview, January 4, 2005)      
The SOMO thus try to resist the bureaucratized and depoliticized style of NGO 
activism, by which needs and interests of ordinary people often cannot be articulated due 
to the political and administrative structures in the authoritarian state and/or a dominance 
of Western donors in the NGO sphere. 
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3. Creating Grassroots Women’s Feminism
In the mid-1990s, the SOMO did not consider feminism to be relevant to their movement: 
Feminism, for me, is a movement for women’s rights. But the thing is, that was never 
relevant to me, because in our country, nobody had rights… Why should we talk about 
women’s rights, when everyone is without rights? We shouldn’t make separations: we’re 
just citizens… Maybe when basic rights are observed, when a citizen can be a citizen 
…then there can be some supplementary rights for women, some supplementary women’s 
struggle… Nobody in the organization thinks that women are particularly oppressed 
(interview May 12, 1995, quoted in Sperling 1999: 72). 
These perceptions started to change in the late 1990s and early 2000s when the 
activists began to become more interested in feminism. As Galia told me, “gender is 
something new for us but we learn to work with it” (interview, January 4, 2005). The 
SOMO movement had, however, in practice already struggled for the opportunities of 
women to influence social institutions:
We can say that in the first years of their existence the organizations of soldier’s mothers 
just did not think about what place they occupy among other women’s organizations and if 
their work is anyhow related to the problem of pursuing gender equality. They just work 
in order to change the situation and norms of behavior in the army, trying to protect every 
soldier, who was abused, beaten up, or humiliated and to stop the arbitrary attitudes of the 
military powers towards inductees. (W.a. 2002: 8)      
As the following section shows, however, the SOMO’s contacts with other women’s 
organizations and feminists were riddled with tensions and disagreements. The 
respondents in my study perceived feminism as a Western product and a movement of the 
Russian academic elite.    
Encounters with the Elitist Feminism      
The SOMO came in contact with Western women’s organizations through their travels 
abroad. While they were able to learn a lot about the women’s movement, they saw a 
great gap between them and Western women’s organizations regarding their activism’s 
material conditions:
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I was lucky and went twice to the U.S. within the projects “Women and the American 
Political Life.” I’ve seen how they work and can see why they do not understand how we 
work over here. Their organizations are supported by the state via some kind of social 
mandate. When we say that we have problems paying the office rent, purchasing the office 
technology, they do not understand it because they do not need to think about it. For them, 
an NGO member is like being a privileged baroness: I have got it all and an incredible 
office, and I can delegate the tasks and communicate easily with others. For them, such a 
thing as organizational problems does not exist! (Interview, September 28, 2001)        
As shown in chapter 12, most of the SOMO activists belong to and represent the 
groups, which the post-Soviet transformations have left financially impoverished. In 
addition, the activists are disadvantaged due to the grant policy of the domestic and 
Western sponsors. How and why the activists became engaged with the issue of gender 
politics is partly related to their positioning among women’s organizations in the NGO 
field, and partly to their marginalization in the official politics. The SOMO started to call 
themselves women’s organizations when they realized that a focus on “gender” in the 
materially differentiating NGO field might help them to find new sources of funding. 
They were resourceful, and were able to take advantage of their skills to write project 
applications and of their established social ties with the Western donors’ representatives in 
Russia:  
At some point I have noticed that we are often invited to different conferences and 
meetings arranged for women’s organizations, although formally we are not regarded as a 
women’s organization … When we attended meetings, we understood that in reality we 
are the true women’s organization … 
When the last year in the fall these organizations went to the USA and had a very nice trip 
and networking, we thought, look at all tremendous sums of money flowing into gender 
programs. What are we waiting for? Why don’t we give it a try! We were inspired and 
wrote a project. Fortunately for us, just at that moment we met personally a representative 
from the Canadian Foundation responsible for the support of the Russian women. She 
approved our project. (Interview, September 28, 2001)      
The SOMO felt at the same time that they were not fully accepted into the formally 
existing network of women’s organizations. In addition, they did not believe that they 
belonged among organizations, which they perceived as mainly elitist and pro-Western:     
In the beginning, all these outings [of feminists] nearly spoiled the whole thing, because 
everything was baked on the American yeasts, this kind of women’s movement does not 
suit us… Of course, individual help and policy are necessary, but the ladies ruin their own 
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status through these [programs with] Arbatova81 and things like that. They should have 
focused instead on the principled things! (Interview, October 23, 2003)  
The SOMO activists classify their movement among the broader community of 
women and they feel alienated by the individualist ideology in the pro-Western version of 
feminism which was brought in and became widespread in post-Soviet Russia. In 
addition, the SOMO reject the concept of women as a “victim” of the system. The SOMO 
construct their feminist ideology around a more collectivist and action-oriented concept of 
woman:  
    
XXX82 says that women should be protected because they are weak and so forth. This way 
to perceive a woman as an object of protection is not right! Take for example our 
movement, we have never been weak and [we refuse to see women as weak]! That is why 
they never accepted us into their coming-together. [They say to us], you are not defending 
the interests of women. Can you understand that? We responded, well, certainly we are 
not, if one ignores such interests of women as the rights of a mother, a wife, a sister, and 
so forth. (Ibid.)
Women in the SOMO react to the ways in which the issue of gender inequality is 
represented by the feminist organizations of academic women. The word ‘gender’ is
borrowed from English and is pronounced with a hard consonant [g] in Russian. While
some researchers have tried to translate it into Russian (see Aristarkhova 1995), it is 
mainly used in the form of a direct transcription of the English word. The word is not 
comprehensible to anyone who is not educated in gender theories. The SOMO try to find 
ways to make the concept of gender widely known among ordinary people. They spread 
knowledge about it among broader publics of women and the members of the military 
with whom they come into contact: 
Their way of understanding gender is very narrow, purely narrow-scientific. We are trying 
to inculcate the term of gender among the broad public, to throw it into the sphere of the 
military institutions, we invited all organizations [to our Congress] and discussed the 
concept of gender with everyone. It is very important. My long experience tells that 
people should get used to the new concept and only then they eventually start to feel it. 
(Interview, October 23, 2003)   
                                                 
81 In the mass media, feminism has been popularized by Mariia Arbatova, a writer and the regular co-host of a 
television talk show called I Myself (Ia Sama) (see Sperling 1999: 4).       
82 Reference to Consortium of women’s non-government organizations; see more about it at their website 
http://www.wcons.org.ru, accessed February 17, 2006.
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Bridging Feminist and Anti-Draft Frames
The SOMO activists construct the grassroots women’s movement by bridging a feminist 
frame with an anti-draft/anti-military frame. The activists’ position in the political sphere 
is ambiguous. As explained in the following sections, while enjoying popularity and 
respect among people they also stress that they are excluded from opportunities to 
influence policy decision-making. Two examples in the following section illustrate how 
the activists construct gender difference and recognize inequalities with reference to the 
post-/Soviet pattern of gender relations and structures.   
Recognizing Gender Inequalities
Some of the respondents argue that women should not be perceived as weak although 
their power is circumscribed to a sphere of ‘informal’ power. I started my discussion of 
women’s position in the Russian society with Anastasia by asking her a question about 
why women, not men predominate in their movement: 
I.: The majority of activists in the Soldiers’ Mothers are women. Is it because it is women 
who mostly take care of family and children?
       
Anastasia: It is obviously so. It is very common in our country! All housework has been 
shifted onto the shoulders of women.
I.: I can see that men are well represented in the political parties and the government, but 
in the voluntary organizations women predominate. It seems like women work hard
without pay…
Anastasia: It is so because our men are mostly demagogical. Take any man. For example, 
your husband, was he ever interested in what and how you purchased for the household? 
He usually does not care how a woman manages to keep things going, how she uses the 
salary which he brought her. Now, it has become ever more like this. And our deputies, 
they are sitting in Duma year after year, many of them since the Soviet times. They are 
used to talk about things. When I see the laws they adopt, I became really worried [about 
the future of our society]. Our men, they still are the same as they were in the [Soviet] 
past.      
(Laughing) The main problem we have is that we, women are just stronger than our men. 
I.: …do you feel that women have fewer opportunities in life?
Anastasia: Oh Lord! I never thought and felt that I have fewer opportunities than men.
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I.: Isn’t it so that it is mostly men who have official power?
Anastasia: Precisely, they have power only officially!  […..  ] they have ruined the army, 
they are not capable to manage practical affairs. (Interview, December 28, 2004)   
                         
The topic of conversation is obviously sensitive for Anastasia. The questions I ask 
are apparently perceived as slightly offensive. A tone of a light irritation in her answers 
can be explained by the SOMO’s ideological standpoint, which tries to resist the 
“mainstreamed” feminist standpoint that women are victims of social oppression. In order 
to make her point that women “are stronger than men,” Anastasia even for a moment 
“takes over” the role of interviewer and confronts me with a half-rhetorical question, “Are 
you married? How was it in your marriage?” On a whole, she expresses an ironic and 
rather denigrating attitude towards men. Many ideas and images of the late Soviet 
discourse are reproduced in her talk. It says that women continue to have the primary 
responsibility for household work and that they do not feel discriminated against. They 
tend instead to see the problem of gender relations in terms of men who are “weak” and 
incapable of managing the practical matters. 
Olga explains in her interview that certain forms of discrimination of women on the basis 
of gender continue to occur and have become worse in the post-Soviet times. For 
example, she says that women predominate in their movement because in the most 
families men tend to take the role of breadwinner. There are, however, exceptions:    
Sometimes fathers come. They take responsibility for their [sons-soldiers] and do 
everything [necessary to help them], often even better than women. I think it depends on 
the situation in the family.
I.: Is it more an exception than a rule? 
Well, yes. During the Soviet time, both men and women worked. Unfortunately, during 
the last ten-twenty years, it became more usual that fathers work and earn more money. It 
is just how it has become now. […] I think that it has changed due to the existing attitudes 
toward women. We had such attitudes also during the Soviet times, when with the same 
level of education … and maybe even higher level, a woman had to be ten times better 
than a man in order to be promoted. Such attitudes have become stronger now. Well,
maybe except for the commercial structures, where woman is self-employed and a boss. 
(Interview, December 28, 2004)   
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Women-activists’ ambiguous attitudes toward participating in party politics reflect 
their marginalized positioning in this gendered sphere of political life.
Positioning in the Party-Political Sphere
The respondents express an ambiguous and double-edged relationship to the party-
political in many different ways. While they loathe institutionalized politics, and choose 
and value not to be part of it, they search for opportunities to influence it. 
Some of the respondents were involved in the democratic movements and political 
party building during the perestroika, but became disillusioned and disenchanted by their
experiences. As was shown in chapter 12, the activists came to realize that the grievances 
of soldier’s mothers are often cynically exploited by men who aspire to political careers. 
Other respondents stress that women in the soldiers’ mothers’ groups from the very 
beginning were skeptical to the sphere of party-politics but their attitudes evolved over 
time. For example, Masha stresses that women in the SOMO groups were initially not 
interested in being drawn into the sphere of politika: 
We, women, decided at once that politics are not for us. I mean, we never joined any 
political movement and were always far away from the debates on how we like or dislike 
this regime. We were always very independent and our demands were always directly 
linked to [questions] related to the conditions in the army. But certainly, everything is 
interrelated. After a while, when we examined and understood the situation in the army, 
we started to formulate and present our proposals to the Duma, our parliament. (Interview, 
September 28, 2001)    
Luda stresses that their organization chose a strategy of keeping a distance from the 
sphere of institutionalized politics, because they needed time and space in order to think 
through forms of their work from a perspective of ordinary people:
We needed time in order to understand better the goals of our organization and in order to 
gain recognition from people. We act in the middle part of the pyramid of power, among 
the broad mass of people. For a while, we kept a low profile and worked quietly, knitting 
our networks. (Interview, November 8, 2000)        
Natasha says that their movement’s source of power is not to participate in formal 
politics, but the moral authority gained from being recognized by ordinary people. To her, 
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politics means ‘power’ asserted with help of political PR-technologies and manipulation 
of public opinion. When I ask her if she feels that NGOs often lack political power, she 
disagrees: “I would not see it in this way; I am not a PR-person, I do not seek power” 
(interview, December 28, 2004). 
Our organizations have enough influence on those structures which we want to influence:
the military institutions. We can always turn to the military prosecutor, military-medical 
commission, and the Ministry of Defense… if necessary we can turn to the Constitutional 
Court, and the Ministry of Justice, in order to protest against illegal orders…   I can tell
that even if we do not have open power, we have a power of social influence as a civic 
organization which has earned a certain authority. (Ibid.)      
The activists stress that they try to be flexible and to create strategic alliances with 
different political parties. None of parties, however, was able to represent fully the ideas 
of a “program” they developed, including the military reform putting an end to the system 
of conscription army. At the same time, the women point out that the SOMO’s access to 
the institutional sites of political decision-making has declined since the parliamentary 
elections in 2003. The situation changed drastically after the authoritarian tendencies 
started to increase in politics in the early 2000s:  
We kept a relatively close contact with the delegates in two previous convocations of the 
Duma - many of our women worked as assistants to the deputies. We could participate in 
the legislative activities; we expressed our opinions to the deputies and they formulated 
proposals at the sessions of the parliament. But after the last election, it seems that the
deputy body is like a scorched earth for us, there is nobody left to cooperate with. They 
won’t listen to us, voting is conducted according to the superior’s orders. (Interview, 
December 28, 2004)        
The SOMO now realize and stress that the human rights organizations’ activity has a 
political dimension, although it is broader than interest group politics. They do thus not 
protect only the interests of members of organizations or their constituency: 
We do not only defend the interests of the people who come to us, but we act in the 
broader scope, in the political field. The Declaration of the Human Rights was signed by 
the government, and therefore politics is always present. We do not simply defend the 
rights of the soldiers, but we demand to establish peace in Chechnya; we do not simply 
show that the conscripts’ rights are violated, but we demand that the conscript army be 
abolished and we say that the present law of alternative military service is not fair. 
(Interview, January 4, 2005)  
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Creating a People’s Party of Soldiers’ Mothers  
Representatives in the regional organizations of the SOMO submitted a proposal to create 
a political party. The maternal frame is central in public discussions at the mass meetings 
which frame women-activists as “independent” force in the party-political arena: 
It seems to me that authority and role of the SOMO is decreasing. For example, the mass 
media refuse to cooperate with us because we do not give them enough with the “fried” 
facts. Many SOMO leaders have joined different political parties, and therefore the 
authority of organizations in the local administrations has diminished. […]. I propose to 
create our own party. We need a party which is not dependent on anybody. As a result of 
the recent elections not a single woman was elected into the regional parliament Duma of 
Tomsk, there are only bankers and the gas company owners. Who will protect families? 
(The Third International Congress 2002: 34)
A member of the SOMO organization from Nizhnii Novgorod, reinforced the
feeling of enthusiasm framing the event of the Civic Forum in the fall 2001 as a sign of 
women’s power: 
After the Civic Forum, I understood that the top of our state, the government, started to 
realize that they cannot survive without listening to the opinion of society. It is our female 
power that we forced men to listen to us and to consider our opinion. Perhaps, the time has 
come to think about the status of our movement. We do not need to contend for our 
position in the civil society, everyone know us very well. But we must to mobilize as a 
special political force. (The Third International Congress 2002: 51)                 
The SOMO members forge a link between their grassroots movement and 
transnational feminist /institutionalized women’s movement: 
What is women’s lot in all the conflicts all over the world? They are forced to deal with 
consequences of decisions which were not made by them, and which they do not accept. 
And it is what we are dealing with, all these problems, payment of combat money, soldiers 
who are taken as prisoners, missing, injured or return from the army with psychological 
scars. It is we who are dealing with all these problems but it was not we, who made all 
these decisions. So, let us address the international community. I propose to write an 
appeal to all national and international women’s organizations and to ask them for 
support. Let us not forget henceforth that we are women’s organizations and let us take 
advantages of that for pressuring the authorities and increasing our influence on it. (The 
Third International Congress 2002: 40).                      
This quote illustrates how the maternal, anti-draft, human rights, grassroots, and 
feminist frames have started to be connected in the shared culture of the SOMO groups. In 
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the interviews given to the mass media, journalists at the first foundational meeting of 
their Party, the delegates stressed its maternal and grassroots-oriented character: "we are 
united in our efforts to grow a healthy future generation, and we are indeed a people's 
party formed from below" (Staff Writer 2004).  
Speakers at the SOMO’s Congress maintain that the SOMO have to think of 
Russia’s women’s movement in terms of their collective responsibility: 
I have to say that at the present moment the women’s movement is in decline. One proof 
of that is that women’s organizations failed in the parliamentary elections. 50% of the 
population is female, but they could not collect five percent of vote. It is a failure of 
women’s politics in Russia. And it is also our fault, I think. (The Second International 
Congress 2000: 63, 64)    
Reinterpreting Feminism
At the mass meeting in their Congress, the activists introduced the new concept of 
“gender equality” to the participants. They stress that they need to find new strategies to 
be able to influence Russia’s political elite: 
We need to find additional methods by which to influence the official authorities. One 
question which might seem strange to you concerns the role of the SOMO in 
strengthening gender equality in Russia. … If we can work with it and grasp its meaning, 
it can become a powerful means of influencing the power-holders. We are an organization
at the level of grassroots. … This theme is very important for us. We can add it to our 
status of human rights organization and to become one of the strongest women’s 
organizations in Russia. (The Third International Congress 2002: 18)    
The SOMO’s standpoint which merges the struggle for articulating women’s needs with
the anti-military perspective is unique among the women’s organizations:
I think that the SOMO is a real movement, a movement covering all Russia. It is the first 
powerful movement engaged in the concrete activities. […] I disagree with those who say 
that this Duma is better than the previous. How is it better if it includes only 0.76 percent 
of women? Women’s experience is not taken into consideration when the decisions are 
made. Nowadays men look down at women - like, they knew nothing. But we know! The 
Head of Department of Educational Work [at the Defense Ministry] should be a woman. 
Women should be members in the Council of Security [in government] and the 
Commission which is being organized at the moment. They say we do not have such 
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women. Yes, we have. They are present here, and there are plenty of them. (The Second 
International Congress 2000: 65)      
There are some activists with a constructionist-feminist perspective among the 
participants in the loose network of the soldiers’ mothers groups. They articulate their 
critical viewpoint on the way gender identities are reproduced in the practice of the 
SOMO by excluding men from participating in the movement. For example, an activist 
from a regional city says:
Our movement is women’s movement and those present here are only women. …We 
usually pay no attention to men. My son is 16 years old and is to be registered in the 
military committee. The military committee asks me, do you think that your son is ready 
to serve in the army? They ask me, not his father. It means that the military committee 
excludes men too. Fathers themselves do not show much enthusiasm for participating in 
the movement. 
To be able to transform all these gender rights, we need to raise our men [in the 
proper way]. Why aren’t they socially active? We do not like men, view them with 
contempt. (The Third International Congress 2002: 77).        
The SOMO create a link between the gender perspective and the anti-war with help 
of the feminist vocabulary which highlights that male politicians use their political power 
to make war. 
Both the women in the zone of the military conflict and in the women’s non-government 
organizations try to repair the consequences of violence, or more precisely, the 
consequences of the political decisions which eventually lead to wars and conflicts. And 
these decisions are not made by women, but by politicians, most of whom are men. Even 
in the most democratic countries, the influence of women on the decisions concerning the 
most important questions of peace and war is very weak. (The Third International 
Congress 2002: 7).          
The SOMO reinterpret feminism from a perspective of the significance of women’s 
activism in the sphere of the state military politics. The task is “not to get confused by the 
so-called woman’s question and to use it in our interests” (interview, December 28, 2004). 
While the “woman question” is perceived as “advancing women’s own rights,” the 
SOMO strategy is to “position ourselves as equal partners of the state and equal 
participants in the decision-making process in the military sphere” (Documents 2004).  
The SOMO’s position is shared by many other grassroots women’s organizations. 
Sperling et al. (2001: 1173) note that at the seminars sponsored by U.S. women activists, 
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most Russian participants tended to view the issue of gender inequality in relation to 
problems of peace and crime reduction, rather than in terms of policy for support of 
family and women’s labor employment, stressed by the American leader of seminars.
The activists refer to the UN resolution from 31 October 2000 which they use in 
their daily work and have included it in their training seminars about “gender strategy” 
with the regional SOMO organizations. 
Half of the population does not participate in making decisions on whether we wage a war 
or not, whether we send people to death or not, whether we make them starve to death or 
not. Nobody ever asks about our opinion on that! We tried to resist that in the Soviet time 
and during the war. We tried to explain that they cannot send people to fight against their 
will using the system of a conscription army, not to mention the moral aspects. But now 
the UN has heard us. The Security Council adopted a resolution that the state should take 
into account the opinion of women’s organizations during the discussion and deciding on 
matters of war, peace and security. It is a binding document! Russia must follow it! 
(Interview, January 23, 2003)  
When the SOMO prepared an All-Russian conference Path to the Peace, they 
proposed that the official authorities set up a plenipotentiary working group, including 
them and other women organizations. This group would work ‘transparently;’ women 
should participate not only in discussions, but also in the decision-making. The president’s
administration officials, however, were not sure on which legal grounds such groups could 
be built. “At the moment, it is useless to think about the mechanisms for realizing the UN 
resolution; nobody has a clue of what it is all about!” (Ibid.) When the SOMO sent the 
Ministry of Defense an invitation to their Congress with “gender equality, war, peace and 
security” on the agenda, the military officials phoned and asked: “What is gender?? We 
looked through three dictionaries but we did not find this word!” Telling me this example, 
the respondents explained that they work with “introducing an abstract and new term of 
gender” (ibid.).
At the same time, the activists draw upon images and beliefs which reflect the 
essentialist perception of gender differences, according to which women possess traits that
make them radically different from men. For example, the SOMO’s final report on the 
project Including Gender into the Strategies of the Soldier’s Mothers (2002: 27) says that 
their “woman-oriented (gender) strategies” mean “staying outside the system; being 
creative, pursuing a constructive dialogue, formulating skillfully a task for a man; 
following an instinct of life preservation; rejecting violence; not being very ambitious, but 
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shrewd and ready for self-sacrifice, flexible, maneuvering and tolerant, trusting own 
intuition and feeling responsibility, love and pride.”    
Summary
This chapter has shown that firstly, the SOMO can politicize the interpretation of soldiers’ 
mothers’ needs and resist the hegemonic discourses about masculine soldiers and self-
sacrificing mothers. They draw upon symbolic resources including the officially 
recognized idiom of rights and civil society, historical narratives about state/society 
opposition, maternal identity, and agency of the autonomous NGO activist. Secondly, the 
SOMO disidentify from depoliticizing and bureaucratized styles of some HR and 
women’s NGOs, which have become incorporated in the institutionalized political 
structures and discourses. In addition, they renegotiate their perceptions of party-political 
activism and incorporate a strategy for autonomous party-building in their repertoire of 
strategies. The activists thus challenge the gendered boundary between the masculinized 
state /party-politics and the feminized civic activity of the Third Sector in the civil society. 
Finally, the SOMO critically reinterpret the “mainstreamed” feminist concept of “gender 
equality” by bridging a feminist frame with frames of grassroots, human rights, anti-draft, 
and the maternal movement.  
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Chapter 15
Conclusions
This dissertation has aimed to contribute to the understanding of Russian women’s 
collective struggles with a focus on how female NGO activists try to transform their 
gendered identities in the context of the depoliticized civil society in post-Soviet Russia in 
the early 2000s. By analyzing the HR SOMO organizations, the dissertation has aimed to 
develop a gender-theoretical perspective on the maternal social movement in the context 
of the NGOs. Based on my theoretical framework, I focused on the following interacting
aspects of the social movement (Flam 2008; Kamenitsa 1998; Caiazza 2002):
1) The way in which activists find political structures favorable or constraining,
2) The way in which they draw upon their established social/organizational ties and 
identities, 
3) The way in which they manage resources to create a new – assertive and critical --
collective identity.
I analyzed how processes of gender positioning impact these aspects of social 
movements (Taylor 1998; Kuumber 2001; Radcliffe 1993; Caiazza 2002). The findings of 
my research suggest different possible expansions and revisions of earlier empirically 
based research of the SOMO movement on the one hand, and development of concepts 
and theories of gendered social movements, on the other. The key findings of my research 
and possible expansions and revisions of earlier research and theories are presented in the 
following three sections regarding political opportunities, social/organizational ties, and 
collective identity in the women’s/maternal movement.  
Political Opportunities, Gender Regime, and Framing Goals 
Existing studies on maternal movements in the post-Soviet context (and elsewhere) are 
based on different empirical models. My research found several similarities between my 
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results and other research of Russian maternal movements (the SOMO) (Caiazza 2002; 
Hojer 2004; Oushakine 2004; Sundstrom 2006a, 2006b; Zdravomyslova 1999). My
findings, however, expand and revise several of the concepts in those studies. 
Regarding a link between the SOMO’s goal framing and the socio-political and 
ideological context in Russia of the early 2000s, Sundstrom (2006a: 56) argues that the 
great popularity of the SOMO can be explained with the concept of normative frame
resonance. The movement is framed in terms of physical harm to innocent victims relying 
on the universal norm against violating the integrity and dignity of the body. This is also 
in agreement with international research that finds that movements framed in terms of 
human suffering are successful (ibid.:73). Sundstrom points out that the political aspects 
of the anti-draft /militarist SOMO movement do not resonate to the same extent in 
Russian society. 
Caiazza (2002: 7, 8) relying on a political opportunity structure approach 
distinguishes between institutional and ideological opportunity structures. A country’s 
ideological opportunity structure consists of its political cultures and ideologies. Political 
actors base their strategic choices on their reading of the institutional structure, available 
organizational resources, and the way in which they define their own identities. Caiazza 
(ibid.: 115) shows that the SOMO were able to achieve success through ‘female 
consciousness’ and a collective image that was consistent with the prevailing ideology 
about motherhood in contemporary Russia. She (ibid.: 139) also points out that traditional
gender identity proved to be an ambiguous resource in a group of the Soldiers’ Mothers 
activists. While gender ideologies contributed to their ability to manipulate public 
opinion, they also weakened the group’s credibility with state actors. Official actors 
dismissed the Mothers’ claims as apolitical and irrational.     
I extend and partly revise these findings by developing a gender-theoretical
perspective on a link between the construction of a movement’s goal and the political 
opportunities.
The results of my study show that the SOMO emerged in the context of political 
changes during Gorbachev’s glasnost, including greater openness in the mass media, 
democratization of the parliament, new possibilities for citizens to stage public protest 
actions, and the destabilization of the Soviet institutions. As a result of these changes, 
mothers /women-activists were able to take advantage of the new opportunities to 
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articulate grievances and claim to have a say in the military draft politics. The political 
and ideological opportunities available to the women’s grassroots NGOs, however,
evolved in the 1990s and the early 2000s. 
I analyzed the way in which a gender regime in the Russian NGO-sphere shapes, 
enables, and constrains the SOMO. By integrating a critical feminist redefinition of the 
mainstream social science concept of ‘political,’ into the theoretical framework I 
approached politics as including a dimension of discursive articulation of civic agency 
beyond the established formal institutions. A discourse of human suffering is interrelated 
with offering help to the aggrieved population groups, soldiers and their family members. 
In the institutional context of the Third Sector of NGOs a discourse of human suffering is 
related to formally organized social services and a discourse of “civic expertise.” A 
gender-theoretical focus on the Third Sector of NGOs enables an analysis of the way in 
which ‘woman’ as a political category is constructed in Russia’s social arena in the early 
2000s. Women’s movements take place within institutional arenas that are structured 
through gender regimes (Taylor 1999). Insofar as civil society organizations tend to be co-
opted into the state administrative system, women are expected to participate in ‘social 
motherhood’ and as helpmates of the state, not as political activists. My results show that 
the activists are aware of the exploitative and oppressive aspects of women’s voluntary 
work in the NGO-sphere. Charity and social service are not the SOMO’s primary goal, but 
rather are viewed a measures prompted by the crisis-ridden situation in the Russian army
and society. Moreover, the activists view the fact that they spend significant amounts of 
energy on intervening in the individual cases of aggrieved soldiers at the expense of their 
anti-draft/military goals as a problem due to the external constraints imposed on the 
movement by the ruling regime.  
Further, the concept of framing is revised in my study, as I explain in more detail in 
the following section. Although gaining broad public support is an important factor in 
social movements in liberal democratic societies, it may be less significant in the social 
movements operating in “repressive” political contexts. In such movements, creating an 
oppositional universe of meaning by trying to reframe the mainstream cultural beliefs and 
norms may be more central than outreach strategies (Flam 2000). Based on this theory, I 
highlight a major significance of the anti-military and human rights frames in the SOMO.  
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In addition, I revise the relationship between the ideological opportunity structure 
and the symbolic resources available to protest groups. Based on a critical feminist 
concept of ‘political’ (Fraser 1989), I analyze a multilayered ideological context as a 
space in which depoliticized, oppositional, and expert discourses clash and coexist. 
By applying a discourse analysis to the sample of articles in the Russian press, I 
have shown that the ideological context is not only shaped through hegemonic discourses, 
but also through counter-discourses in the sphere of the military draft politics. As I 
showed in chapter 11, at least three kinds of discursive images of soldiers’ mothers may
be identified in the sample of Russian newspaper articles, including hegemonic, 
oppositional and pragmatic-legalist discourses. In addition to the ideological-hegemonic 
image, a counter-discursive image of soldiers’ mothers is produced from the perspective 
of human rights groups that are critical of the regime. In the legalist-pragmatic discourse, 
mothers-activists are represented as lay experts in the sphere of draft law. They act as 
brokers between the military draft institutions and the families of draftees. Mother-
activists are represented as promoting a “civilized” legal way to resolve conflicts in the 
state. Through a revised concept of ideological opportunity, I point out that symbolic 
resources beyond the conventional gender ideology are available to the activists. The 
SOMO thus partly challenge and partly reproduce traditional gender identity images.
Oushakine (2004) examined a regional SOMO organization of activists whose sons 
had died. The depoliticization of this mothers’ movement is explained by its lack of 
access to the discourse of civic rights compensated by a reactivation of the discourse of 
memory (ibid.: 76). These women are dependent on the local state administration and are 
passively incorporated in the existing political regime climate. They do not accuse the 
state of the deaths of their sons, but rather create a physical space in which the memory of 
their sons is iconized. Women’s collective identity is thus constructed as a “community of 
grief.” This way of articulating grievances does thus not help women to overcome their 
isolation from society, which is generally indifferent to their sufferings (ibid.: 71).   
I extend the depoliticization model of interaction between the maternal movement 
and the state administration by pointing out tendencies for the SOMO NGOs to become 
co-opted through the civic expertise discourse.   
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Gender and Social/Organizational Ties 
Hojer (2004: 43) applies a multilevel analytical model of gender. Maternal identity is 
constructed through women’s shared feelings that authority over and responsibility for 
their sons does not end with giving birth and raising them. Mothers’ emotions are thus
cognitive constructs situated in the context of specific culturally and historically 
constituted social realities. The role of women and men are imbedded in the Soviet state’s 
ideology and gendered divisions of labor in society. A ‘maternal’ community is thus 
constructed by women in the everyday context of activism in SOMO. 
According to Hojer, the social change produced by SOMO occurs in several arenas. 
Among other things, women recast their biographical stories in terms of the organization’s 
narrative about the “totalitarian state,” they learn to perceive the relationship between 
mothers and the state in the legal terms of rights, instead of the moral terms of family-like 
reciprocity. A vision of a new social world emerges in the interaction between the mothers 
and the bureaucrats, in which the women strive to act as citizens who are able to reclaim 
their constitutional rights instead of begging the state bureaucrats and fearing their 
displays of force. In addition, change results from this vision spreading throughout the 
entire society (Hojer 2004: 46).       
My study developed and extended this model by pointing out that social change is 
enabled through the creation women’s self-organization, which involves an emerging 
collective sense of solidarity among the members. To be able to self-organize women 
have taken advantage of the new social structure in the post-Soviet context: the NGO. It 
is, however, an institution of a double nature. On the one hand, it is a mobilizing structure 
which brings together activists, and their constituency, and allows networking with other
civic groups. On the other hand, NGOs are an official structure; which entails both 
opportunities and risks. The SOMO strive to create autonomous “horizontal” 
organizations which articulate the mothers’ own perspectives on the problems of military 
draft and military politics. 
Organizational structures are gendered. Advantages and disadvantages, exploitation 
and control are patterned and perceived through a distinction between male and female, 
feminine and masculine (Acker 1990). The informal social networks, family, and kin ties 
are usually more important for women’s self-organization than formal organizational
274
structures, from which they tend to be excluded or positioned in secondary roles (Taylor 
1999). 
As my results have shown, the SOMO use informal friendships with the like-
minded, exchanging mutual favors with allies, as well as the family/kin bonds as crucial 
social resources for resisting tendencies of being co-opted, isolated, or limited by the 
official authorities. As I showed in chapter 14, human rights SOMO activists view the 
“parallel” pro-government organizations of soldiers’ mothers, which are supported by the 
military organs, as ideological opponents. The SOMO are also skeptical about the 
bureaucratized and conformist styles of some human rights NGOs and feminist women’s 
organizations, which have become incorporated in the institutionalized political structures 
and discourses. 
In the Russian political sphere, men predominate in the political parties and the 
parliament while the Third Sector of social service NGOs is feminized. Relying on
informal networking, the SOMO were able to build up a political party-organization. The 
activists thereby challenge the gendered boundary between the masculinized state /party-
politics and the feminized civic activity of the Third Sector in the civil society. 
Reframing the Collective Identity of Mother 
Collective identity framing is an important factor in women’s social movements 
contextualized in the gender order of a particular society. The results of my research are
consistent with existing theories of gendered social movements, such as Ruddick’s (1989, 
2004) theory of maternal thinking in peace movements; Taylor’s (1999) analysis of the 
transformation of maternal identity through collective (feminist) action; the concept of 
gendered civil society of NGOs in post-Soviet Russia (Salmenniemi 2005); and the 
existence of simultaneous and diverse struggles in transnational women’s movements
(Mohanty 2003).
I have integrated several aspects of these theories with the feminist concept of 
gendered civil society (Pateman 1988; Kligman and Gal 2000) and the concept of 
“reframing” (Flam 2000) for the purpose of analyzing a change of gender consciousness 
/identity on the small group level in the maternal movement.
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My work refocuses the concept of framing into the concept of reframing. Some 
theorists have stressed that the framing of collective identity and actions by groups of 
activists is not merely a rational, discursive and strategic process (della Porta and Diani 
2006: 86; Goodwin and Jasper 2004). Framing engages the activists’ personal life-stories 
and emotional investments in subject positions (for example, motherhood), as well as 
collective memory and traditions. In addition, Flam (2000) stressed that framing theory 
has been developed in regard to social movements in Western democracies. Reframing of 
mainstream social norms and values is defined as the activists’ production of a shared 
“oppositional” sub-universe of meaning and feeling through which high-risk movement is 
sustained in the context of “repressive” regimes (Flam 2000). I suggest that this 
theoretical refocusing is relevant in explaining gendered social movements in the post-
Soviet authoritarian societies. I apply the concept of reframing in order to understand and 
explain the role of gendered social movements within the post-Soviet NGO-sphere and in 
line with the research developed by Flam (2000). 
I also propose a framework for understanding the different meanings gender identity 
may have for groups of women who participate in maternal movements. First, my 
research findings show that maternal identity means different things to activists and non-
activists. The activists challenge conventional (“depoliticized”) constructions.
Furthermore, maternal identity is constructed differently among various activist groups, 
depending on the members’ socio-economic status and regional location. I thus have 
expanded the concept of collective identity framing in maternal movements by applying 
an intersectional gender perspective on women’s group culture. Various interpretations of
mothers’ group identity can be understood by considering the effects of gender, class, 
nation, and local culture on the shared group cultures. 
It was also important to understand these processes in terms of embodiment. How do 
we explain that collective identity framing is both a strategic and an embodied process? I 
have integrated the concepts reframing, emotional work, and gender-construction in 
maternal movements, defining them as part of processes of deintegration. 
Reframing is an “oppositional” activity, which involves deintegration from the 
mainstream cultural norms, beliefs, and rules of feeling (King 2005). To give up
established social ties often associated with feelings of loyalty and gratitude might 
produce feelings of anxiety and fear. These feelings among the activists therefore need to 
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be managed in the movement community. (Re-)Framing processes enable and are enabled 
(and constrained) by the reproduction of mobilizing structures, such as social networking, 
routine rituals in formal organizations, ties of friendship, solidarity. The forms and 
availability of mobilizing social structures are shaped and limited by the historical and 
political conditions (Kamenitsa 1998).     
By applying this set of theoretical ideas I explained how the symbol of Mother is 
enacted both strategically and as a result of the social embodiment of gender identity. I 
have shown how a new – more assertive and critical – collective identity of mothers is 
produced in the SOMO and how identity of ‘privatized subjectivity’ of ‘little mother’ is 
transformed into a self-assertive identity of the human rights activist. 
The way in which the maternal collective identity is constructed in the SOMO is 
partly based on the idea embedded in social practices of mothering (child-care) which in 
Russia is almost exclusively done by women. Mothering, and being the mother of a 
soldier, has also historically been attributed a high moral and symbolic value in the Soviet
political system. In the post-Soviet context of socio-political and moral crisis and 
uncertainty, however, being a soldier’s mother is frequently associated not with feelings 
of pride, but of fear, despair, and shame, due to the grievances of their sons-draftees. The 
SOMO activists create a critical oppositional discourse through which they articulate the
mothers’ needs and interests. The activists invest emotionally in a position of the 
empathetic and responsible mother. This self-image intertwines with the construction of 
the “social injustice frame” drawing upon stories about maternal grievances and action on 
behalf of the aggrieved soldiers, named as “children” and “dear little boys.” Connecting
the frames “soldiers as children,” “natural mother-son bond,” and the movement’s anti-
draft position, allows the activists to claim their right to have a say in the arena of the 
military draft politics. Combining micro-structuralist and cultural-constructionist 
perspectives on the SOMO social movement, shows that the activists help to manage 
feelings of fear and anxiety through routine storytelling about mothers’ grievances and 
organizational rituals of selflessness. A shared group culture is created; women’s 
frustration and shame are transformed into righteous indignation, emotional energy, 
enthusiasm, and solidarity. At the same time, the activists disidentify from what they see 
as the compliant femininity represented in the image of a ‘Little mother’ as the Other. It 
refers to socially passive and conformist women who are inclined to trust blindly the 
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military authorities and/or indifferent to the issues outside the sphere of their domestic 
lives. 
The results of my empirical research thus indicate that the SOMO in particular and 
maternal social movements in general, (might) not reinforce gender stereotypes. On the 
contrary, they produce shifts in conventional gender identity. In her analysis of SOMO 
groups Caiazza (2002: 132, 133) states that the SOMO’s collective identity frame includes 
both “manipulation of [gender] stereotypes and belief in their underlying truth.” She 
claims that mothers’ feelings of fear and panic play a role in engendering (traditional) 
female consciousness, into which the SOMO could tap. I elaborated further on the role of 
emotions in the maternal movement and was able to show that the framing of gender 
identity in the maternal movement involves important shifts in the activation of traditional 
images of gender identity. Caiazza’s model of maternal identity framing can subsequently
be revised by also taking into account a dimension of deintegration from existing 
mainstream beliefs and rules of feeling, and a design of new ‘obligatory’ rules of feeling 
in a shared group culture of the protest movement.
My results also highlight the way in which the practices of the SOMO NGOs resist a 
reproduction of traditional femininity and motherhood at the structural-institutional level. 
Ruddick (1989) and Forcey (1994) stress that a traditional femininity within the 
framework of the nation state order is intimately intertwined with the legitimate (military) 
state violence. In addition, in the Russian Third Sector, social service NGOs are 
constructed based on a principle of a partnership between female NGO-workers and the 
state. The civil society tends to be governed from above. The military officials expect and 
demand that the SOMO activists exercise a ‘social motherhood’ in the arena of the 
military draft politics. The effect of the activists’ emotional work is disintegration from 
the mainstream nationalist construction of maternal identity. As I showed in chapter 13, 
gender consciousness is changed by drawing on the other essential symbolic resource, the 
human rights frame, which is reinterpreted from the perspective of practical work with a 
particular constituency, while the activists become aware of the exploitive aspects of 
social service NGOs within the post-Soviet state. The point I want to emphasize from my 
research is the way in which Maternal and Human Rights frames are reconstructed as part 
of resisting the co-opting effect of the dominant symbolic-institutional structures in the 
political sphere.  
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By applying the concepts of deintegration, emotional work, and reframing to the 
maternal NGOs, I explain that in the context of the post-Soviet “stealth authoritarianism” 
participants of human rights SOMO NGO are involved in emotional work which frames
women’s collective identity through feelings of hope and/or suspicion, but not anger, 
towards the officials of the political regime which is characterized by high levels of 
violence and lawlessness. The collective identity of the SOMO is further reframed 
through critical re-interpretation of the intellectualized “mainstreamed” feminist concept 
of “gender equality” through bridging a feminist frame with a maternal frame, 
state/society opposition frame, and practically-oriented local grassroots frames. This 
finding confirms the relevance of research which point out the tendencies of hegemonic 
white women’s movements to appropriate the struggles and suppression of the material 
and historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in non-Western countries (see 
Mohanty 2003; Holmgren 1995; Ghodsee 2004). 
In summary, a gender-theoretical perspective on the maternal social movement in 
the context of post-Soviet NGOs has been developed by integrating concepts reframing, 
deintegration, and emotional work with gender construction theory in the study regarding 
the activists’ perceptions of political opportunities and constraints, available social and 
organizational ties, and a construction of more assertive collective identity.      
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Summary
A sphere of non-governmental organizations emerged in the course of the turbulent 
democratic reforms in post-Soviet Russia. By the late 1990s, a Third Sector of social service-
oriented NGOs was shaped as a result of the formalization of the spontaneous socio-political 
activism.
The concept of civil society, a key slogan in the anti-authoritarian movement during
Gorbachev’s glasnost, had been depoliticized by the early 2000s. The shift from ‘civil society 
versus state’ to the ‘third sector with the state’ was interrelated with defining civic activity as 
feminine (Salmenniemi 2005: 747; Kligman and Gal 2000). Women were supposed to work 
in the social sector of NGOs as a helpmate of the state, not as political activists. Groups of 
women-activists have responded and adjusted to this context in different ways. A range of
independent women’s NGOs emerged. Many of them aimed at resolving concrete social 
issues, such as the Soldiers’ Mothers (SOMO) groups, were formed as well as various self-
help, professional, and feminist groups.
The SOMO NGOs were studied as a case of a maternal movement providing needed 
social services to aggrieved groups of soldiers (Caiazza 2002; Sundstrom 2006a). In this 
thesis, I argue that the SOMO also can be studied as a movement related to the Soviet legacy 
of dualist social organizations and oppositional cultural movements, and to the contemporary 
human rights and women anti-militarist activists’ networks. It is important to analyze the 
gender processes within this movement, as the SOMO articulate women’s concerns and 
agency in the context of the masculinized arena of the Russian army. 
This study’s main research problem is how and why the identity of the civic activist is 
enacted, interpreted, and reframed in the human rights SOMO NGOs within the gendered 
arena of the military draft politics in Russia in the early 2000s. The aim is to understand and 
explain women-activists’ experiences contextualized in the feminized Third Sector of NGOs 
and to contribute to a gender-theoretical perspective on the maternal social movement in the 
context of NGOs in post-Soviet society. 
The SOMO NGOs are studied based on a theoretical framework that includes the 
concept of gender as an analytical and political category designed and sanctioned within the 
hegemonic frameworks of nation state order and political regime; a combination of the micro-
structuralist and cultural-constructivist perspectives on social movements; and the idea that 
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gender is an important factor in the emergence and outcomes of women’s protest groups and 
maternal movements. 
Gender ideologies are often part of implementing nationalist projects and the building of 
nation-states. While men are usually positioned as controllers of the state and the dominant 
group in the reproduction of political regimes, women are associated with the role of the 
biological reproducer of nation, unremunerated childrearer, transmitter of culture and men’s 
helpmate (Hearn and Parkin 2001; Fraser 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997). The performance and the 
control of violence is an essential part of the membership in the nation-state. While men 
dominate in the reproduction of militarism and wars, women and children also participate in 
these collective actions in different ways. 
Further, women are mainly excluded from the formally institutionalized politics and 
associated with engagement in the local community groups (Ferree and Merrill 2003). 
Feminist researchers have shown that the distinctions between the “political” and the “social” 
or “moral” are based on criteria that are connected to gender. The ‘male as the norm’ often 
operates in political and social analysis and this type of research excludes much of women’s 
expertise and political concerns (Abbott et al. 2005). Girls and women may be alienated from 
politics and socialized into ‘silence’ (Flam 2008). Women’s social positioning is often 
characterized by ‘disrespect’ expressed through physical violence and denial of rights (ibid.).
At the same time, women cannot be viewed as a singular group based on shared oppression. 
Women are constituted as women through a complex interaction between class (socio-
economic status), sexuality, nationality, geographic location, historically shaped political 
culture, and other frameworks.  
Inspired by Fraser (1989), I approach the political sphere as being constituted through 
the coexistence and struggle between three kinds of discourses which interpret the needs and 
interests of social groups: oppositional, depoliticizing and expert discourses. Oppositional
forms of discourse arise when needs are interpreted “from below.” These groups insist on 
speaking publicly of needs that were previously depoliticized and that these needs receive the
status of legitimate political issues. The oppositional discourse is depoliticized and resisted by 
powerful organized interests who have been shaping hegemonic need interpretation to their 
own ends. Expert discourses are the means of translating politicized needs into objects of 
potential state intervention; they are connected with social science and legal and 
administrative discourses.
Gender order (and regime) impacts the emergence, course and outcomes of social 
movements. The impact of gender can be studied regarding social movements’ political and 
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ideological opportunities/constraints, mobilizing structures and collective identity. In 
women’s maternal movements, conventional compliant femininity defined in the biological-
essentialist terms can be partially reproduced, challenged and transformed.      
Movements emerge when forms of social oppression may be recognized and alternative 
versions of social reality and self-identity are produced and sustained. They help the process 
of overcoming emotional ambivalence and reinforce feeling of anger and righteous 
indignation while suppressing the feeling of shame and fear (Jasper 1998; Flam 2008). 
Movements are constituted through a set of structured face-to-face interactions, rituals, which 
generate emotions including pride, satisfaction. They are also a result of a shared group 
culture, i.e. symbols, meanings and feelings, increasing ‘emotional energy’ and encourage 
interactions with bystanders and opponents. Concepts of reframing social reality, 
deintegration and breaching are central for understanding of how and why social movements 
emerge and achieve social change. Further, concepts of solidarity-building and self-expansion
help to explain how movements are sustained and interact with bystanders and potential 
recruits.   
The dissertation is based on an analysis of secondary literature concerned with 
voluntary associations and gender order in Russia and a qualitative case study of the Soldiers’ 
Mothers (SOMO) human rights NGOs. Empirical data were collected via explorative and 
semi-structural interviews, participant observation, analysis of the documents produced by the 
SOMO activists, and a discourse analysis of articles in the Russian press.  
The informants were selected through strategic convenience sampling and snowballing. 
Two separate organizations of the human rights SOMO located in different large cities were 
included in the case study. Women are the core activists in the organizations; both 
organizations mobilize around the same issue of human rights in the military draft arena. They
have, however, developed different ideologies and group cultures. This sampling was not 
driven by a concern for representativeness of the case for the civil society or the women’s 
movement in post-Soviet Russia. The choices of respondents and interactions were instead
driven by a conceptual question about forms and sense-making of grassroots 
women’s/mothers’ civic activism. I needed to see different instances of the construct of 
maternal activism, in different places, with different people (see Miles and Huberman 1994). 
The intention was not to generalize the findings to other settings.   
In a pilot study, I carried out 36 explorative and semi-structured qualitative interviews 
with members of 14 human rights NGOs, located in two different large cities. In the main 
study, 22 interviews with 17 activists of two different SOMO NGOs (2 men and 15 women) 
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were conducted in five rounds during my repeated trips to Russia in 2000-2005. The semi-
structured interviews in the main study lasted from 45 minutes to an hour and a half; all 
interviews were taped and transcribed. The respondents were asked about five-six topics 
concerning their interactions with 1) the constituency of mothers and soldiers 2) the state and 
military institutions 3) journalists 4) Western donors, organizations from abroad 5) other 
NGOs, and 6) gender as a factor in their socio-political activism.  
I used observation and participant observation to complement and go beyond the 
activists’ verbal narratives in the interviews. I collected and analyzed two kinds of documents: 
the SOMO’s written and electronic documents and 35 articles about soldiers’ mothers
(activists) published in the Russian press in 1998-2005. The analysis of the activists’ 
documents widened the study’s empirical scope. In addition, it allowed me to analyze the 
cultural processes during mass meetings among the local SOMO groups within the 
movement. Discursive representations of the soldiers’ mothers in the Russian mass media 
were analyzed in order to describe the discursive context in which the movement was created 
and sustained.
Part II of the dissertation shows that many NGOs in post-Soviet Russia struggled to find 
enough social and economic capital to survive. The NGO sector was relatively weak, 
fragmented and poorly connected with political elites and with the population it claims to 
represent. Only few NGOs attempt to shape the public agenda, public opinion and/or 
legislation. The Soviet legacy of state-society opposition has partly continued in the post-
Soviet conditions. As a result of a shift in the state’s policies towards a non-profit sector 
designed by the Putin administration in the early 2000s, civic NGOs tend to be more directly 
tied to institutionalized politics. In the Russian semi-democratic context, this potentially 
creates a risk of co-optation of organizations. 
Western donors’ aid to Russian NGOs has been inspired by gendered neoliberal formula 
for development projects. The social service-NGOs, mainly staffed by women, were to step in 
and fill the gaps of the market through providing services to disadvantaged groups. As a 
result, a gendered distribution of power and resources was produced; women tend to be 
associated with a nonprofit non-state sector. In addition, Western intervention contributed to 
formalize and bureaucratize voluntary activism and NGOs were shaped as a site of elitist 
activity distanced from local grassroots citizens’ initiatives. At the same time the Russian 
activists’ access to Western donors’ and activist groups’ intellectual, material, symbolic, 
organizational and social resources created conditions for agency/empowerment, creative 
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compromises and mutual learning, as well as a form of occupation (Hemment 2007; 
Henderson 2003).
Women’s voluntary self-organization outside the Party-state was prohibited in Soviet 
Russia. The “new Soviet woman” was a paradox through which the rural Russia’s legacy of 
biological determinism, sexual polarization and hierarchy between sexes could be reproduced 
and modified in society. In the late 1980s and in the post-Soviet period, the tendencies of 
constituting a female subject as a sexualized and privatized category in opposition to the 
male-dominated spheres of politics and paid work became predominant. In the context of the 
post-/Soviet sexual order, women express discontent, protest and resistance through specific 
forms of consciousness and agency in everyday life. The former state organizations
zhensovety coexist with new independent grassroots NGOs and small feminist organizations
representing women-intellectuals. Most women’s groups denounced feminism in the 1990s 
and the early 2000s. The mainstreamed concept of “gender” was introduced into the Russian 
women’s movements through the Western foundations’ selective granting policy. At the same 
time, different women’s groups are involved in a slow process of renegotiating and accepting
feminist concepts.    
The arena of military draft politics in Russia offered limited political and ideological 
opportunities for women’s civic activist groups in the 1990s and early 2000s due to a strong 
resistance from the powerful military establishment. In the public discursive context the ideas 
of patriotism and national belonging became predominant after the beginning of military 
operations in the Northern Caucasus in 1994. At least three kinds of discursive images of the 
mother of a soldier may be identified in the sample of the Russian newspaper articles. The 
official discourse represents the Mother of a Soldier as courageous, selfless and patriotic. It
states that “simple people” and self-sacrificing mothers and not official authorities should take 
responsibility for the problems in the army. There is consistency between this discourse and 
the feminization of the Third Sector of the NGOs; mothers are supposed to pursue charitable 
voluntary work in cooperation with the official authorities. 
The second discursive image of soldier’s mother is produced from the perspective of the 
regime-critical human rights groups. They describe mothers as biologically predisposed to 
protect the rights of their families and sons from the undemocratic state. The third discursive 
image is legalist-pragmatic. The mothers are represented as grassroots lay experts on military 
draft law, and act as brokers between the draft institutions and the families of the draftees. 
This discourse represents the mother-activist as promoting a “civilized” legal way to resolve 
the conflicts.
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The maternal narrative is central in the SOMO’s interpretative scheme. The movement’s
goals, values and strategies are interpreted with reference to the troubled experiences of 
mothering a son-soldier within a socially disadvantaged constituency. Maternal love to one’s 
own child is an important empowering cultural resource. At the same time, interpretations of 
the civic identity in the maternal movement shifts across different local groups, depending on 
the activists’ socio-economic status and geographic (center-periphery) location. The SOMO 
are aware of the oppressive conditions in which they act. Constructing the ‘little mother’ as 
the “Other” they detach from the symbol of a loyal soldier’s mother and the compliant 
femininity imposed through the dominant discursive practices in the state military arena.
The activists are women who have gone through a process of emotional-cognitive 
liberation and strive for the recognition of mothers of soldiers as political agents in the state 
military sphere. The SOMO try to instill a feeling of disaffection from a routine emotion of 
loyalty to the state in mothers-non-activists. Through routine rituals performed by the SOMO 
activists, women learn to manage their fear of the anger directed at them by social superiors 
(policeman or state military official), not to suppress their own anger felt in moments of 
unjust treatment /humiliation of them/their sons; not to be ashamed of being a ‘bad’ mother of 
a ‘deserter’/unfit for the military service – allegedly unable to raise a physically fit and 
patriotic male child. The new moral norms and ‘rules of feeling’ include both hope and 
contempt directed towards the official authorities, solidarity with soldiers’ mothers, pride of 
their ability to protect the legitimate rights of their son, and their ability to manage fear.       
The SOMO politicize the interpretation of the soldier’s mothers’ needs. They draw upon 
the officially recognized idiom of rights and civil society, the Soviet legacy of state/society 
opposition and a maternal narrative frame. In the Third Sector of NGOs, the SOMO 
disidentify from depoliticizing and bureaucratized styles of some human rights and women’s 
NGOs, which tend to be incorporated in the institutionalized political structures and 
discourses. The SOMO activists also renegotiate their attitudes towards party-politics and 
include a strategy of autonomous party-building into their repertoire. They thereby challenge 
the gendered boundary between the masculinized state/party-politics and the feminized civic 
activities of the Third Sector of NGOs. Finally, the SOMO activists critically reinterpret the 
“mainstreamed” feminist concept of “gender equality” through bridging the intellectualized 
feminist frame with the frames of local grassroots’ activism and human rights anti-draft 
maternal movement.  
This dissertation has aimed to contribute to the understanding of the Russian women’s 
collective struggles in the depoliticized civil society in post-Soviet Russia in the early 2000s. 
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Through the analysis of how female activists in the HR SOMO organizations try to transform 
subordinated gendered identities, the dissertation has aimed to develop a gender-theoretical 
perspective on the maternal social movement in the context of the NGOs. My research found 
several similarities between my results and the results of other studies of Russian maternal 
movements (the SOMO) (Caiazza 2002; Hojer 2004; Oushakine 2004; Sundstrom 2006a; 
Zdravomyslova 1999). At the same time, my findings suggest possible expansions and 
revisions of empirically based research of the SOMO movement on the one hand, and 
concepts and theories of gendered social movements, on the other. 
A gender-theoretical perspective on maternal social movements in the context of post-
Soviet NGOs has been developed in the dissertation by integrating and applying a set of 
concepts reframing, deintegration and emotional work with gender construction theory in the 
case study of the SOMO NGOs, regarding the activists’ perceptions of political 
opportunities/constraints, available social/organizational ties and construction of a more 
assertive collective identity.      
Firstly, the extent to which the activists assess their political opportunities as favorable
or constraining depends on changes in the gender regime within the institutional arena in 
which the movement is created. The gendered institutional and ideological contexts shape 
women’s opportunities to stage collective protests and formulate political goals. My results 
show that the activists are aware of the exploitative and oppressive aspects of women’s 
voluntary work in the NGO-sphere. Charity and social services are not the SOMOS’s prime 
goal, but rather are viewed as measures prompted by the crisis situation in the Russian army
and society. Moreover, the activists view the fact that they spend much energy on intervening
in the individual cases of aggrieved soldiers at the expense of their anti-draft/military goals as 
a drawback due to the external constraints imposed on the movement by the ruling regime. 
Secondly, to be able to self-organize women have taken advantage of the new social 
structure in the post-Soviet context: the NGO. On the one hand, the NGO is a mobilizing
structure which brings together activists and their constituency, and allows them to network 
with other civic groups. On the other hand, NGOs are an official structure; which entails both 
opportunities and risks. The organizational structures are gendered, which means that 
advantages and disadvantages, exploitation and control are patterned and perceived through a 
distinction between female and male, feminine and masculine (Acker 1990). The informal 
social networks, family and kin ties are usually more important for women’s self-organization
than the formal organizational structures, from which they tend to be excluded or positioned 
in secondary roles (Taylor 1999). As my results have shown, the SOMO use the informal 
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friendships with like-minded, exchanging mutual favors with their allies, as well as the 
family/kin bonds as crucial social resources, to resist tendencies of being co-opted, isolated or 
limited by the official authorities. The SOMO are skeptical about the “parallel” pro-
government organizations of soldiers’ mothers, the bureaucratized and conformist styles of 
some human rights NGOs and pro-feminist women’s organizations. The SOMO were able to 
build a political party-organization by relying on informal networking. The activists thus 
challenge the gendered boundary between the masculinized state/party-politics and the 
feminized civic activity of the Third Sector in the civil society. 
Thirdly, this study has explained how the symbol of Mother is enacted strategically and 
as a result of a social embodiment of gender identity. I have shown how a new – more 
assertive and critical – collective identity of the mothers is produced in the SOMO and 
identity of ‘privatized subjectivity’ of the ‘little mother’ is transformed. Combining micro-
structuralist and cultural-constructionist perspectives on the social movement, the analysis 
shows that the activists use routine storytelling about the mothers’ grievance and 
organizational rituals of selfless help to manage feelings of fear and anxiety and produce 
solidarity and emotional energy. The effect of the activists’ emotional work is disintegration 
from the mainstream nationalist construction of maternal identity.
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